In Re The Matter Of: The Bernice K. Price-cameron Trust ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
IN RE THE MATTER OF: No. 84674-4-I
THE BERNICE K. PRICE-CAMERON
TRUST DIVISION ONE
MARCUS E. PRICE, Beneficiary of the UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Bernice K. Price-Cameron Trust,
Appellant,
v.
ANTOINETTE S. PRICE, Co-Trustee
of the Bernice K. Price-Cameron Trust
and in her representative capacity as
Attorney-in-Fact for Bernice K. Price-
Cameron,
Respondent.
FELDMAN, J. — Marcus Price, a beneficiary of the Bernice K. Price-
Cameron Trust (Trust), appeals a trial court’s order denying his petition under the
Trust and Estate Dispute Resolution Act (TEDRA) to remove Antoinette Price as
Trustee and to order the Trust to perform an accounting. Finding no reversible
error, we affirm.
No. 84674-4-I/2
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
Marcus is a beneficiary of the Trust. 1 Antoinette has been Trustee since
Marcus’ removal as co-trustee in 2018 after a trial court concluded that he
“breached his fiduciary duties as Co-Trustee by failing to account for income and
assets under his control in the amount of $174,727.29 as established by
documentary evidence.” In addition to being removed as trustee, Marcus was
ordered to pay the Trust $174,727.29 and Antoinette was awarded reasonable
attorney fees and costs. Marcus appealed that decision, and we affirmed.
Dissatisfied with Antoinette’s administration of the Trust, Marcus filed the
petition at issue in this appeal seeking, among other relief, to remove Antoinette
as trustee and to compel the Trust to perform an accounting. The Trust filed an
answer as well as a motion to dismiss the petition under “CR 12(b) for lack of
jurisdiction, insufficiency of process, insufficiency of service of process, and
failure to join an indispensable party.” The trial court granted that motion on
multiple grounds, including that the petition “is unsupported by admissible
credible evidence sufficient to establish that [Marcus] is entitled to any relief.”
Marcus filed a motion for revision, but the trial court did not decide that motion
because Marcus failed to note it for hearing as required by LCR 7(b)(8)(iii).
Marcus appeals.
1
Because both parties share a last name, we use their first names for clarity.
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ANALYSIS
A. Dismissal Under RAP 18.9
Preliminarily, Antoinette argues that “Mr. Price’s Failure To Pay Prior
Judgments Justifies Dismissal Under RAP 18.9.” RAP 18.9(a) reads: “The
appellate court may condition a party’s right to participate further in the review on
compliance with terms of an order or ruling including payment of an award which
is ordered paid by the party.” As the plain language of RAP 18.9 confirms, we
may condition further review on compliance with an order requiring payment of
an award, but we may not dismiss an appeal under this rule. As a result, we
deny Antoinette’s request to dismiss this appeal under RAP 18.9.
B. The Trial Court’s Dismissal Ruling
Turning to the merits of the appeal, Marcus argues that the trial court
erred when it dismissed his petition to remove Antoinette as trustee and to order
the Trust to perform an accounting. We disagree.
A beneficiary of a trust may petition the superior court for the change of a
trustee for “reasonable cause.” RCW 11.98.039(4). Examples of reasonable
cause to remove a trustee include breach of fiduciary duty, a conflict of interest
between the trustee and the beneficiary, or bad will generated by litigation. In re
Estate of Ehlers, 80 Wn. App. 751, 761, 911 P.2d 1017 (1996). “A court has a
wide latitude of discretion to remove the trustee, when there is sufficient reason
to do so to protect the best interests of the trust and its beneficiaries.” In re
Estate of Cooper, 81 Wn. App. 79, 94-95, 913 P.2d 393 (1996) (quoting
Schildberg v. Schildberg, 461 N.W. 2d 186, 191 (Iowa 1990)).
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A trial court’s decision to remove a trustee is reviewed for an abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Petrie, 105 Wn. App. 268, 274-75, 19 P.3d 443(2001). A court abuses its discretion if its decision is manifestly unreasonable or
based on untenable grounds or untenable reasons. In re Marriage of Chandola,
180 Wn.2d 632, 642, 327 P.3d 644 (2014). We do not substitute our judgment
for that of the trial court even if we might have resolved the factual dispute
differently. Sunnyside Valley Irr. Dist. v. Dickie, 149 Wn.2d 873, 879-80, 73 P.3d
369 (2003). We also do not reweigh or rebalance competing testimony and
inferences even if we would have resolved the factual dispute differently. Bale v.
Allison, 173 Wn. App. 435, 458, 294 P.3d 789 (2013).
Much the same standards of review apply to Marcus’ argument that the
trial court erred when it denied his petition to order the Trust to perform an
accounting. Under RCW 11.106.040, “the court may order the trustee to file an
account for good cause shown.” This, too, is a discretionary ruling and is
reviewed as such. See Nelsen v. Griffiths, 21 Wn. App. 489, 496, 585 P.2d 840(1978) (recognizing trial court discretion to grant a request for an accounting); In
re Estate of Fitzgerald, 172 Wn. App. 437, 448, 294 P.3d 720 (2012) (recognizing
abuse of discretion as the applicable standard of review for TEDRA
determination). 2
2
We similarly recognized that a deferential standard of review applies to
discretionary decisions under TEDRA in In the Matter of the Irrevocable Tr. of Donna
Clark, No. 83996-9-I, slip op. at 8 (Wash. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2023) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/839969.pdf. Although that opinion is
unpublished, we may properly cite and discuss unpublished opinions where, as here,
doing so is “necessary for a reasoned decision.” GR 14.1(c).
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The trial court here correctly concluded that Marcus’ petition “is
unsupported by admissible credible evidence sufficient to establish that he is
entitled to any relief.” In support of his petition, Marcus attached a single
document entitled “Errata Sheet,” which included: (1) documents creating and
detailing the provisions of the Trust; (2) demand letters from Marcus and other
beneficiaries requesting an accounting from Antoinette; (3) reverse mortgage
statements on properties owned by the Trust; and (4) appraisals of the property
owned by the trust.
This evidence is insufficient to establish that Marcus is entitled to relief.
First, Marcus did not authenticate any of the documents he attached to his
petition. The rules of evidence apply to TEDRA proceedings (ER 1101), and in
order for evidence to be admissible it must be authenticated (ER 901(a)).
Second, even if this evidence was admissible, it does not establish “reasonable
cause” for the change of a trustee under RCW 11.98.039(4) or “good cause” to
order the Trust to perform an accounting. None of the attached documents show
that Antoinette breached a fiduciary duty or failed to comply with her accounting
duties established under the Trust. Rather, the attached documents are an
unexplained collection of complaints and financial documents. On this record,
the trial court did not abuse its discretion when it dismissed Marcus’ petition.
Marcus further argues that the trial court erred when it dismissed his
petition with prejudice rather than without prejudice. We again disagree. Under
TEDRA, “[u]nless requested otherwise by a party in a petition or answer, the
initial hearing must be a hearing on the merits to resolve all issues of fact and all
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issues of law . . . .” RCW 11.96A.100(8). The Act further provides that “courts
shall have full and ample power and authority under this title to administer and
settle . . . [a]ll trusts and trust matters.” RCW 11.96A.020(1)(b). The trial court
thus had ample authority under TEDRA to dismiss Marcus’ petition with
prejudice. Having rejected each and all of Marcus’ substantive arguments, we
need not—and do not—reach his remaining arguments.
C. Attorney Fees on Appeal
Lastly, Antoinette seeks attorney fees and costs on appeal. The trial court
here awarded attorney fees in favor of Antoinette pursuant to RCW 11.96A.150.
“If attorney fees are allowable at trial, the prevailing party may recover fees on
appeal.” Aiken v. Aiken, 187 Wn.2d 491, 506, 387 P.3d 680 (2017) (citing RAP
18.1). Because Antoinette has likewise prevailed on appeal, we grant her
request for attorney fees and costs subject to compliance with RAP 18.1.
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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