Amanda Helen Taylor v. Todd Emory Taylor ( 2024 )


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  •                                                                          FILED
    FEBRUARY 6, 2024
    In the Office of the Clerk of Court
    WA State Court of Appeals Division III
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION THREE
    AMANDA HELEN TAYLOR,                          )
    )         No. 39380-1-III
    Appellant,             )
    )
    v.                                  )         UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    )
    TODD EMERY TAYLOR,                            )
    )
    Respondent.            )
    FEARING, C.J. — Amanda Taylor appeals from the superior court’s denial of a
    protection order she sought against her former husband. Because Taylor’s appeal
    primarily questions the superior court’s determination of credibility of the parties, we
    affirm.
    FACTS
    This appeal entails the relationship between former spouses Amanda and Todd
    Taylor. In September 2021, Amanda Taylor initiated a proceeding to dissolve her
    marriage with Todd. The Taylors have two children, C.T. and L.T. C.T. was 13 years
    old and L.T. was 11 years old in September 2021.
    In January 2022, Amanda Taylor filed a motion for a temporary family law order
    removing Todd from the family home. The dissolution court granted the motion and
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    afforded Todd thirty days to move from the house. The Taylors finalized the marital
    dissolution in August 2022.
    This appeal concerns the denial of a petition seeking a protection order, which
    Amanda Taylor filed in October 2022. In the petition, Amanda complained of
    controlling behavior by Todd before and after she filed the marital dissolution. In her
    petition, Amanda averred:
    I am afraid of how Todd may react in response to this request [for a
    protection order], towards the [children] and/or myself. This is based on
    the prior CPS situation with [L.T.] after I filed for divorce, and the
    threatening behavior from Todd towards myself related to the order for him
    to move out of the house. I am also afraid of the ongoing physical
    outbursts from [L.T.] towards myself and [C.T.] after contact with Todd.
    ....
    I have been afraid of Todd’s actions for several years and I continue
    to be afraid of his actions on a daily basis. Our children, [C.T.] and [L.T.],
    are also afraid as well. . . As Todd’s behavior continued after the finalized
    divorce documents, I reached out to the YWCA domestic violence program
    for help. This is where I learned about the Power and Control Wheel that
    identifies different forms of abuse, and also about the concept of coercive
    control.
    Physical aggression or threats of physical aggression directly from
    Todd happen occasionally. When discussing his own medical condition
    back in 2020, he talked about how I couldn’t cope with the pain if he hit me
    across the stomach, smashed both my hands with a hammer, and alternated
    sharp pokes with fire on my feet . . . About three months later in February
    of 2022, we had the hearing [to remove Todd from the home]. I was not
    given a link to attend the hearing, but Todd ended up with 30 days to move
    out. When Todd arrived back at the house that same evening of the
    hearing, he stood directly behind me while I was doing dishes. In a low
    voice, he commented “well, that sure went in your favor.” I was very
    scared and did not respond. Then later that night, I was starting to fall
    asleep on the couch. Todd walked upstairs and stood about two feet from
    the couch in the dark living room staring at me. He did not say anything,
    2
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    but continued to stand there for several minutes. My heart was beating out
    of my chest, and I did not know if he was going to do something or not. He
    ended up going back down the stairs. . .
    The verbal and emotional abuse happens very frequently. Prior to
    filing for divorce in September of 2021, Todd would frequently make
    humiliating and degrading comments toward me. He would tell me things
    like I was selfish, stupid, couldn’t manage money, I wasted time, I was
    disorganized, have bad anxiety, and [was] dirty. When I tried to explain
    how I was doing the best I could, he would say it was a “pity party for
    Amanda,” “you never cared about anyone else,” or I would “let him suffer
    while I went and did fun things with the kids.” . . . [W]hen I mentioned not
    being invited on a weekend trip he said “maybe if you behaved then you
    could go too.” Shortly after I filed for divorce in September of 2021, the
    way Todd communicated these types of things started to shift. Todd
    directed some of them towards [C.T.] and [L.T.] instead. . . . Todd also
    added saying things to [L.T.] such as “you are the reason your mom and I
    are getting divorced.” And “your mom and sister love their friends more
    than you.” These types of comments would send [L.T.] into emotional
    distress to the point where she acted out physically. She would hit, punch,
    kick, and slap me. She would also kick doors and walls and throw
    objects. . . .
    After Todd moved [from the family residence], he kept using [L.T.]
    as a way to continue the abuse. The degrading comments he made to [L.T.]
    continued. . . I hoped this situation would stop after the divorce paperwork
    was completed. However, it did not. The pattern is the same. Todd
    reaches out to [L.T.] through phone call and/or text message. . . . [L.T.]
    becomes upset to the point of hitting, kicking, punching, slapping, and
    pulling my hair. She has left visible bruises on my arms and legs, punched
    my head so hard with her fists I have a headache overnight, and grabbed
    my arm and pulled me to the ground. . . .
    ....
    In addition to the physical incidents, Todd uses his phone to take
    videos when he is made [sic] and threatens to use those videos against me.
    ....
    Todd will frequently blame me for keeping the kids away from him.
    ....
    I am in constant fear with everything I do or don’t do, and how Todd
    will use that against me. This fear is directly related to past threats and
    actions from Todd. . . .
    3
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    ....
    Todd has also taken actions to isolate me from others. . . .
    Other types of non-physical abusive behaviors by Todd include
    removing and withholding joint personal belongings. . . .
    Another primary way Todd maintains coercive control is through
    financial exploitation. He frequently withholds, deceives, or lies about
    financial information for his own personal gain. . . . [B]y May of 2019, I
    found out that Todd had opened his own individual checking account and
    transferred his direct deposit there instead. . . .
    ....
    Since 2019, Todd threatened many times that he could get a divorce
    at any time, and he could also force a sale of the house (text message
    attached dated 12-11-19). . . .
    ....
    The financial abuse goes well beyond just the house, though. When
    Todd submitted his pay stub with the divorce response in 2021, I also
    realized he had opened a new additional retirement account through his
    employer at some point–likely back in 2019.
    ....
    I have spent the last three years living in fear. Despite living in
    separate places and the divorce being final, Todd has continued the
    physical, verbal, emotional, and financial abuse. . . .
    Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 9-27.
    In a declaration opposing the petition for a protection order, Todd Taylor avowed:
    I feel the case should be dismissed as I do not pose any danger to the
    children or Amanda. I love my children and put an emphasis on providing
    them as much love and support as I can. I have had very limited interaction
    with Amanda since the divorce was final and plan to have even less moving
    forward.
    I believe it is important to mention that the court has already heard
    the majority of the matters being presented in this petition, and no
    restraining order has been filed as a result of those proceedings. A
    protection order was not requested or ordered on the Temporary Family
    Law Order filed 2/23/22. A protection order was not requested or ordered
    on any of the final divorce decree paperwork filed 8/22/22.
    4
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    . . . I have no interest in seeing, speaking with, or communicating
    with Amanda unless it is absolutely necessary for the children. The current
    parenting plan requires that I pick up both children directly from their
    schools and drop them off back at their schools, when school is in session,
    which has been the case since our divorce was final. I am currently
    required to pick up and drop off at Amanda’s residence when school is not
    in session, but I stay in the driveway, the children get in my vehicle, and we
    leave. Amanda has typically remained in the residence during these
    exchanges, so there has been very limited contact.
    ....
    As I read through the petition, my understanding is the current
    petition asks for a protection order for Amanda and both children to prevent
    physical harm. The petition references the same emergency room visit /
    CPS case that was heard by the court during the 2/23/22 Temporary Family
    Law order in our divorce case 21-3-01772-32. As mentioned during those
    proceedings, CPS has never contacted me or my attorney about any case
    involving me. No restraining order was ordered as a result of those
    proceedings. I noticed in the paperwork served on me, the After Visit
    Summary from the emergency room Visit for [L.T.] on 11/21/21, provides
    the Diagnosis as a “contusion of fifth toe of left foot.” I am not a doctor,
    but my understanding is this means a bruised toe. Filing a protection order
    against me for a bruised toe an entire year after it occurred, insinuating that
    it was my fault the child’s toe got bruised seems ridiculous to me. I did not
    know about the “injury” or even find out about the emergency room trip
    until the insurance statement was mailed to me. And as stated in my
    previous declaration filed 2-17-22, [L.T.] and I spent time together the
    evening after the emergency room trip, playing games and having fun. If
    there was a legitimate concern for the child’s safety, why did Amanda
    allow the child to spend the following evening with me alone, and why was
    the child so willing to do so? [L.T.] did not even mention the emergency
    room visit from the previous day. The whole situation has been completely
    taken out of context in the way Amanda has presented it. . . . I have never
    intentionally hurt any child. As previously mentioned, I can provide
    multiple declarations from individuals who have spent time with me and
    [L.T.], all of which will support my claim that I have no intention of
    hurting anyone.
    I can’t comment to incidents between Amanda and the kids since I
    was not there, but I am concerned to learn there have been multiple
    5
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    physical alterations involving Amanda and [L.T.]. I agreed to counseling
    for the children in the divorce decree.
    ....
    Regarding the stalking behavior restrictions, the only video that is in
    question is the one Amanda had the children take of me, and the transcript
    Amanda made from it. The video seemed strange at the time since the
    children appeared to be coached on items to video, some of which seem to
    be missing from the provided transcript such as the girls checking the
    expiration dates on items in my freezer and fridge. I feel they must have
    been coached because they made a big deal about some items that I had put
    in freezer bags stating the food was expired. I had to point out the date was
    written with a sharpie marker by me, and was the date I put the items in the
    freezer, not the date the food goes bad. My impression was they were
    instructed to check for dates on items and didn’t completely understand
    what they were looking for.
    Regarding comments about speaking to the children regarding the
    court case, I am not trying to speak on court proceedings, but I must admit
    it is difficult to explain to the children why four Sheriff deputies arrived at
    my apartment to serve the paperwork for this case on me during my
    weekend with the children. I tried to explain that they had paperwork to
    give me and that I was going to my bedroom to read it. Of course they had
    questions. I did my best to avoid them and just say I can’t discuss it, sorry.
    I had the same experience when I was required to move from the home
    during our divorce proceedings. I tried to explain that I had to move, and
    was told by [L.T.] that she did not want me to. I responded by explaining
    that I didn’t have a choice, but I would spend time with her as soon as I
    found a place to live, which only prompted concern about where I was
    going to stay. Not my finest moment for sure, but it was not an attack on
    Amanda, it was just a difficult scenario to work through and explain. I
    never would have imagined that a year later, I am back in court trying to
    defend my character on what I said when I was removed from my own
    home, through no fault of my own.
    . . . I am not physically hurting anyone. I have no desire to
    communicate with Amanda unless I need to for the children. Contrary to
    the information Amanda provided in this case, I approach being a father
    much as I approach life. I encourage learning and looking for new ways to
    complete tasks. I don’t encourage my children to be mean to their mother,
    just the opposite. Much like I stated in the video transcript provided by
    Amanda in the case, I suggested to my children they should make the most
    6
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    of the weekend and have a good one. I love my children and dedicate most
    of my free time to them. I am not an angry or violent person.
    CP at 129-134.
    PROCEDURE
    On October 19, 2022, Amanda Taylor filed her petition for a domestic violence
    protection order against Todd Taylor. Amanda named herself, C.T., and L.T. as the
    persons to be protected by the order. Documents attached to the petition included a
    statement by Amanda, a statement by a family friend, a summary of one of L.T.’s doctor
    visits, a summary of one of Amanda’s doctor visits, emails between Amanda and her
    attorney, the declarations Amanda and Todd submitted in February 2022 regarding the
    motion to evict Todd from the family home, a copy of the February order, and
    screenshots of text message conversations between Amanda and Todd and between
    Amanda and the children.
    Todd Taylor filed a declaration in opposition to the petition for the protection
    order on October 31, 2022. Amanda Taylor filed a reply declaration on November 2.
    The superior court conducted a hearing on the petition for the protection order on
    November 21, 2022. At the beginning of the hearing, Amanda Taylor asked the trial
    court if it wished copies of the statutes and cases she planned to rely on in her argument.
    The court declined but stated that it would ask for copies of the authorities if need be.
    7
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    Amanda proceeded to argue that Todd committed domestic violence by way of coercive
    control.
    At the conclusion of the November 21 hearing, the trial court denied the petition.
    The trial court commented:
    Within the context of domestic violence, of course, I’ve considered
    whether there’s evidence of domestic violence in terms of evidence of
    bodily injury, bodily harm, assault, or whether there’s evidence of coercive
    control, whether there’s evidence of unlawful harassment, whether there’s
    evidence of stalking. . . .
    ....
    And so on one set of circumstances I’m evaluating with victims of
    domestic violence, even with counsel, if there’s evidence that that person is
    afraid of consequences, if they’re afraid for reprisal, it could be reasons
    why things don’t come forward. Alternatively, in terms of a family law
    action, it certainly happens as well that individuals can be upset about how
    things go and consequently they’re looking for retaliation. There’s a
    number of things that can really explain this set of circumstances.
    What I have a duty to do is evaluate this evidence and apply it to, of
    course, the legal standard of preponderance of the evidence. So, I’m
    looking for is there more likely than not or a preponderance of the evidence
    that supports any facet of domestic violence.
    In terms of the allegations, there are a lot of allegations . . . that Mr.
    Taylor will make statements, primarily to [L.T.] but sometimes to [C.T.],
    and they are provocative allegedly in nature. They’re inciteful. [L.T.]
    becomes upset. And then recent behavior would be that [L.T.] is taking out
    her frustration on her mom by hitting you, slapping you, all sorts of
    different inappropriate responses. And so, of course, I’m trying to discern
    whether I find there’s evidence to support that Mr. Taylor is doing that or
    whether there is other plausible explanations for that type of behavior.
    And, in terms of a situation like I have before me where I have, Ms.
    Taylor, you telling me one set of circumstances, and Mr. Taylor telling me
    another set of circumstances, and Mr. Dudley [Todd Taylor’s counsel]
    argued at length Mr. Taylor’s perspective, I look for when I have Mr.
    Taylor denying these allegations and indicating that he’s a victim of power
    and control, I’m looking for what evidence do I have to support one party’s
    8
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    claims over the other. Right now I have your word, Ms. Taylor, over Mr.
    Taylor’s word.
    So, I look for is there, for instance, extrinsic or outside evidence that
    could be supportive of one party’s position. While certainly we can have a
    claim made to child protective services, or a claim made to a physician, I’m
    looking for is there evidence that would warrant an investigation. Namely,
    for instance, in terms of a child protective service’s claim, I would see
    evidence that they’re investigating or that there’s a report that it was either
    founded or unfounded, and as I looked through all the evidence I don’t
    have that report. I have the allegations, but I don’t have a report. And
    while the child was taken in for allegations of assault, in terms of whether
    or not her foot or ankle was slammed in the door and those kind of things,
    ultimately the doctor’s findings were a contusion on the toe. Contusion of
    course is bruising. So, I don’t have evidence exactly of what happened.
    And while hearsay is admissible, I’m also evaluating what weight to
    give that. I have a 14-year-old child, a 12-year-old child, and I have
    allegations from you, Ms. Taylor, as what they’re saying, but I don’t have
    any additional information. I’m looking for do I have for instance
    disclosures to a school counselor, or do I have disclosures to a teacher, or
    a physician in terms of things that seem to be genuine in nature about their
    assessment of credibility.
    I, of course, as everyone knows, I don’t have any of those kind of
    reports, so I’m back to Ms. Taylor what you told me and what Mr. Taylor
    has told me. So, it comes down to ultimately credibility.
    I don’t find, in this instance, that there’s evidence that Ms. Taylor
    you were reluctant to make these statements during the course of the
    dissolution for the reasons I have indicated because in fact in those emails
    there’s information exchanged between you and Ms. Deonier [Amanda’s
    attorney]. Some of those were brought to light in brief litigation and some
    of those didn’t go any further. I don’t know the ultimate reasons about the
    strategy behind if it didn’t come forward, but the Court, to the extent it was
    litigated, didn’t make any particular findings that led to restrictions.
    There was one statement that I read and this is in, Ms. Taylor, your
    narrative where you had alleged that Mr. Taylor back in 2020 talked about
    how you couldn’t cope with the pain if he hit you across the stomach with a
    baseball bat, smashed both your hands with a hammer, and alternating
    sharp pokes with fire on your feet. You presented that as an example of
    physical aggression or threats of aggression that would happen
    occasionally.
    9
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    As I’ve said, I looked at all the emails including that email. So, that
    statement isn’t the only statement in conjunction. There is, of course, two
    pages of text pages, and I read it in its entirety. Perhaps not real artful.
    Don’t mean to be critical.
    But, in terms of the narrative, that wasn’t conveyed by Mr. Taylor as
    a threat but instead upon reading the two-page narrative and the text, it
    was really clear to this Court Mr. Taylor was conveying how he felt
    emotionally and the pain that he felt not just from lack of sleep and those
    kind of things but otherwise. And so that wording was in context of trying
    to give you perspective as to how he felt. It wasn’t the fact that he was
    going to do that. Clearly, it was instead a statement that a way to convey
    this is what it would be like if you suffered that kind of pain, the pain I’m
    feeling, and then, of course, he closes with that it would take that for there
    to be any real reasonable conversations. Otherwise, if you don’t agree with
    that perspective, then sign the papers and they can both move on.
    So, when I consider that, it’s concerning to me that that lacks
    credibility for the Court because it wasn’t a threat. It wasn’t him
    threatening to do those things but instead, of course, it’s in the context of
    conveying his feelings and telling in his own words this is what it would be
    like if this happened to you that’s the level of pain that I’m feeling. “I”
    meaning Mr. Taylor. So, that affects my assessment in terms of credibility.
    So, I don’t find that I have sufficient evidence by a preponderance of
    the evidence that leads me to conclude that there’s been domestic violence,
    unlawful harassment, coercive control, stalking, or otherwise. So, for those
    reasons, I’ll be denying the petition today.
    Report of Proceedings (RP) at 21-27 (emphasis added).
    LAW AND ANALYSIS
    On appeal, Amanda Taylor complains that the superior court erroneously assessed
    the credibility of the parties and, in particular, relied on misleading evidence presented by
    Todd Taylor. She next complains that the superior court applied the wrong legal standard
    when denying her petition for a protection order. Finally, she contends that the superior
    court refused to review the case law she wished to present to the court.
    10
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    Witness Credibility
    Amanda Taylor argues that the trial court erred in analyzing the parties’ credibility
    because it relied on discrete incidents of behavior instead of a pattern of behavior and
    relied on misleading, biased statements. This court defers to the trier of fact on the
    persuasiveness of the evidence, witness credibility, and conflicting testimony. In re
    Knight, 
    178 Wn. App. 929
    , 937, 
    317 P.3d 1068
     (2014). The law does not require any
    particular methods by which a trial court assesses credibility.
    Because we defer to the superior court’s findings of credibility, we do not review
    all of the examples forwarded by Amanda Taylor of comments from the trial court that
    suggest error in the court finding Todd Taylor as more credible. We give two instances.
    Amanda Taylor asserts that the trial court explained to her, on the date she filed
    the petition, that she did not qualify for an immediate protection order because nothing
    significant had happened since the parties’ divorce. Amanda maintains that, by denying
    an immediate protection order, the trial court acted in conflict with RCW 7.105.225(2)(e),
    which provides:
    [t]he court may not deny or dismiss a petition for a protection order
    on the grounds that: . . . [t]he conduct at issue did not occur recently or
    because of the passage of time since the last incident of conduct giving rise
    to the petition.
    11
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    Nevertheless, a denial of an immediate protection order based on the lack of recent
    alleged domestic violence does not equate to denying the underlying petition for the
    protection order.
    Amanda Taylor argues that the trial court abused its discretion when analyzing the
    parties’ credibility because it focused on specific text messages and did not understand
    that the text messages were part of a larger pattern of coercive control. She cites the
    following portion of the superior court’s ruling as support for this argument:
    There was one statement that I read and this is in, Ms. Taylor, your
    narrative where you had alleged that Mr. Taylor back in 2020 talked about
    how you couldn’t cope with the pain if he hit you across the stomach with a
    baseball bat, smashed both your hands with a hammer, and alternating
    sharp pokes with fire on your feet. You presented that as an example of
    physical aggression or threats of aggression that would happen
    occasionally.
    As I’ve said, I looked at all the emails including that email. So, that
    statement isn’t the only statement in conjunction. There is, of course, two
    pages of text pages, and I read it in its entirety. Perhaps not real artful.
    Don’t mean to be critical.
    But, in terms of the narrative, that wasn’t conveyed by Mr. Taylor as
    a threat but instead upon reading the two-page narrative and the text, it was
    really clear to this Court Mr. Taylor was conveying how he felt emotionally
    and the pain that he felt not just from lack of sleep and those kind of things
    but otherwise. And so that wording was in context of trying to give you
    perspective as to how he felt. It wasn’t the fact that he was going to do
    that.
    RP at 25-26. Amanda does not elaborate on how the trial court mistakenly assessed
    credibility based on this passage.
    12
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    The trial court could reasonably question Amanda Taylor’s credibility based on
    many factors. She did not seek a protection order during the marital dissolution
    proceeding. Amanda argues that she did not fully understand the control exerted by Todd
    Taylor during this time, and we recognize that sometimes the victim of coercive control
    does not understand its nature until years later. Still, the superior court could reasonably
    conclude otherwise. Amanda claimed that CPS investigated an injured foot of one of the
    daughters. But CPS found no abuse. Amanda suggested that Todd impliedly threatened
    to beat her with a baseball bat, when Todd only suggested that he felt like someone beat
    him with a bat.
    Legal Standard
    Amanda Taylor argues that the trial court, when assessing coercive control,
    employed a mistaken standard that demanded objective evidence of physical assault
    severe enough to warrant an investigation. Nevertheless, other than citing the portion of
    the record where she believes the court articulated the alleged incorrect standard,
    Amanda does not further discuss the trial court’s analysis.
    RCW 7.105.010defines “domestic violence” for purposes of a protection order:
    (9) “Domestic violence” means:
    (a) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of
    physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; nonconsensual sexual conduct or
    nonconsensual sexual penetration; coercive control; unlawful harassment;
    or stalking of one intimate partner by another intimate partner; or
    (b) Physical harm, bodily injury, assault, or the infliction of fear of
    physical harm, bodily injury, or assault; nonconsensual sexual conduct or
    13
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    nonconsensual sexual penetration; coercive control; unlawful harassment;
    or stalking of one family or household member by another family or
    household member.
    (Emphasis added.) RCW 7.105.010 defines “coercive control” as:
    (4)(a) “Coercive control” means a pattern of behavior that is used to
    cause another to suffer physical, emotional, or psychological harm, and in
    purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with a person’s free will and
    personal liberty. In determining whether the interference is unreasonable,
    the court shall consider the context and impact of the pattern of behavior
    from the perspective of a similarly situated person. Examples of coercive
    control include, but are not limited to, engaging in any of the following:
    (i) Intimidation or controlling or compelling conduct by:
    (A) Damaging, destroying, or threatening to damage or destroy, or
    forcing the other party to relinquish, goods, property, or items of special
    value;
    ....
    (E) Communicating, directly or indirectly, the intent to:
    (I) Harm the other party’s children, family members, friends, or pets,
    including by use of physical forms of violence;
    ....
    (H) Engaging in sexual or reproductive coercion;
    (ii) Causing dependence, confinement, or isolation of the other party
    from friends, relatives, or other sources of support, including schooling and
    employment, or subjecting the other party to physical confinement or
    restraint;
    ....
    (iv) Controlling, exerting undue influence over, interfering with,
    regulating, or monitoring the other party’s movements, communications,
    daily behavior, finances, economic resources, or employment, including but
    not limited to interference with or attempting to limit access to services for
    children of the other party, such as health care, medication, child care, or
    school-based extracurricular activities;
    . . . .or
    (vi) Engaging in psychological aggression, including inflicting fear,
    humiliating, degrading, or punishing the other party.
    14
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    Amanda Taylor relies on the following language from the trial court’s ruling to
    argue that the court used the wrong standard:
    [THE COURT:] . . . Right now I have your word, Ms. Taylor, over
    Mr. Taylor’s word.
    So, I look for is there, for instance, extrinsic or outside evidence that
    could be supportive of one party’s position. While certainly we can have a
    claim made to child protective services, or a claim made to a physician, I’m
    looking for is there evidence that would warrant an investigation. Namely,
    for instance, in terms of a child protective service’s claim, I would see
    evidence that they’re investigating or that there’s a report that it was either
    founded or unfounded, and as I looked through all the evidence I don’t have
    that report. I have the allegations, but I don’t have a report. And while the
    child was taken in for allegations of assault, in terms of whether or not her
    foot or ankle was slammed in the door and those kind of things, ultimately
    the doctor’s findings were a contusion on the toe. Contusion of course is
    bruising. So, I don’t have evidence exactly of what happened.
    And while hearsay is admissible, I’m also evaluating what weight to
    give that. I have a 14-year-old child, a 12-year-old child, and I have
    allegations from you, Ms. Taylor, as what they’re saying, but I don’t have
    any additional information. I’m looking for do I have for instance
    disclosures to a school counselor, or do I have disclosures to a teacher, or a
    physician in terms of things that seem to be genuine in nature about their
    assessment of credibility.
    RP at 23-24. This portion of the superior court’s ruling does not suggest that the trial
    court employed a standard that required objective evidence of physical harm severe
    enough to warrant an investigation when analyzing coercive control. Instead, the court
    explained that it needed to find domestic violence by a preponderance of the evidence
    and, because neither party submitted evidence other than declarations and records of
    communications between them, the court needed to weigh Amanda’s word versus Todd’s
    word.
    15
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    The superior court’s ruling recognized the legislature recently added coercive
    control as a basis for a protective order. Nothing in the ruling suggests the court failed to
    understand the nature of coercive control as defined in RCW 7.105.010(4).
    Case Law
    Finally, Amanda Taylor argues that the trial court erred because it failed to ask for
    copies of cases she used in her argument and failed to cite those cases in its decision.
    Taylor cites no authority that requires a trial court to accept copies of cases that a party
    seeks to hand the court during a hearing.
    The three cases Amanda Taylor sought to present to the superior court were State
    v. Nguyen, 10 Wn. App. 2d 797, 
    450 P.3d 630
     (2019), State v. Abdi-Issa, 
    199 Wn.2d 163
    ,
    
    504 P.3d 223
     (2022) and State v. Becklin, 
    163 Wn.2d 519
    , 
    182 P.3d 944
     (2008).
    Nevertheless, those cases help none in determining whether domestic violence took place
    through coercive control. State v. Nguyen concerned the sufficiency of evidence
    supporting a felony stalking conviction. State v. Abdi-Issa addressed whether animal
    cruelty is a form of domestic violence. State v. Becklin concerned a felony stalking
    charge and statutory interpretation of a stalking statute.
    CONCLUSION
    We affirm the trial court’s denial of Amanda Taylor’s petition for a domestic
    violence protection order.
    16
    No. 39380-1-III,
    Taylor v. Taylor
    A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
    2.06.040.
    _________________________________
    Fearing, C.J.
    WE CONCUR:
    ______________________________
    Lawrence-Berrey, J.
    ______________________________
    Cooney, J.
    17
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 39380-1

Filed Date: 2/6/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 2/6/2024