Rebekah Aila Muriel, V. Jonathan David Farris ( 2024 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
February 6, 2024
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Parenting Plan of:
REBEKAH AILA MURIEL, No. 56723-7-II
Respondent,
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
JONATHAN DAVID FARRIS,
Appellant.
PRICE, J. — Jonathan D. Farris appeals a January 2022 parenting plan entered by the
superior court in the dissolution of his marriage to Rebekah A. Muriel. This parenting plan
modified a prior 2020 parenting plan entered in the dissolution. Muriel has moved to dismiss
Farris’ appeal as moot.
Because the parenting plan being appealed is no longer in effect, this appeal is moot.
Accordingly, we dismiss Farris’ appeal and award attorney fees to Muriel.
FACTS
Muriel filed a petition to dissolve her marriage to Farris. On November 19, 2020, the
superior court entered a final parenting plan. Four months later, Muriel filed a petition to modify
the parenting plan. On January 27, 2022, the superior court entered a new final parenting plan
(January 2022 parenting plan). Farris appealed the January 2022 parenting plan.
No. 56723-7-II
After the appeal was filed, Muriel filed a notice of intent to relocate and a motion for
temporary order allowing her to relocate with the children to the United Kingdom. On June 15,
2023, the superior court entered a temporary order allowing Muriel to relocate with the children
(June 2023 temporary order). Farris has objected to the relocation and a trial appears to be pending.
ANALYSIS
Muriel moved to dismiss this appeal, arguing that the January 2022 parenting plan has been
replaced by the June 2023 temporary order and the appeal is now moot. We agree the appeal is
moot.
A case is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief. Maldonado v. Maldonado,
197 Wn. App. 779, 790, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). We will dismiss a case that is moot. RAP 18.9(c).
Although we generally do not review and decide a case that is moot, we can make an
exception to review issues of substantial and continuing interest. Blackmon v. Blackmon, 155 Wn.
App. 715, 720, 230 P.3d 233 (2010). In deciding that an issue is of substantial and continuing
interest we consider whether (1) the issue is of a public or private nature, (2) an authoritative
determination is desirable to provide guidance to public officers, and (3) the issue is likely to recur.
Id. at 720.
Here, there is no effective relief that this court can provide. This appeal relates to the
January 2022 parenting plan, but that parenting plan is not currently in effect. The parties are now
governed by the June 2023 temporary order. And Farris has made no attempt to argue that the
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No. 56723-7-II
January 2022 parenting plan has any continuing effect that would allow us to grant effective relief
by reversing it.1
There is also no reason to apply the exception to mootness; this appeal does not raise issues
of substantial and continuing public interest. This is a private matter between the parties. The
issues raised by Farris are highly fact-specific and, therefore, determination of the issues would
provide no useful guidance to public officers. And, because a temporary relocation order has been
entered and trial on the relocation is pending, the specific issues related to the prior modification
are unlikely to recur.
Muriel also requests attorney fees on appeal based on RCW 26.09.140 and RAP 18.9. RAP
18.1(a) allows us to award attorney fees on appeal if applicable law grants a party the right to
recover attorney fees. RCW 26.09.140 provides that in dissolution proceedings,
Upon any appeal, the appellate court may, in its discretion, order a party to pay for
the cost to the other party of maintaining the appeal and attorneys’ fees in addition
to statutory costs.
Here, we exercise our discretion and award Muriel her attorney fees on appeal under RCW
26.09.140. Therefore, we do not address sanctions under RAP 18.9.
CONCLUSION
This appeal is now moot. Accordingly, we dismiss Farris’ appeal and award fees to Muriel.
1
Muriel moved to dismiss this appeal in her response brief consistent with RAP 17.4(d). Farris
did not file a reply brief or any other answer to Muriel’s motion to dismiss.
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No. 56723-7-II
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J.
We concur:
CRUSER, A.C.J.
CHE, J.
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