In Re The Estate Of Heidemarie Staab ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Estate of: No. 86038-1-I
HEIDEMARIE STAAB, a/k/a DIVISION ONE
HEIDEMARIE LISELOTTE STAAB,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Deceased.
KEOKI STAAB,
Petitioner,
v.
HOLGER SIEGWART, in his capacity as
the Personal Representative to the
ESTATE OF HEIDEMARIE STAAB, a/k/a
HEIDEMARIE LISELOTTE STAAB and
THOMAS BRAUSSE,
Respondent.
FELDMAN, J. — The Jackson Law Firm, P.A. dba Jackson Law International
(Jackson) appeals a superior court commissioner’s order concluding (1) the
attorney’s lien filed by Jackson in this matter “is frivolous and is REMOVED . . .
and Jackson shall take the necessary steps to release the lien,” and (2) Thomas
Brausse, respondent herein, “is GRANTED his attorney fees and costs.” Jackson
argues that the commissioner’s ruling is procedurally flawed and violates its due
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process rights. It further claims that the commissioner erred in awarding attorney
fees in Brausse’s favor. We affirm the commissioner’s rulings regarding the
attorney’s lien, remand the fee award for required findings, and deny Brausse’s
request for attorney fees on appeal.
Brausse retained Jackson to assist the law firm of Ryan Swanson &
Cleveland, PLLC (Ryan Swanson) in securing information located in Germany for
use in a lawsuit pending in King County Superior Court. The matter eventually
settled, and Ryan Swanson received the settlement proceeds. Although Brausse
made several payments to Jackson for its legal services, Jackson subsequently
filed a notice of attorney’s lien in the amount of $65,954.23. Brausse requested
invoices substantiating the additional fees, and the parties dispute whether those
invoices were provided. To resolve the resulting impasse and determine what
amount, if any, was owed to Jackson, Brausse filed a motion for an order to show
cause why the settlement funds held by Ryan Swanson should not be released.
Among other arguments, Brausse asserted that he and his attorney had requested,
but not received, invoices or other suitable records substantiating the lien. The
commissioner issued an order to show cause directing Jackson to appear at a
scheduled hearing and “then and there to show cause, if any, why settlement funds
held by Ryan Swanson . . . should not be released . . . for the reasons set forth in”
Brausse’s show cause motion. The commissioner granted Brausse’s motion at
the conclusion of the hearing, after hearing oral argument from both parties and
reviewing their submissions.
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Contrary to Jackson’s argument, the superior court proceedings were not
procedurally flawed. Attorney’s liens are governed by ch. 60.40 RCW. RCW
60.40.030, entitled “Procedure when lien is claimed,” states:
If, however, the attorney claim a lien, upon the money or papers,
under the provisions of this chapter, the court or judge may:
(1) Impose as a condition of making the order, that the client give
security in a form and amount to be directed, to satisfy the lien, when
determined in an action; (2) summarily to inquire into the facts on
which the claim of a lien is founded, and determine the same; or
(3) to refer it, and upon the report, determine the same as in other
cases.
Relevant here, the statute does not prescribe any particular procedure. Instead,
prong (2) broadly authorizes courts to “summarily” inquire into the facts on which
a lien is founded and “determine the same.” RCW 60.40.030(2).
Case law is to the same effect. In King County v. Seawest Inv. Assocs.,
LLC, 141 Wn. App. 304, 170 P.3d 53 (2007), the trial court held an evidentiary
hearing to determine the validity of an attorney’s lien filed in the underlying
litigation. The court concluded that the parties “had entered into a binding written
fee agreement” and that the fees at issue “were reasonable” and directed payment
of said fees into the court registry. Id. at 308-09. Addressing the procedure for
adjudicating these issues, the court of appeals reiterated, “In Angeles Brewing, our
supreme court placed the question of how to properly adjudicate an attorney’s lien
on a judgment squarely within the discretion of the trial court.” Id. at 317 (citing
State ex rel. Angeles Brewing & Malting Co. v. King County Superior Court, 89
Wash. 342, 345, 154 P. 603 (1916)).
Based on our careful review of the trial court record, including the report of
proceedings, the summary adjudication at issue here comports with the above
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authorities. The commissioner’s show cause order directed Jackson to “show
cause, if any, why settlement funds held by Ryan Swanson . . . should not be
released . . . for the reasons set forth in” Brausse’s show cause motion, which
expressly noted the absence of supporting invoices. Without those invoices, or
comparable evidence such as detailed billing records, the commissioner could not
properly determine whether the claim of lien—totaling $65,954.23—was founded
on sufficient facts in accordance with RCW 60.40.030 or, alternatively, whether a
different and lesser amount would be appropriate. Yet Jackson did not provide
those invoices to the commissioner before the hearing, nor did he do so at the
outset of the hearing. Jackson alone is responsible for the consequences of that
recalcitrance.
For similar reasons, we reject Jackson’s argument that the trial court
proceedings violated its due process rights. In Krein v. Nordstrom, 80 Wn. App.
306, 908 P.2d 889 (1995), the court considered whether the lack of a full
adversarial hearing in adjudicating an attorney’s lien comports with due process.
The attorney claimant, Levinson, asserted an attorney’s lien as to a settlement
payment after he was discharged by his client in a contingent fee case. Id. at 307.
Similar to the trial court proceedings here, the proper amount of the fee in Krein
“was tried in a summary proceeding on affidavits.” Id. Rejecting Levinson’s due
process argument, the court held: “considering the fee to be determined [allegedly
totaling $130,000], the scope of the hearing called for under the statute [RCW
60.40.030, discussed above], and the actual hearing held, Levinson was given
ample notice and opportunity to be heard. Our statute, and the procedure followed,
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fully comports with due process.” Id. at 310. As the above discussion shows,
Jackson was likewise given ample notice and opportunity to be heard. His due
process argument thus fails.
Next, Jackson argues that the commissioner erred in awarding attorney
fees to Brausse. We agree. “A court may award attorney fees only when
authorized by a contract, a statute, or a recognized ground in equity.” Ahmad v.
Town of Springdale, 178 Wn. App. 333, 343, 314 P.3d 729 (2013). Here, Brausse
requested fees in the trial court under RCW 60.08.080(5) and RCW 4.84.185. The
first provision cited by Brausse, RCW 60.08.080(5), does not apply here because
it relates to frivolous or clearly excessive chattel liens, see RCW 60.08.010, not
attorney’s liens such as the lien at issue here. The second provision cited by
Brausse, RCW 4.84.185, allows a trial court to award attorney fees to the prevailing
party in refuting a frivolous action or defense but expressly requires “written
findings by the judge that the action, counterclaim, cross-claim, third party claim,
or defense was frivolous and advanced without reasonable cause.” The
commissioner here did not enter the required findings. Absent such findings, “we
are unable to determine whether the trial court abused its discretion in granting
attorney fees under this statute.” N. Coast Elec. Co. v. Selig, 136 Wn. App. 636,
650, 151 P.3d 211 (2007). We therefore remand with directions to reconsider the
RCW 4.84.185 basis for the fee award and to enter appropriate findings if the
award is confirmed on that basis.
Lastly, Brausse requests fees on appeal under RCW 4.84.185, both
because it recovered attorney fees below and because Jackson’s appeal is
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frivolous. But the trial court’s fee award lacks the required findings, and this court
has held that RCW 4.84.185 does not provide a basis for recovery of fees on
appeal. See Hanna v. Margitan, 193 Wn. App. 596, 614-15, 373 P.3d 300 (2016)
(“Because RCW 4.84.185 requires written findings to support an award of attorney
fees for a frivolous claim, and appellate courts do not make findings, RCW
4.84.185 does not authorize an award of fees on appeal.”). Accordingly, we deny
Brausse’s request for an award of fees on appeal.
Affirmed in part and remanded in part.
WE CONCUR:
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