State of Washington v. Michael Randall Lauderdale ( 2024 )

FILED
JUNE 13, 2024
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, ) No. 39441-7-III
)
Respondent, )
)
v. ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
MICHAEL RANDALL LAUDERDALE )
)
Appellant. )
PENNELL, J. — In 1995, a jury found Michael Lauderdale guilty of aggravated
first degree murder and first degree felony murder, and sentenced him to life without
parole (LWOP). Mr. Lauderdale was 19 years old at the time of the offense conduct. In
2021, his case was remanded by our Supreme Court to the trial court for resentencing to
consider the mitigating factors of youth in light of In re Personal Restraint of Monschke.
197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021) (plurality opinion). On resentencing, the trial court
reimposed Mr. Lauderdale’s LWOP sentence. We affirm.
No. 39441-7-III
State v. Lauderdale
FACTS 1
In 1994, then 19-year-old Michael Lauderdale killed Jeremy Wood by assaulting
him with a baseball bat. Forensic evidence indicated Mr. Lauderdale also bound
Mr. Woods’s legs and sexually assaulted Mr. Wood’s deceased body. A jury convicted
Mr. Lauderdale of aggravated first degree murder and first degree felony murder.
He received a sentence of LWOP. In 2019, Mr. Lauderdale moved for resentencing,
alleging a double jeopardy violation. The State conceded the violation. The trial court
then vacated the felony murder conviction and Mr. Lauderdale was resentenced to
LWOP, as it was required to do at the time.
Mr. Lauderdale appealed the LWOP sentence, arguing the trial court had the
discretion, but failed to recognize it, to impose a sentence below life in prison based on
the mitigating characteristics of youth. We rejected Mr. Lauderdale’s argument on appeal.
See State v. Lauderdale, No. 37141-7-III, (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2020) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/371417_2_ord.pdf. The Supreme Court accepted
1
The transcript from Mr. Lauderdale’s 1995 trial is unavailable. Unless otherwise
noted, we draw our factual recitation from this court’s prior decisions. See State
v. Lauderdale, No. 37141-7-III, (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 24, 2020) (unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/371417_2_ord.pdf; State v. Lauderdale,
noted at 83 Wn. App. 1023 (1996).
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review only on the sentencing issue and immediately remanded the case to the trial court
for resentencing in light of Monschke, which held that Washington’s constitutional
prohibition of mandatory LWOP sentences extends to youthful offenders aged 18 to 20.
Ruling Granting Rev., State v. Lauderdale, No. 99591-5 (Wash. Sept. 1, 2021).
On remand, Mr. Lauderdale’s attorney submitted a voluminous mitigation packet,
including a detailed family history, psychological evaluation report, risk assessment
report from the Department of Corrections, and various certificates of achievement and
training earned by Mr. Lauderdale while incarcerated.
A resentencing hearing was held on October 20, 2022. The trial court listened to
statements from several of Mr. Wood’s family members and friends. The parties then
presented their recommendations. The State argued that, under Monschke, the court
“must give meaningful consideration to [Mr.] Lauderdale’s youthfulness at the time
he committed the crime.” Rep. of Proc. (RP) (Oct. 20 ,2022) at 30. Nevertheless, the
State asked the court to reimpose the LWOP sentence based on the facts of the case,
seriousness of the crime, and Mr. Lauderdale’s continued lack of remorse. Id. at 31-33.
Mr. Lauderdale asked for a 30-year sentence, which would essentially amount to time
served. During his allocution, Mr. Lauderdale stated he was ashamed of what he had
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done, but was focused on changing himself for the better. Id. at 45-48. The court then
took the matter under advisement.
The trial court reconvened on November 3, 2022. At that hearing, the court
referenced the applicable case law, including Monschke. The court read from State v.
Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 387 P.3d 650 (2017), identifying the factors relevant to
determining whether an offender’s culpability was impacted by the mitigating factors
of youth. RP (Nov. 3, 2022) at 58-59.
The court detailed the information set forth in Mr. Lauderdale’s mitigation packet.
It acknowledged Mr. Lauderdale had a traumatic childhood and lack of impulse control
as a juvenile. Id. at 60-62. The court also noted Mr. Lauderdale had largely stayed out of
trouble in prison and maintained employment and engagement in prison programming.
Id. at 62-63.
The court then turned to the details of Mr. Lauderdale’s offense conduct. The
crime against Mr. Wood showed calculation and planning. It “was not an impulsive act.”
Id. at 69. And, although Mr. Lauderdale had taken responsibility for some of his conduct,
he had never admitted to binding Mr. Wood’s legs or sexually assaulting Mr. Wood. Id.
at 65, 71. There was no evidence Mr. Lauderdale’s conduct was prompted by peer or
family pressure. Id. at 67. And after completion of the crime, Mr. Lauderdale attempted
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to get rid of evidence connecting him to the murder, thus exhibiting not only
consciousness of guilt but an awareness of consequences. Id. at 70-71.
In terms of Mr. Lauderdale’s circumstances at the time of the offense conduct,
the trial court explained Mr. Lauderdale was living as an adult. He was no longer in
his abusive childhood home. He was employed and had obtained independent housing
and his GED (general educational diploma). Id. at 67. “[Mr. Lauderdale] had control
over his own environment at the time that he committed this crime.” Id. at 70. After his
arrest, Mr. Lauderdale demonstrated he was capable of working with counsel and
assisting with his defense. Id. at 67.
The trial court recited the various purposes of punishment under the Sentencing
Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, including proportionality, respect for law,
community protection, “retribution, deterrence, incapacitation, and rehabilitation.” Id.
at 71-72. The court then determined the original LWOP sentence remained appropriate
for Mr. Lauderdale. Id. at 72. The court subsequently conformed its oral decision to
written findings. Clerk’s Papers at 176-82.
Mr. Lauderdale has filed a timely appeal.
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State v. Lauderdale
ANALYSIS
Mr. Lauderdale’s first argument on appeal is that the Washington Constitution
requires a categorical bar on LWOP for defendants aged 20 and under. Mr. Lauderdale
cites to State v. Bassett, 192 Wn.2d 67, 428 P.3d 343 (2018), which adopted a categorical
bar for juveniles under age 18. According to Mr. Lauderdale, the court’s decision in
Monschke dictates that a categorical bar must also apply to young adults aged 18 to 20.
We disagree with Mr. Lauderdale’s assessment of Monschke. The lead opinion in
Monschke “was careful to note it was not concluding that LWOP is categorically barred
for young adults and was therefore not announcing a decision similar to State v. Bassett.”
In re Pers. Restraint of Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d 1, 23, 513 P.3d 769 (2022). The Monschke
lead opinion specifically recognized that “[n]ot every 19- and 20-year-old will exhibit
. . . mitigating characteristics” warranting leniency. 197 Wn.2d at 326. Accordingly,
Monschke affords trial courts discretion to assess the propriety of an LWOP sentence on
an individual basis. This court has repeatedly rebuffed invitations to extend Monschke’s
ruling. See State v. Krueger, 26 Wn. App. 2d 549, 555-56, 540 P.3d 126 (2023), review
denied, ___ Wn.2d ___, 547 P.3d 900 (2024).
Consistent with Monschke, we hold sentencing courts retain discretion to impose
LWOP sentences on youthful adult offenders. To the extent Mr. Lauderdale believes
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Bassett must be expanded to include youthful offenders, that must be resolved by our
Supreme Court.
Mr. Lauderdale also argues the trial court abused its discretion at resentencing by
focusing on the facts of the offense and retribution instead of taking a forward-looking
approach focused on rehabilitation. In support of this argument, Mr. Lauderdale cites
State v. Haag, 198 Wn.2d 309, 495 P.3d 241 (2021). 2
Mr. Lauderdale’s reliance on Haag is misplaced. Haag involved a juvenile
resentencing under former RCW 10.95.030(3) (2015) and former RCW 10.95.035 (2015).
Former RCW 10.95.030(3)(b) set forth the following process for imposing a sentence for
aggravated first degree murder on a defendant under age 18:
[T]he court must take into account mitigating factors that account for the
diminished culpability of youth as provided in Miller v. Alabama, [567 U.S.
460,] 132 S. Ct. 2455[, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407] (2012) including, but not limited
to, the age of the individual, the youth’s childhood and life experience, the
degree of responsibility the youth was capable of exercising, and the
youth’s chances of becoming rehabilitated.[3]
Haag noted that this statutory language does not include a “any reference to retributive
factors.” 198 Wn.2d at 322. Given the statutory text, the Supreme Court reasoned that
2
Mr. Lauderdale also complains the trial court improperly relied on facts outside
the record and did not reconstruct the 1995 trial transcript. These contentions were not
preserved in the trial court and therefore will not be reviewed on appeal. See RAP 2.5(a).
3
This same provision is now found in RCW 10.95.030(2)(b).
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State v. Lauderdale
“the legislature intended sentencers to focus on mitigating factors, with retribution
playing a minor role.” Id. According to the Haag court, this means the sentencing hearing
“must be forward looking, not backward looking.” Id. at 322-23.
Because Mr. Lauderdale was nearly 19 years and 8 months old at the time of his
offense conduct, his 2022 resentencing did not fall under former RCW 10.95.030(3)(b).
Rather, as recognized by the trial court at the time of resentencing, Mr. Lauderdale’s
sentencing was governed by the nonstatutory, constitutional factors set forth in Ramos.
As explained in Ramos, when assessing the constitutionality of an LWOP sentence
on a youthful offender, a trial court “must meaningfully consider how juveniles are
different from adults.” 187 Wn.2d at 434-35. “If the [young person] proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that his or her crimes reflect transient immaturity,
substantial and compelling reasons would necessarily justify an exceptional sentence
below” LWOP. Id. at 435. A court assessing the constitutionality of an LWOP sentence
during a resentencing hearing may consider evidence of a defendant’s postsentencing
rehabilitative efforts. Id. at 449. However, it is not required to consider such evidence. Id.The resentencing court here complied with the procedure set forth in Ramos.
The court gave meaningful consideration to Mr. Lauderdale’s mitigation evidence.
It recognized Mr. Lauderdale had a traumatic childhood. It also recognized he had done
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State v. Lauderdale
a lot to rehabilitate himself during his time in prison. But the court determined that
at the time of the offense Mr. Lauderdale was exhibiting adult conduct and behavior.
His offense conduct did not reflect transient immaturity. Thus, the court was not
constitutionally prohibited from imposing a sentence of LWOP.
CONCLUSION
The judgment of conviction is affirmed.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in
the Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
_________________________________
Pennell, J.
WE CONCUR:
______________________________
Staab, A.C.J.
______________________________
Cooney, J.
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