State Of Washington, V. Anrio D. Adams, Sr. ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
DIVISION ONE
Respondent,
No. 85913-7-I
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
ANRIO DEMETREOUS ADAMS SR.,
Appellant.
DWYER, J. — A jury convicted Anrio Adams of residential burglary and
felony violation of a no-contact order. Adams challenges his convictions, alleging
several instances of prosecutorial misconduct. The State concedes that the
prosecutor engaged in misconduct, that the cumulative effect of the misconduct
was prejudicial, and that Adams is entitled to a new trial. We accept the State’s
concession, reverse Adams’s convictions, and remand for a new trial.
I
On April 6, 2022, police officers Andrew Huerta and Carl Buster travelled
to a Centralia residence in response to a 911 telephone call. The officers were
acquainted with a person who lived at the residence, C.M.
Officer Buster arrived first and observed a man walk from the residence to
a vehicle parked outside, and then return to the residence. The officers also
learned from “dispatch” about the existence of a no-contact order prohibiting
contact between C.M. and the registered owner of the vehicle, Anrio Adams.
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The officers contacted C.M., who did not appear to want help from the police and
denied that Adams was with her. Officer Buster received a copy of Adams’s
driver’s license, and noted that the photograph appeared to depict the person the
officer had seen walking between the residence and the vehicle. After the
officers obtained a search warrant and warned the occupants that they were
preparing to enter the residence, a man, later identified as Adams, came outside.
The officers arrested him.
The State charged Adams with residential burglary and felony violation of
a court order—both offenses designated as crimes of domestic violence. At trial,
the State presented the testimony of Officer Buster, Officer Huerta, and a
Department of Licensing employee who testified about records related to C.M.
and confirmed that, according to Department records, her date of birth matched
the date listed on the no-contact order. A jury convicted Adams as charged.
II
Adams raises several claims of prosecutorial misconduct. Specifically,
Adams contends that the State (1) improperly elicited and relied on the opinion
testimony of the two police witnesses to establish guilt, (2) violated a limiting
instruction, and (3) improperly vouched for/bolstered the law enforcement
witnesses in closing remarks.1 The State concedes that the conduct Adams
identifies was improper. We accept the State’s concession.
1 Adams also alleges that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by denigrating defense
counsel and arguing facts not in evidence. However, we agree with the State that the prosecutor
did not denigrate defense counsel when he argued that the defense theory required the jury to
“ignore” some evidence presented. The argument merely highlighted the parties’ disagreement
as to whether the State’s evidence satisfied its burden of proof. Moreover, to the extent the
prosecutor argued that the relevant court documents bore the defendant’s signature, the
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Witness testimony that opines on the defendant’s guilt unfairly invades the
province of the jury. State v. King, 167 Wn.2d 324, 331, 219 P.3d 642 (2009).
Opinion testimony by law enforcement officers may also carry a “‘special aura of
reliability’” and therefore be especially prejudicial to a defendant. King, 167
Wn.2d at 331 (quoting State v. Kirkman, 159 Wn.2d 918, 928, 155 P.3d 125(2007)).
Here, in order to prove both charges, the State had to establish that
Adams, the defendant, was the same person who was subject to a no-contact
order and had two prior convictions for violating court orders.2 Former RCW
26.50.110 (1)(a), (5) (2019); RCW 9A.52.025. To satisfy its burden of proof, the
State was required to do more than rely on court orders and judgments that bore
the same name as the defendant on trial. State v. Huber, 129 Wn. App. 499,
501-03, 119 P.3d 388 (2005) (because multiple individuals may share the same
name, the prosecution must show by independent evidence that the person
named in the document is the defendant on trial and can meet its burden by, for
example, presenting booking photographs, fingerprints, eyewitness
identifications, a certified copy of a driver’s license, or other distinctive personal
information). But in questioning both officers, the State repeatedly elicited
opinion testimony to establish identity, by asking, for instance, whether the
person the officers arrested was the “same person that was the subject of a no-
contact order.” The State also questioned the officers about “verifying” Adams’s
argument was based on the evidence (the documents admitted at trial). The jury was able to
evaluate the persuasiveness of the argument based on that evidence.
2 The State relied on the violation of the no-contact order to establish that Adams entered
or remained in the residence unlawfully for purposes of residential burglary.
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prior convictions for violating no-contact orders, and as to each of the criminal
judgments admitted, elicited testimony that the documents “relate” to Adams, the
defendant.
Adams’s criminal liability depended on him being the person to whom the
no-contact order and prior judgments pertained. The only disputed issue in the
case was whether the “Adams” who was on trial was the same “Adams” as was
referenced in the various documents. In the specific context of this case, and
especially in view of the witnesses’ law enforcement status and the lack of factual
foundation for the line of questioning, the elicited testimony amounted to
improper opinion testimony as to defendant Adams’s guilt.
Another instance of misconduct relates to the trial court’s limiting
instruction which provided that information the officers learned from “dispatch”
was admitted “solely” to provide “context for why the officers acted the way they
did,” and was not to be considered as “substantive evidence.” Yet, orally, and in
power point slides summarizing the evidence, the prosecutor encouraged the jury
to consider the information provided by dispatch without limitation. The State
concedes prejudicial misconduct, and we agree. See State v. Fisher, 165 Wn.2d
727, 747-49, 202 P.3d 937 (2009) (State’s presentation of evidence of physical
abuse, in spite of pretrial ruling conditioning admission of such evidence on the
defense raising issue of delayed reporting, amounted to misconduct).
Finally, it is generally improper for prosecutors to bolster the character of
law enforcement witnesses. State v. Jones, 144 Wn. App. 284, 293, 183 P.3d
307 (2008). Improper vouching may occur when the prosecution places the
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“‘prestige of the government behind the witness’” or suggests there is evidence
not presented to the jury that supports the witness’s testimony. State v. Stotts,
26 Wn. App. 2d 154, 167, 527 P.3d 842 (2023) (quoting State v. Coleman, 155
Wn. App. 951, 957, 231 P.3d 212 (2010)).
In response to the defense argument that the evidence was insufficient to
establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the person named in the court
documents was the defendant, the State argued that the jury should credit the
police officers’ testimony that “each document relates to [the] defendant”
because “[t]hese are police officers, professionals doing their job,” and because
certain aspects of identification are verified upon arrest and booking. As Adams
contends, and the State appropriately concedes, this argument amounted to
improper vouching and/or bolstering.
III
We next consider whether these instances of improper conduct by the
State unfairly prejudiced Adams. Adams argues that the misconduct
cumulatively prejudiced him so as to warrant a new trial. The State concedes
that Adams should receive a new trial. We agree.
The standard of review to determine whether the defendant was
prejudiced depends on whether the defendant objected to the conduct. See
State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 760, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). “If the defendant
objected at trial, the defendant must show that the prosecutor’s misconduct
resulted in prejudice that had a substantial likelihood of affecting the jury’s
verdict.” Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760.
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“If the defendant did not object at trial, the defendant is deemed to have
waived any error, unless the prosecutor’s misconduct was so flagrant and ill
intentioned that an instruction could not have cured the resulting prejudice.”
Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 760-61. Under this heightened standard, the defendant
must show both that a curative instruction would not have obviated the prejudicial
effect and that the misconduct resulted in prejudice that had a substantial
likelihood of impacting the verdict. Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 761. But even when
one instance of improper conduct is not prejudicial, “the cumulative effect of
repetitive prosecutorial misconduct may be so flagrant that no instruction or
series of instructions could erase their combined prejudicial effect.” State v.
Cook, 17 Wn. App. 2d 96, 106, 484 P.3d 13 (2021).
Adams did not object to the State’s closing remarks and objected to some,
but not all, of the questions eliciting improper opinion testimony. The State
appears to suggest that the improper comments in closing remarks could, by
themselves, meet the heightened prejudice standard because the court provided
a limiting instruction, which was ineffective due to the prosecutor’s arguments.
But we need not decide whether any instance, standing alone, rose to the level of
incurable misconduct. We say this because, collectively, they do. As a result of
the State’s conduct, the jury (1) repeatedly heard law enforcement witnesses
testify, without factual foundation, that in their opinion, Adams was the person
subject to the no-conduct order and had been previously convicted of violating
court orders; (2) learned that they could consider information provided by
dispatch about a no-contact order applicable to Adams and his criminal history as
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No. 85913-7-I/7
evidence of guilt; and (3) heard the prosecutor’s opinion that the testimony linking
Adams, the defendant, to the relevant documents was entitled to great weight
because of the witnesses’ law enforcement status and because of police
procedures about which no witness testified. We accept the State’s concession
and conclude that, cumulatively, these instances are so flagrant that no
instruction or series of instructions could cure their combined prejudicial effect.
We accept the State’s concession that Adams is entitled to a new trial due to
prosecutorial misconduct.
We reverse Adams’s convictions and remand for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion. Given our remand for retrial, it is unnecessary to
address Adams’s remaining assignments of error.
Reversed and remanded.
WE CONCUR:
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