State Of Washington, V. Terrance Quinlan ( 2023 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 84239-1-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v.
TERRANCE JOE QUINLAN, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Appellant.
SMITH, C.J. — After a dispute over a rented room, Terrance Quinlan fired a
handful of gunshots at Santokh Tara-Singh and his girlfriend, Amanda Gomez,
as they fled the scene. Quinlan was later charged with and convicted of first
degree assault, two counts of first degree unlawful possession of a firearm, and
felony violation of a court order. On appeal, Quinlan asserts that his counsel was
ineffective for failing to object to testimony that was irrelevant and overly
prejudicial. He also contends the victim penalty assessment should be stricken
because he is indigent. And in a statement of additional grounds, he raises
several issues related to his due process rights, his right to privacy, and the
effectiveness of his trial counsel. Finding no error regarding his convictions, we
affirm but remand for the court to strike the victim penalty assessment.
FACTS
In 2020, Gary Sayers and his wife were living in a house in Kent and
renting out one of the rooms to Santokh Tara-Singh. The rental terms were
established by verbal agreement and Tara-Singh had no formal lease. In
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exchange for rent, Tara-Singh, a mechanic, worked on cars that Sayers bought
at auctions and later sold. Tara-Singh’s girlfriend, Amanda Gomez, frequently
stayed at the house with him.
On October 1, 2020, Tara-Singh and Gomez arrived at the house to find
Tara-Singh’s room door had been kicked down and his room had been
ransacked. Many of Tara-Singh’s belongings were missing. When Tara-Singh
confronted Sayers about the break-in, Sayers admitted that he broke into the
room and that he wanted to rent the room to Terrance Quinlan instead. Quinlan
was also present at this time, along with his girlfriend, Leah Roberts, and his
cousin. Sayers started demanding that Tara-Singh vacate the room immediately
but offered to let him move his things to the living room. Quinlan joined in with
Sayers and demanded that Tara-Singh leave the premises. After arguing with
Sayers and Quinlan for a few more minutes, Tara-Singh and Gomez decided to
leave.
While Gomez gathered her belongings, Tara-Singh headed to his car
parked in the driveway. A short while later, Tara-Singh tried to go back into the
house to help Gomez but discovered that the door had been locked. He could
hear Gomez shouting “[l]et me out” on the other side; Gomez also yelled through
the door that Quinlan was blocking the exit. Gomez and Quinlan started pushing
each other at the door, and Tara-Singh was eventually able to push the door
open enough to allow Gomez to escape. Once Gomez was outside, the two
rushed to Tara-Singh’s car.
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Sayers, Roberts, and Quinlan’s cousin followed Tara-Singh outside.
Roberts ran toward the car and hit the front windshield with a brick while
Quinlan’s cousin and Sayers attempted to pry the car doors open. After doing a
180-degree fishtail, Tara-Singh managed to maneuver around the other cars
blocking the driveway. As Tara-Singh exited the driveway, he heard a gunshot
and then his car’s rear window shattered. A second gunshot hit the corner panel
near Tara-Singh’s head. Tara-Singh looked over his shoulder as he drove away
and saw Quinlan standing on the porch with a handgun pointed in his direction.
Quinlan fired at least three other shots that missed the car. Two of those shots
struck a neighbor’s house, one hitting the garage and the other travelling through
the house and lodging in the front door.
Tara-Singh was shocked and afraid but uninjured. Gomez, however, was
bleeding from a bullet fragment that had grazed her neck. Tara-Singh started to
drive towards the hospital but stopped when he realized that Gomez’s injury was
minor. Tara-Singh and Gomez instead drove to a nearby 7-Eleven convenience
store and asked a bystander to call 911.
Several Kent police officers, along with a few on-duty special weapons
and tactics (SWAT) officers, responded to Sayers’s house in response to the
shooting. Suspecting that the shooter was still inside, officers established a
perimeter outside the house and ordered all occupants outside. Sayers and his
wife complied and exited the house. Officers determined from the missing cars
in the driveway that Quinlan had already left the scene before police arrived.
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Using global positioning system (GPS) pings from Quinlan’s cellphone,
officers were later able to determine his location. Officers then conducted
surveillance of Quinlan for about a week. During this time, officers witnessed
Quinlan with Roberts, in violation of a no-contact order protecting Roberts.
On October 23, a joint task force comprised of officers from the Bureau of
Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) and the Department of Corrections
(DOC)1 arrested Quinlan outside a convenience store. Police vehicles
surrounded Quinlan’s car to prevent him from fleeing and, because his windows
were too darkly tinted to allow officers to view inside the car, officers broke the
windows. Roberts was found nearby and officers noted that she had dyed her
dog’s fur a different color than they’d previously observed.
After the arrest, officers spotted a gun in the center console of the car.
Detective Daniel Yagi of the Kent Police Department obtained a search warrant
for the car and it was transported to a secure impound lot. Once at the lot,
officers searched the vehicle and recovered the gun in the center console.
Quinlan was transported to the Kent police station and agreed to speak
with the officers. He denied involvement in the shooting, claimed not to know
Sayers, and told officers he did not know there was a gun in the car. He also
denied owning a cellphone, despite police finding one on his person.
Quinlan was charged with first degree assault, two counts of first degree
unlawful firearm possession, and felony violation of a court order. A jury
convicted him as charged. Quinlan appeals.
1 These agencies frequently work together to perform arrests.
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ANALYSIS
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Quinlan claims his trial counsel was ineffective for not objecting to
irrelevant and overly prejudicial testimony about the police investigation and his
subsequent arrest. Because the testimony was both relevant and not overly
prejudicial, we disagree.
We review ineffective assistance of counsel claims de novo. State v.
Estes, 188 Wn.2d 450, 457, 395 P.3d 1045 (2017). The Sixth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and article I, section 22 of the Washington State
Constitution guarantee the right to effective assistance of counsel. Estes, 188
Wn.2d at 457. To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a
defendant must establish (1) that counsel’s performance was deficient, and (2)
that deficiency resulted in prejudice. State v. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d 856, 862, 215
P.3d 177 (2009). Counsel’s performance is deficient if it falls “below an objective
standard of reasonableness based on consideration of all the
circumstances.” State v. McFarland, 127 Wn.2d 322, 334-35, 899 P.2d 1251(1995). To show prejudice, the defendant must show that there was a
“ ‘reasonable probability’ ” that but for the deficient performance, the result of the
proceedings would have been different. State v. Jones, 183 Wn.2d 327, 339,
352 P.3d 776 (2015) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694, 104
S. Ct. 2052, 80 L. Ed. 2d 674 (1984)). If either element of the test is not met, our
inquiry ends. Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 862.
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There is a strong presumption that representation was effective. State v.
Grier, 171 Wn.2d 17, 33, 246 P.3d 1260 (2011). “When counsel’s conduct can
be characterized as legitimate trial strategy or tactics, performance is not
deficient.” Kyllo, 166 Wn.2d at 863. “Decisions on whether and when to object
to trial testimony are classic examples of trial tactics.” State v. Crow, 8 Wn. App.
2d 480, 508, 438 P.3d 541 (2019). If an appellant focuses “their claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel on their attorney’s failure to object, then ‘[they]
must show that the objection would likely have succeeded.’ ” State v. Vazquez,
198 Wn.2d 239, 248, 494 P.3d 424 (2021) (quoting Crow, 8 Wn. App. 2d at 508).
However, if counsel fails to object to inadmissible evidence, then they have
performed deficiently. Vazquez, 198 Wn.2d at 248.
Only relevant evidence is admissible. ER 402. “Relevant evidence” is any
evidence that tends to make a fact of consequence more or less probable than it
would be without that evidence. ER 401. But relevant evidence “may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair
prejudice.” ER 403. Testimony about police investigations is relevant because
the average juror has little to no knowledge about police investigations and may
question the appropriateness of the officers’ actions if not properly explained.2
2 Relying on State v. Aaron, 57 Wn. App. 277, 787 P.2d 949 (1990),
Quinlan asserts that “[e]vidence of the circumstances of a person’s arrest is
typically irrelevant and inadmissible.” But the issue in Aaron was far narrower:
the court focused its analysis on whether a hearsay exception applied and did
not announce such a broad sweeping rule as Quinlan suggests. 57 Wn. App. at
280 (concluding that officer’s state of mind in reacting to dispatcher’s statement
was not relevant for another purpose other than proving the truth of the matter
asserted).
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State v. Perez-Arellano, 60 Wn. App. 781, 783-84, 807 P.2d 898 (1991)
(evidence that defendant was arrested for delivery of controlled substance in a
“high narcotic area” relevant to explain why police were surveilling the area). The
threshold to admit relevant evidence is very low and even minimally relevant
evidence is admissible. State v. Darden, 145 Wn.2d 612, 621, 41 P.3d 1189(2002).
Here, Quinlan contends that testimony from law enforcement officers
about the circumstances of his arrest and the related investigation were irrelevant
and unduly prejudicial because the testimony (1) suggested the offenses were
particularly egregious, (2) implied that police had information not in the record
suggesting Quinlan was an extreme danger to society, and (3) gave the jury the
impression that the police had already deemed Quinlan guilty. He also
challenges testimony by a neighbor as irrelevant and unduly prejudicial. We
address each witness’s testimony in turn.
Officer Garth Corner. Quinlan objects to the following testimony from
Officer Corner:
• That “on-duty SWAT” responded to the incident at Sayers’s
house.
• That there were safety concerns necessitating more officers
on the scene and containment of the house.
This testimony from Officer Corner was relevant to explain the actions of law
enforcement. Officer Corner explained that establishing a perimeter around the
house was necessary because officers believed the suspected shooter was still
inside the house. He also noted that additional safety precautions were
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warranted because the officers received a report that flammable containers were
inside the house and that at least one roommate was still inside the house even
after officers ordered everyone to vacate.
We disagree that this testimony was unduly prejudicial. The reference to
the SWAT response was in passing and, as the officer noted, an “on-duty” SWAT
response is very different from, and much smaller than, a full SWAT deployment.
And the reference to “safety concerns” was also not unduly prejudicial—it is
apparent that the response to a report of a shooting presents a safety concern.
Detective Doug Whitley. Quinlan challenges the following testimony from
Detective Whitley:
• That law enforcement obtained cellphone location data to locate
Quinlan.
• That officers surveilled Quinlan for a week with a high-powered
camera.
• That officers placed GPS trackers on cars associated with Quinlan.
• That officers decided against using a search warrant and chose to
arrest Quinlan away from his residence “for the safety” and to avoid
using a SWAT team.
• That the Kent Police Department obtained the assistance of a joint
“task force” that included ATF and DOC officers to arrest Quinlan.
• That at least three vehicles were used to block Quinlan’s car.
• That officers “jumped out of their vehicle” and “broke the windows
[of Quinlan’s car] and then demanded compliance.”
Detective Whitley’s testimony about cellphone location data, the high-powered
camera, the task force, and the pinning technique was relevant to explain the
propriety of the investigation and how law enforcement was able to find Quinlan.
It was also relevant to show that Quinlan was located at Sayers’s house near the
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time of the shooting and that Quinlan was with Roberts in violation of the
no-contact order.
None of this testimony was unduly prejudicial. Detective Whitley testified
that cellphone data is commonly used in investigations to locate suspects and
noted that a court order is necessary to obtain such information. And although
Quinlan asserts that he was surveilled for a week with a high-powered camera,
Detective Whitley’s testimony only supports that Quinlan was photographed on a
single occasion while outside doing yard work. Moreover, the detective noted
that the high-powered camera was only used because law enforcement wasn’t “a
hundred percent sure” that the individual was Quinlan. As to the car tracking,
Detective Whitley testified that only two cars were being tracked and that they
were both cars associated with Quinlan and with Roberts. The detective’s
testimony about the joint ATF and DOC task force, the procedure for pinning
Quinlan’s car, and the number of cars used to pin Quinlan’s car was not unduly
prejudicial because these were brief statements and not part of a central theme
in the State’s case. And even if defense counsel believed this evidence was
inadmissible, counsel’s performance is still not deficient for failing to object to it; it
is a legitimate trial tactic to decline to object to inadmissible evidence to avoid
emphasizing it. State v. McLean, 178 Wn. App. 236, 247, 313 P.3d 1181 (2013).
We note that the detective’s testimony about the search warrant and use
of SWAT was objected to by defense counsel and the objection was sustained.
The permitted testimony did not mention SWAT and explained that the officers’
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“safety concerns” with executing the warrant had to do with displacing other
residents at the home.
Officer Cody Blowers. Quinlan contests the following testimony from
Officer Blowers:
• That when he arrived at Sayers’s house, at least three officers were
already there waiting for additional officers to arrive because it was
“a dangerous shooting.”
• That with “violent crimes and stuff like that SWAT will come out”
and that a SWAT team did respond in this case.
Quinlan’s argument that Officer Blowers’ testimony was irrelevant and unduly
prejudicial is unconvincing. Again, testimony about the police investigation was
relevant to explaining how Quinlan was apprehended and the propriety of the
investigation. That three or more officers responded to a reported shooting is
unsurprising and to be expected. Shootings are, by their very nature, dangerous
and violent crimes. The officer explained that SWAT frequently works with the
Kent Police Department to help serve warrants in situations involving guns. So,
Officer Blowers’s testimony tended to show that SWAT involvement was not an
indication that Quinlan himself was unusually dangerous.
Specialist John Conaty. Quinlan asserts that the following testimony from
ATF Specialist Conaty was irrelevant and unduly prejudicial:
• That his “ATF task force,” comprised of officers from different law
enforcement agencies, “was the primary [agency] that was going to
arrest Mr. Quinlan.”
• That the task force conducted surveillance on Quinlan before the
arrest.
• That the task force wanted “to prevent him from fleeing” because
“somebody who’s driving erratically or trying to get away from an
arrest poses a safety risk.”
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• That the procedure of blocking a car in and breaking its windows
was not unusual “in this kind of case.”
As discussed, testimony about ATF’s actions and involvement with the arrest and
surveillance was relevant to explain to the jury how the gun was recovered and to
help the jury evaluate the propriety of the investigation. Because the jury heard
testimony that ATF routinely assisted the Kent Police Department with
investigations, this testimony was not unduly prejudicial.
We note, too, that Quinlan mischaracterizes and misquotes part of
Specialist Conaty’s testimony. Specialist Conaty did not imply that Quinlan had
been driving erratically—he explained that the procedure of boxing in a car is to
prevent a suspect from fleeing and to insure “the safe arrest of the person” and
the safety of the officers. Because the safety of all parties involved is of
paramount concern, Specialist Conaty explained that “somebody who’s driving
erratically or trying to get away from an arrest poses a safety risk”—he did not
specify that Quinlan was driving erratically or trying to escape. Likewise,
Specialist Conaty clarified that the procedure of boxing in a car is not unique to
Quinlan’s case—law enforcement uses this tactic whenever a suspect is in a car
to insure safety.
The same is true for breaking the car’s windows. Specialist Conaty
explained that “seeing people’s hands is the most important thing” because “if
they hold a weapon or anything like that, it can hurt you, so that’s primarily the
reason why [the officers here] ended up having to break windows is because
they’re so darkly tinted we can’t see inside there.” And when asked whether
breaking windows is standard operating procedure or unusual, Specialist Conaty
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replied, “It’s not unusual.” None of the specialist’s testimony suggested to the
jury that Quinlan was uniquely dangerous; rather, the testimony indicated that
law enforcement employed standard tactics used in most cases involving
suspects in cars.
Marie Vergara. Quinlan takes issue with the following testimony from
Marie Vergara, Sayers’s neighbor:
• That a bullet entered her home and went through the infant room of
the daycare she runs out of her house.
• That Sayers’s house was irksome and the neighborhood felt
unsafe.
• That at least four or five police cars responded to Sayers’s house
that evening.
This testimony was relevant to the charges involved and not unduly prejudicial.
Vergara identified the room on a diagram to show the path of the bullet, which
was relevant to prove that the gunshots originated from Sayers’s house. Vergara
did not comment on the infant room but simply referred to the room by its
purpose, which was not improper and did not warrant an objection.
Vergara’s comment that the higher volume of traffic around Sayers’s
house made the neighborhood seem unsafe is also not unduly prejudicial to
Quinlan. It could even support Quinlan’s theory of the case that someone else
was responsible for the shooting. Vergara’s testimony that four or five police
cars responded to the scene is similarly not unduly prejudicial. When asked how
many police cars were at the scene, Vergara first responded, “I don’t remember”
before adding that there were “at least four to five.” That four or five police cars
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responded to a shooting incident—where the suspect was still at large—does not
indicate an outsized police response.
We also emphasize that Quinlan’s counsel did attempt to exclude much of
the testimony Quinlan challenges on appeal. During motions in limine, defense
counsel moved to prevent members of the task force arrest team from testifying
that Quinlan was on DOC supervision, that he had a DOC warrant out, or that the
DOC officers were even involved in supervising offenders at all. On these facts,
Quinlan fails to demonstrate that his counsel was deficient.
Victim Penalty Assessment
Quinlan maintains that the victim penalty assessment should be stricken
because of his indigent status. The State agrees.
The legislature recently amended RCW 7.68.035 to prohibit the imposition
of a victim penalty assessment if the court finds that the defendant is indigent at
the time of sentencing. As neither party disputes that Quinlan was indigent at the
time of sentencing, we remand for the court to strike the assessment from the
judgment and sentence.
Statement of Additional Grounds
In a statement of additional grounds, Quinlan asserts that officers violated
his right to privacy by seizing evidence from his car without a warrant and by
using excessive force. He also contends that his due process rights were
violated when police failed to turn over exculpatory evidence. Finally, he argues
that his counsel was ineffective for not objecting to either of these violations. We
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disagree that Quinlan’s right to privacy or his due process rights were violated
and therefore disagree that his counsel was ineffective.
1. Right to Privacy
Article I, section 7 of the Washington State Constitution provides that “[n]o
person shall be disturbed in his private affairs, or his home invaded, without
authority of the law.” The “authority of the law” needed is typically a warrant, with
a few narrow exceptions.3 State v. Cornwell, 190 Wn.2d 296, 301, 412 P.3d
1265 (2018).
Here, the officers had a warrant to search Quinlan’s car. Detective Yagi
testified that officers obtained a warrant to search Quinlan’s car a few days after
he was arrested. During the search, officers located a 9mm Smith & Wesson
handgun inside the center console.
Quinlan also claims that the officers used excessive force in violation of
the Fourth Amendment by trapping his car with three police vehicles. Because
Quinlan does not explain why this tactic constituted excessive force, we decline
to reach this issue. See Palmer v. Jensen, 81 Wn. App. 148, 153, 913 P.2d 413(1996) (“Passing treatment of an issue or lack of reasoned argument is
insufficient to merit judicial consideration.”).
3 Quinlan notes that individuals on probation have a reduced expectation
of privacy and that a community corrections officer may search these individuals
based on a reasonable suspicion of a probation violation rather than a warrant.
He then argues that the officers in this case did not have reasonable suspicion of
a probation violation and that the search was unlawful. Because the officers had
a warrant to search the car, we do not need to address whether the search met
this lower standard.
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2. Due Process
To comply with due process, the prosecution has a duty to disclose
material exculpatory evidence to the defense and a duty to preserve such
evidence for the defense. State v. Armstrong, 188 Wn.2d 333, 344, 394 P.3d
373 (2017). But this rule does not require the police to search for exculpatory
evidence. Armstrong, 188 Wn.2d at 345. To establish a violation of this rule, a
defendant must establish (1) that the evidence is favorable, either because it is
exculpatory or impeaching, (2) that the evidence was suppressed by the State,
either willfully or inadvertently, and (3) that the evidence is material. State v.
Davila, 184 Wn.2d 55, 69, 357 P.3d 636 (2015).
Quinlan asserts that the State breached its duty to disclose exculpatory
evidence by failing to obtain and produce video footage of the shooting that was
captured by a neighbor. The record paints a different picture. At trial, the State
learned from one of its witnesses that a neighbor possibly possessed
surveillance video of the events at issue. The prosecutor told the court that an
officer had previously attempted to retrieve the video but was unsuccessful and
that the State would try to locate the video immediately. The State successfully
retrieved the video that same day and disclosed it to defense counsel. The video
captured only the audio of four to six gunshots and video of Tara-Singh’s car
driving down the street. Because the video did not provide any new information
outside the testimony given at trial, it was not exculpatory. Despite the delay in
obtaining the evidence, we conclude that Quinlan suffered no due process
violation.
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3. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
Finally, Quinlan argues that his counsel was ineffective for failing to object
to the allegedly warrantless search and the due process violation. Because the
search was not warrantless and Quinlan suffered no due process violation, there
was nothing for Quinlan’s counsel to object to and counsel was not ineffective.
We affirm and remand for the court to strike the victim penalty
assessment.
WE CONCUR:
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