In the Matter of the Detention of: A.A. ( 2024 )

FILED
FEBRUARY 8, 2024
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Detention of ) No. 39347-0-III
)
A.A. )
) ORDER WITHDRAWING
) OPINION
)
Having considered both parties’ motion to modify the court’s opinion filed
February 1, 2024, the Court agrees the opinion should be modified.
IT IS ORDERED, the motion to modify the opinion is granted.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, this Court’s opinion filed February 1, 2024, is
hereby withdrawn and a new opinion will be filed this day. The opinion will be modified
to substitute the appellant’s initials for his name throughout the opinion.
PANEL: Judges Staab, Lawrence-Berrey, Cooney
FOR THE COURT:
___________________________________
GEORGE FEARING
Chief Judge
FILED
FEBRUARY 8, 2024
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Detention of )
) No. 39347-0-III
A.A. )
)
) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
STAAB, J. — Under Washington law, when a person who has been involuntarily
committed for treatment at a hospital for a period of 90 or 180 days is determined to no
longer need impatient care, the State must work with the treatment provider to “develop
an individualized discharge plan” and “arrange for a transition to the community . . .
within 14 days of the determination.” RCW 71.05.365. After A.A. was found
incompetent and felony charges were dismissed, the court granted the State’s petition for
involuntary commitment and ordered A.A. to be held for up to 90 days of involuntary
treatment.
On appeal, A.A. assigns error to the order authorizing involuntary treatment,
arguing that the order violated RCW 71.05.365 because the evidence presented at the
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hearing indicated that he was at “baseline” and would not improve with additional
inpatient treatment. The State responds that the requirements of RCW 71.05.365 apply
only after a person has been involuntarily committed for 90 or 180 days. The parties
disagree on whether A.A.’s detention during his criminal case qualified as “involuntary
commitment” for the purposes of RCW 71.05.365. We hold that A.A.’s pre-trial
commitment for evaluation and restoration under chapter 10.77 RCW does not qualify as
involuntary commitment for treatment under RCW 71.05.365. Thus, the trial court’s
initial order of civil commitment did not violate RCW 71.05.365.
BACKGROUND
A.A. is an individual who has been diagnosed with both substance abuse disorder
and schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type. He was admitted to Eastern State Hospital
(ESH) on May 5, 2022 for a 15-day competency evaluation period for the purpose of
restoring his capacity following several criminal charges. When restoration was
unsuccessful, on June 27, 2022, the “Yakima County Superior Court ordered that Mr.
A.A. undergo a second period of competency restoration treatment for up to 90 days as
well as an evaluation regarding his competency to proceed to trial.” Clerk’s Papers (CP)
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at 11. On September 16, 2022, after restoration efforts failed, the criminal charges were
dismissed pursuant to RCW 10.77.086(4).1
That same day, the court signed an order committing A.A. to ESH for 72 hours for
evaluation for the purpose of filing a civil commitment petition under the Involuntary
Treatment Act (ITA), ch. 71.05 RCW. ESH filed a petition with the court for 180-day
involuntary treatment under chapter 71.05 RCW. Specifically, it filed this petition
because it was determined that A.A. was incompetent, had “committed acts constituting a
felony, and as a result of [his] behavioral health disorder, present[ed] a substantial
likelihood of repeating similar acts.” CP at 2. A treating psychologist at ESH provided an
affidavit supporting the petition for involuntary treatment. She concluded that A.A., as a
result of his behavioral health disorder, was “gravely disabled.” CP at 5.
On October 27, 2022, a hearing was held for the involuntary commitment of A.A..
Upon agreement of the parties, ESH sought only 90 days of involuntary treatment on the
1
“When any defendant whose highest charge is a class C felony other than assault
in the third degree under RCW 9A.36.031(1)(d) or (f), felony physical control of a
vehicle under RCW 46.61.504(6), felony hit and run resulting in injury under RCW
46.52.020(4)(b), a hate crime offense under RCW 9A.36.080, a class C felony with a
domestic violence designation, a class C felony sex offense as defined in RCW
9.94A.030, or a class C felony with a sexual motivation allegation is admitted for
inpatient competency restoration with an accompanying court order for involuntary
medication under RCW 10.77.092, and the defendant is found not competent to stand
trial following that period of competency restoration, the court shall dismiss the charges
pursuant to subsection (7) of this section.”
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sole basis of grave disability. At the hearing, one of his doctors testified that A.A.’s
behavior had improved and that he was considered to be at baseline. The doctor
indicated that getting A.A. to baseline took significant doses of medication over the
months and the doctor was still worried about A.A.’s aggressiveness. In her opinion,
A.A. required further inpatient care at ESH to establish a discharge plan. Additionally,
another doctor testified that less restrictive alternative treatment was not in A.A.’s best
interest, due to the lack of supportive housing and A.A.’s intent to stop medication. After
hearing this testimony, the court found A.A. gravely disabled, remanded A.A. into the
custody of DSHS, and ordered 90 days of intensive inpatient treatment.
A.A. now appeals the trial court’s commitment order.
ANALYSIS
A.A. contends that the trial court erred in ordering him civilly committed to ESH
for 90 days of inpatient treatment because A.A. had already been at ESH for four months
and was no longer benefitting from inpatient treatment. He asserts that under these
conditions, RCW 71.05.365 required his release within 14 days. The issue requires us to
interpret RCW 71.05.365.
When interpreting a statute, a court’s “fundamental objective is to ascertain and
give effect to the legislature’s intent.” Leander v. Dep’t of Ret. Sys., 186 Wn.2d 393,
405, 377 P.3d 199 (2016). Construction of a statute is a question of law reviewed de
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novo. State v. Engel, 166 Wn.2d 572, 576, 578, 210 P.3d 1007 (2009). “Where the
language of a statute is clear, [the] legislature intent is derived from the [plain] language
of the statute.” Id. at 578. In order to determine a statute’s plain meaning, courts should
examine the “statute in which the provision at issue is found, as well as related statutes or
other provisions of the same act in which the provision is found.” Dep’t of Ecology v.
Campbell & Gwinn, LLC., 146 Wn.2d 1, 10, 43 P.3d 4 (2002). If after this inquiry the
plain meaning is susceptible to more than one reasonable meaning, “the statute is
ambiguous and it is appropriate to resort to aids to construction, including legislative
history.” Id. at 12.
“In general, a . . . person may be involuntarily committed under the ‘Involuntary
Treatment Act’ (ITA), chapter 71.05 RCW, by one of two avenues.” See In re Detention
of P.P., 6 Wn. App. 2d 560, 568, 431 P.3d 550 (2018). “The first avenue involves
procedures initiated by mental health professionals” while the “second . . . involves
procedures after the dismissal of a felony charge under RCW 10.77.086.” Id. at 568-69.
An important distinction here is that under the former avenue, after “a 72-hour evaluation
and treatment period, . . . a petition for an additional 14 days of involuntary intensive
treatment or an additional 90 days of a less restrictive alternative . . . may be filed. Id. at
569. However, under the latter avenue, and relevant here, a petition may bypass “the 14-
day and 90-day requirements mandated under the first avenue of the ITA.” Id. at 569-70.
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In essence, after the “72-hour evaluation period, . . . the evaluating physician[ ]” may
move forward directly with a petition “for 180 days of involuntary treatment” as occurred
here. Id. at 569.
Once “a person has been determined to be incompetent pursuant to RCW
10.77.086(7)” following dismissal of felony charges, “then the professional person in
charge of the treatment facility or his or her professional designee or the designated crisis
responder may directly file a petition . . . for 90-day treatment under RCW 71.05.280(1),
(2), or (4).” RCW 71.05.290(3). Additionally, they may “petition for 180-day treatment
under RCW 71.05.280(3).” Id. Among other things, and applicable here, “a person may
be committed for further treatment pursuant to RCW 71.05.320” if “[s]uch person is
gravely disabled.” RCW 71.05.280(4).
In this case, after ESH filed its petition seeking involuntarily commitment for 180
days, the parties agreed that ESH would proceed on a request for only a 90-day
involuntary commitment for treatment. If a court finds a person is gravely disabled and
that the best interests of either that person or another will not be served by less restrictive
treatment, “the court shall remand him or her to the custody of the department of social
and health services or to a facility certified for ninety day treatment by the department for
a further period of intensive treatment not to exceed ninety days from the date of
judgment.” RCW 71.05.320(1)(a). Here, the court found that A.A. suffers from both
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“substance disorder” and “schizoaffective disorder, bipolar type.” CP at 37. As a result
of these behavioral health disorders, it found A.A. gravely disabled and ordered inpatient
treatment at ESH for 90 days.
After an initial commitment for treatment, the ITA provides for the release of
persons who are no longer benefitting from inpatient services and should be transitioned
into the community. “When a person has been involuntarily committed for treatment to a
hospital for a period of 90 or 180 days,” and it is determined “that the person no longer
requires . . . inpatient” treatment, the responsible agency and hospital shall work together
“to develop an individualized discharge plan, and arrange for transition to the community
. . . within 14 days of the determination.” RCW 71.05.365.2
2
RCW 71.05.365: “When a person has been involuntarily committed for treatment
to a hospital for a period of 90 or 180 days, and the superintendent or professional person
in charge of the hospital determines that the person no longer requires active psychiatric
treatment at an inpatient level of care, the behavioral health administrative services
organization, managed care organization, or agency providing oversight of long-term care
or developmental disability services that is responsible for resource management services
for the person must work with the hospital to develop an individualized discharge plan,
including whether a petition should be filed for less restrictive alternative treatment on
the basis that the person is in need of assisted outpatient treatment, and arrange for a
transition to the community in accordance with the person's individualized discharge plan
within 14 days of the determination.”
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A.A. argues that the conditions of RCW 71.05.365 were met and required his
transition into the community rather than a 90-day civil commitment. In response to the
State’s argument that his earlier detention was not a civil commitment for treatment, A.A.
argues that chapters 10.77 and 71.05 RCW are related statutes and should be read in
tandem. Thus, he contends that his detention under chapter 10.77 RCW should qualify as
“involuntary commitment for treatment” under RCW 71.05.365. As further support for
this argument, he points out that the term “commitment” is defined the same under both
chapters. See RCW 10.77.010(3); 71.05.020(1).
We disagree that the criminal commitment provisions under chapter 10.77 RCW
are the same as the civil commitment provisions under chapter 71.05 RCW. While the
two chapters concern the detention, evaluation, and treatment of persons with mental
illness, they have distinct goals, and apply different procedures at different stages of a
criminal case. Chapter 10.77 RCW provides procedures to determine the competency of
a person charged with a crime, restoration efforts, and commitment of the criminally
insane following acquittal of criminal charges by reason of insanity. See RCW
10.77.060(1)(e), .086, .084(1)(b), .110.
Here, A.A. had been ordered to undergo competency restoration at ESH. Once
restoration was proved unsuccessful, his criminal charges were dismissed. Pursuant to
RCW 10.77.086(7)(a) and because A.A. had previously engaged in inpatient
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competency restoration services for this case, the court ordered a 72-hour hold for the
purpose of filing a civil commitment petition.
Civil, or involuntary commitment is governed by chapter 71.05 RCW. As noted
above, when a defendant’s competency cannot be restored and criminal charges are
dismissed, a petition may be filed seeking involuntary commitment for treatment. Here,
A.A.’s initial detention at ESH was for competency evaluation and restoration under
chapter 10.77 RCW. The court’s 90-day civil commitment was the first time A.A. had
been civilly committed for mental health treatment under chapter 71.05 RCW.
In support of his argument that “involuntarily committed for treatment” has the
same meaning in both chapters, A.A. points to RCW 71.05.030, which provides that
“[p]ersons suffering from a behavioral health disorder may not be involuntarily
committed for treatment of such disorder except pursuant to provisions of this chapter,
[or] chapter 10.77 RCW,” along with several other chapters.3 It is true that in addition to
providing procedures for competency evaluation and restoration, chapter 10.77 RCW also
provides for the treatment of those who have been found criminally insane. RCW
3
RCW 71.05.030: “Persons suffering from a behavioral health disorder may not
be involuntarily committed for treatment of such disorder except pursuant to provisions
of this chapter, chapter 10.77 RCW, chapter 71.06 RCW, chapter 71.34 RCW, transfer
pursuant to RCW 72.68.031 through 72.68.037, or pursuant to court ordered evaluation
and treatment not to exceed ninety days pending a criminal trial or sentencing.”
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10.77.120. But A.A. was not acquitted by reason of insanity so this portion of chapter
10.77 RCW did not apply to him.
Finally, we reject A.A.’s constitutional challenge. A.A. provides a brief paragraph
arguing that in addition to violating the ITA, the court’s order “raises constitutional
concerns.” Appellant’s Br. at 9. Specifically, A.A. provides that pursuant to due process,
people may be civilly committed only to the extent necessary. One of A.A.’s providers
testified that A.A. had “stabilized,” was “at baseline,” and only required continued
inpatient care to create a discharge plan. Id. However, aside from this short paragraph
and quote from the provider, A.A. does not challenge any of the court’s findings that he
was gravely disabled or provide meaningful argument of the issue. “Passing treatment of
an issue or lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to allow for our meaningful review.”
See State v. Stubbs, 144 Wn. App. 644, 652, 184 P.3d 660 (2008), rev’d on other
grounds, 170 Wn.2d 117, 240 P.3d 143 (2010).
Prior to his charges being dismissed, A.A. was detained for competency evaluation
and restoration; he was not involuntarily committed for treatment. Following a hearing,
the trial court found A.A. gravely disabled and involuntarily committed
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A.A. for 90 days at ESH. Under these circumstances, RCW 71.05.365 does not
apply and A.A. was not entitled to be released.
Affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
_________________________________
Staab, J.
WE CONCUR:
_________________________________
Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.
_________________________________
Cooney, J.
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