Detention Of C.A.A. ( 2024 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
May 21, 2024
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Detention of: No. 58800-5-II
C.A.A.,
Appellant. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PRICE, J. — As a result of threats against an employee of a grocery store, C.A. was charged
with the crime of felony harassment. However, C.A., who suffered from mental illness, was
deemed to be incompetent to stand trial and unlikely to be restored. Pursuant to the process for
felony-based commitment under the “Involuntary Treatment Act” (ITA), chapter 71.05 RCW, the
superior court dismissed the charges and permitted C.A. to be held in the county jail for up to
14 days prior to transport to Western State Hospital (WSH). Soon thereafter, the superior court
ordered C.A. to be committed for 180 days of involuntary treatment. The superior court found
that commitment was justified under the ITA’s felony-based commitment procedure, but it also
found, separately, that C.A. was gravely disabled.
C.A. appeals the superior court’s order, arguing that (1) the State failed to prove C.A.
committed a felony as required by felony-based commitment under the ITA, (2) the ITA violates
the First Amendment because it does not require the State to prove an individual’s mental state for
felony-based commitment when the underlying crime involves speech, and (3) the superior court
did not have any authority to order C.A. to be held in the county jail for up to 14 days after
dismissing the criminal charge against him.
We affirm.
No. 58800-5-II
FACTS
In October 2022, C.A. was lying on the ground in front of the entrance to a grocery store,
obstructing people who were heading out to the parking lot. A security guard for the grocery store
asked C.A. to move, but C.A. ignored him. Unsure what C.A. would do next, the security guard
took out pepper spray from his pocket. Seeing the pepper spray, C.A. accused the security guard
of pointing a weapon at him and said several times, “You . . . just wait, I’m going to show you.”
Verbatim Rep. of Proc. at 32.
C.A. then stood up, took out what appeared to be a gun, and pointed it at the security guard.
Fearing he was about to be killed, the security guard drew his own gun while continuing to hold
the pepper spray. Soon thereafter, the security guard pepper sprayed C.A., causing C.A. to retreat.
Law enforcement later found C.A. and placed him under arrest.
Based on the threats made to the security guard, the State charged C.A. with felony
harassment. C.A. later underwent a competency evaluation to determine whether he was
competent to stand trial. The resulting report stated that more likely than not, C.A. lacked the
capacity to assist in his own defense and that the chances of restoration would improve if C.A.
could receive involuntary mental health treatment. As noted in the report, C.A. had had a history
of involuntary mental health treatment (including 15 or 16 prior admissions to WSH over a nearly
twenty-year period), a lack of insight into his mental illness, and an unwillingness to accept
medication.
After a delay of several months without C.A. being admitted to competency restoration,
the superior court entered an “Order Dismissing Felony Charges and Directing Civil Commitment
Evaluation” pursuant to the felony-based involuntary commitment process in the ITA. As part of
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No. 58800-5-II
its order, the superior court found that C.A. was incompetent to stand trial pursuant to RCW
10.77.010 and 10.77.050 and that it was unlikely that C.A.’s competency would be restored. The
superior court dismissed the charges against C.A. The superior court ordered C.A. committed to
WSH for up to 120 hours for the purposes of being evaluated for a civil commitment petition. The
superior court also ordered:
The defendant shall be held in the jail/detention facility for a maximum of 14 days
pending admission to the state hospital for civil commitment evaluation. The
defendant shall be released if the state hospital has not offered admission within 14
days. The defendant shall be transported to the state hospital by the jail/detention
facility.
Clerk’s Papers at 37 (emphasis added).
Two weeks later, C.A. was admitted to WSH. Following C.A.’s admission, two WSH
mental health providers filed a petition for a 180-day civil commitment (WSH’s petition). WSH’s
petition alleged that (1) C.A. committed acts constituting felony harassment and C.A. presented a
substantial likelihood of repeating similar acts as a result of a behavioral health disorder; and (2)
C.A. was gravely disabled as a result of a behavioral health disorder.
The superior court held a hearing on WSH’s petition. WSH psychologist, Dr. Archer,
testified on behalf of the petition. According to Dr. Archer, C.A. experiences schizoaffective
disorder, bipolar type, as well as substance use disorder. Dr. Archer further explained that C.A.’s
disorders result in a lack of cognitive and volitional control. She also described occasions when
C.A. was placed in seclusion due to unsafe interactions causing danger to others and himself.
Testifying about the alleged grounds for commitment, Dr. Archer said that as a result of
his behavioral health disorder and escalating loss of volitional control, C.A. presented a substantial
likelihood of repeating acts similar to the charged criminal behavior. She also testified that C.A.
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No. 58800-5-II
was gravely disabled because he was unable to meet his basic health and safety needs due to his
behavioral health disorder, which would place him at risk of serious physical harm.
Following the hearing, the superior court entered written findings of fact and conclusions
of law. The superior court found, in part, that the testimony established that C.A. committed acts
constituting the crime of felony harassment and that C.A. presented a substantial likelihood of
repeating acts similar to the charged criminal behavior. As a separate basis for commitment, the
superior court also found that C.A. was gravely disabled as a result of a behavioral health disorder.
Thus, the superior court ordered C.A. to receive up to 180 days of intensive inpatient treatment.
C.A. appeals.
ANALYSIS
C.A. challenges his commitment with three arguments. Two of C.A.’s arguments relate to
the superior court’s 180-day commitment order, while the third relates to the superior court’s order
authorizing C.A. to be held in the county jail pending his transport to WSH. First, C.A. contends
his commitment was unlawful because the State failed to prove the mens rea element of the
underlying crime of felony harassment. Second, C.A argues that if the ITA, through former RCW
71.05.280(3) (2022), does not require the State to prove the mens rea of felony harassment, then
the ITA violates the First Amendment. And third, C.A. argues that the superior court did not have
the authority to order that he be held for up to 14 days pending his transport to WSH.
I. C.A.’S 180-DAY COMMITMENT ORDER IS LAWFUL
C.A.’s first two arguments pertain to the portion of the superior court’s order that relates
to the ITA’s felony-based commitment provision—whether the State is required to prove the
person committed all elements of felony harassment, including the mens rea element, and whether
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No. 58800-5-II
the provision violates the First Amendment because it does not require the State to prove an
individual’s mental state for felony-based commitment when the underlying crime involves
speech.
The State responds, in part, that the superior court may be affirmed because C.A. did not
assign error to the superior court’s second basis for commitment unrelated to his felony-based
commitment—the finding that C.A. was gravely disabled under former RCW 71.05.280(4).1 We
agree with the State.
Unchallenged findings of fact are verities on appeal. In re Det. of W.C.C., 193 Wn. App.
783, 793 n.5, 372 P.3d 179 (2016). The superior court authorized C.A.’s commitment for
involuntary treatment on two separate bases—the felony-based commitment and, separately, a
finding that C.A. was gravely disabled.
C.A. only challenges the felony-based commitment portion of the superior court’s order.
C.A. does not assign error to, or challenge, the superior court’s separate finding that C.A. was
gravely disabled, making it a verity. Id. Thus, an independent basis for the superior court’s
180-day commitment order exists irrespective of the portion of the superior court’s order relating
to felony-based commitment.2 See In re Det. of W.R.G., 110 Wn. App. 318, 327, 40 P.3d 1177(2002) (“gravely disabled” finding provided an independent basis for commitment despite jury
instruction errors). Accordingly, we affirm the superior court’s 180-day commitment order.
1
C.A. does not respond to this aspect of the State’s argument.
2
C.A. provides no argument that there are different consequences resulting from these two
independent bases for ITA commitment.
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No. 58800-5-II
II. THE SUPERIOR COURT’S AUTHORITY TO HOLD C.A. AFTER DISMISSING THE CRIMINAL CHARGE
C.A.’s final argument is that the superior court did not have the authority to hold him for
up to 14 days after dismissing the criminal charge. We disagree.
We review questions of statutory interpretation de novo. Jametsky v. Olsen, 179 Wn.2d
756, 761, 317 P.3d 1003 (2014). The primary goal of statutory interpretation is to determine and
give effect to the legislature’s intent. Id. at 762. To determine legislative intent, we first look to
the statute’s plain language. Id. “If the statute’s meaning is plain on its face, we give effect to that
plain meaning as the expression of what was intended.” TracFone Wireless, Inc. v. Dep’t of
Revenue, 170 Wn.2d 273, 281, 242 P.3d 810 (2010). Only when a statute is ambiguous do we turn
to statutory construction, legislative history, and relevant case law to determine legislative intent.
Jametsky, 179 Wn.2d at 762. And we construe statutes to avoid absurd results. Jespersen v. Clark
County, 199 Wn. App. 568, 578, 399 P.3d 1209 (2017).
As relevant here, former RCW 10.77.086(5) (2022) provides that when a defendant is
unable to be restored to competency, the superior court shall dismiss the charges and order the
defendant committed to the state hospital for up 120 hours to be evaluated for the purposes of
filing a civil commitment proceeding. And former RCW 10.77.068 (2022) provides the time
periods mandated by the legislature for the performance of services related to competency
evaluation and restoration. Former RCW 10.77.068 provides, in relevant part:
[(1)](b) The legislature establishes a performance target of 14 days or fewer for the
following services related to competency to stand trial, when access to the services
is legally authorized:
....
(ii) To extend an offer of admission to a defendant ordered to be committed to a
state hospital following dismissal of charges based on incompetency to stand trial
under RCW 10.77.086.
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No. 58800-5-II
....
[(2)](b) A maximum time limit of 14 days as measured from the department’s
receipt of the court order . . . is established to complete the services specified in
subsection (1)(b) of this section.
Here, the superior court properly exercised its authority consistent with the plain language
of the relevant statutes. The plain language of former RCW 10.77.086(5) requires that, when
competency has not been restored, the superior court dismiss the charges against the defendant3
and order that the defendant be committed for evaluation for civil commitment. Former RCW
10.77.086(5). The superior court’s order complied with these statutory requirements. Nothing in
the statute requires that the defendant be released from confinement immediately upon dismissal
of the charges.
And former RCW 10.77.068 clearly contemplates that the state hospital will have 14 days
to offer admission to a defendant committed under former RCW 10.77.086(5). Here, the language
included in the superior court’s order, read as a whole, is clearly designed to enforce the prescribed
legislative time periods for WSH to comply with the superior court’s order committing C.A. for
evaluation by ordering that C.A. be released if he is not transferred to WSH within the allowed
14 days. The superior court did not exceed its authority, but rather explicitly enforced the
legislative directive to WSH in former RCW 10.77.068.
3
We note that there are circumstances, not applicable here, where the superior court may not
dismiss the charges and must order an extended competency restoration period. See former RCW
10.77.086(5) (“However the court shall not dismiss the charges if the court or jury finds that: (a)
the defendant (i) is a substantial danger to other persons; or (ii) presents a substantial likelihood of
committing criminal acts jeopardizing public safety or security; and (b) there is a substantial
probability that the defendant will regain competency within a reasonable period of time.”).
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No. 58800-5-II
Finally, interpreting former RCW 10.77.068 and former RCW 10.77.086 to require the
superior court to release a confined criminal defendant immediately upon dismissal of charges
after ordering commitment for evaluation for civil commitment leads to an absurd result. Since
2013, the legislature has identified the need to balance protecting public safety from violent
behavior committed by individuals suffering from behavioral health disorders and reducing
unnecessary confinement from those suffering from behavioral health disorders. See LAWS OF
2013, ch. 289, § 1; LAWS OF 2015 1st sp. s., ch. 7, § 1. Reading the relevant statutes to require
superior courts to immediately release a criminal defendant from confinement after ordering
commitment under former RCW 10.77.068 is an absurd interpretation of the statutes, based on
language that does not exist, contrary to the legislative intent to protect the public from violent
behavior. In contrast, reading the statutes to allow the state hospitals the prescribed 14 days to
offer admission to a criminal defendant who is already subject to confinement and is ordered to be
committed for evaluation is a reasonable interpretation of the plain language of the statute
consistent with the legislative intent.
The superior court’s order complied with all the relevant statutory requirements regarding
commitment of an individual charged with a felony who cannot be restored to competency. The
superior court dismissed the charges and ordered the defendant committed as required by former
RCW 10.77.086(5). And the superior court allowed WSH 14 days to comply with the commitment
order as prescribed by former RCW 10.77.068. Accordingly, C.A.’s argument fails.
CONCLUSION
We affirm.
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No. 58800-5-II
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J.
We concur:
CRUSER, C.J.
MAXA, J.
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