Parentage Of H.n.c.: Melissa Curry, V. Michael Coffman ( 2024 )

Filed
Washington State
Court of Appeals
Division Two
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
October 15, 2024
DIVISION II
In the Matter of the Parentage and Support of No. 57694-5-II
H.N.C.
MELISSA CURRY,
Appellant,
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
v.
MICHAEL COFFMAN,
Respondent.
PRICE, J. — Melissa Curry appeals the trial court’s final orders modifying the parenting
plan for her 7-year-old daughter, H.N.C. Curry raises numerous assignments of error to support
her argument that the trial court abused its discretion by modifying the parenting plan to make
Michael Coffman, H.N.C.’s father, the primary residential parent. We affirm the trial court.
FACTS
I. ORIGINAL PARENTING PLAN AND RELOCATIONS
In 2019, the trial court entered a final parenting plan for H.N.C., designating Curry as the
primary residential parent and providing Coffman with multiple day visits and an extended
weekend visit once a month to accommodate Coffman’s work schedule. The parenting plan also
required both parents to provide H.N.C. a gluten-free diet.
In 2021, Curry filed a notice to relocate from the Vancouver area to the Columbia Gorge
area. Coffman did not object to Curry’s relocation but moved to modify the parenting plan because
No. 57694-5-II
the current residential schedule would not be feasible with the distance between the residences.
Curry relocated to the Columbia Gorge area in July 2021.
Three months later at the end of September 2021, Coffman was offered a job as a border
patrol agent with the United States Border Patrol. The job required him to attend training academy
in New Mexico and then to move to Texas after his academy graduation in April 2022.
After several continuances, a one-day trial on the parenting plan modification was set for
September 27, 2022.
II. TEMPORARY VISITATION ORDERS
Prior to the trial on the parenting plan modification, the trial court held multiple hearings
addressing temporary orders on the parents’ visitation schedule.
When Curry initially filed her notice of intent to relocate, she requested that visitation with
Coffman be limited because H.N.C. exhibited behavioral problems and violence towards animals
after those visits. Curry also alleged that H.N.C. now had “a preliminary diagnosis of severe
ADHD [attention deficit hyperactivity disorder] and a transition[-]related Trauma and stress
disorder.” Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 54. Curry contended that visitations with Coffman aggravated
H.N.C.’s ADHD symptoms and triggered H.N.C.’s trauma. Coffman disagreed that visitations
caused harm to H.N.C. and requested that his visitations be modified to give him visits every other
weekend. A hearing was held on August 20, 2021.
At the hearing, Coffman proposed a temporary visitation schedule providing the exchanges
for his visits take place at 7:00 p.m. at an agreed location halfway between the Vancouver area and
the Columbia Gorge area. Curry raised numerous objections to Coffman’s proposal, including
that H.N.C. experienced “major trauma stress response” and behavioral problems after visits, that
evening exchanges were unworkable because she could not see at night, and that an earlier
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exchange time interfered with Curry’s work schedule. Verbatim Rep. of Proc. (VRP) at 11.
Ultimately, the trial court ordered visitation with Coffman every other weekend with exchanges to
take place at 5:00 p.m. at the halfway point agreed to by the parties. A hearing on presentation of
the temporary order was set for September 10, 2021.
At the September 10 presentation hearing, Curry raised new concerns about the order.
Curry pointed out that with the modified visitation schedule and holiday schedule, Coffman would
have visitations three weekends in a row, with one visit being an extended holiday weekend. Curry
admitted that H.N.C. did well with her last visit with Coffman, but contended that if H.N.C. spent
more than two nights at Coffman’s house, she would start exhibiting violence towards animals and
severe behavioral responses. Ultimately, Coffman agreed to skip a weekend of visitation but asked
that H.N.C. be able to attend the birthday party he had planned for her at his house. The trial court
agreed and entered a temporary parenting plan consistent with these decisions.
After Coffman was offered the position with Border Patrol in October 2021, he moved to
modify visitation again. Coffman requested an extended visit in Texas at Christmas, a six-day
visit to New Mexico for H.N.C. to attend his April 2022 graduation from the training academy,
and weekly video calls. Curry objected to any visitation that did not occur in the Pacific Northwest.
Curry claimed flying would be physically damaging to H.N.C. because she has “severely sensitive
auditory canals” and flying during COVID-19 would cause extreme disruptions to her schooling
because of quarantine requirements. CP at 179. Curry also insisted that if H.N.C. went to New
Mexico for Coffman’s graduation, Curry had to be the one to fly with her. And Curry stated that
if Coffman wanted to do a video call, it had to be largely consistent with the current visitation
schedule—every other weekend when his parenting time would start.
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A hearing was held on October 22, 2021. At the beginning of the hearing, in response to
Curry’s objection to Coffman’s proposed visitation, the trial court stated,
Yeah, okay. I would like you to go ahead and put your objections on the record.
Well, let me tell you. I gotta stop you. Actually, this could go on forever.
So you’re objecting because you think that the child, every time you get the child
back, the child is suffering after seeing [her] dad—seeing the dad, father. You’re
objecting because you don’t think the child should be able to fly. The child has
every issue in the book. Ears, gluten, you name it, the child has it. And so, you
think that basically, it sounds like you think that anything that has to do with anyone
else besides you, the child shouldn’t do. That’s what it sounds like to the Court, I
have to tell you. And I’m not trying to just be sarcastic.
We were here originally, because there was a motion for you to move and we—the
[c]ourt allowed that move. And that was interesting because—and then—and then
you didn’t—then you wanted the visitation during a certain time, because you can’t
see well at night. The [c]ourt accommodated you there. We did all these different
accommodations and then now dad’s got a great job and wants to see his child and
you think that that should not happen, correct?
VRP at 33-34.
Curry continued to object to Coffman’s proposal, arguing that H.N.C. could not travel to
Texas because she would miss at least 10 days of school due to COVID-19 quarantine because
H.N.C. would not likely be vaccinated for travelling. Curry explained that H.N.C. had reactions
to vaccines due to being a “ventilation genetic carrier.” VRP at 36. Curry also insisted that,
although H.N.C. had been doing “beautifully” on the current visitation schedule, H.N.C. could not
be allowed to visit Coffman for more than two days because of her trauma and stress diagnosis
and her exhibiting violence towards animals at Coffman’s house. VRP at 39. Curry also argued
that a video call every Saturday afternoon was disruptive and requiring hour-long video calls was
too long for H.N.C. to sit still and be on the phone. Coffman responded by agreeing to move video
calls to any day as long as he had a regular video call once a week.
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No. 57694-5-II
The trial court agreed to modify the visitation schedule for Coffman’s requested Christmas
and graduation visits, as well as the scheduled video conferences. However, the trial court said
that it would reconsider the visits if Curry presented evidence from H.N.C.’s school that the travel
would require missing more than a week of school. The trial court also expressed its growing
concern for H.N.C.:
But I’m really looking forward to the trial in this case, I have to say. This—the
response that we—that you bring into this courtroom causes me concern for your
child. I have to indicate that as well at this point.
I feel like—I feel—it does—I’ve got some—I’m very concerned. I’m very
concerned. I’ve been concerned—I get concerned at each—more each time,
especially when I received all of your pleadings and the things you state. I’m really
concerned for your—
MS. CURRY: You should be concerned. She hurts animals when she’s at his
house.
THE COURT: I am—I am really concerned for her. I am really concerned. I’m
very concerned. I’m very concerned. So, —
MS. CURRY: It shows [Coffman] is in complete denial of the—
THE COURT: I think somebody probably is in denial on this side. It might [be]
the [c]ourt as well. But we’ll get to the bottom of it when we have trial.
VRP at 40-41. When Curry continued asking what documentation she would need from the
airlines or the school to convince the trial court to restrict H.N.C.’s travel, the trial court expressed
further concern about Curry’s insistence on restricting Coffman’s visitation with H.N.C.:
I’m very—I’m—I’m very concerned about the—the—what’s happening here. At
every turn, the limitations that you’re trying to create for dad to have visitation with
his child. And that was when he was present.
So, now this is—he’s—he’s literally gonna be absent in the way that you wanted
him to be and he is only asking for this limit. And you found every way and it’s all
of the health of your child. Can’t travel because her ears. Can’t travel because of
this stress. Can’t travel because there is a list a mile long. And I’m concerned
about that.
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VRP at 42. A hearing on presentation of the temporary orders was set for November 12, 2021.
At the November 12 hearing, Curry told the trial court she had not signed the temporary
orders because she needed to change the times required for dropping H.N.C. off at the airport.
Coffman also told the trial court he had recently learned that the Border Patrol had limited his time
off at Christmas to only two days and he thought that was too short of a time to require H.N.C. to
travel for a visit so he was willing to forego the Christmas visitation. The trial court entered
modified temporary orders consistent with this agreement.
By May 6, 2022, the trial date needed to be continued, leading to another hearing. At that
hearing, Coffman requested that they address a summer visitation schedule because the trial would
now be moved past summer and set in September. Coffman asked for an extended summer visit
from mid-June until the end of July. He supported this long duration by pointing out that H.N.C.’s
six-day visit for his April graduation went very well. Curry admitted the visit for Coffman’s
graduation was “amazing” and “went great,” but she objected to an extended summer visit. VRP
at 62.
The trial court denied Coffman’s request for an extended summer visit but ordered that he
could have two weeks of visitation over the summer. When Curry continued discussing
summertime visitation, the trial court interrupted to ask if Curry was objecting to the two weeks
of visitation or the longer initially-requested, but denied, visit:
So, I—so,—so, are you saying—is your argument no to two weeks. Just can I—I
need to be clear here, because I don’t want to sit here and dwell on a bunch of time.
He’s—he made a big jump, asked for a month or so. I want you to wait [until] I
stop talking. Asked—he asked for like a month or so of visitation. I thought that
was a lot, since they haven’t had that type of time together and that she hasn’t been
away from you that long before. But two weeks was something that was a part of
the parenting plan. He’s—he’s asked you to exercise those two weeks now. Are
you telling me you’d object to that?
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No. 57694-5-II
VRP at 62-63. Curry responded that two weeks was the maximum length of visitation she thought
was appropriate. The trial court ordered that Coffman’s summer visitation would be from June 20
through July 6.
The trial court set the trial for September 27, 2022, and a trial readiness hearing for
September 6.
III. TRIAL
At the readiness hearing, the trial court discussed the logistics of the trial. The trial court
noted that the parties could appear in person in the courtroom or on Zoom. But if either party
chose to appear by Zoom, they needed to be sure they had a way to manage the evidence and
exhibits because the trial court and court staff would not be managing evidence for the parties.
Coffman was going to be represented by an attorney at the trial, Curry was going to be self-
represented.
Prior to trial, Coffman filed his trial brief in which he argued that it was in H.N.C.’s best
interests for the trial court to designate him the primary residential parent. Coffman also proposed
two parenting plans, one if he was designated the primary residential parent and one if he remained
the long-distance parent, although the actual residential schedule was the same.
A. TRIAL DAY ONE—MORNING
On the day of trial, Curry appeared by Zoom and had several issues with the audio on her
computer. As these challenges became apparent, the trial court expressed concern about Curry
appearing on Zoom, especially in how it would impact Curry’s ability to present and admit
exhibits. Curry expressed confusion about how exhibits were handled during trial and claimed
nobody had explained it to her. The trial court attempted to explain to Curry how she would have
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No. 57694-5-II
to handle exhibits using screen sharing on her computer. Ultimately, notwithstanding these
challenges, the trial court determined that the trial needed to proceed.
Jennifer Harley, the court-appointed guardian ad litem (GAL), was the first witness. She
testified that she was appointed to investigate all issues related to establishing a new parenting plan
and she conducted her investigation by reviewing documents provided by the parents and third-
party providers, as well as conducting interviews.
Harley testified that she reviewed approximately 100 pages of documents from the
Department of Children, Youth, and Families regarding Curry. Harley identified “founded
determinations” from Child Protective Services (CPS) regarding Curry’s older son related to the
child being medically fragile and concerns regarding Curry’s mental health stability. Harley
testified that Curry’s son had been removed from her care due to concerns regarding neglect and
malnutrition and that Curry no longer had contact with the child. Harley also identified one CPS
report regarding H.N.C. which did “not screen in” for investigation. VRP at 95. Although the
report was not screened in, the CPS notes on the report indicated that Curry had H.N.C. on a
restricted diet due to Curry’s insistence that H.N.C. had food intolerances and allergies despite
medical providers stating that H.N.C. did not have any special dietary needs.
Harley testified that she reviewed H.N.C.’s medical records and determined that H.N.C.
had been screened twice for Celiac disease and both screenings were negative. The medical
records also noted “suspected ADHD.” VRP at 99. Harley also testified that Curry indicated
H.N.C. was suffering from suicidal ideation (although Harley opined that, in her experience as a
GAL, it would be unusual for a six- or seven-year-old child to be experiencing suicidal ideation).
Harley further testified that Curry had claimed that Coffman refused to follow H.N.C.’s
dietary restriction and was directly responsible for H.N.C.’s behavioral issues. Harley explained
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No. 57694-5-II
that Curry claimed H.N.C. experienced suicidal ideation and began hurting animals when H.N.C.
was in Coffman’s care for more than five to seven days. However, Harley did not find any
evidence that Coffman refused to comply with the dietary restrictions and Harley did not identify
any behavioral issues that were attributable directly to Coffman.
Harley ultimately recommended that Coffman be designated the primary residential parent.
Harley testified that Curry had had multiple jobs and residences over the last several years and that
Coffman would provide more stability and decreased conflict in H.N.C.’s day to day life. And
although Curry was able to meet H.N.C.’s “minimal care needs,” Coffman could provide H.N.C.
with an increased level of care. VRP at 107.
Curry attempted to cross-examine Harley about her investigation, but Curry struggled to
present the exhibits she was attempting to refer to or ask relevant questions.
With Curry’s challenges again becoming apparent, the trial court expressed concern about
how Curry’s decision to appear remotely by Zoom was affecting the timing of the trial and Curry’s
ability to participate effectively. Eventually, the trial court interrupted Curry’s attempt at cross-
examination and tried to redirect Curry to presenting relevant evidence:
Okay. I’m just really quick, Ms. Curry, probably 90 [percent] of my litigants in
family law are pro se. That seems odd to you maybe and I know what you’ve
kept—keep relying on the fact that you didn’t understand what procedures are this
or what procedures are that.
But in—in this case, I’m required to treat all parties fairly, regardless of whether
they have an attorney or not. I tend to try to help pro se litigants kind of do what
they’re supposed to do and not necessarily hold you such—to such strict point,
unless demanded by the other side, because that’s the law.
[Coffman’s counsel] has kind of just let you go, because—probably because
strategically, it’s helpful to him, sorry. And I just want to let you know right now
you’re—you’re having a hard time keeping the [c]ourt focused on the issues the
[c]ourt needs to—to deal with.
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No. 57694-5-II
I will also indicate to you that you so—we are at 11:00 and I’ve heard no testimony
that’s gonna be useful in my decision[-]making process. I can’t understand what
point you’re trying to get to right now. You haven’t gotten there. We’ve gone
through a review of records of what Ms. Harley saw. We’ve gone—I mean we
literally have not—there’s not even been one piece of evidence admitted at this
point.
It is 11:00. We were to start at 9:00. I know you showed up a little bit late. This
case would last three weeks at this rate. You’re not asking any questions that are
relevant and [Coffman’s counsel] is allowing it, because again, probably
strategically, it’s helpful to him. But you’re not benefitting this [c]ourt right now.
And—and it’s—it’s you’re wasting the judicial resources we have. So, I’m having
a hard time. I need you to decide what point you’re trying to make. Don’t try to
be sneaky or extra smart. If you have something that you want to point out that Ms.
Harley has done incorrectly or something this [c]ourt wasn’t able to see from her
report, I mean generally, she would be off the stand by now. So, it’s time for you
to just get to the point on what it is that you want to get out of Ms. Harley for this
trial.
VRP at 137-38. Curry’s cross-examination of Harley continued for an additional half hour.
B. TRIAL DAY 1—AFTERNOON
The first witness in the afternoon was Lawrence Merrifield, the GAL appointed to
investigate the original parenting plan. Merrifield testified that when he did the original
investigation, Curry reported she suffered from numerous physical and mental health conditions
including Celiac disease and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and she was on a number of
different medications. Merrifield also testified that a psychological evaluation on Curry,
performed in 2014, indicated Curry lacked insight into her own behavior.
During his investigation, Merrifield became concerned about Curry projecting health
issues onto H.N.C. According to Merrifield, Curry reported H.N.C. was gluten and lactose
intolerant and had Celiac disease, despite there being no medical documentation of these
conditions. Merrifield also expressed concern that Curry attributed all of H.N.C.’s medical
problems to Coffman even though his visitations with H.N.C. were limited.
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No. 57694-5-II
Coffman was next to testify. He testified that, at the time of the original parenting plan, he
worked a job where he was on-call 24 hours a day with only two weekend days and five weekdays
off each month. In his current job as a border patrol agent, Coffman said he worked five days a
week for 8 to 12 hours per day. Coffman currently owned a 2300 square foot house in which
H.N.C. had her own bedroom. Coffman also got married in June 2021 to Sara Coffman.1 Coffman
also testified that when H.N.C. visited him to attend his academy graduation, she was “wonderful”
on the visit and did not exhibit any behavioral concerns. VRP at 171.
Coffman explained that H.N.C. was currently on a gluten-free diet because Curry had
claimed that H.N.C. had Celiac disease. When tests showed that H.N.C. did not have Celiac, Curry
still insisted H.N.C. was gluten-intolerant. Coffman testified he had not seen any medical report
that required H.N.C. to be on a gluten-free diet, but he maintained the gluten-free diet because it
had been court-ordered in the original parenting plan as a “lifestyle choice.” VRP at173. Coffman
also testified that Curry claimed H.N.C. had ADHD, but there were no medical reports that
definitively diagnosis her with ADHD.
Coffman further testified about how his communication with Curry influenced his
relationship with H.N.C. Coffman said that Curry’s constant accusations about his care of H.N.C.
made him concerned to be alone with H.N.C. when no one would witness what he was doing. He
also explained that Curry was often antagonistic and argumentative about Coffman exercising his
visitation, and he believed Curry was trying to make it so uncomfortable for him that he would not
exercise his visitation time. Coffman testified that during visits he would get a lot of emails and
1
Because Michael and Sara Coffman have the same last name, we refer to Sara by her first name
to avoid confusion. We intend no disrespect.
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No. 57694-5-II
texts, and then after visits, Curry would send him messages accusing him of ruining H.N.C., of
causing her pain and anguish, and of being a horrible father.
Coffman explained that if H.N.C. misbehaved, it was consistent with being a child.
Generally, her misbehavior was minor and she simply had to be reminded of the rules. Coffman
also described some behavior of aggression toward the animals in Coffman’s house. Coffman
testified that once H.N.C. had squeezed the dog’s mouth shut while screaming at it. Another time,
she hit the cat with a dog toy. And another time, H.N.C. kicked the dog in the yard. Despite these
behavioral issues, Coffman had not seen H.N.C. exhibit any suicidal ideation.
Coffman also testified that H.N.C. decided to call his wife, “mommy Sara.” VRP at 177.
Then during one visit, H.N.C. was acting strangely and calling Sara names like “babysitter,”
“nanny,” and “help.” VRP at 178. When they confronted H.N.C., H.N.C. began crying because
she had been “told to call her these things” and did not want to get in trouble for calling Sara
“mommy Sara.” VRP at 178. Coffman testified that H.N.C. is now back to calling Sara “mommy
Sara.”
Coffman testified that he was unable to be H.N.C.’s primary residential parent in 2019, but
now he was in a position to be the primary residential parent. Coffman also believed it would be
the best thing for H.N.C.
As Coffman’s cross-examination was starting, the trial court took a recess to allow Curry
to get her exhibits organized and prepare some questions. When the trial resumed, the trial court
encouraged Curry to focus her questions on the factors related to determining a parenting plan, not
her own relocation, because the parenting plan was the only relevant issue.
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No. 57694-5-II
After Curry cross-examined Coffman, Dr. Tracy Williams, H.N.C.’s pediatrician,
testified.2 Dr. Williams testified that H.N.C. was not diagnosed with Celiac disorder. But Dr.
Williams explained that he did diagnose H.N.C. with suspected gluten intolerance based on
Curry’s description of H.N.C.’s symptoms and reactions to gluten. Dr. Williams testified that he
believed both parents cared deeply for H.N.C. and had her best interests at heart but their lack of
cooperation was impacting H.N.C. Dr. Williams testified that he did not have specific concerns
about Curry self-diagnosing herself or H.N.C.
The next witness was Kristen Doyle, H.N.C.’s mental health counselor for approximately
seven months in 2021. Doyle testified that H.N.C. was being seen for a trauma and stress-related
disorder; she explained this was a diagnosis given when a child exhibited some trauma-related
symptoms but did not meet the criteria for a PTSD diagnosis. Doyle testified that the diagnosis
was based on Curry’s reporting about both what H.N.C. witnessed (alleged domestic violence in
Coffman’s home) and H.N.C.’s behavior.
Doyle also testified about one visit related to discussing H.N.C.’s violent actions toward
the animals at Coffman’s house. Sara told Doyle that H.N.C. was kicking and chasing the dog and
claimed she did it because the dog could not hurt her back. Doyle testified that Sara thought
H.N.C. was acting out because Curry would not allow H.N.C. to attend Coffman and Sara’s
wedding. When Doyle asked H.N.C. about the incident, H.N.C. said that she was sad because she
kicked the dog and Sara made her go to bed early.
Doyle also noted that H.N.C. had difficulty with transitions. Doyle said it was difficult to
predict how children would react, but historically H.N.C. experienced a period of adjustment and
2
Although Dr. Williams was one of Curry’s witnesses and Coffman had not concluded his case,
the trial court allowed several witnesses to testify out of order to accommodate schedules.
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No. 57694-5-II
some dysregulation in transitioning from one home to another. Doyle opined that H.N.C.’s
reactions to these transitions would be helped if the parents would be supportive of each other’s
visitation.
As the trial continued into the afternoon, the trial court noted that the trial was obviously
not going to be finished in one day, but that it had a commitment to attend a funeral at around
11:00 a.m. the next day. Given this commitment, the trial court asked the parties to consider
whether they could finish within a short period of time the next morning or if they needed to set
another trial day. After discussion, the trial court confirmed that the parties had decided to resume
the trial the next day from 8:30 a.m. until 11:00 a.m., but another trial day would be scheduled if
necessary. And given Curry’s difficulties appearing remotely, the trial court told Curry she was
required to appear in person for the remainder of trial.
At the end of the first day, Coffman explained he only had two witnesses remaining and
their testimony would be short. Curry expressed confusion about where they were in the trial, and
the trial court explained that they had taken several of her witnesses out of order, before Coffman’s
witnesses, to accommodate their scheduling. Ultimately, Curry stated she had no further witnesses
available to call that day, but she wanted to recall the GAL Harley the next day. The trial court
explained Harley had already been released from her subpoena but Curry could try to find out if
Harley would be available to testify again. The trial court reiterated that only 8:30 a.m. to 11:00
a.m. was available for the next day but, if necessary, they could continue looking for additional
trial days.
C. TRIAL DAY 2—MORNING
Coffman’s mother, Theresa Hastie, testified that she rarely got to see H.N.C. since Coffman
moved to Texas because Curry would not agree to visits with her. Hastie also flew with H.N.C.
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No. 57694-5-II
to Texas for Coffman’s graduation and did not observe any concerning behaviors during the trip.
Hastie testified that H.N.C. “did great,” “did really awesome,” and had a “fun time” seeing her
father and the rest of the family. VRP at 295-96. But Hastie testified that when she picked up
H.N.C. to go to the airport, she had to buy her all new clothes because Curry dropped her off with
a suitcase that was empty except for a stuffed animal and a blanket. During cross-examination,
Curry disputed that she was obstructing visits between H.N.C. and Hastie.
Finally, Coffman called his wife, Sara. Sara testified that Coffman and H.N.C. had a great
relationship and H.N.C. enjoyed being in their home. Sara also testified that H.N.C.’s visit to
Texas was wonderful and she did not exhibit any behavioral issues. Sara testified that H.N.C. had
her own room and bathroom at their house in Texas. And in the event Coffman was designated
the primary residential parent, they had investigated the school H.N.C. would attend and had
identified potential counselors for her. Finally, Sara explained she was a stay-at-home spouse so
she would be able to care for H.N.C. without the need for daycare. On cross-examination, Sara
testified that she had witnessed two instances of H.N.C. being violent towards animals. After
Sara’s testimony, Coffman stated he had no further witnesses.
As it was Curry’s turn for testimony, the trial court allowed Curry, as an unrepresented
party, to testify in narrative form. Curry testified that after Coffman started exercising all of his
permitted visitations, H.N.C. started exhibiting violence towards animals and that H.N.C.’s
behavior at daycare was so poor she was going to get kicked out. When Curry moved to the
Columbia Gorge area, there was even more antagonism, contention, and chaos around visitations.
Curry testified that Coffman refused to co-parent with her about medical decisions and could not
be collaborative.
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The trial court asked Curry why she believed the transitions to visit Coffman were a
problem, but Curry’s multiple moves over a few years did not create any problems with transitions.
Curry responded that it was because her parenting relationship with H.N.C. was stable and secure
and because her residential moves did not change the other dynamics in H.N.C.’s life. Curry also
told the trial court that when H.N.C. returned from Coffman’s house, H.N.C. said “she didn’t want
to live anymore.” VRP at 333. Regarding Hastie’s testimony about being obstructed from visits,
Curry stated that H.N.C. was allowed to go visit Coffman’s family but the family had not made
very many requests. Finally, Curry admitted that H.N.C. had done really well after her recent
visits to Texas and had not exhibited any violence towards animals in over a year.
Following Curry’s testimony, the trial court expressed concern about H.N.C.’s reported
suicidal ideation—specifically the lack of documentation from H.N.C.’s counselor’s discussing
treatment for suicidal ideation. The trial court asked Curry to have H.N.C.’s counselor write a
declaration addressing H.N.C.’s treatment for suicidal ideation so the trial court could consider it
before making a final decision.
As for Curry’s desire to potentially recall Harley, the GAL, Curry told the trial court that
she had emailed Harley but had not received a response. Notwithstanding the trial court’s earlier
offer to add more trial days if necessary, neither Curry or Coffman identified any further witnesses.
The trial proceeded to closing arguments.
Following closing arguments, the trial court reiterated its request that Curry submit a
declaration from H.N.C.’s counselor documenting treatment for the suicidal ideation. The trial
court also expressed concern about Curry’s attitude and questionable conduct related to visitations
that Curry had not addressed in her testimony. As a result, the trial court offered Curry the
opportunity to submit a declaration explaining her conduct around visitations. The trial court went
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No. 57694-5-II
on to further explain the remaining concerns she had at the conclusion of trial and what additional
information she thought would be helpful to making an informed decision:
So, I need to understand how come you think that’s okay. How—how this is gonna
change moving forward? And I just—I don’t know what else to say. She did her
visit to Texas, everybody says it was a great thing. You begged me not to let her
go, and you told me she was gonna commit suicide if she went.
So, I—and so, I did not expect the outcome to feel like this at the end of this case.
I continually took your position throughout this whole process and let you set the
parameters and still we ended up in this exact same space. So, no matter what we
took away from dad and it was [n]ever enough. And so, I’m—I’m a little confused
by that. I did not think that we would end up here.
And I’m also surprised that you would take this case to trial, when you could have
just agreed with them, and then you would have the custodial—been the custodial
parent. But I think now you’re willing to agree with a lot more things, because you
realize that it’s just not reasonable. So, I haven’t made a full decision yet. I’d sure
like to see some of the things that I’ve asked about. But I’m having a hard, you
know, with kind of—I’ve—we’ve had two GALs that work in this field. . . .
....
. . . And everyone who has looked at this from basically an interview and document
process, has indicated that this is not healthy what’s happening to this child. Not
just because—it’s not just because they’re not taking on the diagnosis that—this is
because you’ve had 99 [percent] of the parenting time and every one of the things
that is wrong with this child is dad’s. That’s what you’ve done throughout this
entire process.
And that is something [Coffman’s attorney], said in his closing. But it was
something that I wrote down yesterday. Because it’s been exactly how it’s been
every time we’ve come in—everything wrong with this kid. Every single thing has
been from dad. And he has had very little parenting time. He’s been limited at
every—every front.
VRP at 370-71. The trial court also informed the parties that the evidence was causing her to
consider a major modification to the parenting plan:
So, I’m having a hard—I’m struggling with this. So, it’s a shift I would never plan
on making in most cases, but this is the way the evidence has come out. So, I just
want you to be prepared for that. And I’m hoping that you’ll have some—some
evidence to show that helps the [c]ourt make a more informed decision.
17
No. 57694-5-II
VRP at 371. The trial court also agreed the parties could submit additional evidence on whether
or not Coffman’s mother, Hastie, requested visits and whether those visits were refused.
After the trial court’s comments, Curry asked if they were going to do another half day of
trial. The trial court responded that the trial was finished. The trial court noted that Curry had said
she had no other witnesses and the parties had just concluded their closing arguments, so it was
unclear why Curry thought they were going to do another half day. The trial court set a hearing
for its decision for October 12.
D. POSTTRIAL SUPPLEMENTAL INFORMATION
As requested, Curry supplied an additional declaration from H.N.C.’s counselor, Doyle. In
the declaration, Doyle said she was aware of only one reference to suicidal ideation, noting that
H.N.C. had previously exhibited “one instance of passive suicidal ideation (wishing she was
dead).” CP at 312. The declaration made no mention of Doyle engaging in any specific treatment
regarding the suicidal ideation. Curry also submitted an additional declaration from Dr. Williams
even though the trial court did not request more information from the pediatrician.
Regarding the issue of whether Coffman’s mother, Hastie, was prevented from visiting
H.N.C., both parties submitted text messages which documented several requests for Hastie to see
H.N.C. which were either ignored or refused by Curry.
In her own declaration, Curry addressed her presentation at trial explaining her PTSD was
triggered, she was “frazzled” by attempting to manage her exhibits, and she does not handle
confrontation well. CP at 296. Curry also tried to establish a backstory to her history of
communication with Coffman and stated that her current way of communicating resulted from too
18
No. 57694-5-II
many years attempting to be accommodating to his controlling behavior. Finally, Curry stated that
she would go to Texas if the trial court ordered H.N.C. to live with Coffman.
IV. TRIAL COURT’S DECISION AND ORDERS
On October 12, the trial court issued its decision—the trial court designated Coffman as
the primary residential parent and adopted Coffman’s proposed parenting plan. The trial court
recognized that it initially believed this case would be a straightforward relocation and
modification:
The trial was regarding a relocation, originally. And—and then it kind of became
a modification, which that’s the natural progression of a relocation. At that time,
you can basically—you open the doors to all—all forms of modification.
So, I wanted to first indicate that I was, you know, with these relocations, they
generally go down one direction very easily. The way that the statute reads. The
way that the, you know, parties are able to decide amongst themselves like can
work because when I know the way the statute reads. And this case, kind of it threw
me for a loop. I’ll be quite honest.
VRP at 375. But after trial, the trial court felt it was necessary to consider making a major,
disruptive change to the parenting plan:
And after the trial, having—having felt that way, that was hard for me, because I
know that there was—that—the decision that I felt that I should make absent getting
more information, was gonna be very disruptive to the child, because it was gonna
be such a big change. I asked for extra information. And the manner in which I
received that information and the types of things that were said, in that the way I
got that information, simply confirmed with me that I was making the correct
decision here.
So, originally, Ms. Curry had asked to move some 25 miles away from the location
that she was. Father kind of opposed, but then withdrew his opposition. And then
just asked for a parenting plan that was extremely reasonable, which again, was
opposed by Ms. Curry. And then throughout the entire process, any types of
reconciliation that could have occurred was—were opposed by Ms. Curry.
I asked Ms. Curry, something that—and you said something from the counselor
and some communication regarding visitations with grandparents during the time
that the child was here without the father being present or during any of that time.
19
No. 57694-5-II
And what I received back, was communication—the communication being
grandmother and Ms. Curry, clearly was not full, complete because when I received
that complete communication, you could see that that was not actually the way the
conversation went. It was just only the pieces that she wanted me to see.
Also, she had went to the counselor, must not have asked the exact question I asked,
but got information that I didn’t—wasn’t asked for, and then, went and got
information from a doctor I did not ask for any further information from.
But both parties who gave their declarations, talked about information that occurred
in this trial, as if they were present in this trial, but they were not present. They
received information from Ms. Curry, basically saying we had villainized her, that
we had done all of these things, and they had written their things with that spin in
mind, which is exactly the problem that we have here. No matter what the Court—
the [c]Court puts down as a parenting plan, no matter what we’re trying to do to
create some type of a co-parenting situation, she finds a way to spin it her own
direction.
VRP at 375-77. The trial court then explained why it determined that its decision was in H.N.C.’s
best interests:
And—and for me, I know she loves this child very much. I know she wants to take
care of this child very much. But she just up and decides that she knows what’s
best and she’s not—and she’s gonna do whatever it takes to do what’s best and she
hasn’t even, you know, taken anything into consideration when it comes—if the
child is going to have the robust relationship which his—her father as she deserves
to have, then she’s going to need—it’s not gonna happen with Ms. Curry. She’s
not going to allow that to happen.
And so, while this is going to be disruptive as our GAL, as she had testified in court,
and—and I think, she was under the same notion, that she herself wasn’t gonna be
able to go this direction. That while this was gonna be a bigger disruption in the
beginning, it’s the only choice that one can make, because of the consistency and
resiliency that was needed for this child.
....
And I’m—I just want you to know, that I see you. And so, it’s unfortunate, because
I know that you’ve—think you have someone’s best interest at heart. But that was
not the way that you behaved at trial. It’s not the way you’ve behaved before trial.
It’s not the way you’ve behaved since we’ve had trial. And it’s unfortunate.
VRP at 377; 383.
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No. 57694-5-II
The trial court also made findings on the statutory relocation factors (the trial court
apparently believed that the findings were necessary because this modification was initiated by
Curry’s notice to relocate).
The trial court further noted that in Curry’s declaration, she had volunteered her intent to
move to Texas if the trial court made Coffman the primary residential parent and the trial court
considered that information. As a result of Curry’s potential move to Texas, Coffman suggested
including two alternative residential schedules in the parenting plan, the long-distance residential
schedule and an alternative residential schedule that would be in effect if Curry was living within
30 miles of Coffman. The trial court agreed and ordered that if Curry moved to Texas, the
alternative residential schedule should be closer to equal parenting time.
The parties discussed when the transition of primary residency should take place. The trial
court determined that it needed additional information from H.N.C.’s school in Texas to make a
decision. The hearing for presentation of the final orders was set for November 4.
At the presentation hearing, it appeared there was some confusion or miscommunication
around whether H.N.C. would be leaving with Coffman when he flew back to Texas. Ultimately,
Coffman told the trial court he would like to arrange to take H.N.C. to Texas three days later (after
school on Monday) so she would have the weekend and a last day at school to get ready to move.
The trial court agreed.
The trial court entered the final written orders consistent with its oral rulings and the agreed
modifications. The final order contained language finding that living with Curry was not in
H.N.C.’s best interests and that Coffman should be the primary residential parent. The final order
21
No. 57694-5-II
also repeated the trial courts findings on all of the statutory relocation factors.3 The new permanent
parenting plan included joint decision-making. The parenting plan also included two alternative
residential schedules as well as the modifications agreed to at the presentation hearing. The final
parenting plan included a conclusion that the parenting plan was in the best interests of the child.
Curry appeals.4
ANALYSIS
Curry challenges the trial court’s final order on the petition for relocation and the resulting
parenting plan with 14 assignments of error.5 Essentially, Curry makes four arguments. First, she
argues that the trial court misapplied the “Child Relocation Act” (CRA), RCW 26.09.405-.560.
Second, Curry argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the new parenting
plan. Third, Curry argues the trial court erred by ordering H.N.C. to change residences with only
three days’ notice. And fourth, Curry argues the trial court erred by shortening the trial to attend
a funeral. We affirm the trial court’s final orders.
3
The final orders were drafted by Coffman’s counsel.
4
Following entry of the final orders on appeal, the trial court held additional hearings and entered
orders related to a dispute regarding changing H.N.C.’s therapist. These orders do not fall within
the scope of review of the final order and final parenting plan. See RAP 2.4. Further, Curry did
not move for discretionary review nor did she assign error to these orders.
5
In his brief, Coffman moves to strike Curry’s opening brief for failure to comply with the court
rules, specifically the rule requiring citation to the record. RAP 10.3(a)(5) (“Reference to the
record must be included for each factual statement.”). We deny Coffman’s motion to strike
Curry’s brief in its entirety. However, the facts relied on in this opinion are supported by the
record designated in this case, and we do not consider any factual statement in Curry’s brief that
is not supported by the record.
22
No. 57694-5-II
I. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a trial court’s decision related to the welfare of children for an abuse of
discretion. In re Marriage of Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d 381, 386, 409 P.3d 1184, review denied,
190 Wn.2d 1022 (2018). A trial court abuses its discretion when its decision is manifestly
unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons. Id. “ ‘A court’s decision is manifestly
unreasonable if it is outside the range of acceptable choices, given the facts and the applicable
legal standard; it is based on untenable grounds if the factual findings are unsupported by the
record; it is based on untenable reasons if it is based on an incorrect standard or the facts do not
meet the requirements of the correct standard.’ ” Id. (quoting In re Marriage of Littlefield,
133 Wn.2d 39, 47, 940 P.2d 1362 (1997)).
Decisions in family law actions will seldom be changed on appeal. See In re Marriage of
Landry, 103 Wn.2d 807, 809, 699 P.2d 214 (1985). The courts have recognized,
Such decisions are difficult at best. Appellate courts should not encourage appeals
by tinkering with them. The emotional and financial interests affected by such
decisions are best served by finality.
Id. And because the trial court hears the evidence firsthand and has a unique opportunity to observe
the witnesses, we are “ ‘extremely reluctant to disturb child placement dispositions.’ ” In re
Parentage of Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. 343, 349, 22 P.3d 1280 (2001) (quoting In re Marriage of
Schneider, 82 Wn. App. 471, 476, 918 P.2d 543 (1996), overruled on other grounds by Littlefield,
133 Wn.2d 807).
II. APPLICATION OF THE CRA
Curry argues that the trial court abused its discretion by misapplying the CRA. Curry
appears to argue that the trial court actually denied her relocation and, therefore, did not have
authority to modify the parenting plan. Alternatively, Curry argues that the trial court conflated
23
No. 57694-5-II
the requirements for relocation with the requirements for modifying a parenting plan. Although
we recognize the written findings in the final orders appear to conflate the decision on relocation
and the decision on modification, we disagree that any legal error occurred.
The CRA provides certain notice requirements and standards for changing the primary
residence of a child who is the subject of a court order regarding residential time. See RCW
26.09.405-.560; Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d at 386. “ ‘If a person entitled to residential time or
visitation objects to a child’s relocation, the person seeking to move the child may not relocate the
child without court approval.’ ” Laidlaw, 2 Wn. App. 2d at 386-87 (quoting In re Marriage of
McNaught, 189 Wn. App. 545, 553, 359 P.3d 811 (2015)). The CRA establishes a rebuttable
presumption that the relocation will be permitted. RCW 26.09.520. The CRA also provides
11 factors the trial court should consider to determine whether the detrimental effects of relocation
outweigh the benefits to the child and the relocating parent. RCW 26.09.520(1)-(11).
A party who is entitled to residential time with the child may file an objection to either the
relocation or the relocating parent’s proposed revised residential schedule. RCW 26.09.480. If no
objection to the relocation is filed, then the relocation shall be permitted. RCW 26.09.500. Even
if a parent does not object to the relocation, the parent retains the right to move for modification
of the parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260. RCW 26.09.500(3).
RCW 26.09.260(6) governs modification of a parenting plan in relation to a relocation and
permits the trial court to entertain a change in the primary residential parent when a relocation is
requested:
The court may order adjustments to the residential aspects of a parenting plan
pursuant to a proceeding to permit or restrain a relocation of the child. The person
objecting to the relocation of the child or the relocating person’s proposed revised
residential schedule may file a petition to modify the parenting plan, including a
change of the residence in which the child resides the majority of the time, without
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No. 57694-5-II
a showing of adequate cause other than the proposed relocation itself. A hearing to
determine adequate cause for modification shall not be required so long as the
request for relocation of the child is being pursued. In making a determination of
a modification pursuant to relocation of the child, the court shall first determine
whether to permit or restrain the relocation of the child using the procedures and
standards provided in RCW 26.09.405 through 26.09.560. Following that
determination, the court shall determine what modification pursuant to relocation
should be made, if any, to the parenting plan or custody order or visitation order.
(Emphasis added.) Essentially, a relocation is all that is required for modification of the parenting
plan because “[r]elocations involve new time and distance factors that will inevitably require
dramatic changes to a parenting plan.” In re Marriage of Fahey, 164 Wn. App. 42, 68, 262 P.3d
128 (2011), review denied, 173 Wn.2d 1019 (2012). “ ‘[A] trial court need not support each term
of a parenting plan with specific factual findings. Rather, a trial court has broad discretion to
structure a parenting plan, guided by the provisions of the applicable statutes.’ ” Laidlaw, 2 Wn.
App. 2d at 388 (alteration in original) (quoting McNaught, 189 Wn. App. at 563).
Here, although the trial court’s ruling somewhat blurs the distinction between the relocation
of the parent and the modification of the residential time in the parenting plan for the child, there
was no error. Curry initiated the current proceedings by filing a notice of relocation to move from
Vancouver to the Columbia Gorge area without filing any proposed revised residential schedule.
In response, Coffman did not object to the relocation, but he petitioned for modification of the
parenting plan in order to address changes necessitated by Curry’s relocation. Thus, because
Coffman did not object, the relocation was permitted based on RCW 26.09.480 and
RCW 26.09.500. And, in fact, Curry relocated to the Columbia Gorge area early on in the
proceedings. But the issue of Coffman’s responsive request for modification of the parenting plan
remained. And the trial court made clear throughout the proceedings that the only issue before it
was the modification of the parenting plan because there was no objection to Curry’s relocation.
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No. 57694-5-II
We recognize that some of the trial court’s language in the final order appears to discuss
relocation; the trial court’s order appears to discuss the child’s move to the Columbia Gorge area
separately from Curry’s move. See CP at 323 (“The court allowed the child to temporar[il]y move
with Mother while Father continued to seek a change in the parenting plan regarding who the
primary residential parent would be.”), CP at 326 (“The child may not move with Mother on a
permanent basis and father shall be the primary residential parent.”). Although this language in
the order can be read to suggest the trial court was improperly focused on whether to allow the
relocation, rather than being focused on the parenting plan modification, we disagree that this is
the correct interpretation. Based on the history of the case—including the fact that Curry had
already relocated—and the trial court’s oral rulings, it appears the language in the order is simply
inartful in expressing the trial court’s intent to decide modifications to the parenting plan as
initiated by Curry’s request for relocation to the Columbia Gorge area. Further, because relocation
focuses on where the parent will reside, while modification of the parenting plan and residential
schedule focuses on where the child will reside, the trial court’s clear focus on where H.N.C. will
reside demonstrates the trial court was deciding the correct issue—the modification to the
residential schedule in the parenting plan, rather than whether to allow the relocation.
In addition to its inartful language, the trial court’s order also appears to contain
unnecessary findings that further blurs this issue. The order includes findings under each of the
factors for relocation under RCW 26.09.520(1)-(11); by including these findings, it appears the
trial court believed these findings were necessary because the current action was initiated by
Curry’s notice to relocate. But because the relocation was permitted and had, in fact, already
occurred, the trial court was not required to make findings under these relocation factors. And the
trial court was not required to make additional findings supporting its authority to consider
26
No. 57694-5-II
modification of the parenting plan under these circumstances because relocation, by itself, is
enough to modify a parenting plan under RCW 26.09.260(6). Because the trial court’s relocation
findings were unnecessary, they were superfluous, not a legal error.6
Ultimately, we conclude all of the trial court’s actions were consistent with the statutory
scheme governing modification of a parenting plan in relation to a relocation. Although the final
written orders contained inartful language and superfluous findings under the relocation statute,
there was no legal error that demonstrates an abuse of discretion requiring reversal of the parenting
plan. Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by misapplying the requirements of
the CRA.
III. MODIFICATION OF THE PARENTING PLAN
Curry next argues that the trial court abused its discretion in determining the new parenting
plan because it was not in H.N.C.’s best interests to make Coffman the primary residential parent.
We disagree.
The trial court exercises broad discretion when it develops a parenting plan. In re Marriage
of Katare, 175 Wn.2d 23, 35, 283 P.3d 546 (2012). The trial court must allocate parenting
responsibilities in the best interests of the child. RCW 26.09.002. RCW 26.09.187 provides
factors for the trial court to consider when determining decision-making authority and the child’s
6
We also note that the trial court was not required to make findings regarding Coffman’s move to
Texas because, at the time of his move, Coffman was not the person with whom the child resided
the majority of the time nor did he have substantially equal residential time. Therefore, the
requirements of the CRA did not apply to Coffman’s move to Texas. See RCW 26.09.430.
Further, Coffman’s move to Texas was not a change in H.N.C.’s principal residence. See RCW
26.09.410(2) (“ ‘Relocate’ means a change in principal residence either permanently or for a
protracted period of time, or a change in residence in cases where parents have substantially equal
residential time as defined by RCW 26.09.525.”).
27
No. 57694-5-II
residential schedule. RCW 26.09.187(2), (3).7 Specific findings on the statutory factors are not
required when evidence regarding the statutory factors is presented to the trial court and the trial
7
RCW 26.09.187(3) provides,
RESIDENTIAL PROVISIONS.
(a) The court shall make residential provisions for each child which encourage each
parent to maintain a loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child,
consistent with the child’s developmental level and the family’s social and
economic circumstances. The child’s residential schedule shall be consistent with
RCW 26.09.191. Where the limitations of RCW 26.09.191 are not dispositive of
the child’s residential schedule, the court shall consider the following factors:
(i) The relative strength, nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with
each parent;
(ii) The agreements of the parties, provided they were entered into
knowingly and voluntarily;
(iii) Each parent’s past and potential for future performance of parenting
functions as defined in RCW 26.09.004(3), including whether a parent has taken
greater responsibility for performing parenting functions relating to the daily needs
of the child;
(iv) The emotional needs and developmental level of the child;
(v) The child’s relationship with siblings and with other significant adults,
as well as the child’s involvement with his or her physical surroundings, school, or
other significant activities;
(vi) The wishes of the parents and the wishes of a child who is sufficiently
mature to express reasoned and independent preferences as to his or her residential
schedule; and
(vii) Each parent’s employment schedule, and shall make accommodations
consistent with those schedules.
Factor (i) shall be given the greatest weight.
(b) Where the limitations of RCW 26.09.191 are not dispositive, the court may
order that a child frequently alternate his or her residence between the households
of the parents for brief and substantially equal intervals of time if such provision is
in the best interests of the child. In determining whether such an arrangement is in
the best interests of the child, the court may consider the parties geographic
proximity to the extent necessary to ensure the ability to share performance of the
parenting functions.
(c) For any child, residential provisions may contain any reasonable terms or
conditions that facilitate the orderly and meaningful exercise of residential time by
a parent, including but not limited to requirements of reasonable notice when
residential time will not occur.
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No. 57694-5-II
court’s decision reflects consideration of the relevant factors. In re Parenting & Supp. of C.T.,
193 Wn. App. 427, 443, 378 P.3d 183 (2016).
On appeal, we do not reweigh the evidence or review the trial court’s credibility
determinations. In re Marriage of Black, 188 Wn.2d 114, 127, 392 P.3d 1041 (2017).
Here, after reviewing the whole record, it is evident that the trial court’s paramount concern
was H.N.C.’s best interests and maintaining stable and nurturing relationships with both of her
parents, especially after it started to appear to the trial court that Curry’s concerns about Coffman
were unsubstantiated. Throughout this entire case, Curry insisted that limited visitation with
Coffman was necessary to protect H.N.C.’s physical and mental health, despite presenting no
evidence establishing that H.N.C. suffered from any specific physical or mental illness. Any
evidence of suspected or provisional diagnoses were based on Curry’s own reports of H.N.C.’s
behavior. With the exception of the testimony regarding a few specific instances of H.N.C. hurting
the animals at Coffman’s house, there was no evidence documenting the severe behavioral
problems that Curry repeatedly attributed to H.N.C. visiting her father. Further, despite all
accounts establishing that the visitation H.N.C. did have with Coffman went extremely well, Curry
continued insisting that Coffman should only be permitted short visits. Because of Curry’s
continued insistence, without factual support, on interfering with Coffman’s visitations and his
relationship with H.N.C., the trial court’s determination that it was in H.N.C.’s best interests to
make Coffman the residential parent in order to nurture that parent-child relationship was not
manifestly unreasonable or based on untenable grounds or reasons.8
8
Further, this is consistent with consideration of RCW 26.09.187(3)(i) (“The relative strength,
nature, and stability of the child’s relationship with each parent.”), which is the factor to be given
the greatest weight in considering a parenting plan.
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No. 57694-5-II
Moreover, the trial court’s comments make it clear that the trial court recognized that
transitioning the primary residential parent was going to have some detrimental effect on H.N.C.’s
well-being. The trial court considered the detrimental effect of the residential shift in light of the
potential benefits—increasing the stability of H.N.C.’s relationship with Coffman, potentially
reducing interference and conflict around visitation, and lessening the potential harm of Curry’s
preoccupation with H.N.C.’s alleged physical and mental conditions. And the trial court
recognized that at this point in H.N.C.’s life, such a transition would likely be easier than
addressing further harm to Coffman’s relationship with H.N.C. or effecting such a large change
later. The trial court is in the best position to weigh the competing considerations in this case and,
therefore, we must be extremely reluctant to change the trial court’s child placement decisions.
Schroeder, 106 Wn. App. at 349. Because the trial court carefully considered the harms, benefits,
and consequences of its decision in light of the testimony that it heard, the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in modifying the parenting plan to designate Coffman as the primary residential
parent.
Curry’s arguments to the contrary primarily relate to the trial court’s weighing of evidence
or credibility determinations and are unpersuasive. First, Curry claims that the trial court abused
its discretion by failing to consider relevant facts, evidence, and testimony from experts. But the
trial court carefully considered evidence from all three experts in this case, the GAL Harley, the
pediatrician Dr. Williams, and the counselor Doyle. And although neither Dr. Williams nor Doyle
labeled Curry’s actions as unreasonable, neither expert substantiated her claims regarding H.N.C.’s
alleged physical and mental health conditions or offered any firsthand observations of the
symptoms and behaviors Curry reported. Further, the trial court clearly valued Doyle’s role as
H.N.C.’s counselor because it requested follow-up information from Doyle to address the concerns
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No. 57694-5-II
regarding suicidal ideation. However, the additional information included only a single report
from Curry of passive suicidal ideation and did not establish H.N.C. was currently suffering from,
at immediate risk from, or undergoing treatment for, suicidal ideation. There is nothing in the
record that establishes the trial court disregarded credible evidence or that its decision was not
based on the evidence.
Second, Curry argues that the trial court abused its discretion by considering Curry’s
statement that she would move to Texas if Coffman became the primary residential parent.
However, Curry voluntarily provided that information in a declaration she submitted specifically
for the trial court’s consideration. It is not improper for the trial court to consider information it
was specifically asked to consider by a party.
Third, Curry argues that the trial court erred by finding Coffman credible.9 We do not
review credibility determinations. Black, 188 Wn.2d at 127. And to the extent Curry is alleging
9
Curry also argues that the trial court abused its discretion by applying the “friendly parent”
concept, which has been defined as when “primary residential placement is awarded to the parent
most likely to foster the child’s relationship with the other parent.” In re Marriage of Lawrence,
105 Wn. App. 683, 687, 20 P.3d 972 (2001). The friendly parent concept is often reflected in
pieces of legislation which apply it as a presumption or specific factor to be considered in order to
ensure that the child will have frequent and continuing contact with both parents. Id. In
Washington, the legislature has repeatedly declined to adopt this policy, and therefore, the friendly
parent concept is not the law in this state. Id. at 687-88
Curry’s argument is unpersuasive. Neither party argued that the placement should be made
consistent with the friendly parent concept. Further, nothing in the record suggests that the trial
court made its decision based on the mistaken belief that it was required by this concept to ensure
that H.N.C. had frequent and continuing contact with both parents. Instead, as explained above,
the trial court clearly made its decision based on what it determined to be in H.N.C.’s best interests
considering the nature of her relationship with both parents as well as the effect of Curry’s conduct
on H.N.C.’s well-being.
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that Coffman’s testimony was directly contradicted by medical records, there were no medical
records admitted as evidence at trial.
Fourth, Curry assigns error to several findings of fact that the trial court made regarding
the statutory relocation factors. As explained above, the specific findings regarding the statutory
relocation factors are superfluous in this case. And we have already concluded that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion in designating Coffman as the primary residential parent. Accordingly,
we do not further address Curry’s assignments of error challenging specific findings of fact related
to the relocation factors.
In the end, the trial court was faced with a difficult decision. Because the trial court is in
the best position to observe the parties and the witnesses, we will not review the trial court’s
credibility determinations. Id. And here, based on those credibility determinations and careful
consideration of the evidence, the trial court determined that placement with Coffman as the
primary residential parent was in H.N.C.’s best interests. Absent a legal error or an abuse of
discretion, we are extremely reluctant to change a trial court’s placement decisions. See Schroeder,
106 Wn. App. at 349. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s permanent parenting plan
designating Coffman as the primary residential parent.
IV. ADDITIONAL ISSUES
Curry’s third and fourth arguments are that the trial court erred by ordering H.N.C. to
change residences with only three days’ notice, and that the trial court erred by shortening the trial
to attend a funeral. Neither argument establishes Curry is entitled to relief.
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A. TRANSFER OF CUSTODY FOR H.N.C.
Curry contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it gave only three days of
notice before Coffman received custody of H.N.C. after the November 4 presentation hearing.
Because this issue is moot, we decline to review it.
An issue is moot if a court can no longer provide effective relief. See Maldonado v.
Maldonado, 197 Wn. App. 779, 790, 391 P.3d 546 (2017). An issue that is moot is dismissed.
See RAP 18.9(c).
Here, the transfer of custody from Curry to Coffman has already occurred. While we
empathize with the difficulties of an abrupt transfer of the primary residential parent, there is no
relief that we can provide, so Curry’s challenge to the limited notice of the transfer is moot.
Accordingly, we do not address this issue.
B. TRIAL SCHEDULING
Finally, Curry argues that the trial court improperly shortened the time for trial in order to
accommodate the trial court’s plans to attend a funeral. We disagree.
“Trial courts have the inherent authority to control and manage their calendars,
proceedings, and parties.” State v. Gassman, 175 Wn.2d 208, 211, 283 P.3d 1113 (2012).
Here, the trial court’s decision was not improper. The trial was originally scheduled to be
one day. Because of complications resulting from Curry appearing for trial remotely, the trial
court recognized that one day was going to be insufficient. But the trial court had a prior obligation
to attend a funeral the afternoon of the next day and asked the parties if they needed additional
time for trial. The trial court had the inherent authority to manage its calendar in order to attend a
funeral. Further, because the trial court offered the parties more time for trial but both parties
represented they had no further witnesses and proceeded to closing argument, the trial court did
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not abuse this inherent authority by concluding the trial when it did, rather than proceeding to
another half day of trial. Moreover, the trial court gave Curry additional time to present
declarations addressing the issues the trial court was most concerned about during trial. There was
nothing improper about the trial court’s decision exercising its inherent authority to manage its
calendar.10
10
Curry also appears to make three additional arguments about the trial court. First, it appears that
Curry is arguing that the trial court was so affected by grief related to the funeral on the second
day of trial that the trial court was unable to properly conduct the trial or properly consider the
evidence. However, there is no evidence in the record before us that supports this contention.
Accordingly, we do not consider it.
Second, Curry argues that the trial court discriminated against her based on how Curry’s ADHD
and PTSD affected her presentation at trial. However, although Curry referenced her ADHD and
PTSD, she did not make any request for accommodation under GR 33. And the trial court’s
comments repeatedly demonstrated that the trial court was trying to understand Curry’s position
and carefully considering Curry’s allegations. For example, when Curry alleged that H.N.C. was
suffering suicidal ideation, the trial court appeared to urgently request additional information so
she could understand the extent of the problem and how it should affect her decision. Curry fails
to demonstrate that the trial court discriminated against her based on how her ADHD and PTSD
affected her presentation at trial.
Third, Curry argues that the trial court was biased against her. Although the trial court expressed
its frustration with the way trial was being handled (and we encourage all trial courts to limit
expressions of frustration, especially towards unrepresented parties), a full review of the record
demonstrates that the trial court’s conduct was limited to just that—frustration with the amount of
time the trial was taking. Notwithstanding that some of these expressions of frustration were
unfortunate and perhaps unnecessary, the trial court repeatedly demonstrated concern for
reviewing all of the evidence in the case, for exploring the issues in the case, and for attempting to
understand the positions of both parents. Expressions of frustration, by themselves, do not show
the trial court was biased. See Tacoma S. Hosp., LLC v. Nat’l Gen. Ins. Co., 19 Wn. App. 2d 210,
218, 494 P.3d 450 (2021) (To overcome the presumption that a trial judge acts without bias or
prejudice, the party raising the challenge must identify specific facts raising at least a suspicion of
bias or partiality, such as a personal or pecuniary interest in the outcome of the proceedings.),
review denied, 198 Wn.2d 1041 (2022). Curry has offered no specific facts of bias; rather, the
record demonstrates that the trial court struggled with, and thoroughly considered, the difficult
decision it made in this case. Accordingly, Curry’s argument of bias fails.
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V. ATTORNEY FEES
Coffman requests attorney fees on appeal as sanctions for Curry filing a frivolous appeal
under RAP 18.1. However, because Coffman references his request for attorney fees in the
conclusion section of his brief, Coffman fails to comply with the requirements of RAP 18.1(b) to
present the request for attorney fees in a separate section of his brief. Further, RAP 18.1(a) allows
us to award attorney fees “[i]f applicable law grants to a party the right to recover reasonable
attorney fees or expenses on review . . . .” And Coffman identifies no applicable law that grants
him the right to recover attorney fees. Accordingly, Coffman’s request for attorney fees is denied.
CONCLUSION
The trial court did not misapply the CRA or abuse its discretion in determining the new
parenting plan. Finally, Curry’s challenge to the timing of the transfer of custody is moot and the
trial court did not improperly shorten the trial. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court. And we
deny Coffman’s request for attorney fees on appeal.
A majority of the panel having determined that this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but will be filed for public record in accordance with RCW 2.06.040,
it is so ordered.
PRICE, J.
We concur:
GLASGOW, P.J.
CHE, J.
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