Snap Mobile, Inc., App/x-resp V. Michael Argyrou, Resps/x-apps ( 2024 )

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SNAP! MOBILE, INC., a Delaware No. 83766-4-I
corporation,
DIVISION ONE
Appellant,
ORDER DENYING MOTION
v. FOR RECONSIDERATION,
DENYING MOTION TO
MICHAEL ARGYROU, an individual; PUBLISH, AND AMENDING
LEERA KPEA, an individual; BRIAN OPINION
LEE, an individual; LEIGHTON RUSH,
an individual; MARCUS THORNTON,
an individual; TRAVIS TINER, an
individual; JAY WOODWORTH, an
individual,
Respondents,
ALEX CARDENAS, an individual;
CHRIS REINHARDT, an individual;
DYLAN REDA, an individual,
Defendants.
Respondents Michael Argyrou, Leera Kpea, Brian Lee, Leighton Rush,
Marcus Thornton, Travis Tiner and Jay Woodworth filed a motion for
reconsideration and a motion to publish the opinion filed on December 26, 2023
in the above case. Appellant Snap! Mobile filed an answer. A majority of the panel
has determined that the motions should be denied but the opinion amended.
Now, therefore, it is hereby
No. 83766-4-I/2
ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration and motion to publish are
denied. The opinion filed on December 26, 2023 shall be amended as follows:
1. On Page 18, the following sentences:
In this case, Snap claims to seek damages for lost profits caused
by Respondents’ running additional fundraising campaigns after
December 2020, as well as the “cost of assembled workforce.”
Snap’s expert explained, “The cost of the assembled work
represents Snap’s recovery for investment in recruiting and training
the Sales Reps. The earnings relating to lost profits are what those
Sales Reps are able to generate AFTER they have received this
training.”
shall be deleted and replaced with the following:
In this case, Snap initially sought damages for lost profits caused
by Respondents’ running additional fundraising campaigns after
December 2020, as well as the “cost of assembled workforce.”
Prior to the summary judgment hearing, Snap withdrew its claim for
workforce damages. As to lost profits, Snap’s expert explained,
“The earnings relating to lost profits are what those Sales Reps are
able to generate AFTER they have received this training.”
2. On Page 18, the following sentence shall be deleted:
Through these damages, Snap seeks to recoup the costs incurred
to recruit and train Respondents, rather than the cost to retrain
replacements for which VR and Landers were held liable in the
Idaho lawsuit.
The remainder of this opinion shall remain the same.
FOR THE COURT:
2
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
SNAP! MOBILE, INC., a Delaware
corporation,
Appellant, No. 83766-4-I
v. DIVISION ONE
MICHAEL ARGYROU, an individual; UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LEERA KPEA, an individual; BRIAN
LEE, an individual; LEIGHTON RUSH,
an individual; MARCUS THORNTON,
an individual; TRAVIS TINER, an
individual; JAY WOODWORTH, an
individual,
Respondents,
ALEX CARDENAS, an individual;
CHRIS REINHARDT, an individual;
DYLAN REDA, an individual,
Defendants.
CHUNG, J. — Snap! Mobile, Inc. (Snap) lost many former employees and
accounts to upstart rival Vertical Raise, LLC (VR). Snap sued VR and its founder
Paul Landers in Idaho for tortious interference with contract, unfair competition,
and misappropriation of trade secrets, resulting in a monetary judgment and
permanent injunction in Snap’s favor. In this lawsuit, Snap sued several of its
former employees in King County for breach of restrictive covenants in their
employment agreements. Relying on the Idaho judgment, the former employees
No. 83766-4-I/2
moved for summary judgment and dismissal on their affirmative defenses of
claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel). The trial
court concluded both doctrines applied and granted summary judgment in the
former employees’ favor.
Snap appeals the dismissal of its claims. Respondents, the former
employees, cross-appeal the denial of their motion to amend and their fee award.
We affirm the trial court’s denial of Respondents’ motion to amend. However, we
conclude that Snap’s claims are not precluded under the doctrines of claim
preclusion or issue preclusion. Therefore, we reverse the summary judgment
order and remand for further proceedings.
FACTS
Snap, founded in 2013, is a Delaware corporation with its principal place
of business in King County. Snap developed an online platform to help teams
and schools raise money through online donation campaigns. Snap employs
area sales representatives across the country who serve as the primary contacts
for its customers. The sales representatives were independent contractors until
Snap began converting them to W-2 employees in June 2017.
The sales representatives who chose to become employees signed a
sales representative agreement. The agreement included a forum selection
clause agreeing to jurisdiction in King County, Washington and resolution under
Washington law for any disputes related to or arising out of the agreement, with
the employee consenting to personal jurisdiction in King County Superior Court.
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Additionally, the agreement included several provisions in a section entitled
“Restrictive Covenants” aimed at protecting Snap’s interest in its “Proprietary and
Trade Secret Information.” The restrictive covenants consisted of a non-compete
clause, a non-acceptance of business clause, and a non-solicitation of business
clause for the specific geographic area where the employee performed services
for Snap as well as “any geographic area about which Employee learned
Confidential, Proprietary, and Trade Secret Information.” The agreement also
prohibited solicitation of other Snap employees. All restrictions had a duration of
18 months after termination of employment.
VR entered the online fundraising industry in 2018, five years after Snap.
VR began hiring Snap sales representatives as independent contractors, and
Chief Executive Officer (CEO) Paul Landers encouraged them to use Snap’s
client lists and other confidential customer information for VR’s benefit. In
October 2018, Snap sued two former employees and VR to enforce the
restrictive covenants in the agreement in King County. See Snap! Mobile v. Clay,
et al., Case No. 18-2-26321-2 SEA. VR successfully moved to dismiss for lack of
personal jurisdiction, as its place of business was in Idaho, and the lawsuit
proceeded against only the former employees. 1 In December 2019, Snap
brought a complaint against VR in Idaho for tortious interference with contract,
misappropriation of trade secrets, and unfair competition, and subsequently
1 The record on appeal references preliminary injunctions entered against former Snap
employees Bradly Clay and Joseph Sanford, but contains only the order regarding Clay.
3
No. 83766-4-I/4
amended to add Landers as a defendant. See Snap! Mobile, Inc. v. Vertical
Raise, LLC, Case No. CV28-19-8796 (Kootenai County, Idaho) (“Idaho lawsuit”).
Soon after, Snap filed this lawsuit for breach of contract, seeking damages
and injunctive relief against ten other former Snap employees—Michael Argyrou,
Alex Cardenas, Leera Kpea, Brian Lee, Chris Reinhardt, Leighton Rush, Marcus
Thornton, Travis Tiner, Dylan Reda, and Jay Woodworth (collectively,
Respondents). The Respondents had all signed the Snap sales representative
agreement with its restrictive covenants and had subsequently joined VR as
independent contractors. None of these former Snap employees was a resident
of Washington State. Snap brought the lawsuit in King County, Washington,
pursuant to the forum selection clause in the sales representative agreement.
Snap continued to pursue VR and Landers in the Idaho lawsuit. In
December 2020, the Idaho court granted Snap’s motion for a preliminary
injunction, enjoining VR, Landers, “and anyone acting in concert or on behalf of
Vertical Raise and Landers” from engaging in certain activities, including
soliciting, accepting, or transacting business with Snap customers and business
partners served by former Snap employees, aiding former Snap employees in
breaching their sales representative agreements, compensating former Snap
employees for transacting business with former Snap clients in the geographic
area they had served for Snap, and obtaining or using Snap’s confidential, trade
secret information.
4
No. 83766-4-I/5
Meanwhile, in King County, Respondents answered Snap’s complaint,
alleging several affirmative defenses, including hostile work environment leading
to the Respondents’ departure from the company and constructive discharge. In
April 2021, Respondents filed a motion for summary judgment alleging the
restrictive covenants were void as a matter of law and unenforceable. The same
day, Snap filed a motion for summary judgment asking the court to strike the two
affirmative defenses based on hostile work environment under CR 12(f), find the
restrictive covenants valid and enforceable as a matter of law, and determine that
Respondents breached the covenants. The trial court granted Snap’s request to
strike Respondents’ hostile workplace affirmative defenses but denied summary
judgment on all other issues. The court also denied the Respondents’ motion for
summary judgment.
Back in Idaho, Snap moved for partial summary judgment on its claims
against VR and Landers for tortious interference with contract and
misappropriation of trade secrets. In June 2021, the court determined that Snap
had established a prima facie case of tortious interference and VR and Landers
failed to provide any evidence of justification. The court concluded that VR and
Landers personally were liable for tortious interference as a matter of law. The
court also held that VR and Landers misappropriated Snap’s trade secrets. The
court granted partial summary judgment on the two claims.
The remaining issues went to trial, and a jury awarded Snap $750,000 in
economic damages for unjust enrichment, $150,000 in punitive damages from
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No. 83766-4-I/6
VR, and $100,000 in punitive damages from Landers individually. Snap moved
for additur, i.e., additional damages, and received an additional $410,021 for
VR’s unjust enrichment and $900,000 for the cost to Snap for workforce
replacement. In September 2021, the Idaho court granted a permanent injunction
against VR, Landers, “and their employees, independent contractors, servants,
and agents, and anyone acting in concert or on behalf of Vertical Raise, LLC and
Paul Landers,” enjoining them from the same actions outlined in the preliminary
injunction for 18 months.
During trial in the Idaho lawsuit, non-party and former Snap employee
Paul Croghan appeared as a witness. While he was in Idaho to testify, Snap
served him with a motion for contempt for violating the preliminary injunction. 2
The Idaho court dismissed the contempt proceedings against Croghan,
concluding the preliminary injunction was overbroad and lacking in specificity
such that it did not provide Croghan with proper notice of the scope of prohibited
conduct. In addition, the trial court determined it lacked personal jurisdiction over
Croghan. 3
2 Snap also filed multiple motions for contempt against VR/Landers for failing to abide by
the preliminary injunction. The court subsequently dismissed Snap’s motions for contempt against
VR/Landers on due process grounds.
3 The court concluded it lacked personal jurisdiction because Snap had failed to properly
serve Croghan by violating the well-established privilege that a witness coming from another state
or jurisdiction is exempt from service of process while in court. The court noted that it also lacked
personal jurisdiction over Croghan under the Idaho long-arm statute, because Croghan worked in
California, had not transacted business in Idaho, did not have minimum contacts with Idaho, and
exercising jurisdiction did not comport with due process.
6
No. 83766-4-I/7
Back in King County, Respondents filed a motion to amend their answer to
add affirmative defenses including res judicata, collateral estoppel, and material
breach “based on harassment that the Defendants experienced in the workplace
and that the hostile work environment was a material breach of the Defendants’
Sales Representative Agreements and employee handbook.” The court granted
Respondents’ motion to amend to add affirmative defenses of collateral estoppel,
res judicata, unjust enrichment, offset, and unconscionability, but denied the
material breach defense because it was identical to the previously dismissed
hostile work environment affirmative defenses. Two months later, Respondents
moved for summary judgment on their affirmative defenses that Snap’s claims
were precluded under the doctrines of res judicata and collateral estoppel based
on the entry of the final judgment in the Idaho lawsuit against VR and Landers.
The trial court granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment, concluding
Snap’s claims were precluded by both collateral estoppel and res judicata. Under
the terms of the agreement, Respondents requested and received attorney fees
and costs.
Snap appeals the court’s dismissal of its breach of contract claim.
Respondents cross-appeal the denial of the motion to amend and the amount of
attorney fees awarded.
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No. 83766-4-I/8
DISCUSSION
I. Summary Judgment Dismissal of Snap’s Claims
The trial court dismissed Snap’s claims on summary judgment, citing both
collateral estoppel and res judicata. We review orders on summary judgment de
novo. Kim v. Lakeside Adult Fam. Home, 185 Wn.2d 532, 547, 374 P.3d 121(2016). We construe evidence and reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. Summary judgment is appropriate when
there is no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law. Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658, 663, 958
P.2d 301 (1998) (citing CR 56(c)).
As an initial matter, for clarity and consistency, in keeping with the more
modern lexicon, we refer to res judicata as “claim preclusion” and collateral
estoppel as “issue preclusion,” unless referencing specific statements by a court
or the parties. 4 Issue preclusion and claim preclusion “are equitable doctrines
that preclude relitigation of already determined causes.” Weaver v. City of
Everett, 194 Wn.2d 464, 472-73, 450 P.3d 177 (2019). The two doctrines share
the goal of judicial finality and promoting judicial economy. Id. at 473. Claim
preclusion refers to restrictions on relitigating the same claim or cause of action.
14A DOUGLAS J. ENDE, WASHINGTON PRACTICE: CIVIL PROCEDURE § 35:20, at 552
4 As the U.S. Supreme Court has noted, the terms “claim preclusion” and “issue
preclusion” “have replaced a more confusing lexicon. Claim preclusion describes the rules
formerly known as ‘merger’ and ‘bar,’ while issue preclusion encompasses the doctrines once
known as ‘collateral estoppel’ and ‘direct estoppel.’ ” Taylor v. Sturgell, 553 U.S. 880, 892 n.5,
128 S. Ct. 2161, 171 L. Ed. 2d 155 (2008) (citing Migra v. Warren City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Ed., 465
U.S. 75, 77, n.1, 104 S. Ct. 892, 79 L. Ed. 2d 56 (1984)).
8
No. 83766-4-I/9
(3d ed. 2018). Claim preclusion “bars litigation of claims that were brought or
might have been brought in a prior proceeding." Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 473. By
contrast, “instead of preventing a second assertion of the same claim or cause of
action, [issue preclusion] prevents a relitigation of a particular issue in a later
proceeding involving the same parties.” 14 ENDE, supra, § 35:32, at 595.
Whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion apply are questions of law reviewed
de novo. Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 473.
The parties address the elements of claim preclusion and issue preclusion
together. However, because the doctrines and their elements are different, we
address them separately.
A. Claim Preclusion (Res Judicata)
Claim preclusion prevents relitigation of an entire claim when a prior
proceeding involving the same parties and issues culminated in a judgment on
the merits. 5 Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 480. In addition to the threshold requirement
of a final judgment on the merits in the prior suit, the party asserting claim
preclusion has the burden of proof to establish that the prior action and the
5 Without application of claim preclusion, the fact that VR and Landers were held liable
for injury to Snap based on Respondents’ actions will not necessarily preclude claims against
Respondents for the same conduct. As RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 49 (Am. Law
Inst. 1982) states, “A judgment against one person liable for a loss does not terminate a claim
that the injured party may have against another person who may be liable therefor.” Comment a
to § 49 explains,
When the claimant thus brings consecutive actions against different
persons liable for the same harm, the rendition of the judgment in the first action
does not terminate the claims against other persons who may be liable for the loss
in question. The judgment itself has the effect of officially confirming the
defendant’s obligation to make redress, an obligation which under the substantive
law co-exists with that of the other obligor. No reason suggests itself why the legal
confirmation of one obligation should limit or extinguish the other.
9
No. 83766-4-I/10
challenged action have “concurrence of identity” in four areas: (1) subject-matter;
(2) cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons for
or against whom the claim is made. Id. All four elements must be satisfied to
establish claim preclusion. Hisle v. Todd Pac. Shipyards Corp., 151 Wn.2d 853,
866, 93 P.3d 108 (2004).
In disputing claim preclusion, Snap focuses on whether the two actions
involve the same persons and parties, asserting that Respondents, as
independent contractors, cannot be in privity with VR and Landers. Respondents
are the same party 6 for claim preclusion purposes if they are in privity. Feature
Realty, Inc. v. Kirkpatrick & Lockhart Preston Gates Ellis, LLP, 161 Wn.2d 214,
224, 164 P.3d 500 (2007). “ ‘Privity within the meaning of the doctrine of [claim
preclusion] is privity as it exists in relation to the subject matter of the litigation,
and the rule is construed strictly to mean parties claiming under the same title. It
denotes mutual or successive relationship to the same right or property.’ ”
Loveridge v. Fred Meyer, Inc., 125 Wn.2d 759, 764, 887 P.2d 898 (1995)
(quoting Owens v. Kuro, 56 Wn.2d 564, 568, 354 P.2d 696 (1960)). Privity is also
established when a nonparty is in actual control of the litigation or substantially
participates in it. Loveridge, 125 Wn.2d at 764. A nonparty may also be in privity
6 Commentators have noted that the element “quality of the persons for or against whom
the claim is made” rarely adds any distinct analysis, and courts either conclude the third element,
identity of parties, satisfies the quality of persons element, or collapse the two into one test.
Kathleen M. McGinnis, Revisiting Claim and Issue Preclusion in Washington, 90 Wash. L. Rev.
75, 105 (2015); Landry v. Luscher, 95 Wn. App. 779, 785, 976 P.2d 1274 (1999) (quoting Philip
A. Trautman, Claim and Issue Preclusion in Civil Litigation in Washington, 60 Wash. L. Rev. 805,
820 (1985)) (“[o]nly if there is identity of parties, including the privity concept, need one consider
the fourth element, identify in the quality of the persons for or against whom the claim is made.”).
10
No. 83766-4-I/11
with a party if that party adequately represented the nonparty’s interests in the
prior proceeding. Feature Realty, 161 Wn.2d at 224.
An employer-employee relationship may be sufficient to establish privity
for claim preclusion purposes. Loveridge, 125 Wn.2d at 764. For example, in
Feature Realty, a former client filed and dismissed two legal malpractice lawsuits
against a law firm and one of its attorneys in California. Id. at 218. The second
dismissal amounted to an adjudication on the merits under CR 41(a)(4). Id. at
224. When Feature Realty filed a third lawsuit against a Washington attorney at
the firm who had not been party to the prior two lawsuits, the court determined
the attorney was in privity with the law firm and, therefore, entitled to the
preclusive effects of claim preclusion. Id. at 224-25. Similarly, in Ensley v.
Pitcher, an injured driver sued a drunk driver and the tavern that served her
alcohol. 152 Wn. App. 891, 895, 222 P.3d 99 (2009). After partial summary
judgment resulted in dismissal of claims against the tavern, Ensley brought the
same claims against the bartender. Id. at 894. Although the bartender had not
been named in the original suit, there was identity of the parties because the
employer’s liability turned solely on vicarious liability for the bartender’s actions.
Id. at 903.
Here, however, Respondents were not VR employees. Rather,
Respondents agreed to work for VR as independent contractors. 7 Unlike in an
7 The early VR independent contractor agreement did not provide any details about the
amount of independence allotted to the contractor and control reserved to VR. A later revision of
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No. 83766-4-I/12
employer-employee relationship, a principal is generally not liable for the acts of
an independent contractor. DeWater v. State, 130 Wn.2d 128, 137, 921 P.2d
1059 (1996). Therefore, unlike in Ensley, vicarious liability cannot serve as the
foundation for privity between Respondents and VR and Landers.
Despite the nature of the principal-independent contractor relationship,
Respondents argue that “[o]ur courts do not distinguish between employees and
independent contractors regarding [the] question of privity with their employer for
activities undertaken within the scope of their employment.” Br. of Resp’t at 32. In
support, Respondents cite Kuhlman v. Thomas, 78 Wn. App. 115, 118, 897 P.2d
365 (1995), which considered privity in the context of two lawsuits filed by a
disgruntled employee. After being disciplined for harassing female co-workers,
Kuhlman sued his employer, claiming violation of due process and breach of
contract. Id. at 118-19. Kuhlman then brought the same claims against officers
and employees of his employer. Id. at 118. After the original lawsuit against the
employer was dismissed with prejudice on summary judgment, the court
dismissed the suit against the officers and employees as precluded under both
the doctrines of claim preclusion and issue preclusion. Id. at 119. On appeal, in
assessing privity, this court noted that the liability of the employer in the first suit
was premised on the actions of the employees named in the second suit. Id. at
122. In defending the first suit, the employer protected the interests of the
the independent contractor agreement provided specifics about the contractor as an independent
contractor.
12
No. 83766-4-I/13
employees. Id. Therefore, we determined the parties were “sufficiently the same,
if not identical.” Id.In contrast, here, in the Idaho case, VR CEO Landers disclaimed
responsibility for the actions of former Snap employees, such as Respondents,
testifying, “[W]hen we hire guys they’re independent contractors. They go and get
the business. We just set them up, train them on the software, and they go get
the business.” Similarly, testifying about discussions VR had with sales
representatives about the preliminary injunction, Landers noted, “[T]hey’re
independent contractors. We told them not to violate this preliminary injunction,”
and “I thought they would follow my directions and not violate it as we told them.”
When asked, “Your people ran these fundraisers?” Landers replied, “Correct.
These independent contractors.” Landers repeatedly emphasized that the former
Snap employees were independent contractors, not VR employees. Rather than
defend their interests, he distanced himself from their actions. Landers/VR and
Respondents do not have a commonality of interests that would make them
“sufficiently the same.”
Without a commonality of interest, or an employer-employee relationship
that would lead to vicarious liability, the Respondents are not in privity with
Landers or VR. Therefore, Snap’s current lawsuit against Respondents lacks a
“concurrence of identity” of “persons or parties” with Snap’s prior case against
Landers and VR. As a result, Respondents cannot establish one of the four
elements required for claim preclusion. Claim preclusion does not apply to
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No. 83766-4-I/14
preclude Snap’s claims against Respondents, and the trial court erred by
dismissing the case on this basis.
B. Issue Preclusion (Collateral Estoppel)
Snap claims that the court “inverted preclusion rules” by holding it, rather
than Respondents, estopped from contesting their liability for breach of contract.
Issue preclusion precludes relitigation when an issue of ultimate fact has been
determined by a valid and final judgment, such that the issue cannot be litigated
between the same parties in any future lawsuit. Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 473.
“Application of [issue preclusion] is limited to situations where the issue
presented in the second proceeding is identical in all respects to an issue
decided in the prior proceeding.” Lemond v. Dep’t of Licensing, 143 Wn. App.
797, 805, 180 P.3d 829 (2008).
According to Snap, “[t]he logical consequence of giving the Idaho
judgment preclusive effect would be to bind Respondents to the Idaho jury’s
finding that Vertical Raise and Paul Landers facilitated their breaches of contract
and that they are jointly liable for the damages flowing from their breaches.”8
Respondents acknowledge they “work for Vertical Raise and just as in Idaho,
Snap’s claim for damages arises from alleged violations of their Snap
employment agreements while working for Vertical Raise.” But they then argue
8 Despite this possibility, Snap did not move the trial court to apply issue preclusion
against Respondents on the legal issue of breach of their contract.
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that because Snap already succeeded in obtaining a judgment on the issue, it
cannot now relitigate the breach of contract—including the damages award.
This argument by Respondents conflates the distinct doctrines of issue
and claim preclusion. Having addressed claim preclusion above, we now focus
on the issues in the two cases, rather than the claims. And based on their
arguments below and on appeal, Snap and Respondents agree that both the
Idaho lawsuit and the current case involve the identical issue of Respondents’
breach of their Snap sales representative agreements. 9 We also agree.
In the Idaho lawsuit, the claim of tortious interference with contract
required establishing (1) the existence of a contract, (2) the defendant’s
knowledge of the contract (3) intentional interference causing a breach of the
contract, and (4) injury to plaintiff resulting from the breach. See Idaho First Nat’l
Bank v. Bliss Valley Foods, Inc., 121 Idaho 266, 283-84, 824 P.2d 841 (1991).
Thus, in granting Snap’s motion for summary judgment on the tortious
interference claim, the Idaho court determined that Snap had satisfied each of
these elements, including the existence of the contracts, and that by recruiting
and hiring former Snap employees, VR and Landers had engaged in “a scheme
to knowingly entice Snap employees to break their contracts with Snap.” The
Idaho court explained that VR and Landers “actively sought out and encouraged
Snap employees to breach their contracts.” Thus, the Idaho court’s decision to
grant summary judgment against VR and Landers on liability required concluding
9 Respondents characterize this as the same “cause of action” and same “right.”
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No. 83766-4-I/16
that the employees breached their contracts. As a result, the specific issues of
the existence of the contracts and whether the former Snap employees breached
those contracts are precluded from being further litigated.
In the present case, the breach of contract claim requires proof of three
elements—the existence of a contract, its breach, and resulting damages. Nw.
Indep. Forest Mfrs. v. Dep’t of Lab. & Indus., 78 Wn. App. 707, 713, 899 P.2d 6(1995). While the parties agree as to the preclusive effect of the Idaho case on
the first two elements, existence of the contract and breach, they disagree as to
the preclusive effect on the third element, resulting damages. Snap argues
Respondents are bound by the Idaho court’s determination that they breached
their contracts, resulting in liability for damages to be proven at trial, whereas
Respondents argue Snap is barred from relitigating both liability and resulting
damages. Therefore, we must consider whether issue preclusion bars Snap from
litigating the issue of resulting damages in this case.
The party asserting issue preclusion as an affirmative defense has the
burden of proof. Lemond, 143 Wn. App. at 805. The party asserting the
defense—in this case, the Respondents—must establish four elements:
(1) the issue decided in the earlier proceeding was identical to the
issue presented in the later proceeding; (2) the earlier proceeding
ended in a judgment on the merits; (3) the party against whom
[issue preclusion] is asserted was a party to, or in privity with a
party to, the earlier proceeding; and (4) application of [issue
preclusion] does not work an injustice on the party against whom it
is applied.
16
No. 83766-4-I/17
Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 474. Because proof of all four elements is required, the
failure to establish any one element prevents application of the doctrine. Lemond,
143 Wn. App. at 805. Additionally, “the party against whom the doctrine is
asserted must have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate its case in a prior
proceeding.” Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 473-74.
As discussed above, the identical issue of breach of the sales
representative agreements was decided in the Idaho lawsuit. Further, the
requirement of a final judgment on the issue of breach is satisfied, as the Idaho
court granted summary judgment in Snap’s favor on the tortious interference
claim, including on the element of intentional interference causing a breach of the
contract. A trial on damages resulted in a jury verdict and judgment for Snap. 10
Snap argues the injunction is unenforceable, resulting in a void judgment such
that there is no final judgment on the merits. However, the Idaho judgment itself
is neither unenforceable nor void. 11 The final judgment stands in the Idaho case
and satisfies the second requirement for issue preclusion.
As to the third element, in the context of issue preclusion, privity requires
that “the party against whom [issue preclusion] is asserted was a party to, or in
privity with a party to, the earlier proceeding.” Id. at 474 (emphasis added).
10 The trial court had also granted summary judgment finding VR and Landers liable for
misappropriation of trade secrets. The jury did not award any damages for the misappropriation
claim. The jury did find that VR and Landers engaged in unfair competition that caused damages
to Snap and awarded punitive damages.
11 Again, Respondents conflate issue and claim preclusion. While claim preclusion
requires a final judgment against the same persons or parties, issue preclusion does not.
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Because it is Respondents who seek to assert the doctrine against Snap, this
element is satisfied because Snap is the same party in both actions. 12
However, the parties disagree as to whether the issue of Respondents’
liability for damages for breach of contract is identical in the Idaho case and the
present case. In the Idaho case, the jury found VR’s and Landers’s actions
constituting tortious interference and unfair competition resulted in damages for
unjust enrichment totaling $750,000 and awarded punitive damages against both
VR and Landers. Subsequently, the Idaho trial court granted Snap’s motion for
additur of damages for workforce replacement through December 2020 as well
as additional damages for unjust enrichment. In this case, Snap claims to seek
damages for lost profits caused by Respondents’ running additional fundraising
campaigns after December 2020, as well as the “cost of assembled workforce.”
Snap’s expert explained, “The cost of the assembled work represents Snap’s
recovery for investment in recruiting and training the Sales Reps. The earnings
relating to lost profits are what those Sales Reps are able to generate AFTER
they have received this training.” Through these damages, Snap seeks to recoup
the costs incurred to recruit and train Respondents, rather than the cost to retrain
replacements for which VR and Landers were held liable in the Idaho lawsuit.
Thus, the Respondents cannot establish that the issue of their liability for
damages caused by their breach of contract in this case is identical to the
12 The privity analysis under the doctrine of claim preclusion is different, as a claim is
precluded only if there is a concurrence of identities in four areas, including “persons and parties.”
Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 480.
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previously litigated issue of VR’s and Landers’s liability for damages for tortious
interference with contract. As a result, issue preclusion does not bar litigation of
the issue of damages caused by Respondents’ breach of the agreement. 13
II. Respondents’ Cross-Appeal
Respondents raise two issues on cross-appeal. They argue the trial court
erred by denying their motion to amend their answer to add a material breach
affirmative defense and by awarding significantly reduced attorney fees.
A. Motion to Amend
The trial court denied Respondents’ motion to amend their answer to add
the material breach affirmative defense, concluding it was identical to the
previously stricken affirmative defenses. Respondents argue they should be able
to argue that Snap’s breach of its employee handbook relieved them of any
obligation to abide by the restrictive covenants in the agreement. Snap contends
that Respondents did not assign error to the trial court’s order striking the original
13 As to the fourth element required for application of issue preclusion, Snap argues that
the trial court’s ruling unjustly allows Respondents to avoid liability for breach of contract. For their
part, Respondents claim that issue preclusion is not unjust because Snap chose to bring its
action in Idaho and did not try to implead them into that action. But whether or not Snap could
have brought such claims is not part of the analysis under the doctrine of issue preclusion, as it is
for claim preclusion. Weaver, 194 Wn.2d at 481.
The parties also spar over whether Snap had a full and fair opportunity to litigate the
liability of individual Respondents given the Idaho court’s ruling on a contempt motion that it did
not have personal jurisdiction over Croghan, an out-of-state VR independent contractor who did
not have minimum contacts with the state. Additionally, Snap argues that the forum selection
clause in Respondents’ agreements with Snap named King County as the proper location for
lawsuits arising from those contracts and, thus, would have prevented it from litigating against
Respondents in the Idaho case. We need not address these arguments, as Respondents cannot
establish that the identical issue of Respondents’ liability for damages for breach of contract was
litigated in the Idaho lawsuit.
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two defenses and have failed to show how the new affirmative defense differs
from those already struck. We agree with Snap.
CR 15(a) governs amendment of pleadings:
A party may amend the party’s pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served, or, if the
pleading is one to which no responsive pleading is permitted and
the action has not been placed upon the trial calendar, the party
may so amend it at any time within 20 days after it is served.
Otherwise, a party may amend the party’s pleading only by leave of
court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be
freely given when justice so requires.
“The touchstone for the denial of a motion to amend is the prejudice such an
amendment would cause to the nonmoving party.” Wilson v. Horsley, 137 Wn.2d
500, 505, 974 P.2d 316 (1999). Factors to consider when determining whether
amending would cause prejudice include undue delay, unfair surprise, and jury
confusion. Id. at 505-06.
The decision to allow leave to amend is within the discretion of the trial
court and is reviewed for manifest abuse of discretion. Id. at 505. “The trial
court’s decision ‘will not be disturbed on review except on a clear showing of
abuse of discretion, that is, discretion manifestly unreasonable, or exercised
on untenable grounds, or for untenable reasons.’ ” Id. (quoting State ex rel.
Carroll v. Junker, 79 Wn.2d 12, 26, 482 P.2d 775 (1971)).
In their initial answer, Respondents raised several affirmative defenses,
including the following:
2. Plaintiff’s claims are barred by its own unclean hands and otherwise
inequitable conduct, including that it knew or should have known that its
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chief executive officer, Cole Morgan and other supervisors employed by
Plaintiff, including employee Kenny Stivers, engaged in sexual
harassment, discrimination, drug use, and retaliation against Answering
Defendants and other Snap employees, all of which created a hostile work
environment, which ultimately forced Answering Defendants to leave the
company.
3. Snap’s hostile work environment, including the sexual harassment,
discrimination, drug use, and retaliation engaged in by Snap officers such
as Morgan and Stivers, lead [sic] to the constructive discharge of
Answering Defendants.
The trial court struck these two defenses on Snap’s request. 14 Respondents then
moved to amend to add “material breach” as an affirmative defense, explaining
“Snap’s material breach is based on harassment that the Defendants
experienced in the workplace and that the hostile work environment was a
material breach of the Defendants’ sales representative agreements and
employee handbook.” The trial court denied the motion to add the “material
breach” defense, deeming it “identical to the hostile work
environment/discrimination defenses” that it had previously stricken.
As Respondents acknowledged, the newly proposed “material breach”
affirmative defense was based on the hostile work environment and harassment
they purported to experience while at Snap. The two prior affirmative defenses
also relied on similar allegations of hostile work environment and harassment.
The three defenses are different approaches to the same concept based on the
same factual predicate: Snap’s hostile workplace led Respondents to leave the
14 On appeal, Respondents do not challenge the court’s decision to strike these
defenses.
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No. 83766-4-I/22
company and relieved them of their obligations under the restrictive covenants in
the sales representative agreement. The trial court had already rejected two
forms of this constructive discharge defense. The trial court’s denial of the motion
to add the “material breach” defense was consistent with its prior order and was
not a manifest abuse of discretion.
B. Attorney Fees
Under the terms of the sales representative agreements, the prevailing
party is entitled to fees:
8. Prevailing party attorney fees, costs, and expense recovery. The court
shall award the prevailing party in any dispute arising out of or related to
this Agreement all its reasonable attorney’s fees, expenses, and costs
incurred in the dispute.
The trial court awarded Respondents attorney fees as the prevailing party below.
Respondents argue the court abused its discretion in determining the amount of
fees. However, because Respondents are no longer the prevailing party, we
reverse the attorney fee award. Any award of fees is deferred until resolution of
Snap’s breach of contract claims. See Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138,
153, 94 P.3d 930, (2004), abrogated on other grounds by Mikkelsen v. Pub. Util.
Dist. No. 1 of Kittitas County, 189 Wn.2d 516, 404 P.3d 464 (2017) (“Where a
party has succeeded on appeal but has not yet prevailed on the merits, the court
should defer to the trial court to award attorney fees.”).
CONCLUSION
The trial court erred by applying claim preclusion (res judicata) and issue
preclusion (collateral estoppel) to bar Snap’s claims against Respondents in their
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entirety. We agree with the parties that the doctrine of issue preclusion bars
relitigation of the existence of the sales representative agreements and
Respondents’ breach of these contracts. However, the resulting damages for
which Respondents are alleged to be liable are not identical to those awarded in
the Idaho case. We reverse and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.
WE CONCUR:
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