In Re The Detention Of C-h.g. ( 2024 )


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  •           IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    In the Matter of the Detention of:
    No. 85016-4-I
    C-H.G.,
    DIVISION ONE
    Appellant.
    UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    MANN, J. — C-H.G. appeals an order committing her involuntarily for 14 days
    under the Involuntary Treatment Act (ITA), ch. 71.05 RCW. We affirm.
    I
    In January 2023, a designated crisis responder (DCR) petitioned to have C-H.G.
    detained for inpatient evaluation and treatment. According to the petition, C-H.G.’s
    daughter reported that C-H.G., who had been involuntarily hospitalized before, had
    stopped taking her medications, had destroyed her husband’s laptop because she
    thought he was cheating on her, had threatened to tell law enforcement that her
    husband had “raped everyone in the house and . . . [was] a pedophile,” interfered with
    family members’ medical treatment, was not sleeping at night and would sing at the top
    of her lungs for hours, believed the government was stalking her and her family
    poisoning her, drove with her eyes closed, and “talk[ed] to God” on the phone. The
    DCR declared that C-H.G. “presented with pressured speech, an angry tone,
    No. 85016-4-I/2
    suspiciousness, paranoia, illogical thought process and a labile affect,” “deflected issues
    to her family,” did not believe she needed treatment, and said she was “ ‘sending
    messages to churches that is above the state level’ but could not explain further.” The
    DCR attested that C-H.G.’s behaviors “represent a worsening, marked and concerning
    change in her baseline behavior” and that “as a result of a behavioral health disorder
    [C-H.G.] presents a likelihood of serious harm to . . . herself, others, or to the property of
    others, and/or that [she] is gravely disabled.” The trial court granted the petition for
    initial detention, and C-H.G. was admitted to Navos Inpatient Services (Navos).
    On January 12, Navos petitioned for a 14-day involuntary commitment order. A
    hearing was held in early February. C-H.G. and her daughter T.G. each testified, as did
    Michelle Mang, a Navos mental health counselor who evaluated C-H.G. and reviewed
    her medical chart. At the close of the hearing, the trial court found that C-H.G. was
    “gravely disabled” as defined in the ITA and ordered that C-H.G. be detained for 14
    days of involuntary treatment. C-H.G. appeals.
    II
    C-H.G. argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the 14-day
    involuntary commitment order. We disagree.
    The ITA authorizes a trial court to commit a person for up to 14 days if the court
    finds by a preponderance of the evidence that the person is, as relevant here, “gravely
    disabled.” RCW 71.05.240(4)(a). On review, we determine whether substantial
    evidence supports the trial court’s findings and, if so, whether those findings support its
    conclusion of law and judgment. In re Det. of A.F., 20 Wn. App. 2d 115, 125, 
    498 P.3d 1006
     (2021). “Substantial evidence is the quantum of evidence sufficient to persuade a
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    No. 85016-4-I/3
    fair-minded person of the truth of the declared premise.” In re Det. of H.N., 
    188 Wn. App. 744
    , 762, 
    355 P.3d 294
     (2015).
    Here, the trial court found that C-H.G. was “gravely disabled” under former RCW
    71.05.020(24)(b) (2022), or “Prong B,” which provides that a person is “gravely
    disabled” if that person, “as a result of a behavioral health disorder[,] . . . manifests
    severe deterioration in routine functioning evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of
    cognitive or volitional control over his or her actions and is not receiving such care as is
    essential for his or her health or safety.”
    C-H.G. first argues this was error because in the days leading up to the
    commitment hearing, she was showing “increased control,” and thus the evidence did
    not show “escalating loss” of cognitive or volitional control. But while there was
    evidence that C-H.G. was improving in the days before the hearing due to her resuming
    medication, there was also evidence that she remained far from baseline. T.G. testified
    that when C-H.G. was her “normal self,” she was happy, fully functioning, and a good
    communicator, and although she would fast once in a while, she would regularly eat “a
    couple of meals a day.” She testified that at her baseline, C-H.G. would sleep regularly
    and had “[v]ery good” hygiene. But T.G. also testified that as recently as two or three
    days before the commitment hearing, C-H.G. sounded angry, had disorganized speech,
    “and her sentences were not completely understandable,” and that these behaviors had
    also been precursors to her initial decompensation. Progress notes from C-H.G.’s chart
    at Navos showed that she frequently missed meals, did not sleep regularly, and did not
    care for her hygiene. She was drinking excessive amounts of water, indicating that she
    wanted to “flush out her system because of the[ ] poisons that she believes are in her
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    No. 85016-4-I/4
    body from the government and from others.” Mang diagnosed C-H.G. with
    schizophrenia and opined that C-H.G. was gravely disabled as a result of her
    schizophrenia. Although Mang acknowledged that C-H.G.’s sleep, hygiene, and dietary
    habits had improved since she resumed taking medication, she also testified that
    C-H.G. was still exhibiting “active symptoms” as well as “increasing paranoia and
    delusions.” The record supports the trial court’s determination that as a result of her
    schizophrenia, C-H.G. “manifest[ed] severe deterioration in routine functioning
    evidenced by repeated and escalating loss of cognitive or volitional control over . . . her
    actions.” See former RCW 71.05.020(24)(b). While C-H.G. relies on general principles
    stated In re Detention of LaBelle to argue otherwise, even LaBelle rejected the notion
    that a person must be released merely if their condition has improved. 
    107 Wn.2d 196
    ,
    207, 
    728 P.2d 138
     (1986) (“It would . . . result in absurd and potentially harmful
    consequences[ ] for a court [to] be required to release a person whose condition, as a
    result of the initial commitment, has stabilized or improved minimally—i.e., is no longer
    ‘escalating’—even though that person otherwise manifests severe deterioration in
    routine functioning and, if released, would not receive such care as is essential for his or
    her health or safety.”).
    C-H.G. next points out that to show C-H.G. was “not receiving such care as is
    essential for . . . her health or safety” as required under the second part of former RCW
    71.05.020(24)(b), the evidence had to show that C-H.G. was “unable, because of
    severe deterioration in mental functioning, to make a rational decision with respect to
    [the] need for treatment.” LaBelle, 
    107 Wn.2d at 208
    . C-H.G. claims she testified that
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    No. 85016-4-I/5
    she planned to continue taking her medication if released and that she was not opposed
    to continuing treatment in the community.
    But although C-H.G. testified that she would take her medications upon release,
    her testimony was equivocal: she also stated that she did not think she needed
    medication and believed it was “not a coincidence” that “deadly side effects [of the
    medication] happen[ ] to [her] family.” C-H.G.’s chart notes reflected that she
    consistently stated throughout her initial detention that her medications were poisoning
    her, denied any mental illness, and indicated she was not willing to go to counseling or
    continue taking medication once released. Additionally, T.G. testified that C-H.G. had
    stopped taking her medications before. When asked whether she would go to
    outpatient treatment, C-H.G. did not provide a direct answer, instead stating that it
    would be “kind of hard” because she had “a very old car.” And Mang testified that
    C-H.G. “does not have any insight” into her need for treatment and “ha[d] not been
    receptive” to “multiple attempts to talk with her about outpatient services for psychiatry,
    as well as counseling.” The evidence amply supported the trial court’s finding that the
    second part of Prong B was satisfied. Cf. In re Det. of A.M., 17 Wn. App. 2d 321, 336,
    
    487 P.3d 531
     (2021) (substantial evidence supported a finding that detainee would not
    receive care that was essential for his health or safety if released where a provider
    testified that the detainee “had no insight into his mental illness, . . . did not believe that
    he needed any medication[, and] had ‘a history of noncompliance with medication in the
    community’ ”).
    In sum, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s determination that C-H.G.
    was gravely disabled under Prong B.
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    No. 85016-4-I/6
    Affirmed.
    WE CONCUR:
    -6-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 85016-4

Filed Date: 1/22/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 1/22/2024