State Of Washington, V. David Lee Morris ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 83157-7-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v.
DAVID LEE MORRIS, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
SMITH, C.J. — A jury convicted David Lee Morris of murder in the first
degree with a deadly weapon enhancement for stabbing his former girlfriend,
Gabrielle Garcia, in a food court in front of their five-year-old son. On appeal,
Morris contends the trial court erred by (1) excluding testimony of an expert
witness in violation of his right to present a defense, (2) overruling his GR 37
challenge, (3) conducting voir dire via Zoom, (4) denying his motion for mistrial,
(5) giving a first aggressor jury instruction, (6) imposing an exceptional sentence,
and (7) imposing a victim penalty assessment and DNA fee. Finding no error, we
affirm the conviction. However, we remand for Morris to move to have the victim
penalty assessment and DNA fee stricken.
FACTS
Background
David Lee Morris and Gabrielle Garcia met online and began dating in
May 2012. Shortly thereafter, Garcia became pregnant. She gave birth to their
son, G.M., in February 2013. At that time, Morris was an infantryman in the Army
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and deployed in Afghanistan; he was still stationed there when G.M. was born.
Although Morris and Garcia had been engaged when he deployed, they
separated shortly after he returned in June 2013. In early 2014, Morris was
stationed in Germany and stayed there until June 2015, when he was honorably
discharged for unsatisfactory performance. After leaving the Army, Morris moved
in with his mother in Texas.
In March 2016, Morris and Garcia began dating again and Garcia moved
to Texas with G.M. to be with Morris. Six months later, they separated again and
Garcia moved back to Seattle with G.M. After her return to Seattle, Garcia hired
a lawyer to write a parenting plan so that she could maintain custody of G.M.
In the meantime, Morris became fixated on getting back together with
Garcia, and his behavior toward her quickly escalated into obsession,
harassment, and hatred. Morris was particularly jealous of Garcia’s relationships
with other men and he believed that her alleged promiscuity was harming G.M.
Garcia started to limit her communication with Morris, and began relying on her
father, Joe Garcia, as an intermediary. Despite this, Morris continued to inundate
Garcia and her father with threatening text messages and e-mails.1 By August
1 For example, in February 2018, Morris sent the following text message
to Garcia’s father: “And so help me God if I see [G.M.] sitting in that strangers
[sic] lap. I am tired of no say. . . . Gabby can [sleep with] half of Seattle, but this
bullshit ends now sir.” And in August 2018, Morris sent the following text
message to Garcia’s father: “I hope her cheating and avoidance due to
cowardice was worth it. Three bfs in 1 year and my son has no father. . . . You
have no idea how hard I’ve fought to keep myself from taking revenge. . . . If
there is a God, may you all burn in hell.”
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2018, Morris’s messages became even more troubling—he threatened suicide
and claimed that G.M. would be “better off in foster care” than with Garcia.
In September 2018, a parenting plan was entered giving Garcia full
custody of G.M. and permitting Morris to have limited phone contact and in-
person visits. In October 2018, Garcia obtained an anti-harassment order to
restrain Morris from continuing to contact her. The same day that the anti-
harassment order was issued, Morris e-mailed Garcia about his plans to visit
G.M. in Seattle. In the e-mail, he also threatened to surveil Garcia and to convey
inappropriate information about her to G.M.
After a hearing in late October 2018, a permanent anti-harassment order
was entered against Morris. Morris was in Seattle at that time for a scheduled
visit with G.M. Unbeknownst to Garcia, Morris had been fired from his job in
Texas and had planned to stay in Seattle and sleep in his car until he found work
in the city.
On November 1, following a barrage of messages from Morris, Garcia
reported to her lawyers and to law enforcement that Morris had violated the anti-
harassment order.
On November 2, 2018, Garcia and G.M. were scheduled to meet Morris at
Seattle Center for a visit. That morning, Garcia’s lawyers had e-mailed Morris
about his violation of the anti-harassment order and cautioned him to follow the
order; Morris responded in an agitated and angry manner. Around 3:30 p.m.,
Garcia met Morris at the Pacific Science Center. Morris tried to talk to Garcia
about their relationship but Garcia refused, and Morris got upset.
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Garcia and Morris eventually left the Science Center and headed to the
food court located in the Armory. At the Armory, Garcia ordered a cheese pizza
at MOD Pizza for G.M. While she was ordering, G.M. came to the counter and
asked Garcia to buy him a treat. When Garcia told G.M. that he needed to eat
his pizza first, G.M. became upset and started yelling. Morris came over and told
Garcia to “[j]ust buy [G.M.] the cake.” Garcia, Morris, and G.M. then proceeded
to a table to eat the pizza.
Minutes later, several Armory employees and food court patrons heard
Garcia scream and witnessed Morris pinning her up against the wall, stabbing
her repeatedly in the neck. G.M. was less than three feet away. Morris quickly
left the building. Bystanders tried to save Garcia’s life by applying pressure to
her neck with towels and clothing but she later died in surgery at Harborview
Medical Center.
Outside the Armory, a witness approached Morris, drawing his firearm to
keep Morris from fleeing. Other witnesses told Morris to drop the knife, and
Morris repeatedly told them that he had killed the woman he loved and asked
that they shoot him. Another passerby pepper sprayed Morris.
Police arrived on the scene and subdued Morris. Morris immediately
began to tell officers that he had murdered Garcia. Officers advised Morris of his
Miranda2 rights. Morris continued to relay details about the murder to officers,
telling them that he “was trying to make her death quick” but that if Garcia
2 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694(1966).
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survived, she’d “probably use this to victimize herself the rest of her life.” When a
responding officer asked Morris if he understood why he’d been arrested, Morris
replied: “Well, let’s see here, I mean, I’m covered in blood from killing the woman
I love for taking my son. I think it might be attempted murder, or possibly murder
depending if she dies.”
Morris was transported to an interview room at the Seattle Police
Department headquarters and read his Miranda rights again. When left alone in
the interview room, Morris started talking to himself about the stabbing. He
ranted that he wanted “revenge” against Garcia, that she was “evil” for having an
abortion, that she was promiscuous, and that she “deserved to die.” When the
detective returned, Morris spoke freely for several hours about his relationship
problems with Garcia and his motivations for killing her. Morris told the detective
that he debating killing Garcia and ultimately decided that G.M. would be better
off being raised by another family. Morris also acknowledged that his son was
likely traumatized; he stated that he hoped his son would either repress the
events or “eventually get over it with therapy.” Throughout the interview, Morris
fixated on Garcia’s relationships with other men and what he perceived to be
promiscuity as a justification for killing her.
Morris also provided the detective a detailed account of his plan for killing
Garcia. He told the detective that when he first got to the Science Center, he had
“briefly thought about just taking her out right there, taking it and knifing her.”
Morris stated that he had “remembered all the horrible things [Garcia] had done,
and how much had been cut out of [his] life.” Once they got to the food court,
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Morris told the detective that he “was really starting to let out [his] anger at her.”
He called Garcia a “whore” and told her she was being a “coward” about her
anxiety. Morris also told the detective that he started seriously thinking about
killing Garcia several months earlier, in April or May.
Morris explained that when Garcia got up to use the restroom, he thought
she was going to call her lawyer and report him for violating the anti-harassment
order. He decided then to act. Morris told the detective: “Like, okay, that’s it.
She’s just gonna go tell some other people; I’m getting cut out of my son’s life.
I’m, like, all right . . . . I’m taking her out for this. I’m not going to let her get away
with anything else.” Morris then explained how he pulled out his knife,
confronted Garcia, and started stabbing her. Morris claimed that he was “trying
to be humane” and “kill her quickly,” but that “no plan is perfect.”
Morris was later charged with murder in the first degree with a deadly
weapon enhancement. The State also alleged several aggravating factors,
including that it was a crime of domestic violence, that Morris had committed it
within the sight or sound of his minor child, and that the crime had a destructive
and foreseeable impact on persons other than Garcia.
Pre-Trial Motions and Trial
Morris’s initial defense was one of insanity. He claimed that he suffered a
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD)-induced flashback that made it impossible
for him to discern that he was stabbing Garcia and not a burka3-clad woman he’d
3A burka is a loose enveloping garment that covers the face and body
and is worn in public by certain Muslim women.
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encountered while deployed Afghanistan. Before trial, the State moved to
exclude Morris’s expert witness, Dr. Mark Whitehill, on the grounds that
Dr. Whitehill was unable to testify that Morris’s mental disorder met the
requirements for a defense of insanity or diminished capacity. The trial court
granted the motion, reasoning that because Dr. Whitehill concluded that neither
defense was available to Morris, the testimony was irrelevant.
At trial, Morris proceeded on a theory of self-defense. He testified that he
experienced a PTSD-induced flashback that led him to believe Garcia was a
burka-wearing woman from whom he needed to protect himself and G.M. He
claimed that his confessions to police were lies.
The jury rejected Morris’s self-defense claim and convicted him as
charged. The State requested an exceptional upward sentence, while Morris
requested an exceptional downward sentence. The court imposed an
exceptional upward sentence of 464 months. Morris appeals.
ANALYSIS
Exclusion of Expert Testimony and Right to Present a Defense
Morris asserts that the court erred in excluding expert testimony of
Dr. Whitehill as irrelevant and that this error infringed on his constitutional right to
present a defense. He maintains that Dr. Whitehill should have been allowed to
testify about his PTSD and autism diagnoses because the testimony was
relevant to Morris’s insanity and diminished capacity defenses and theory of self-
defense. He also asserts that this error led to other lay witnesses being wrongly
excluded. We disagree. Because Dr. Whitehill could not testify that Morris met
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the elements of either diminished capacity or insanity, the testimony was
irrelevant and the court did not err by excluding it. And because Morris never
asked the court to admit Dr. Whitehill’s testimony in support of his self-defense
theory, the court never ruled on whether the testimony was admissible for that
purpose. We also conclude that Morris’s right to present a defense was not
violated, as Morris was still able to present his theory of the case and could have
sought to introduce expert testimony related to self-defense.
We apply a two-step standard of review to determine whether an
evidentiary ruling violates a defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to present a
defense. State v. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d 53, 58, 502 P.3d 1255 (2022). First, we
review the trial court’s evidentiary ruling for an abuse of discretion. State v.
Arndt, 194 Wn.2d 784, 797-98, 453 P.3d 696 (2019). If the ruling constitutes an
abuse of discretion, we apply a harmless error analysis. Jennings, 199 Wn.2d
at 59. If the error was not harmless, our analysis ends here. Jennings, 199
Wn.2d at 59.
Second, if no abuse of discretion occurred, or if the abuse of discretion
was harmless error, we review de novo whether the exclusion of evidence
violated the defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense. Jennings, 199
Wn.2d at 58-59.
1. Exclusion of Dr. Whitehill’s Testimony
We review a trial court’s determination on the admissibility of expert
testimony for an abuse of discretion. Arndt, 194 Wn.2d at 798. A court abuses
its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or exercised on untenable
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grounds or for untenable reasons. State v. Lord, 161 Wn.2d 276, 283-84, 165
P.3d 1251 (2007).
Expert testimony is admissible under ER 702 if (1) the witness qualifies as
an expert, and (2) the testimony is helpful to the trier of fact. L.M. v. Hamilton,
193 Wn.2d 113, 134, 436 P.3d 803 (2019). A witness may qualify as an expert
by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education. ER 702. Expert
testimony is helpful if it concerns matters outside the common knowledge of
laypersons and is not otherwise misleading. State v. Groth, 163 Wn. App. 548,
564, 261 P.3d 183 (2011). Only relevant testimony is helpful to the jury. State v.
Atsbeha, 142 Wn.2d 904, 917-18, 16 P.3d 626 (2001). Testimony is relevant if it
tends to make the existence of any fact of consequence more or less probable
than it would be without the evidence. ER 401. Irrelevant evidence is not
admissible. ER 402.
a. Insanity and Diminished Capacity Defenses
Here, Morris’s primary defenses were that of insanity and diminished
capacity. To establish insanity, he needed to prove that at the time of the
murder, his mental condition prevented him from appreciating the nature, quality,
or wrongfulness of his actions. RCW 9A.12.010; State v. Box, 109 Wn.2d 320,
322, 745 P.2d 23 (1987). To establish diminished capacity, he needed to show
that the alleged condition demonstrably impaired his ability to form the requisite
mental intent to commit the charged crimes. State v. Thomas, 123 Wn. App.
771, 779, 98 P.3d 1258 (2004). A mental disorder may amount to insanity and
also have a specific effect on the defendant’s capacity to achieve a culpable
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mental state but diminished capacity does not necessarily follow from insanity.
State v. Gough, 53 Wn. App. 619, 622, 768 P.2d 1028 (1989).
In order for an expert’s testimony to be helpful where a defendant raises
an insanity or diminished capacity defense, it is not enough that the defendant be
diagnosed as suffering from a particular mental condition. State v. Greene, 139
Wn.2d 64, 73-74, 984 P.2d 1024 (1999). Rather, “[t]he diagnosis must, under
the facts of the case, be capable of forensic application in order to help the trier
of fact assess the defendant’s mental state at the time of the crime.” Greene,
139 Wn.2d at 74. “The opinion concerning a defendant’s mental disorder must
reasonably relate to impairment of the ability to form the culpable mental state to
commit the crime charged.” Atsbeha, 142 Wn.2d at 921. “Under this standard, it
is not necessary that the expert be able to state an opinion that the mental
disorder actually did produce the asserted impairment at the time in question—
only that it could have, and if so, how that disorder operates.” State v. Mitchell,
102 Wn. App. 21, 27, 997 P.2d 373 (2000).
For example, in Mitchell, the defendant was charged with third degree
assault after punching a police officer. 102 Wn. App. at 23. In a pretrial hearing,
the defendant’s expert testified that, at the time of the offense, the defendant
suffered from paranoid schizophrenia, a disorder capable of diminishing his
capacity to know that the individuals he was interacting with were police officers.
Mitchell, 102 Wn. App. at 26. But the expert could not say with reasonable
certainty that the defendant’s mental disorder actually caused his capacity to be
diminished at the time of the incident, only that it was possible. Mitchell, 102 Wn.
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App. at 26. The trial court excluded the testimony, concluding that an
explanation of the disorder would only confuse the jury and invite them to
speculate unless the expert could affirmatively state that the defendant’s disorder
was actually affecting his conduct at the time of the incident. Mitchell, 102 Wn.
App. at 27. On appeal, this court concluded that the trial court erroneously
excluded the expert’s testimony because it would have helped the jury
understand the dynamics of the defendant’s mental disorder and helped explain
an otherwise bizarre incident. Mitchell, 102 Wn. App. at 26-27. The court noted
that the “jury should be allowed to determine whether Mitchell was experiencing
delusions at the time of his arrest even if [the expert] could only say it was
possible.” Mitchell, 102 Wn. App. at 28.
In contrast, in Greene, our Supreme Court concluded that the trial court
properly excluded expert testimony concerning the defendant’s dissociative
identity disorder (DID) as irrelevant because, given the state of the relevant
science at the time, “it was not possible to reliably connect the symptoms of DID
to the sanity or mental capacity of the defendant.” 139 Wn.2d at 79. The court
explained that there were various approaches to determining whether an
individual suffering from DID was legally insane at the time of committing the
offense, but that “none of the various approaches ha[d] been accepted as
producing results capable of reliably helping to resolve questions regarding
sanity and/or mental capacity in any legal sense.” Greene, 139 Wn.2d at 77.
Here, Dr. Whitehill diagnosed Morris with PTSD and autism. Dr. Whitehill
concluded that Morris’s PTSD manifested in the following ways: anxious arousal
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(e.g., worrying about things); depression (e.g., feeling empty inside); intrusive
experiences (e.g., nightmares or bad dreams); and defensive avoidance (e.g.,
trying to block out certain memories). Dr. Whitehill noted that Morris tested very
well on a screen for neurological difficulties, placing him in the range of “[v]ery
low probability of impairment.” As to Morris’s ability to tell right from wrong, Dr.
Whitehill opined that there was no evidence to support Morris’s assertion that he
suffered a PTSD-induced flashback and that Morris’s subsequent justifications
for stabbing Garcia undercut his claim that he had experienced a flashback. As
to Morris’s capacity to understand the nature and quality of the acts committed,
Dr. Whitehill opined that “there is no question that Mr. Morris was aware that he
was stabbing.” Dr. Whitehill noted that this conclusion was also supported by
Morris’s statements to police and his musings about the murder when left alone
in the interview room.
As to Morris’s defense of diminished capacity, Dr. Whitehill opined that
such a defense was not warranted regardless of whether Morris experienced a
PTSD-induced flashback or not because Morris intended to stab someone either
way.
On these facts, the trial court did not err in excluding Dr. Whitehill’s
testimony as it related to Morris’s defenses of insanity or diminished capacity.
Dr. Whitehill’s conclusion that Morris had the capacity to understand the nature of
his actions is fatal to Morris’s claim that the testimony was relevant. Even if
Dr. Whitehill testified that it was possible Morris experienced a flashback that
impeded his ability to tell right from wrong, Dr. Whitehill could not testify that
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Morris lacked the capacity to understand the nature and quality of his actions.
Similarly, regardless of whether Morris experienced a flashback or not, Dr.
Whitehill could not testify that he lacked the intent to commit the offense.
Because Dr. Whitehill could not reliably connect the symptoms of Morris’s PTSD
diagnosis with insanity or diminished capacity, the trial court properly excluded
the testimony as irrelevant.
b. Self-Defense
Morris also argues that Dr. Whitehill’s testimony was relevant to his theory
of self-defense. He contends that Dr. Whitehill should have been able to testify
as to his diagnoses of PTSD and autism and that the exclusion of Dr. Whitehill as
a witness led to other witness’s testimony being erroneously excluded. But
because Morris did not ask the court to admit Dr. Whitehill’s testimony to support
his self-defense claim, the court did not rule on whether it was admissible.
Therefore, this issue is not properly before this court.
In general, mental disorders, such as PTSD, are beyond the ordinary
understanding of laypersons and require explanation via expert testimony. State
v. Green, 182 Wn. App. 133, 146, 328 P.3d 988 (2014). For example, a
layperson might not understand that PTSD can induce a host of lesser known
effects, like a dissociative state or a flashback. Green, 182 Wn. App. at 146-47;
State v. Bottrell, 103 Wn. App. 706, 715, 14 P.3d 164 (2000).
Here, after the court excluded Dr. Whitehill’s testimony as to insanity and
diminished capacity, Morris pursued a theory of self-defense. In support of this
theory, Morris planned to elicit testimony from jail health staff and Seattle Police
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No. 83157-7-I/14
Officer Brian Muoio that Morris was experiencing PTSD symptoms after the
murder. During motions in limine, the State moved to exclude testimony of the
jail health staff, contending it was inadmissible without supporting expert
testimony about PTSD. Defense counsel had the following colloquy with the
court about the jail health staff witnesses:
[DEFENSE]: There is no evidentiary requirement. This is not a
diminished capacity defense. And there’s no evidentiary
requirement that we present a mental health expert witness for
Mr. Morris to be able to testify about PTSD or his subjective
flashback.
....
I think there would be some minimal observations about
Mr. Morris’s demeanor in their interactions.
The jail health staff would likely testify about their actions in
relation to Mr. Morris—
[COURT]: Well, let’s—before we move onto actions, what about
the demeanor and how does it relate to the events at issue in this
case?
[DEFENSE]: So, Mr. Morris’s demeanor when he was relating
symptoms of mental health to them; whether or not his demeanor, I
guess, was consistent with his recounting of any mental health
symptoms.
[COURT]: But, do I understand correctly that you are not going
to be calling these witnesses with respect to any kind of diagnosis
or any other expert opinion?
[DEFENSE]: There will be no expert opinion.
Before the court ruled on the admissibility of the jail health staff testimony,
it followed up with defense counsel about expert testimony:
[COURT]: Just to confirm: you’re not going to be asking any
witness for a diagnosis or any other medical opinion; is that
correct?
[DEFENSE]: We are not asking for any medical opinion, and I think
it’s safe to say we’re not going to ask them to opine about his
diagnosis.
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The court then excluded the testimony of the jail health staff, reasoning
that Morris needed to proffer an expert opinion to support his PTSD diagnosis
before lay witnesses could testify about his PTSD. The court also noted that
Morris could move for reconsideration of the court’s ruling if Morris was able to
provide additional evidence that would directly link his PTSD diagnosis to his
self-defense claim.
Later at trial, the State objected to the admission of Officer Muoio’s
testimony about PTSD, arguing that it lacked foundation without underlying
expert testimony about Morris’s PTSD diagnosis. The court agreed, explaining
that expert testimony was needed to establish an adequate foundation as to
Morris’s diagnosis.
The court did not err in excluding the jail health staff or officer’s testimony
on the basis that such testimony lacked foundation. It is well-established that the
intricacies of a PTSD diagnosis are outside the understanding of laypeople.
Thus, Morris needed to provide expert testimony as to his PTSD diagnosis
before proffering lay witness testimony as to the same. But because Morris
never asked the court to rule on the admissibility of Dr. Whitehill’s testimony as it
related to self-defense, the court did not rule on whether the testimony was
admissible for that purpose and no ruling exists about the exclusion of an expert
witness for us to review on appeal.
2. Right to Present a Defense
Because the court did not err in excluding Dr. Whitehill’s testimony as it
related to Morris’s insanity and diminished capacity defenses, we next consider
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whether the exclusion of the testimony violated Morris’s right to present a
defense. We conclude that it did not.
Criminal defendants have a right to present a defense guaranteed by both
the federal and state constitutions. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. 1,
§ 22; Jennings, 199 Wn.2d at 63. But this right is not absolute; for example,
defendants only have a right to present relevant evidence, not irrelevant
evidence. State v. Jones, 168 Wn.2d 713, 720, 230 P.3d 576 (2010). And when
a defendant has an opportunity to present their theory of the case, the exclusion
of some aspects of their proffered evidence is not a violation of their
constitutional right to present a defense. State v. Ritchie, 24 Wn. App. 2d 618,
635, 520 P.3d 1105 (2022), review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1005, 526 P.3d 851 (2023).
Here, Morris contends that he was “forbidden from eliciting any
corroborating testimony about his mental state at the time of the stabbing.” This
is inaccurate. Although the court excluded Dr. Whitehill’s testimony for the
purposes of Morris’s insanity and diminished capacity defenses, it did not prevent
Morris from presenting another expert to testify about how his PTSD diagnosis
related to his theory of self-defense. Rather, the court repeatedly asked Morris’s
counsel if it would like to proffer expert testimony as to PTSD and Morris’s
counsel expressly told the court that they did not plan to offer such expert
testimony. Without expert testimony to properly explain the PTSD diagnosis, lay
witness testimony about Morris’s PTSD-related symptoms was inadmissible and
properly excluded. Green, 182 Wn. App. at 146 (expert testimony needed to
explain PTSD); ER 701 (lay witness testimony cannot be based on scientific or
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other specialized knowledge). We conclude that Morris’s right to present a
defense was not violated.
GR 37 Challenge
Morris contends that the State engaged in a pattern of gender
discrimination in violation of GR 37 by using seven of its eight peremptory strikes
against men. He also argues that the court incorrectly applied Batson4 by (1) not
requiring the State to articulate a gender-neutral reason for striking each of the
seven jurors, and (2) not assessing whether an objective observer could view
gender as a factor for each of the seven peremptory challenges, only the one
challenge that Morris objected to. We disagree that GR 37 applies to gender-
based challenges. We also disagree that the court found that a pattern of
discrimination existed; therefore, the State did not need to articulate a gender-
neutral reason for the previous jurors. And because the State set forth a gender-
neutral reason for striking the challenged juror, we conclude that the court did not
err in overruling Morris’s GR 37 challenge.
1. Waiver
As a preliminary matter, we must determine whether Morris properly
preserved this issue for review. The State maintains that Morris did not ask the
trial court to reconsider its first six peremptory challenges nor did he request that
the court apply an objective observer standard to the first six peremptory
challenges and that these arguments are waived on appeal. We disagree.
4 Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 S. Ct. 1712, 90 L. Ed. 2d 69(1986).
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In general, we will not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.
RAP 2.5(a). Here, Morris objected to the State’s alleged pattern of excluding
male jurors. This objection also preserved Morris’s argument that the court failed
to apply the right standard to each of the challenges. By highlighting what he
asserted to be a pattern and specifying the number of stricken jurors, Morris
implicitly challenged each of the State’s earlier peremptory challenges against
men. The argument was not waived.
2. GR 37 and Gender Bias
We now turn to Morris’s GR 37 argument and first address whether GR 37
applies to claims of gender discrimination. We conclude that it does not.
Our federal and state constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right
to a trial by impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 22. In
furtherance of this right, parties may exercise for cause and peremptory
challenges to excuse potentially unfit jurors. RCW 4.44.130. However,
peremptory challenges may not be used to exclude potential jurors on the basis
of race or ethnicity. Batson, 476 U.S. at 91.
When an objection to the use of a peremptory challenge is raised, the
court applies the three-step Batson test. First, the party challenging the strike
must make a “prima facie case of purposeful discrimination by showing that the
totality of the relevant facts gives rise to an inference of discriminatory purpose.”
Batson, 476 U.S. at 93-94. Second, if a prima facie case is made, the burden
shifts to the striking party to provide an adequate, race-neutral justification for the
strike. City of Seattle v. Erickson, 188 Wn.2d 721, 726-27, 398 P.3d 112418
No. 83157-7-I/19
(2017). Third, if the party making the strike provides a race-neutral reason, the
court must then weigh all the relevant circumstances to decide if the proffered
reasons are pretextual and give rise to an inference of discriminatory intent.
Batson, 476 U.S. at 97-98; Flowers v. Mississippi, 588 U.S. __, 139 S. Ct. 2228,
2241, 204 L. Ed. 2d 638 (2019). “This final step involves evaluating ‘the
persuasiveness of the justification’ proffered by the prosecutor, but ‘the ultimate
burden of persuasion regarding racial motivation rests with, and never shifts
from, the opponent of the strike.’ ” Rice v. Collins, 546 U.S. 333, 388, 126 S. Ct.
969, 163 L. Ed. 2d 824 (2006) (quoting Purkett v. Elem, 514 U.S. 765, 768, 115
S. Ct. 1769, 131 L. Ed. 2d 834 (1995) (per curiam)). On review, we afford “a high
level of deference to the trial court’s determination of discrimination” and the trial
court’s decision will only be reversed if the appellant can show it was clearly
erroneous. State v. Hicks, 163 Wn.2d 477, 493, 181 P.3d 831 (2008); Erickson,
188 Wn.2d at 727.
In the early 1990s, this court and the Supreme Court extended Batson’s
application to gender-based discrimination in the use of peremptory challenges.
State v. Burch, 65 Wn. App. 828, 830 P.2d 357 (1992); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel.
T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 114 S. Ct. 1419, 128 L. Ed. 2d 89 (1994).
In 2017, recognizing the shortcomings of the Batson test in addressing
racial bias in jury selection, our State Supreme Court adopted GR 37, which
modifies the third Batson step. Instead of the court determining whether a
challenge was motivated by racial animus, GR 37 requires the court to assess
whether “an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor in the use
19
No. 83157-7-I/20
of the peremptory challenge.” GR 37(e). The rule defines an “objective
observer” as someone who is “aware that implicit, institutional, and unconscious
biases, in addition to purposeful discrimination, have resulted in the unfair
exclusion of potential jurors in Washington State.” GR 37(f). If the court finds
that an objective observer could view race or ethnicity as a factor, the peremptory
challenge must be denied. State v. Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d 225, 249, 429 P.3d
467 (2018). But although GR 37 expands the Batson test, the rule is limited to
bias and discrimination based on race and ethnicity. State v. Brown, 21 Wn.
App. 2d 541, 552, 506 P.3d 1258, review denied, 199 Wn.2d 1029, 514 P.3d 641(2022).
Here, Morris’s assertion that Jefferson expanded the GR 37 framework to
include gender is unavailing. The Jefferson court did not consider whether
GR 37 applied to gender and did not state that GR 37 applied to all discrimination
traditionally subject to Batson. Rather, the court’s analysis was explicitly limited
to race and ethnicity. See Jefferson, 192 Wn.2d at 239 (“Our current Batson test
does not sufficiently address the issue of race discrimination in juror selection.”
(emphasis added)). And the court was clear as to the purpose of GR 37: “The
evil of racial discrimination is still the evil this rule seeks to eradicate.” Jefferson,
192 Wn.2d at 249 (emphasis added). No case since Jefferson has applied
GR 37 in a gender discrimination context. See, e.g., State v. Listoe, 15 Wn. App.
2d 308, 333 n.21, 475 P.3d 534 (2020) (Melnick, J., concurring) (“In addition,
even though GR 37 is not applicable to peremptory challenges that implicate
gender-based discrimination, Batson applies.”); Brown, 21 Wn. App. 2d at 554
20
No. 83157-7-I/21
(“Jefferson’s test was explicitly limited to race and ethnicity. . . . GR 37 does not
apply to gender or any other protected status covered by the equal protection
clause and our state constitution.”).
Moreover, the final report on GR 37 makes clear that the rule does not
apply to gender. See PROPOSED NEW GR 37—JURY SELECTION W ORKGROUP,
FINAL REPORT.5 The report explicitly states that GR 37 does not apply to issues
of gender and sexual orientation because the workgroup had not yet discussed
those categories or classifications. FINAL REPORT at 5. The workgroup members
“agreed that while gender and sexual orientation should be included in the
proposed rule at a later time after thoughtful consideration, in order to meet the
court’s requested time frame and objective, it was necessary to postpone further
discussion on gender and sexual orientation.” FINAL REPORT at 5. We are
unconvinced that GR 37 applies to gender-based challenges and conclude that
the objective observer standard does not apply in the present case.
3. Application of Batson
Because the objective observer standard does not apply here, Morris’s
claim of gender discrimination is properly analyzed under the traditional Batson
test. Under that test, we conclude that Morris fails to prove that the strikes were
motivated by gender-based animus.6
5 https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%
20Orders/OrderNo25700-A-1221Workgroup.pdf
6 We note, too, that most cases addressing gender bias in jury selection
focus on the exclusion of female jurors, not male jurors. See, e.g., Burch, 65 Wn.
App. at 837 (concluding that gender-based peremptory challenges are an
obvious denial of female jurors’ equal rights); Brown, 21 Wn. App. 2d at 555-56
21
No. 83157-7-I/22
As discussed above, once a Batson challenge is raised, the court applies
a three-part test. First, the objecting party must demonstrate a prima facie case
of purposeful discrimination. Burch, 65 Wn. App. at 840. This prong is met by
showing that the peremptory challenge was exercised against a member of a
constitutionally protected group and that “other relevant circumstances” raise an
inference that the challenge was based on that group membership. Batson, 476
U.S. at 96. Relevant circumstances can include a “ ‘pattern’ ” of strikes against a
particular constitutionally cognizable group. Burch, 65 Wn. App. at 840 (quoting
Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-97). But “a ‘pattern of strikes’ is only found when ‘[t]he
strikes . . . affect those members to such a degree or with such a lack of
apparent nonracial explanation as to suggest the possibility of racial motivation.’ ”
State v. Wright, 78 Wn. App. 93, 102, 896 P.2d 713 (1995) (quoting People v.
Hope, 137 Ill.2d 430, 462-63, 560 N.E.2d 849, 168 Ill. Dec. 252 (1990)).
Second, if the objecting party establishes a prima facie case, the burden
then shifts to the striking party to provide a gender-neutral reason for striking the
juror. Burch, 65 Wn. App. at 840. The neutral explanation must be “clear and
reasonably specific.” Batson, 476 U.S. at 98 n. 20 (quoting Texas Dep’t of Cmty.
Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 258, 101 S. Ct. 1089, 67 L. Ed. 2d 207 (1981)).
Finally, the court must determine from the totality of the circumstances whether
the objecting party has established purposeful discrimination. Jefferson, 192
Wn.2d at 232. Because these findings depend on the court’s determination of
(examining exclusion of female jurors for gender bias); but cf. J.E.B., 511 U.S. at
130 (determining that use of peremptory challenges to remove all male jurors
from venire was discriminatory).
22
No. 83157-7-I/23
the credibility of the attorneys and jurors, we review them for clear error. Brown,
21 Wn. App. 2d at 558.
At the outset, we acknowledge that the trial court engaged in these steps
out of order. Nevertheless, we agree with the court’s determination that Morris
failed to carry his burden of proving purposeful discrimination.
After Morris alleged that the State engaged in a pattern of gender
discrimination by striking male jurors, the court immediately asked the State to
articulate a gender-neutral reason for striking juror 115, the last juror in the
alleged pattern. The State explained that the juror indicated he received his
news from a far-right, libertarian blog that had been banned in some countries for
its extremist views and from a “Russian State controlled international television
network.” Morris then offered additional argument as to why he believed a
pattern of discrimination existed. The court overruled the challenge. A while
later, the State reminded the court that it had not yet ruled as to whether Morris
had established a prima facie case that a pattern of discrimination existed. The
court then stated: “I think seven out of eight could be a pattern; but—and so, I
believe the Rule requires me to consider the rationale given; but, I continue to
rule—to overrule the objection.” (Emphasis added.)
Typically, to avoid collapsing the Batson test, the court should first make a
preliminary determination that the challenger has demonstrated a prima facie
showing of discrimination before eliciting the State’s gender-neutral explanation.
Wright, 78 Wn. App. at 100-01. When the State provides an explanation and the
court rules on the ultimate question of discrimination, the preliminary prima facie
23
No. 83157-7-I/24
case is unnecessary. Hicks, 163 Wn.2d at 492. In the instant case, however,
the State’s explanation as to juror 115 did not render the prima facie case moot.
Although the court should have asked Morris for further proof of a pattern before
eliciting a response from the State, we disagree that this misstep rendered the
prima facie case moot. While the court indicated that there could be a pattern, it
then, in direct response to the State’s inquiry about ruling on whether Morris had
established a prima facie case concerning a pattern of discrimination, stated,
I think seven out of eight could be a pattern; but—and so, I believe
the Rule requires me to consider the rationale given; but, I continue
to rule—to overrule the objection because political beliefs are not a
protected category. Peremptories have a long-standing—the long-
standing tradition of peremptory challenges in our system of justice
is that unless—unless it’s prohibited due to an improper motive
based on excluding members of a protected category, in general,
Counsel, exercise at their discretion to benefit their client’s position.
While the court indicated it could be a pattern, we conclude that the above
statement and the court’s actions are inconsistent with the court having made a
determination that a prima facie showing of a pattern was made.
In any event, the circumstances of the present case do not support a
conclusion that the court’s determination was clear error. Although the State’s
use of seven peremptory challenge against men could, at first glance, appear
disproportionate, the State also struck a female juror. And the female juror was
stricken after the State had exercised four peremptory strikes against male jurors
but before the final three strikes. Of the seven male jurors stricken by the State,
three were replaced by other male jurors whom the State did not attempt to
strike. The State also waived its last peremptory challenge, which could have
24
No. 83157-7-I/25
been used to remove another male juror. Moreover, the State accepted the jury
on two separate occasions: once after it had struck only two men and once after
it had struck six men and one woman. On both occasions, the jury consisted of
six men and ten women. We also note that Morris, too, struck seven male jurors.
At the end of voir dire, there were six men and ten women on the final jury. The
original venire consisted of 130 people, 66 men, 64 women, and 1 non-binary
person.
On appeal, Morris contends that the court erred by not requiring the State
to give a neutral explanation for each of the seven male jurors in the alleged
pattern. But aside from the fact that seven male jurors were struck, Morris does
not provide any other relevant circumstances that would indicate bias or
discrimination. Without more, we are unconvinced that a discriminatory purpose
existed or that the court committed clear error in finding none. Finally, we note
that venires commonly consist of only male and female jurors. That a “pattern”
emerges in a party’s use of peremptory challenges against a specific gender is
not enough on its own to constitute discriminatory intent; such a “pattern” may
very well be random. To establish a prima facie case, the strikes must be
accompanied by relevant circumstances indicative of discrimination, such as
discriminatory comments by the party exercising the challenge.7 Here, the record
7 Relying on Zant v. Stephens, 462 U.S. 862, 103 S. Ct. 2733, 77 L. Ed.
2d 235 (1983), Morris also maintains that political affiliation is constitutionally
suspect and that the court erred in concluding that the State’s explanation for
striking juror 115 was not discriminatory. We disagree. The Zant court
discussed constitutionally impermissible factors to consider at sentencing—not
jury selection—and only stated that the political affiliation of the defendant should
not be relied upon. 426 U.S. at 885 (“. . . factors that are constitutionally
25
No. 83157-7-I/26
supports that the court properly reviewed the alleged pattern and concluded that
a discriminatory pattern did not exist. We conclude that the court’s finding was
not clearly erroneous.
Jury Selection
Morris maintains that by conducting voir dire via Zoom, the court violated
his constitutional right under article I, section 21 of the Washington Constitution
to in-person jury selection. He also argues that Zoom voir dire violated his ability
to select a fair jury and his right to be present. Finally, he contends that the trial
court violated a local rule by proceeding with jury selection over his objection.
We disagree.
A trial court has wide discretion in conducting voir dire. State v. Wade, __
Wn. App. 2d __, 534 P.3d 1221, 1229 (2023). Absent an abuse of discretion and
a showing of prejudice, the trial court’s ruling on the scope and content of voir
dire will not be disturbed on appeal. Wade, 534 P.3d at 1229. The court abuses
its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable, rests on untenable
grounds, or is made for untenable reasons. Wade, 534 P.3d at 1229.
1. Article 1, Section 21
This court recently addressed whether article 1, section 21 of our state
constitution applied to jury selection and concluded it did not. State v. Booth, 24
Wn. App. 2d 586, 604-05, 521 P.3d 196, review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1006, 526 P.3d
impermissible or totally irrelevant to the sentencing process, such as for
example, the race, religion, or political affiliation of the defendant . . .” (emphasis
added)). Zant does not address whether the political affiliation of jurors is an
acceptable basis on which to exercise a peremptory strike.
26
No. 83157-7-I/27
849 (2022). In Booth, we engaged in a Gunwall8 analysis to address whether
article I, sections 21 and 22 of our state constitution protected the use of
peremptory challenges in criminal jury selection proceedings. 24 Wn. App. 2d at
601-02. We explained that article I, section 21 governs a litigant’s right to a jury
trial while article I, section 22 governs jury selection and that the two sections
serve complementary roles. Booth, 24 Wn. App. 2d at 604. We concluded that
article 1, section 21 did not apply to jury selection and to interpret it as such
would render article I, section 22’s protections superfluous. Booth, 24 Wn. App.
2d at 604-05.
Booth controls in the present case. Because article 1, section 21 does not
govern jury selection procedures, we disagree that it necessitates in-person jury
selection.
2. Ability to Select a Fair and Impartial Jury
Next, Morris asserts that conducting voir dire via Zoom violated his right to
a fair and impartial jury because he was unable to properly assess the jurors’
demeanor or credibility. He also contends that remote voir dire prevented the
potential jurors from understanding the significance of the proceedings because
they could not feel the gravitas of being present in a courthouse. Finally, he
maintains that remote voir dire resulted in unequal juror experiences due to
variances in the quality and size of the potential jurors’ video screens. We are
unpersuaded.
8 State v. Gunwall, 106 Wn.2d 54, 720 P.2d 808 (1986).
27
No. 83157-7-I/28
Our federal and state constitutions guarantee criminal defendants the right
to an impartial jury. U.S. CONST. amend. VI; WASH. CONST. art. 1, § 22. This
guarantee includes “the right to have a jury drawn from a fair cross section of the
community.” State v. Meza, 22 Wn. App. 2d 514, 533, 512 P.3d 608, review
denied, 200 Wn.2d 1021, 520 P.3d 978 (2022). Voir dire is central to protecting
this right, because it permits the parties to “ask questions and engage in
discussion with potential jurors to draw out potential bias.” State v. Bell, 26 Wn.
App. 2d 821, 829, 529 P.3d 448, review denied, 1 Wn.3d 1035, 536 P.3d 181(2023). “But voir dire is more than just a question and answer session,” it also
allows the parties to assess a potential juror’s credibility via nonverbal cues,
which are often more indicative of a juror’s real character. Bell, 26 Wn. App. 2d
at 829. The scope of voir dire should be coextensive with its purpose, which “ ‘is
to enable the parties to learn the state of mind of the prospective jurors, so that
they can know whether or not any of them may be subject to a challenge for
cause, and determine the advisability of interposing their peremptory
challenges.’ ” State v. Frederiksen, 40 Wn. App. 749, 752, 700 P.2d 369 (1985)
(quoting State v. Laureano, 101 Wn.2d 745, 758, 682 P.2d 889 (1984)).
The trial court’s broad discretion in conducting voir dire is limited “only by
the need to assure a fair trial by an impartial jury.” State v. Brady, 116 Wn. App.
143, 147, 64 P.3d 1258 (2003). The court abuses its discretion if it “adopts a
view that no reasonable person would take.” State v. Sisouvanh, 175 Wn.2d
607, 623, 290 P.3d 942 (2012).
28
No. 83157-7-I/29
In response to the COVID-199 pandemic, Washington courts instituted a
variety of practices to ensure that trials could continue safely. Our State
Supreme Court issued an order requiring courts to “conduct all [jury trial]
proceedings consistent with the most protective applicable public health
guidance in their jurisdiction.” Ord. re: Modification of Jury Trial Proc., In re
Statewide Response by Washington State Courts to the COVID-19 Public Health
Emergency, at 3 (Wash. June 18, 2020) https://www.courts.wa.gov/content/
publicUpload/Supreme%20Court%20Orders/Jury%20Resumption%20Order%
20061820.pdf [https://perma.cc/S5YJ-BWPR]. It also noted that “[t]he use of
remote technology in jury selection, including use of video for voir dire in criminal
and civil trials, is encouraged to reduce the risk of coronavirus exposure.” Ord.
re: Modification of Jury Trial Proc. at 3. King County Superior Court issued a
similar order authorizing in-person criminal jury trials with remote voir dire.
Emergency Ord. #27 re: Crim. Cases, No. 21-0-12050-3, Suspension of In-
Person Criminal Jury Trials Through February 12, 2021 (King County Super. Ct.,
Wash. Jan. 22, 2021) https://kingcounty.gov/~/media/courts/superior-court/docs/
COVID-19/FILED-Emergency-Order27-KCSC-210120503.ashx?la=en [https://
perma.cc/X2JE-4YGV].
Morris’s arguments about the burdens of Zoom voir dire are without merit.
At the time voir dire took place, masking was still mandatory in King County. Had
voir dire been conducted in-person, the venire would have been masked and
9 COVID-19 is the World Health Organization’s official name for
“coronavirus disease 2019,” a severe, highly contagious respiratory illness that
quickly spread throughout the world after being discovered in December 2019.
29
No. 83157-7-I/30
Morris likely would have had more difficulty ascertaining the jurors’ demeanor. In
contrast, on Zoom, the jurors did not need to be masked and Morris could easily
see their full faces on his computer screen. Zoom voir dire also permitted Morris
to see each of the jurors clearly, as opposed to in-person voir dire where jurors
could be in a faraway row, or hidden by other jurors surrounding them.
Moreover, the jurors were given clear instructions on remote voir dire procedures
to ensure that they were fully engaged and fully attentive to the process.
Given that voir dire took place at the height of the COVID-19 pandemic,
we disagree that the court’s decision to conduct voir dire remotely was an abuse
of discretion. The court implemented reasonable voir dire procedures to protect
the health and safety of all involved parties. These procedures did not violate
Morris’s ability to select to a fair and impartial jury.
3. Right to be Present
Morris also maintains that remote voir dire violated his right to be present.
We are unconvinced.
Criminal defendants have the right to be present at all critical stages of
trial, including voir dire. State v. Irby, 170 Wn.2d 874, 880, 246 P.3d 796 (2011).
Whether this right has been violated is a question of law that we review de novo.
Irby, 170 Wn.2d at 880.
In accordance with orders from King County Superior Court and our State
Supreme Court, the trial court conducted voir dire remotely via Zoom. The court
noted that voir dire would not exclude anyone who did not have access to
internet and that anyone who wished to attend voir dire in-person could do so.
30
No. 83157-7-I/31
Morris cites no authority for his contention that the right to be present
means the right to be present in-person with the entire venire. Nor does he
explain specifically how his right to be present was “burdened” by remote voir
dire. As Morris was able to attend voir dire in-person himself and was able to
view the venire via Zoom, we conclude that his right to be present was not
violated.
4. Violation of LCrR 4.11
Lastly, Morris claims that the trial court violated LCrR 4.11(b) because the
parties did not agree to remote voir dire. This court recently rejected a similar
claim in Wade.
In Wade, the defendant objected to remote voir dire and later claimed that
the trial court violated LCrR 4.11(b) by proceeding with remote voir dire over his
objection. 534 P.3d at 1230. On appeal, we explained that the trial court
properly relied on the Supreme Court’s October 2020 and June 2020 Orders and
King County Superior Court Emergency Order #27 when it allowed for remote
jury selection. Wade, 534 P.3d at 1231. We concluded that the trial court did not
violate LCrR 4.11(b) because the Supreme Court’s June 2020 order recognized
that courts would need to adopt, modify, or suspend rules like LCrR 4.11 during
the pandemic. Wade, 534 P.3d at 1231. We also noted that “ ‘local rules may
not be applied in a manner inconsistent with the civil rules’ promulgated by the
Supreme Court.” Wade, 534 P.3d at 1231 (quoting Jones v. City of Seattle, 179
Wn.2d 322, 344, 314 P.3d 380 (2013)).
31
No. 83157-7-I/32
The same holds true in the present case. When this case proceeded to
trial in April 2021, all of the emergency orders at issue in Wade were still in
effect. Therefore, our analysis in Wade applies here and we conclude that the
court did not violate LCrR 4.11(b) by complying with the courts’ orders and
conducting voir dire via Zoom.
Motion for Mistrial
Morris asserts that the court abused its discretion in denying his motion for
a mistrial after a witness stated that they’d seen Morris in an orange jumpsuit
before. Because the comment did not result in prejudice, we disagree.
We review a trial court’s denial of a motion for mistrial for an abuse of
discretion. State v. Emery, 174 Wn.2d 741, 765, 278 P.3d 653 (2012). A court
abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable, based on
untenable grounds, or made for untenable reasons. State v. Barry, 184 Wn. App.
790, 797, 339 P.3d 200 (2014). A trial court should grant a mistrial “only when
the defendant has been so prejudiced that nothing short of a new trial can ensure
that the defendant will be fairly tried.” Emery, 174 Wn.2d at 765. We consider
three factors in determining whether an irregularity warrants a new trial: (1) the
seriousness of the irregularity, (2) whether the statement was cumulative of other
properly admitted evidence, and (3) whether an instruction would cure the
irregularity. State v. Perez-Valdez, 172 Wn.2d 808, 818, 265 P.3d 853 (2011).
We presume that jurors follow instructions and disregard improper evidence.
State v. Christian, 18 Wn. App. 2d 185, 199, 489 P.3d 657, review denied, 198
Wn.2d 1024, 497 P.3d 394 (2021).
32
No. 83157-7-I/33
Morris challenges the following exchange with Joe Garcia, Gabrielle
Garcia’s father, in which the witness was asked to identify Morris in the
courtroom:
[STATE]: And if you’re not able to, that’s okay.
[GARCIA]: Well, I should be able to, I sat in a bunch of
hearings in the children’s side.
[STATE]: Well—
[GARCIA]: —and he was in an orange jumpsuit, so—
[STATE]: Joe—Mr. Garcia—
[GARCIA]: Okay.
[STATE]: —if you’re not able to make the identification,
that’s okay.
[GARCIA]: Okay. All right.
[DEFENSE]: Objection.
[COURT]: Yes. Ladies and gentlemen, please disregard
the last statement by the witness.
Condon is instructive here. In Condon, a witness made three separate
statements that the defendant had been in jail, in violation of a ruling in limine.
72 Wn. App. 638, 648, 865 P.2d 521 (1993). The witness testified that the
defendant called her “when he was getting out of jail” and that he had asked her
to pick him up from jail in Seattle. Condon, 72 Wn. App. at 648. Later, on cross-
examination, the witness testified, “Yeah. I didn’t tell her where I was picking him
up. I’m not allowed to say that, but he was in a desperate situation that night.”
Condon, 72 Wn. App. at 648. The trial court granted the defendant’s motion to
strike the comments, denied the defendant’s subsequent motion for a mistrial,
and instructed the jury to disregard any references that the defendant was in jail.
Condon, 72 Wn. App. at 648. This court upheld the trial court’s ruling on appeal,
33
No. 83157-7-I/34
reasoning that the fact the defendant had been in jail did not mean he was guilty.
Condon, 72 Wn. App. at 649. We also determined that the statements were not
serious enough to warrant a mistrial and that the court’s instruction was sufficient
to cure any potential prejudice. Condon, 72 Wn. App. at 649.
Like in Condon, the court granted Morris’s objection, struck the
statements, and gave a curative instruction to the jury. We also note that the
irregularity in the present case is less serious than that in Condon. Here, the
witness made one passing statement, not three, that Morris had been in an
orange jumpsuit. This comment was not prejudicial. Even though some jurors
may have inferred that Morris was in custody, that would not be unusual given
the nature of the charges. And nothing about the witness’s reference to “a bunch
of hearings” indicated how long Morris may have been in custody. We conclude
that the court properly denied Morris’s motion for mistrial.
First Aggressor Jury Instruction
Morris claims that the court erred in giving a first aggressor instruction
because it relieved the State of its burden of proving the absence of self-defense.
Because such an instruction does not shift the burden of proof away from the
State, we disagree.
A party is entitled to an instruction if it is “supported by substantial
evidence in the record.” State v. Griffith, 91 Wn.2d 572, 574, 589 P.2d 799(1979). We review de novo whether sufficient evidence exists to support an
instruction, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the party
34
No. 83157-7-I/35
requesting the instruction. State v. Bea, 162 Wn. App. 570, 577, 254 P.3d 948(2011).
“Generally, a slayer may not claim self-defense to justify a killing when
they were the aggressor or provoked the confrontation.” State v. Hatt, 11 Wn.
App. 2d 113, 135, 452 P.3d 577 (2019). A first aggressor jury instruction is
appropriate where “there is credible evidence from which the jury can reasonably
determine that the defendant provoked the need to act in self-defense” or “if
there is conflicting evidence as to whether the defendant’s conduct precipitated a
fight.” State v. Riley, 137 Wn.2d 904, 909-10, 976 P.2d 624 (1999). A first
aggressor instruction is also appropriate if “the evidence shows that the
defendant made the first move by drawing a weapon.” State v. Anderson, 144
Wn. App. 85, 89, 180 P.3d 885 (2008). But such an instruction is not warranted
“where the defendant undisputedly engaged in a single aggressive act and that
act was the sole basis for the charged offense.” State v. Grott, 195 Wn.2d 256,
272, 458 P.3d 750 (2020).
Contrary to Morris’s assertion, first aggressor instructions do not relieve
the State of its burden of proof. Our Supreme Court clarified recently that “first
aggressor instructions are used to explain to the jury one way in which the State
may meet its burden: by proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
provoked the need to act in self-defense.” Grott, 195 Wn.2d at 268. And here,
the jury instructions stated that the State needed to prove the absence of self-
defense beyond a reasonable doubt.
35
No. 83157-7-I/36
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the State, a first
aggressor instruction was warranted because there was some conflicting
evidence as to who precipitated the events and there was evidence that Morris
made the first move by drawing a knife. On the day of the murder, a folding
pocketknife was found in Garcia’s jacket pocket. Morris also sustained a cut on
his finger. When asked about the cut during his police interview, Morris told
detectives that Garcia did not have a knife that day but that “she had been armed
before” and that he “didn’t really think she would ever try to stab [him].”
But at trial, Morris’s story changed. He cross-examined one of the
investigating detectives at length about the pocketknife found in Garcia’s jacket,
asking about the blade length and whether the user could “open it just one-
handed.” Morris then testified that, on the day of the murder, Garcia “had some
big, dragon, shiny knife thing” and that he saw it “[a] few times.” He also testified
that Garcia kept “drawing [the blade] out,” that she was shuffling things in her
backpack, and that Garcia was fidgeting. He stated that he was “scared.”
Morris also testified that Garcia’s actions at the food court made him
anxious:
She—she had the baggy clothing and the phone fidgeting thing,
and she had scratched herself a little. . . . I started panicking. I
think I was mumbling to myself or something, I’m not certain. And
that’s—that’s when the thing happened.
She—she stood up and was starting to move a little bit and I
. . . I freaked out. I got up and flicked the knife really quickly, and
then she—she took one step. I don’t know which leg. I don’t know.
She took some step. And then I started moving at her, and she
screamed, obviously, and then this—this hook stabbing thing
happened.
36
No. 83157-7-I/37
Because there was conflicting evidence as to who initiated the events—even
though Morris asserts he was not implying that Garcia was the first aggressor—
and there was evidence that Morris made the first move, we conclude that
substantial evidence supported a first aggressor instruction. We also reject
Morris’s novel argument on appeal that there was no evidence indicating Morris
was not the sole aggressor.
Imposition of Exceptional Sentence
Morris asserts that the court violated the Sixth and Fourteenth
Amendments to the United States Constitution by making a factual determination
that facts found by the jury were substantial and compelling reasons justifying an
exceptional sentence. Our case law mandates a different result. This court
considered the same argument in State v. Sage, 1 Wn. App. 2d 685, 407 P.3d
359 (2017), and determined that this inquiry is a legal one.
Whether the imposition of an exceptional sentence violates the Sixth and
Fourteenth Amendments is a question of law that we review de novo. State v.
Alvarado, 164 Wn.2d 556, 563, 192 P.3d 345 (2008).
The Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants a right to trial by
jury. This right, in conjunction with the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, requires that each element of a crime be proved to a jury beyond a
reasonable doubt. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 104, 133 S. Ct. 2151,
186 L. Ed. 2d 314 (2013) (plurality opinion). Other than the fact of a prior
conviction, any fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the statutory
maximum is an “element” that must be submitted to the jury and proved beyond a
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reasonable doubt. Hurst v. Florida, 577 U.S. 92, 92, 136 S. Ct. 616, 193 L. Ed.
2d 504 (2016); Blakely v. Washington, 542 U.S. 296, 301, 124 S. Ct. 2531, 159
L. Ed. 2d 403 (2004). The statutory maximum is “the maximum sentence a judge
may impose solely on the basis of the facts reflected in the jury verdict or
admitted by the defendant.” Blakely, 542 U.S. at 303 (emphasis omitted).
For the court to impose an exceptional sentence, the jury must first find
“unanimously and beyond a reasonable doubt, one or more of the facts alleged
by the state in support of an aggravated sentence” exist. RCW 9.94A.537(6).
Then, the court must “find[], considering the purposes of this chapter, that the
facts found [by the jury] are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an
exceptional sentence.” RCW 9.94A.537(6). The court must set forth its reasons
for imposing an exceptional sentence in written findings of fact and conclusions
of law. RCW 9.94A.535.
Despite settled law to the contrary, Morris contends that the court
engaged in impermissible fact finding by concluding that there are substantial
and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional sentence. And although this
court rejected the same argument in Sage, Morris claims that the court in Sage
did not fully explain its reasoning. We disagree.
Like Morris, the defendant in Sage argued that the trial court engaged in
fact finding, in violation of his Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, by entering an
exceptional sentence. 1 Wn. App. 2d at 707. This court disagreed, explaining
that
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“once the jury by special verdict makes the factual determination
whether aggravating circumstances have been proved beyond a
reasonable doubt, ‘[t]he trial judge [is] left only with the legal
conclusion of whether the facts alleged and found were sufficiently
substantial and compelling to warrant an exceptional sentence.’ ”
1 Wn. App. 2d at 708 (quoting State v. Suleiman, 158 Wn.2d 280, 290-91,
291 n.3, 143 P.3d 795 (2006)).
The Sage court also rejected Morris’s argument that Washington’s
sentencing scheme is analogous to the sentencing scheme deemed
unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Hurst:
In Hurst, the Supreme Court held Florida’s death penalty procedure
violated the defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial
because the jury's findings of aggravating factors were advisory,
resulting in prohibited fact finding by the judge. But the Florida
statute at issue expressly state[d] that the jury findings were
“advisory.” FLA. STAT. § 921.141 (2004). By contrast, under
Washington procedure here, the jury exclusively resolves the
factual question whether the aggravating circumstances have been
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
1 Wn. App. 2d at 710 n.86.
We decline to deviate from our holding in Sage. In the present case, the
jury entered special verdict forms with specific findings that the aggravating
circumstances had been proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The court then
noted on the record that the jury had made such findings and described the
evidence that supported each finding. The court next concluded that the jury’s
findings constituted “[s]ubstantial and compelling interests” for imposing an
exceptional sentence. The trial court properly analyzed and articulated its basis
for imposing an exceptional sentence and did not engage in any fact finding.
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Victim Penalty Assessment and DNA Fee
In supplemental briefing, Morris maintains that the victim penalty
assessment should be stricken because the court determined he was indigent at
the time of sentencing. He also contends that the DNA fee should be waived for
the same reason. We disagree that the court determined Morris to be indigent,
but remand for Morris to make such a motion as to the victim penalty assessment
and the DNA fee.
The legislature recently amended RCW 7.68.035 to prohibit the imposition
of a victim penalty assessment if the court finds that the defendant is indigent at
the time of sentencing. See LAWS OF 2023, ch. 449, § 1 (“The court shall not
impose the penalty assessment under this section if the court finds that the
defendant, at the time of sentencing, is indigent.”). If the court does not make
such a finding at sentencing, a defendant can later move to have the fee waived
if they are unable to pay the penalty and the court must waive the fee. RCW
7.68.035(5)(b). The legislature also eliminated the DNA collection fee from
RCW 43.43.7541. Under newly amended RCW 43.43.7541, the court must
waive any DNA collection fee imposed before to July 1, 2023 upon a motion by a
defendant.
Here, the court did not find Morris indigent at sentencing, but did grant his
motion for an order to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal. Because such a
finding was not made and Morris is now indigent, we remand for Morris to move
to strike the victim penalty assessment. On remand, he may also move to waive
the DNA collection fee.
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We affirm the conviction and remand for Morris to move to strike the victim
penalty assessment and DNA collection fee.
WE CONCUR:
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