Barbara Kanta, V. Washington State Department Of Licensing ( 2024 )


Menu:
  •                                                                                              Filed
    Washington State
    Court of Appeals
    Division Two
    October 1, 2024
    IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
    DIVISION II
    BARBARA KANTA,                                                     No. 58434-4-II
    Petitioner,
    v.
    STATE OF WASHINGTON, DEPARTMENT                             UNPUBLISHED OPINION
    OF LICENSING,
    Respondent.
    CRUSER, C.J. — Barbara Kanta was arrested for driving under the influence in July 2021.
    Shortly after her arrest, a phlebotomist drew a sample of Kanta’s blood which was sent to a
    laboratory for analysis. The laboratory tested Kanta’s blood for alcohol in May 2022, and issued a
    report in September 2022 stating that Kanta’s blood sample contained 0.18% alcohol. In November
    2022, the Department of Licensing (the department) suspended Kanta’s driving license. Kanta
    contested the suspension, arguing that because the vial used to store her blood expired in November
    2021 (according to the manufacturer’s certificate of compliance), the blood was not properly
    preserved and therefore did not comply with the Washington Administrative Code (WAC). A
    hearing examiner rejected Kanta’s argument and affirmed the suspension. Kanta appealed to the
    superior court. The superior court found that substantial evidence supported the hearing examiner’s
    No. 58434-4-II
    conclusion that the blood test complied with the necessary criteria, and was therefore properly
    admitted.
    Kanta appeals to this court, arguing that the hearing examiner erred in admitting the results
    of her blood test into evidence because the vials were expired at the time of testing. As such, Kanta
    argues, the superior court erred in affirming the suspension of her license. The department
    responds that the blood test complied with all necessary criteria as designated by the state
    toxicologist and the administrative code, and therefore, the hearing examiner did not err in
    admitting the test. We agree with the department.
    FACTS
    I. BACKGROUND INCIDENT
    In July 2021, Barbara Kanta was arrested for driving under the influence. According to a
    witness, Kanta’s vehicle veered off the road and overturned once or twice before landing in a ditch.
    Kitsap County Sheriff’s Deputy D.R. Corn responded to the collision. Corn advised Kanta that she
    was under arrest for driving under the influence. After reading Kanta her Fifth Amendment rights,
    Corn used a preliminary breath test (PBT) to test Kanta’s breath for alcohol content. According to
    the PBT, Kanta’s breath alcohol content registered at 0.173%.
    Kanta voluntarily consented to her blood being drawn for testing. Shortly after she was
    arrested, she was transported to a nearby medical center, where Gillian Stockwell, a phlebotomist,
    drew samples of Kanta’s blood. Stockwell used Deputy Corn’s WSP blood draw kit to obtain the
    samples. Corn stated in the incident report that “[p]rior to providing this blood kit to the
    phlebotomist [he] checked to make sure that the tubes were in good condition, were not expired,
    and that the white preservative anticoagulant powder was present in the tubes.” Clerk’s Papers
    2
    No. 58434-4-II
    (CP) at 48. After Stockwell obtained the blood samples, Corn kept the sample in his possession
    until entering them as evidence in the Sheriff’s office in Silverdale.
    Kanta’s blood samples were then sent to the Seattle Toxicology Laboratory. The blood
    samples were tested on May 19 and May 20, 2022. In September 2022, the laboratory issued a
    toxicology test report, finding that Kanta’s blood alcohol content registered at 0.18%.
    The blood collection tube used to sample Kanta’s blood was manufactured by BD
    Diagnostics. BD Diagnostics issued a certificate of compliance, certifying that the blood collection
    tube used complied with the manufacturing specifications governing the ratios of additives, as well
    as manufacturing and sterility regulations. According to the certificate of compliance, the tube was
    manufactured on December 11, 2019, and was set to expire on November 30, 2021, and it was
    manufactured specifically for blood alcohol determination. The certificate of compliance further
    provided that “[t]he chemicals added to this tube will not disturb the integrity of the blood sample
    relative to the alcohol content.” Id. at 54.
    II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    In October 2022, the department notified Kanta that her license would be suspended from
    November 13, 2022 until February 11, 2023. Kanta moved to rescind the suspension of her license,
    arguing that the blood test was not valid. An administrative hearing on the matter was held on
    November 2, 2022.
    Elena Mack, a representative of BD Diagnostics, the test tube manufacturer, provided a
    declaration to Kanta. In regard to the expiration of the test tubes, Mack made the following
    declarations:
    4. . . . The use of BD Vacutainer® Tubes extends beyond the date of the
    original blood collection. That use includes, but may not be limited to, storage of
    3
    No. 58434-4-II
    the blood within the Tube, in addition to the processing (or extraction) of the blood
    from the Tube for testing. BD does not make any representation or claim regarding
    any use of any BD Vacutainer® Tubes for any purpose post-date of any Tubes’
    expiration date.
    5. BD Vacutainer® Tubes are manufactured and guaranteed to function to
    accurately determine blood alcohol content up to their date of expiration. BD cannot
    provide any guarantee or representation regarding the function and efficacy of BD
    Vacutainer® Tubes after the date of their expiration, including drawing the sample
    post-expiration, . . . Such conclusion(s) would constitute expert testimony which I
    am not qualified to opine on. . . .
    6. The expiration date included on BD Vacutainer® Tubes is included to
    ensure the product is working properly from the date of manufacture up to the
    certain date of expiration as predetermined at the time of manufacture. Although
    scientific, in general terms, the expiration of BD Vacutainer® Tubes is determined
    according to a specific blood: additive ratio. Specific lab testing and/or expert
    analysis would be necessary to determine the efficacy of any BD Vacutainer®
    Tubes post-expiration date, as the Tubes’ expiration date, alone, likely cannot be
    the only factor to their efficacy.
    Id. at 21-22.
    The hearing examiner sustained the suspension of Kanta’s driving license, after concluding
    that the collection and testing of her blood sample complied with RCW 46.61.506. The hearing
    examiner noted that the arresting officer “reported that the blood vials were not expired when they
    were used to collect the sample of Ms. Kanta’s blood.” Id. at 5-6 n.3. The hearing examiner found
    that “[t]he facts of the case do not show the validity of Ms. Kanta’s blood test result was
    compromised.” Id. The examiner noted that as Mack declared, “ ‘the Tubes’ expiration date, alone,
    likely cannot be the only factor to their efficacy.’ ” Id. (quoting CP at 22).
    Kanta appealed the hearing examiner’s order suspending her driver’s license to the Kitsap
    Superior Court. The superior court heard oral argument in July 2023, and found that “substantial
    evidence supports the hearing examiner’s decision that the [d]epartment met its burden
    4
    No. 58434-4-II
    demonstrating the blood draw and testing criteria complied with the requirements enumerated in
    WAC 448-14-020(3).” Id. at 56. The court explained that:
    The record does not establish that the use of an expired vial would cause
    clotted and/or unstable blood. Nor does the record establish the test results would
    be inaccurate by the use of the expired vials. A letter submitted by the manufacturer
    of the vials states that the expiration date, alone, cannot be the only factor as to the
    efficacy of the vials. There is nothing in the record demonstrating efficacy of the
    vials was affected by any other factor.
    Id. at 57.
    Accordingly, the court affirmed the hearing examiner’s decision not to rescind the
    suspension of Kanta’s license. Kanta sought discretionary review from this court. A commissioner
    of this court granted review.
    ANALYSIS
    Kanta argues that because the vials used to store her blood expired on November 30, 2021,
    before the blood was tested in May 2022, and before the toxicology report was issued in September
    2022, the department failed to establish that the test complied with the necessary statutory and
    administrative requirements before suspending Kanta’s license. It follows, Kanta argues, that the
    superior court erred in affirming the suspension. Kanta contends that the department failed to
    produce prima facie evidence because the department did not provide expert testimony to establish
    that the blood tests were reliable beyond the tube’s expiration.
    The department responds that the hearing examiner properly admitted Kanta’s blood test
    results, as substantial evidence established that the tests complied with the necessary requirements
    for admissibility, as determined by the state toxicologist. Accordingly, the department maintains
    that the superior court did not err in affirming the suspension of Kanta’s license. The department
    5
    No. 58434-4-II
    also argues that after the blood test results were admitted, “the burden shifted to Kanta to refute
    the accuracy of the test results, thereby challenging the weight to be afforded to them.” Br. of
    Resp’t at 28.
    I. LEGAL PRINCIPLES
    A. Standard of Review
    “We review the Department’s administrative decision from the same position as the
    superior court.” Singh v. Dep’t of Licensing, 5 Wn. App. 2d 1, 9, 
    421 P.3d 504
     (2018). When a
    person appeals the department’s revocation or suspension of their license,
    [t]he review must be limited to a determination of whether the department has
    committed any errors of law. The superior court shall accept those factual
    determinations supported by substantial evidence in the record: (a) That were
    expressly made by the department; or (b) that may reasonably be inferred from the
    final order of the department.
    RCW 46.20.308(8).
    B. Admission of Blood Test Results
    1. Admission of Blood Test Results is Governed by WAC 448-14-020(3) and RCW
    46.61.506(3)
    Pursuant to RCW 46.61.506(3), in order for test results from blood and breath analyses to
    be valid and admissible, the tests must be “performed according to methods approved by the state
    toxicologist.” The standards set forth by the state toxicologist for blood testing are outlined in
    WAC 448-14-020.
    WAC 448-14-020(1)-(3) outline the analytical and reporting procedures for blood testing,
    as well as the requirements for the sample container and preservative in which blood is stored
    pending testing. According to the code, blood samples for alcohol must use “[a] chemically clean
    dry container consistent with the size of the sample with an inert leak-proof stopper.” WAC 448-
    6
    No. 58434-4-II
    14-020(3)(a). Additionally, “[b]lood samples for alcohol analysis must be preserved with an
    anticoagulant and an enzyme poison sufficient in amount to prevent clotting and stabilize the
    alcohol concentration. Suitable preservatives and anticoagulants include the combination of
    sodium fluoride and potassium oxalate.” WAC 448-14-020(3)(b). WAC 448-14-020 makes no
    reference to an expiration date for the sample container and preservative.
    2. The Department Must Provide Prima Facie Evidence that the Tests Complied with
    Necessary Criteria
    “The Department has the initial burden of establishing a prima facie case that blood
    preservation and testing were correctly performed and, therefore, free of adulteration that could
    produce error.” Singh, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 8.
    “ ‘When the protocols . . . and existing Code provisions are followed, there is sufficient
    assurance of accuracy and reliability of the test results to allow for general admissibility of test
    results.’ ” City of Seattle v. Allison, 
    148 Wn.2d 75
    , 80, 
    59 P.3d 85
     (2002) (alteration in original)
    (quoting State v. Straka, 
    116 Wn.2d 859
    , 870, 
    810 P.2d 888
     (1991)). The State must show that the
    blood sample and the chemicals used in the blood test are free from adulteration. State v. Brown,
    
    145 Wn. App. 62
    , 69-70, 
    184 P.3d 1284
     (2008). “ ‘[A] blood sample analysis is admissible to show
    intoxication under RCW 46.61.502 only when it is performed according to WAC
    [ ]requirements.’ ” Id. at 70 (first alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hultenschmidt, 
    125 Wn. App. 259
    , 265, 
    102 P.3d 192
     (2004)).
    In Brown, Division Three of this court explained that the administrative code
    requires only that the blood samples “be preserved with an anticoagulant and an
    enzyme poison sufficient in amount to prevent clotting and stabilize the alcohol
    concentration.” [ ] Further, there is a relaxed standard for foundational facts under
    the blood alcohol statute in that the court assumes the truth of the State’s evidence
    and all reasonable inferences from it in a light most favorable to the State.
    7
    No. 58434-4-II
    Id. at 71 (internal citation omitted) (quoting WAC 448-14-020(3)(b)).
    Brown argued that because the State did not present firsthand testimony regarding the
    substances contained in the vials used to draw his blood, there was “no evidence that the vials
    contained the requisite chemicals before the blood draw,” and therefore, the blood tests were
    improperly admitted. Id. at 70-71. The court disagreed, concluding that the State did, in fact,
    provide sufficient evidence that the blood tests complied with necessary requirements under WAC
    448-14-020(3)(b) and RCW 46.61.506(4)(b).
    The court based this conclusion, in part, on testimony from the toxicologist. In his
    testimony, the toxicologist identified the chemicals in the vials as potassium oxalate and sodium
    fluoride; stated that the labels on the vials indicated that they contained these chemicals; and
    explained that without the presence of those chemicals, the blood would clot and a test would not
    detect alcohol, but as he observed, “the samples [were] not clotted and alcohol was detected in the
    samples.” Id. at 71. The court concluded that based on this testimony, the State “provided sufficient
    evidence, under RCW 46.61.506(4)(b), that the vials contained the WAC-approved substances in
    sufficient amounts to stabilize and preserve the blood samples.” Id.
    Once the department satisfies its initial burden of producing prima facie evidence
    establishing that the test complied with the code, the test results are admissible. State v. Straka,
    
    116 Wn.2d 859
    , 875, 
    810 P.2d 888
     (1991); State v. Clark, 
    62 Wn. App. 263
    , 271, 
    814 P.2d 222
    (1991). “A defendant still has the opportunity to attack the test results,” and may refute the
    “accuracy and reliability of the test reading.” Straka, 
    116 Wn.2d at 875
    . However, these arguments
    go to the weight rather than the admissibility of the evidence, and are for the trier of fact to decide.
    Clark, 
    62 Wn. App. at 271
    ; Straka, 
    116 Wn.2d at
    875
    8
    No. 58434-4-II
    II. APPLICATION
    Kanta argues that the department failed to satisfy the foundational requirements for
    admitting her blood test, because the tubes expired before the blood was tested. The department
    counters that it met its burden for admission of the test by presenting prima facie evidence that
    Kanta’s blood sample complied with WAC 448-14-020 and RCW 46.61.506(3). We agree with
    the department.
    As it relates to the container in which a blood sample is stored following its collection,
    WAC 448-14-020(3) provides that blood samples must be placed in a “[a] chemically clean dry
    container consistent with the size of the sample with an inert leak-proof stopper,” and “must be
    preserved with an anticoagulant and an enzyme poison sufficient in amount to prevent clotting and
    stabilize the alcohol concentration.” The code explains that “[s]uitable preservatives and
    anticoagulants include the combination of sodium fluoride and potassium oxalate.” WAC 448-14-
    020(3)(b). Kanta does not take issue with the procedures involving the reporting or analysis of her
    blood. Rather, she confines her complaint to the manner in which her blood was stored prior to
    testing because although the tubes had not yet expired at the time her blood was collected and
    placed inside the tubes, they expired roughly four months after collection and her blood was not
    tested for another six months after that.
    The department presented three exhibits to the hearing examiner: a certificate of
    compliance for the blood collection tube used, the report from law enforcement, and a credential
    verification from the Department of Health. The certificate of compliance establishes that the tube
    used in Kanta’s blood sample met the necessary requirements for preservatives and anticoagulants.
    According to the certificate of compliance, the tube used in Kanta’s blood test contained 18 to 23
    9
    No. 58434-4-II
    milligrams of potassium oxalate and 90 to 115 milligrams of sodium fluorite. The certificate also
    established that the tubes were certified to be sterile and complied with manufacturing regulations.
    The fact that the hearing examiner admitted the certificate of compliance into evidence
    distinguishes Kanta’s case from Singh. In Singh, the court held that the hearing examiner erred in
    concluding that the “Department produced prima facie evidence of compliance with the WAC.”
    Singh, 5 Wn. App. 2d at 11. The hearing examiner in that case did not admit the certificate of
    compliance into evidence, after Singh argued that it must be excluded because it was not signed
    under penalty of perjury. Id. at 5-6. The only other evidence submitted by the department regarding
    Singh’s blood sample was a certification of the testing process provided by the forensic scientist
    who tested Singh’s blood. Id. The court concluded that the certification from the scientist was not
    sufficient to establish compliance with WAC 448-14-020(3). Id. at 10. The court reasoned that the
    scientist could not “certify the performance of tasks that she did not perform herself,” and
    explained that she did “not provide information about the contents of those tubes,” meaning that
    the report “lack[ed] the crucial information about the presence of anticoagulants and enzyme
    poison required to prove compliance with WAC 448-14-020(3).” Id.
    In contrast, the hearing examiner in Kanta’s case did admit the certificate of compliance,
    which provided the necessary information regarding the presence of preservatives and
    anticoagulants that was lacking in Singh. Furthermore, Deputy Corn stated in his report that
    “[p]rior to providing this blood kit to the phlebotomist I checked to make sure that the tubes were
    in good condition, were not expired, and that the white preservative anticoagulant powder was
    present in the tubes.” CP at 48.
    10
    No. 58434-4-II
    The department met its burden of providing prima facie evidence that Kanta’s blood test
    complied with necessary requirements as designated by the state toxicologist and outlined in WAC
    448-14-020. As the Brown court explained, “The regulation requires only that the blood samples
    ‘be preserved with an anticoagulant and an enzyme poison sufficient in amount to prevent clotting
    and stabilize the alcohol concentration.’ ” Brown, 
    145 Wn. App. at 71
     (quoting WAC 448-14-
    020(3)(b)). Moreover, the court draws “all reasonable inferences from it in a light most favorable
    to the State.” 
    Id.
    Kanta focuses all of her arguments on the admissibility of her blood test. The WAC does
    not require that the blood in the test tubes be tested prior to the expiration of the tubes. As we note
    above, once the department satisfies its initial burden of producing prima facie evidence
    establishing that the test complied with the code, the test results are admissible. Straka, 
    116 Wn.2d at 875
    ; Clark, 
    62 Wn. App. at 271
    . A defendant may nevertheless contest the “accuracy and
    reliability of the test reading.” Straka, 
    116 Wn.2d at 875
    . Here, the hearing examiner considered
    Kanta’s challenge to the persuasiveness of the blood test evidence and concluded that the blood
    test was reliable.
    CONCLUSION
    We hold that the hearing examiner properly admitted the blood test evidence at Kanta’s
    administrative hearing and affirm the superior court 1 We affirm.
    1
    Amicus Curiae Washington Foundation for Criminal Justice raises the same issue as Kanta
    regarding admissibility of the blood test, as well as two additional issues not raised by Kanta and
    not raised below. We do not consider issues raised only by amicus. Citizens for Responsible
    Wildlife Mgmt. v. State, 
    149 Wn.2d 622
    , 631, 
    71 P.3d 644
     (2003). We are not persuaded by
    amicus’s other arguments.
    11
    No. 58434-4-II
    A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
    Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
    it is so ordered.
    CRUSER, C.J.
    We concur:
    MAXA, J.
    GLASGOW, J.
    12
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 58434-4

Filed Date: 10/1/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/1/2024