Personal Restraint Petition Of Edwin C. Zuniga ( 2023 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
December 12, 2023
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Personal Restraint of: No. 57212-5-II
EDWIN CHAVEZ ZUNIGA, UNPUBLISHED OPINION
Petitioner.
CHE, J. ⎯ In 2016, Edwin C. Zuniga pleaded guilty to two counts of first degree rape of a
child in Pierce County Superior Court cause number 15-1-01315-9. Count 1 was based on acts
Zuniga committed between the age of 20 and 21. Count 2 was based on acts Zuniga committed
between the age of 13 and 19. The trial court sentenced Zuniga to a SSOSA1, which was revoked
in 2019. Subsequently, Zuniga filed a CrR 7.8 motion for relief from judgment, which the trial
court transferred to this court for consideration as personal restraint petition.
Zuniga argues that he is entitled to resentencing because the trial court did not consider
mitigating factors relating to his youthfulness at the time of the crimes. He further argues that his
petition is not time barred because of a significant, material, retroactive change in the law. We
disagree and dismiss the petition as time-barred.
RCW 10.73.090(1) requires that a petition be filed within one year of the date that the
petitioner’s judgment and sentence becomes final. Zuniga’s judgment and sentence became final
when it was filed on May 16, 2016. RCW 10.73.090(3)(a). Zuniga did not file this petition until
March 24, 2022, well over one year later. Thus, unless Zuniga established that one of the six
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Special Sex Offender Sentencing Alternative (SSOSA).
No. 57212-5-II
time-bar exceptions in RCW 10.73.100 applies to his argument or that his judgment and sentence
is facially invalid or was not entered by a court of competent jurisdiction, this petition is time
barred. RCW 10.73.090(1); RCW 10.73.100; In re Pers. Restraint of Hankerson, 149 Wn.2d
695, 702, 72 P.3d 703 (2003).
Zuniga does not argue that his judgment and sentence is facially invalid or that it was not
rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction. Instead, he argues that this petition is not time
barred because State v. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409 (2017), and In re Personal
Restraint of Monschke, 197 Wn.2d 305, 482 P.3d 276 (2021), are significant, material,
retroactive changes in the law that qualify for the significant change in the law exception to the
time bar established in RCW 10.73.100(6).
Zuniga was an adult when he committed count 1. Therefore, his reliance on Houston-
Sconiers fails as to that count because Houston-Sconiers’s holding is expressly limited to
juvenile defendants and Zuniga was not a juvenile when he committed that offense, so it is not
material to this petition. In re Pers. Restraint of Young, 21 Wn. App. 2d 826, 831-32, 508 P.3d
687, review denied, No. 1009585 (2022). Although Monschke extended Houston-Sconiers to
young adult offenders who were convicted of aggravated first degree murder and sentenced to a
mandatory sentence of life without the possibility of parole, our Supreme Court has not extended
Houston-Sconiers to young adult offenders who were convicted of other crimes and not
sentenced to mandatory life sentences. In re Pers. Restraint of Kennedy, 200 Wn.2d 1, 24-25,
513 P.3d 769 (2022); In re Pers. Restraint of Davis, 200 Wn.2d 75, 81-83, 514 P.3d 653 (2022).
Accordingly, Zuniga does not establish a significant, material, retroactive change in the law or
any other time bar exception in RCW 10.73.100(2) as to count 1.
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No. 57212-5-II
The untimeliness of Zuniga’s challenge to count 1 is fatal to his petition. Zuniga may or
may not have been a juvenile when he committed count 2; he was between the age of 13 and 19.
But because Zuniga’s challenge to count 1 is untimely, his petition is at best “mixed,” meaning it
raises both untimely claims and claims that are exempt from the time limit under RCW
10.737.100. Mixed petitions must be dismissed. In re Pers. Restraint of Thomas, 180 Wn.2d 951,
953, 330 P.3d 158 (2014). Therefore, even assuming Zuniga can show that count 2 was
committed when he was a juvenile, his petition must nonetheless be dismissed.
Accordingly, we hold that Zuniga’s petition is time-barred and dismiss his petition.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW
2.06.040, it is so ordered.
Che, J.
We concur:
Lee, P.J.
Veljacic, J.
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