Hughes v. United States ( 2022 )

1 2 3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 4 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 5 AT SEATTLE 6 MICHELLE RENEE HUGHES, Case No. C21-1368RSM 7 8 Petitioner, ORDER DENYING PETITIONER’S MOTION UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 2255 9 v. 10 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 11 Respondent. 12 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Before the Court is Petitioner’s § 2255 Motion to Vacate, Set Aside, or Correct 15 Sentence. Dkt. #1. Michelle Renee Hughes challenges the 52-month sentence imposed on her 16 by this Court following her guilty plea for eight counts including mail fraud, making false 17 statements, and aggravated identity theft. Id. at 1; Case No. 2:19-cr-00124-RSM, Dkts. #12, 18 19 #46. Petitioner asserts what appear to be ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claims and claims 20 that her fraudulent acts were lawful. After full consideration of the record, and for the reasons 21 set forth below, the Court DENIES this § 2255 Motion. 22 II. BACKGROUND 23 The Court generally agrees with the relevant background facts as set forth by the 24 25 Government and demonstrated by court records. See Dkt. #5 at 2–8. Ms. Hughes has failed to 26 file a reply brief and therefore does not dispute this largely procedural background. The Court 27 will attempt to focus only on those facts necessary for a ruling. 28 Ms. Hughes was involved in forging signatures and defrauding individuals into 1 2 purchasing two aircraft in 2019 that legally belonged to third parties. Law enforcement posed 3 as buyers for the aircraft in an undercover operation and arrested Ms. Hughes on June 13, 2019. 4 The Government initially charged Ms. Hughes by Complaint with two counts of false 5 statements and two counts of aggravated identity theft. Case No. 2:19-cr-00124-RSM, Dkt. #1. 6 Although the Government sought pretrial detention, Ms. Hughes was released on bond. Case 7 8 No. 2:19-cr-00124-RSM, Dkt. #10. The grand jury in June 2019 returned an eight-count 9 indictment. Counts One and Two charged Ms. Hughes with mail fraud, in violation of 18 10 U.S.C. § 1341. Counts Three through Six charged her with false statements, in violation of 18 11 U.S.C. § 1001. Counts Seven and Eight charged her with Aggravated Identity Theft, in 12 13 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1028A. Case No. 2:19-cr-00124-RSM, Dkt. #12. 14 Ms. Hughes violated her pretrial bond by attempting to flee the country at the U.S.- 15 Canada border and her bond was revoked. Case No. 2:19-cr-00124-RSM, Dkts. #37 and #46. 16 Ms. Hughes filed no pretrial motions. On April 30, 2020, she pleaded guilty to all eight 17 counts. Case No. 2:19-cr-00124-RSM, Dkt. #47. At the change-of-plea hearing, after being 18 19 placed under oath, Ms. Hughes confirmed that she had previously entered guilty pleas and had 20 reviewed the plea agreement with trial counsel. Case No. 2:19-cr-00124-RSM, Dkt. #68 at 3, 5. 21 The Court then went through the elements of each crime listed in the indictment, confirming 22 Ms. Hughes understood all the elements required to establish her guilt. Id. at 5-8. The Court 23 went over, in detail, each right Ms. Hughes was giving up by pleading guilty, including the 24 25 right to persist in a non-guilty plea. Id. at 11-12. When asked if she understood these rights, 26 Ms. Hughes said, “Yes, I do.” Id. at 12. The Court read the plea agreement’s factual statement 27 28 verbatim into the record and asked Ms. Hughes “is this what happened” and she replied in the 1 2 affirmative. Id. at 20. 3 Ms. Hughes’ sentencing memorandum appears to credibly admit guilt and remorse for 4 what she did in this case. See Case No. 2:19-cr-00124-RSM, Dkt. #57. She apologized for her 5 actions at the sentencing hearing. 6 The Court calculated Ms. Hughes’ Sentencing Guidelines range as 37 to 46 months 7 8 based on a total offense level of 20 and a criminal history category of II. Case No. 2:19-cr- 9 00124-RSM, Dkt. #69 at 13. The Court noted that Counts Seven and Eight carried a 10 mandatory-minimum sentence of 24 months, required by statute to run consecutive to any other 11 sentence imposed. Id. The Court adopted the joint recommendation of the parties, granted Ms. 12 13 Hughes full credit for acceptance of responsibility, and imposed a below-Guidelines prison 14 sentence of 28 months on counts One through Six, and 24 months on Counts Seven and Eight, 15 to be run consecutive, for a total of 52 months’ imprisonment. Id. 16 Ms. Hughes filed a notice of appeal and was assigned appellate counsel. Case No. 2:19- 17 cr-00124-RSM, Dkt. #62, #67. In May 2021, while represented by counsel, Ms. Hughes 18 19 moved under Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 42(b) and Ninth Circuit Rule 27-9 to dismiss 20 her own appeal. Case No. 20-30262, Dkt. #14-1 (9th Cir. May 16, 2021). Ms. Hughes’ counsel 21 confirmed to the Ninth Circuit that “[t]his motion is made with the consent of appellant 22 Michelle Renee Hughes.” Id. at 1. Ms. Hughes submitted a signed letter to the Ninth Circuit 23 “verify[ing] that I consent to the voluntary dismissal of my direct appeal” and confirming that 24 25 “I have been advised by my counsel that I have a constitutional right to a direct appeal”; that 26 “[m]y counsel also advised me regarding the effects of voluntarily dismissing my direct 27 appeal”; that “I understand that I am giving up my constitutional right to a direct appeal”; and 28 that “this letter will serve as an exhibit to” the motion. Case No. 20-30262, Dkt. #14-2 (9th Cir. 1 2 May 16, 2021). The Ninth Circuit granted Ms. Hughes’ unopposed motion and dismissed the 3 appeal. 4 Ms. Hughes filed this instant petition pro se on October 6, 2021. Dkt. #1. She requests 5 release from prison, financial compensation, return of property “including aircrafts,” and 6 cancelation of court cost and restitution. Id. at 12. 7 8 Ms. Hughes asserts three grounds for relief—one for each category of charge. For 9 Ground One, she challenges her two mail-fraud convictions, Counts One and Two, by claiming 10 that “[t]he forms said to claim abandoned property you must mail the forms only. To claim the 11 property you must mail the paperwork to the FAA in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma. You could 12 13 not appear in person.” Id. at 5. Ms. Hughes then alleges that “[m]y attorney never filed any 14 motions that she claimed. She never investigated my evidence. I was prosecuted based on my 15 poverty status.” Id. For Ground Two, Ms. Hughes challenges her four false-statement 16 convictions, Counts Three through Six, by claiming that she: 17 was following instructions according to the Owners Manual. I have 18 the legal right to claim the aircraft. Aircrafts [sic] was abandoned 19 because owners refusal to renew ownership of Aircraft. The Aircrafts [sic] was abandoned for at least 6 months. If the owners 20 could not front the $10 for renewal then how did they have tens of thousands of dollars for a private attorney. They were using the 21 aircrafts for illegal activities. It is unjust. When will I ever receive 22 justice for false i[m]prisonment. How can it be a false statement if it tells you what to put down on forms. 23 Id. at 6. Ms. Hughes again repeats her claim that “[m]y attorney never filed any motions that 24 25 she claimed.” Id. For Ground Three, Ms. Hughes challenges her two aggravated identity theft 26 convictions, Counts Seven and Eight, by claiming that “I was following instructions on the 27 forms. The owners manual claimed that I had to sign the previous owners names. It said it on 28 page 94 or 95, in the very first sentence.” Id. at 8. Ms. Hughes again claimed that “my 1 2 attorney never filed any motions that she claimed.” In her filing, Ms. Hughes fails to support 3 her assertions with record citations, exhibits, a declaration, or any other evidence. She has not 4 requested an evidentiary hearing or discovery. 5 III. DISCUSSION 6 A. Legal Standard 7 8 A motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 permits a federal prisoner in custody to collaterally 9 challenge her sentence on the grounds that it was imposed in violation of the Constitution or 10 laws of the United States, or that the Court lacked jurisdiction to impose the sentence or that the 11 sentence exceeded the maximum authorized by law. 12 13 A petitioner seeking relief under Section 2255 must file her motion with the one-year 14 statute of limitations set forth in § 2255(f). 15 A claim may not be raised in a Section 2255 motion if the defendant had a full 16 opportunity to be heard on the claim during the trial phase and on direct appeal. See Massaro 17 v. United States, 123 S. Ct. 1690, 1693 (2003). Where a defendant fails to raise an issue before 18 19 the trial court, or presents the claim but then abandons it, and fails to include it on direct appeal, 20 the issue is deemed “defaulted” and may not be raised under Section 2255 except under 21 unusual circumstances. Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 622 (1998); see also United 22 States v. Braswell, 501 F.3d 1147, 1149 & n.1 (9th Cir. 2007). Unless the petitioner can 23 overcome this procedural default, the Court cannot reach the merits of his claims. See Bousley, 24 25 523 U.S. at 622. To do so, the petitioner must “show both (1) ‘cause’ excusing his double 26 procedural default, and (2) ‘actual prejudice’ resulting from the errors of which he complains.” 27 28 United States v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 168 (1982).1 To demonstrate “cause” for procedural 1 2 default, a defendant generally must show that “some objective factor external to the defense” 3 impeded his adherence to a procedural rule. Murray, 477 U.S. at 488. See also United States v. 4 Skurdal, 341 F.3d 921, 925 (9th Cir. 2003). The Supreme Court has held that “cause” for 5 failure to raise an issue exists “where a constitutional claim is so novel that its legal basis is not 6 reasonably available to counsel.” Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984). The “prejudice” prong 7 8 of the test requires demonstrating “not merely that the errors at . . . trial created a possibility of 9 prejudice, but that they worked to his actual and substantial disadvantage, infecting his entire 10 trial with error of constitutional dimensions.” Frady, 456 at 170. 11 B. Analysis 12 13 There is no dispute that Ms. Hughes meets the “custody” requirement of the statute and 14 that this is Motion is timely under § 2255(f). This is not a second or successive petition. 15 The Government first argues that all of Ms. Hughes’ claims, except for her ineffective 16 assistance claims, are barred by the collateral-review waiver in her plea agreement. Dkt. #5 at 17 10 (citing, inter alia, United States v. Abarca, 985 F.2d 1012, 1014 (9th Cir. 1993); United 18 19 States v. Goodall, 15 F.4th 987, 993-97 (9th Cir. 2021)). The Court agrees. The Court’s 20 colloquy with Ms. Hughes at the change-of-plea hearing confirmed she understood her decision 21 to waive her appellate and collateral-review rights. Because she does not dispute that her “plea 22 agreement as a whole was knowingly and voluntarily made,” any freestanding innocence 23 claims in her § 2255 motion are barred by the explicit terms of her collateral-review waiver. 24 25 United States v. Jeronimo, 398 F.3d 1149, 1154 (9th Cir. 2005). 26 27 28 1 Another means by which procedural default may be excused is by establishing actual innocence. See Bousley, 523 U.S. at 622. Ms. Hughes’ claims of innocence are foreclosed by the guilty plea for the reasons stated 1 2 in Government briefing, even if there had not been a waiver. Dkt. #5 at 11. 3 All of Ms. Hughes’ claims, except for her ineffective assistance claims, are also 4 procedurally defaulted given Ms. Hughes’ failure to raise them on direct appeal. She has failed 5 to demonstrate sufficient cause for the default or to present any evidence that she is actually 6 innocent of these offenses. 7 8 This just leaves Ms. Hughes’ ineffective assistance of counsel claims. 9 Ineffective-assistance claims may be brought on collateral review even if not raised on 10 direct appeal. Massaro v. United States, 538 U.S. 500, 504 (2003). The standards to be applied 11 to ineffective assistance claims are those defined in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 12 13 (1984). Such a claim has two components: inadequate performance by counsel, and prejudice 14 resulting from that inadequate performance. To prevail, a defendant first must show that “in 15 light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or omissions were outside the wide range of 16 professionally competent assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690. “This requires showing that 17 counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the 18 19 defendant by the Sixth Amendment.” Id. at 687. However, “[a] fair assessment of attorney 20 performance requires that every effort be made to eliminate the distorting effects of hindsight, 21 to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel’s challenged conduct, and to evaluate the conduct 22 from counsel’s perspective at the time.” Id. at 688 (citation omitted). The presumption is that 23 counsel was competent. Id. Even if the first part of the Strickland test is satisfied, a defendant 24 25 is not entitled to relief unless he can show prejudice. Id. at 687. A defendant “must show that 26 there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty 27 and would have insisted on going to trial.” Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985)). 28 Ms. Hughes has failed to show that her counsel committed any error, and thus she has 1 2 failed to show that she would not have pleaded guilty or that her counsel otherwise “made 3 errors so serious that counsel was not functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by 4 the Sixth Amendment.” Strickland at 687. She offers no details as to the motions that should 5 have been filed by counsel, or the evidence that her counsel failed to investigate. She makes 6 only conclusory arguments as to these points. She has failed to file a reply brief addressing the 7 8 Government’s valid points on these issues. 9 C. Certificate of Appealability 10 A petitioner seeking post-conviction relief under § 2255 may appeal this Court’s 11 dismissal of his petition only after obtaining a Certificate of Appealability (“COA”) from a 12 13 district or circuit judge. A COA may issue only where a petitioner has made “a substantial 14 showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” See 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(3). A petitioner 15 satisfies this standard “by demonstrating that jurists of reason could disagree with the district 16 court’s resolution of [her] constitutional claims or that jurists could conclude the issues 17 presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further.” Miller-El v. Cockrell, 18 19 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S. Ct. 1029, 154 L. Ed. 2d 931 (2003). The Court finds that the law 20 above is clear and there is no basis to issue a COA. 21 IV. CONCLUSION 22 Having considered Petitioner’s motion, Respondent’s answer thereto, and the remainder 23 of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS: 24 25 1. Petitioner’s Motion under § 2255 (Dkt. #1) is DENIED. No COA shall be issued. 26 2. This matter is now CLOSED. 27 28 3. The Clerk of the Court is directed to forward a copy of this Order to Petitioner and 1 2 all counsel of record. 3 DATED this 5th day of October, 2022. 4 5 6 A 7 RICARDO S. MARTINEZ 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28