Jake Platt, V. Paige Wager ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JAKE PLATT,
No. 85758-4-I
Respondent,
DIVISION ONE
v.
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
PAIGE WAGER,
Appellant.
DÍAZ, J. — A trial court issued a domestic violence protection order (DVPO)
against appellant Paige Wager, which protects her ex-husband and co-parent,
Jake Platt. The court found that Wager had engaged in domestic violence through
unlawful harassment. Wager now asserts that the court failed to make sufficiently
specific findings explaining the basis of the DVPO, and that Platt did not proffer
sufficient evidence to establish harassment. Wager fails to demonstrate reversible
error and we affirm.
I. FACTS
Wager and Platt were married from 2011 to 2015. They share equal
parenting time with their son, R.P., per a superior court parenting plan.
Wager remarried after their divorce and, according to Platt, their co-
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parenting relationship began to deteriorate after her second husband attempted
suicide with a firearm in 2021. Prior to his own suicide attempt, the second
husband’s son had committed suicide by a self-inflicted gunshot in 2020.
Platt petitioned for a DVPO in May 2023. In support, he provided a
declaration that alleged Wager was abusively targeting him online, and that
attached relevant text messages and emails between them, as well as declarations
signed by his fiancée and adult son. Platt’s fiancée’s declaration claimed that
Wager once chased her and Platt across a parking lot as they were walking to their
car when leaving an event for R.P. Platt’s petition also requested the immediate
surrender of a number of firearms he claimed Wager owned. The court ex parte
granted the petition and entered a temporary order.
Later that month, Platt filed an amended petition, which made several new
factual claims and which requested an order of protection for their son in addition
to himself. Namely, in a supporting declaration, Platt asserted that a court in
Issaquah had entered an entirely separate protective order against Wager in 2022
based on harassing text messages she had sent to her then mother-in-law.
Further, he provided evidence that she had since violated that order and faced
criminal charges. In the same declaration, he also reported that, following the entry
of the temporary order in this matter, he had received another message from
Wager in violation of the order, in which she threatened to take full custody of their
son.
Additionally, Platt provided a declaration from Wager’s second husband,
who attested that she possessed numerous high-capacity rifles which did not
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conform to legal specifications, and that he was concerned Wager was evading
the temporary weapons surrender order. Platt’s attorney also filed a declaration
attaching an email from a detective in the King County Prosecuting Attorney’s
Office Regional Firearms Unit. The detective stated that Wager owned six guns,
one of which was not accounted for in her purchase history, and that Wager had
“blatantly” refused to comply with the surrender order. The detective further stated
that three of the weapons were illegally altered or contained a magazine capacity
in violation of regulations.
Finally, in his amended petition, Platt stated he feared for his son based
upon new information he had recently received. Platt claimed Wager’s ex-husband
told him several friends had witnessed Wager driving drunk with their son in the
car and said that she regularly drank heavily. And Platt asserted that R.P. told him
that Wager had once punched him and cursed at him. To supplement his amended
petition, he later filed another declaration from his mother, in which she also
attested that R.P. had told her that Wager punched him, upsetting and scaring him.
She claimed R.P. also told her Wager punished him for lengthy periods if he
disagreed with her.
Following a June 2, 2023 hearing, a pro tem commissioner granted Platt’s
amended petition for a DVPO, protecting both Platt and R.P. The commissioner
entered the DVPO solely “based upon the fact that there’s been allegations of harm
to [R.P.]. . . .” Wager moved for revision.
In July 2023, a superior court judge granted the motion on revision in part
and entered an amended protection order. The court struck the provisions of the
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prior protection order that related to R.P. because it found only “limited details”
showing Wager had physically harmed R.P. and because the timing and nature of
the relief sought “raise[d] credibility questions.” However, the court denied the
motion for revision as to Platt, finding that, based on the totality of the evidence,
Platt provided sufficient proof that Wager engaged in domestic violence by
unlawfully harassing him.
The court later denied Wager’s motion for reconsideration, and she now
timely appeals each of the superior court’s decisions. 1
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
This court reviews a trial court’s decision to grant or deny a domestic
violence protection order for an abuse of discretion. Maldonado v. Maldonado,
197 Wn. App. 779, 789, 391 P.3d 546 (2017); see also Juarez v. Juarez, 195 Wn.
1 During the pendency of the appeal, Platt filed a “Motion to Dismiss as Moot”
(Sept. 5, 2024), arguing that Wager’s appeal should be dismissed because the
DVPO has now expired. Wager filed a written opposition to the motion. “Generally,
we will dismiss an appeal where only moot or abstract questions remain or where
the issues raised in the trial court no longer exist.” Price v. Price, 174 Wn. App.
894, 902, 301 P.3d 486 (2013). A case is not moot, however, when the court can
still provide effective relief. Hough v. Stockbridge, 113 Wn. App. 532, 537, 54 P.3d
192 (2002). Because this court could provide effective relief to Wager, we address
the merits of her claims.
In Wager’s opposition to Platt’s motion, she also expressly sought as alternative
relief, if the panel granted Platt’s motion to dismiss, an accompanying order from
this court “that the entire superior court case in Platt v. Wager, King County
Superior Ct. No. 23-2-07898-5 SEA, is moot and order that the case be dismissed
and that any findings that Ms. Wager committed domestic violence or represented
a physical threat to Mr. Platt be vacated,” but offered no authority in support of the
proposition that we may issue such an order. Answer of Appellant to "Resp’t’s
Mot. to Dismiss as Moot" at 1-2 (Sept. 9, 2024). Because we reach the merits of
her appeal, we need not consider this request further.
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App. 880, 890, 382 P.3d 13 (2016) (“We will not disturb such an exercise of
discretion on appeal absent a clear showing of abuse.”) (emphasis added). A court
abuses its discretion “when a trial judge’s decision is exercised on untenable
grounds or for untenable reasons,” or “if its decision was reached by applying the
wrong legal standard.” Id.In reviewing a trial court’s factual findings, this court does not “substitute our
judgment for the trial court’s, weigh the evidence, or adjudge witness credibility.”
In re Parentage of T.W.J., 193 Wn. App. 1, 8, 367 P.3d 607 (2016) (quoting In re
Marriage of Greene, 97 Wn. App. 708, 714, 986 P.2d 144 (1999)). Instead, this
court determines whether substantial evidence supports the findings and whether
those findings support the conclusions of law. Graser v. Olsen, 28 Wn. App. 2d
933, 941, 542 P.3d 1013 (2023).
Substantial evidence exists if the record contains “evidence sufficient to
persuade a fair-minded, rational person that the finding is true.” Id. “[S]ubstantial
evidence review ‘is deferential and requires the court to view the evidence and
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the party who prevailed’
below.” Garza v. Perry, 25 Wn. App. 2d 433, 453, 523 P.3d 822 (2023) (quoting
State v. Living Essentials, LLC, 8 Wn. App. 2d 1, 14, 436 P.3d 857 (2019). 2
B. The Adequacy of the Trial Court’s Findings
Wager first argues that the trial court’s findings are not sufficient for
2 Wager argues this court must review the DVPO with a degree of “heightened”
scrutiny because she also brings a claim under the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution. For the reasons below, we do not reach the merits of her First
Amendment claim, and thus we need not and will not consider this argument
further.
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appellate review. That is, she claims the trial court erred because it did not “set
out with specificity which of the communications [she sent to Platt] constituted
unlawful harassment.” In support, Wager cites to three cases and a court rule, but
none support her proposition that a judge must make detailed findings to grant a
civil protection order.
Each case Wager relies on require specific findings in discrete legal
contexts. For instance, she cites to In re Marriage of Lawrence, 105 Wn. App. 683,
686, 20 P.3d 972 (2001), a family law case in which appellant challenged an order
granting custody to her children’s father. This court remanded the matter back to
the superior court to make additional findings, holding that “[a] trial court must
make findings of fact and conclusions of law sufficient to suggest the factual basis
for the ultimate conclusions” and that the trial court’s findings were “so incomplete
that this court is unable to determine the theory upon which it made its decision”
to award custody to the respondent. Id.Lawrence is distinguishable for two reasons. First, the findings were
deficient because they were “insufficient for us to determine the basis” of the
custody decision, both legally and factually. Id. at 685. Here, in contrast, as we
will detail below, this court can determine the statutory basis of Platt’s legal theory
(harassment) and the general factual basis of the trial court’s ultimate conclusions.
Cf. Noll v. Special Elec. Co., Inc., 9 Wn. App. 2d 317, 319, 444 P.3d 33 (2019)
(where this court held it may remand for additional findings of fact where it is unable
to “discern the reasoning or underlying facts supporting [a trial court’s] decision,”
but is not required to do so where the record indicates proper statutory analysis).
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Second, the basis on which the trial court in Lawrence was required to make
“findings of fact and conclusions of law” was inter alia CR 52(a). 105 Wn. App. at
686, n.2. That rule requires trial courts to make specific findings of fact and
separate conclusions of law, but generally only in “all actions tried upon the facts
without a jury or with an advisory jury” or where “specifically required.” CR 52(a)(1)
and (2). Those actions “specifically required” include decisions involving (A)
“temporary injunctions,” (B) as in Lawrence, “domestic relations,” and (C) “[i]n
connection with any other decision where findings and conclusions are specifically
required by statute, by another rule, or by a local rule of the superior court.” CR
52(a)(2). Because the authority under which the court in Lawrence was required
to issue findings of fact and conclusions of law is inapplicable here, that case is
inapposite. 3
Moreover, the protection order statute makes clear, in its silence on the
matter, that it does not require a court to state particular factual findings before
issuing a DVPO. RCW 7.105.225(5) states that, when a court “declines to issue a
protection order, it shall state in writing the particular reasons for the court’s denial.”
(Emphasis added). The statute contains no similar language requiring a court to
3 Wager’s reliance on State v. Cannon, 130 Wn.2d 313, 329, 922 P.2d 1293(1996), fails for similar reasons. Cannon was a criminal bench trial where specific
findings of fact are required under CrR 6.1(d) for purposes of appealing a criminal
conviction. Id. at 317. Cannon urged our Supreme Court to reverse his conviction
because the trial court failed to enter written findings of fact and conclusions of law
until two years after his sentencing. Id. at 329. The opinion is focused on the
timing and prejudice of belated entry of findings for purposes of the right to appeal
a criminal conviction, and is otherwise silent as to the specificity of the required
findings of fact and conclusions of law, if any, let alone in civil cases such as here.
Id. at 329-330.
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provide specific facts or reasons it considered and adopted for a decision to grant
a DVPO.
To “give effect to the legislature’s intentions,” this court must, “[w]hen
possible. . . derive legislative intent solely from the plain language enacted by the
legislature, considering the text of the provision itself, the context of the statute in
which the provision is found, related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a
whole.” Rodriguez v. Zavala, 188 Wn.2d 586, 591, 398 P.3d 1071 (2017). “Our
starting point” for deriving a statute’s plain meaning is not only the language on the
face of the statute, but also the language of “closely related statutes in light of the
underlying legislative purpose.” In re Marriage of Drlik, 121 Wn. App. 269, 276, 87
P.3d 1192 (2004).
Wager essentially asks this court to add a requirement where there is none,
but we “‘must not add words where the legislature has chosen not to include them.’”
Birgen v. Dep’t of Labor & Indus., 186 Wn. App. 851, 857, 347 P.3d 503 (2015)
(quoting Rest. Dev., Inc. v. Cananwill, Inc., 150 Wn.2d 674, 682, 80 P.3d 598(2003)). “Instead, we construe statutes assuming that the legislature meant
exactly what it said.” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Herridge, 169 Wn. App. 290,
297, 279 P.3d 956 (2012)). Therefore, we hold RCW 7.105.225’s plain language
does not require specific findings before granting a DVPO.
Finally, Wager’s argument is weakened, rather than strengthened, by her
reliance on In re Det. Of LaBelle, 107 Wn.2d 196, 219, 728 P.2d 138 (1986).
There, our Supreme Court deemed the trial court’s written findings to be deficient
in part because they were not specific enough to determine which of two alternative
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statutory definitions the court had relied upon. Id. However, the court held that
reversal was still not required, because the court’s oral statements and the
evidence contained in the record “indicate[d]” it relied on appropriate statutory
criteria. Id. at 219-220. Our Supreme Court explained, “a trial court is not required
to make findings of fact on all matters about which there is evidence in the record;
only those which establish the existence or nonexistence of determinative factual
matters need be made.” Id. at 219. And even if a trial court’s written findings are
inadequate, the Court held an appellate court may still review the “entire record,
including the trial courts’ oral decisions, in order to determine the sufficiency of the
evidence supporting the trial court’s ultimate findings . . . .” Id. “In addition, where,
as here, no exceptions are taken below to the findings, we will give them a liberal
construction rather than overturn the judgment based thereon.” Id.Here, the orders on review are adequate either in themselves or because
they at least allow us to identify “the existence or nonexistence of determinative
factual matters” and the statutory basis for the court’s decision to grant the DVPO.
Id.Specifically, the court’s written order first reiterated the procedural history
of Platt’s several petitions made in his declarations, and then it expressly
compared the level of detail of his allegations that Wager had abused R.P. with the
level of detail he provided regarding the allegations of her harassment of him.
As to the latter, in its oral ruling, the court found that:
the level of detail surrounding the physical and verbal abuse asserted
by Mr. Platt was significantly different when compared to the level of
detail that was provided regarding the other allegations raised
against the respondent, Ms. Wager. For example, in the amended
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petition and the accompanying documents, it was unclear when the
child alleged that they were punched by Ms. Wager, when the
alleged assaults took place, and when that Mr. Platt learned of the
alleged assaults.
In other words, the court identified that the factual allegations of the physical and
verbal abuse suffered by Platt were the determinative factual issues, while the
alleged physical abuse of R.P. was not.
Furthermore, the court identified the universe of the evidence upon which it
was relying and specified the type of domestic violence at issue, finding:
the totality of the evidence is sufficient to establish the Respondent’s
communication with the Petitioner, while often related to parenting,
nonetheless demonstrated a knowing and willful course of conduct
aimed at alarming, annoying, or harassing the Petitioner.
Thus, of the many forms of domestic violence, the court identified the harassment
prong as the statutory basis for its order.
In turn, we hold the factual and legal basis to grant the DVPO was, if not
fulsome, was sufficient for appellate review, particularly as the underlying statute
and no other authority requires detailed findings of fact or conclusions of law. 4
C. The Sufficiency of the Evidence of Domestic Violence Harassment
4 Wager also argues that the court’s findings were deficient because its order did
not contain “an explanation for why Ms. Wager’s communications created a threat
to Platt’s physical safety.” In support of her claim that the court found, without
sufficient support, that she posed a threat to Platt’s physical safety, Wager cites to
a box checked under finding number seven on the amended protection order.
Indeed, in the amended order, there is a box checked indicating the court found
“[t]he restrained person represents a credible threat to the physical safety of the
protected person/s.” However, the court did not make or adopt a finding that
Wager posed a threat to Platt’s physical safety when it announced its oral ruling,
nor did it separately state that in its order on revision. Moreover, there is no
requirement that the court find a risk to someone’s physical safety before it can
issue a harassment-based DVPO. Thus, whether it did or did not substantiate this
superfluous finding is irrelevant to our analysis.
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1. Applicable Law
To grant a domestic violence protection order, the trial court must find by a
preponderance of the evidence that the petitioner has been subjected to domestic
violence by the respondent. RCW 7.105.225(1)(a). Domestic violence can occur
between intimate partners, the definition of which includes persons who formerly
resided with one another or share a child in common. RCW 7.105.010(20). One
form of domestic violence is unlawful harassment. RCW 7.105.010(9). More
specifically, RCW 7.105.010(9) defines domestic violence to mean any of the
following: “Physical harm. . . infliction of fear of physical harm . . . or . . . unlawful
harassment.” RCW 7.105.010(9) (emphasis added).
RCW 7.105.010(36)(a) explains that “unlawful harassment” means, not only
an act or threat of physical violence, but also:
A knowing and willful course of conduct directed at a specific person
that seriously alarms, annoys, harasses, or is detrimental to such
person, and that serves no legitimate or lawful purpose. The course
of conduct must be such as would cause a reasonable person to
suffer substantial emotional distress, and must actually cause
substantial emotional distress to the petitioner . . . .
RCW 7.105.010(36) (emphasis added). “Course of conduct” refers to a pattern of
conduct composed of a series of acts that occur over a period of time. RCW
7.105.010(6)(b). The series of acts which constitute harassment may encompass
any form of communication, contact, or conduct that evidence a continuity of
purpose. Id. The statute further expressly exempts constitutionally protected free
speech or activity from its definition of harassment. Id.RCW 7.105.010(6)(b) provides factors to use “[i]n determining whether the
course of conduct serves any legitimate or lawful purpose.” Among the relevant
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factors are whether:
(ii) [t]he respondent has been given clear notice that all further
contact with the petitioner is unwanted;
(iii) [t]he respondent’s course of conduct appears designed to alarm,
annoy, or harass the petitioner;
(v) [t]he respondent’s course of conduct has the purpose or effect of
unreasonably interfering with the petitioner’s privacy or the purpose
or effect of creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive living
environment for the petitioner; . . .
(vi) [c]ontact by the respondent with the petitioner or the petitioner’s
family has been limited in any manner by any previous court order.
RCW 7.105.010(6)(b). Taken together, the statutory definitions allow a court to
enter a DVPO after finding harassment based on a pattern of knowing and willful
actions over a period of time, in which someone directs a series of communications
or conduct to another, without a lawful purpose, that are detrimental and
reasonably cause the recipient to suffer emotional distress. On its plain terms,
such a course of conduct may occur even without evidence of a threat of violence
or an act of physical violence.
2. Discussion
Wager argues the trial court abused its discretion when it found she
committed domestic violence through unlawful harassment. Specifically, she
argues, on the one hand, that the court’s decision was “based on an incorrect legal
standard” (i.e., entering a DVPO based on mere words) and, on the other hand,
that the order otherwise “lacked substantial evidence to support them.” She
contends the only evidence before the court involved Wager’s speech which is
legally insufficient and that, because the court did not find she was physically
aggressive, that she stalked Platt, or had done anything else to Platt other than
“say annoying things,” there was insufficient evidence to grant the DVPO.
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As to the first argument, Wager’s suggestion that the evidence in the record
consisted only of her speech is simply factually incorrect. The evidence before the
court included allegations of behavior or conduct beyond mere speech. Platt
provided evidence that Wager chased after him in a parking lot. He also provided
evidence that she “blatantly” refused to comply with the legal obligation to turn over
numerous, potentially illegally-owned, firearms. The court also had evidence
before it that Wager had violated a separate antiharassment order. Moreover,
multiple witnesses declared that she drank excessive amounts of alcohol, in a
manner endangering their child. It is simply not correct, as Wager contends, that
the court “did not find that the harassment was based on anything other than Ms.
Wager’s speech.” The court based its decision on the totality of the evidence and
it is not for this court to “adjudge witness credibility” or weigh allegations of
concerning conduct when they are in the record. T.W.J., 193 Wn. App. at 8.
Even if we were solely to examine Wager’s written communications, we are
unable to conclude that the court abused its discretion in finding her text and other
messages implicate more than just “annoying” words. That is, a reasonable
person could find that those texts constituted harassment because the totality of
her communications demonstrate a course of conduct intended to alarm, annoy or
threaten Platt. RCW 7.105.010(36).
Indeed, several of Wager’s messages to Platt explicitly state that she had
the intention to insult and threaten Platt. For instance, she writes in one series of
text messages, “And yes/this is a threat. . . Consider it a threat and if you are
insulted you can also consider mission accomplished.” (Emphasis added). In a
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separate e-mail, she writes, “I will take custody from you if you don’t start
participating [in “mutual” activities] . . . Yes – this is a threat.” (Emphasis added).
Platt also provided text and other messages Wager sent to him and to his
fiancée over time, which a reasonable person could conclude were intended to
demean their physical appearance, their sincerity, and their fidelity to each other.
In text messages Platt filed with the court, he provided Wager with responses that
a reasonable person could conclude were clear notice that such contact was
unwanted, and yet, in further texts, Wager repeatedly chose to continue to send
what a reasonable person could find to be “alarming” messages. See RCW
7.105.010(6)(b)(ii) (a petitioner may establish a course of conduct in part by
showing “[t]he respondent has been given clear notice that all further contact with
the petitioner is unwanted”); RCW 7.105.010(36).
In short, there is sufficient evidence in the record “to persuade a fair-minded,
rational person that” the finding that Wager knowingly and willfully engaged in an
annoying, harassing, or detrimental course of conduct, as required by RCW
7.105.010(36)(a), “is true.” Graser, 28 Wn. App. 2d at 941.
In response, Wager suggests that there was no evidence of harassment
because Wager’s communications were “made in the context of on-going
discussions about parenting issues.” But her communications were not
automatically sent for a “lawful purpose,” under RCW 7.105.010(36), simply
because much of her contact with Platt temporally related to their parenting plan
or conveyed parenting requests. That is, a respondent’s threats are not cleansed
from being harassment simply because the purpose behind them was to raise
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parenting objections. Here, we cannot conclude that the trial court erred when it
found the totality of Wager’s communication with Platt, while often related to
parenting, nonetheless demonstrated a knowing and willful course of conduct
aimed at alarming, annoying, or harassing Platt.
Finally, there is sufficient evidence in the record to provide a tenable basis
for the court’s finding that Wager’s conduct caused Platt substantial emotional
distress, as required by the statute. RCW 7.105.010(36). Platt proffered more
than conclusory statements about the impact of Wager’s conduct. Several
declarations describe in some detail that Wager’s course of conduct caused a
variety of emotional disturbances, which manifested themselves in physical and
psychological distress. Platt, for example, attested that:
Since August 2022, I have experienced severe trauma, fear,
insomnia, headaches, and fatigue as a result of [Wager’s] continuous
threats and emotional abuse. I have sought professional help from a
psychologist and a naturopath to cope with the ongoing trauma and
manage my health issues resulting from this abuse.
The record here establishes that there was sufficient evidence “to persuade
a fair-minded, rational person that” Wager engaged in domestic violence by
harassing Platt. 5 Graser, 28 Wn. App. 2d at 941.
D. Wager’s Constitutional Claim
5 In the alternative, Wager argues that Platt should be denied the equitable relief
of a protection order because he engaged in coercive litigation tactics by falsely
accusing her of abusing their son. The court did not actually find, however, that
Platt falsely accused her. Rather, it decided that “limited details” in the evidence
and the timing of the accusations raised “credibility questions,” such that it declined
to find she did abuse her son. Thus, we need not reach whether he engaged in
abusive litigation tactics in a way that may bar him from receiving equitable relief.
There is simply no factual basis for the claim.
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Wager alleges that, if the DVPO statute permits a court to find harassment
based on pure speech, the statute violates her constitutional right to free speech
on its face. She did not raise this argument in the trial court.
This court may refuse to review claims of error which were not raised in the
trial court. RAP 2.5(a). “The purpose underlying our insistence on issue
preservation is to encourage ‘the efficient use of judicial resources.’” State v.
Robinson, 171 Wn.2d 292, 304, 253 P.3d 84 (2011) (quoting State v. Scott, 110
Wn.2d 682, 685, 757 P.2d 492 (1988)). However, pursuant to RAP 2.5(a), “a party
may raise . . . for the first time in the appellate court . . . [a] (3) manifest error
affecting a constitutional right.” RAP 2.5(a). Wager argues the issue is so
preserved simply because “the only basis for the issuance of the order was Platt’s
claim of emotional distress in response to Wager’s speech.” For the reasons
above, this claim is simply not true, and this argument is otherwise frankly
conclusory and this court declines to further review it. In re Guardianship of Ursich,
10 Wn. App. 2d 263, 278, 448 P.3d 112 (2019) (Passing treatment of an issue or
lack of reasoned argument is insufficient to merit judicial consideration). 6
6 Wager appeals, not only the amended DVPO and order on revisions, but also the
order denying her motion for reconsideration. However, Wager’s briefing presents
no argument specifically on the motion for reconsideration and this court does not
consider it. Matter of Dependency of A.N.C., 24 Wn. App. 2d 408, 419, 520 P.3d
500 (2022) (“A party that offers no argument in its opening brief on a claimed
assignment of error waives the assignment.”) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(quoting Brown v. Vail, 169 Wn.2d 318, 336 n.11, 237 P.3d 263 (2010)).
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III. CONCLUSION
We affirm.
WE CONCUR:
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