Brandon v. Department of Corrections of Washington ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 9 10 MYRON G. BRANDON, CASE NO. 3:22-cv-05284-LK-DWC 11 Plaintiff, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF’S 12 v. MOTION FOR RECUSAL 13 WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS et al., 14 Defendants. 15 16 I INTRODUCTION 17 This matter comes before the Court following referral by United States Magistrate Judge 18 David W. Christel (Dkt. No. 34) of Plaintiff Myron G. Brandon’s motion for recusal (Dkt. No. 19 32). For the reasons stated herein, the Court AFFIRMS Magistrate Judge Christel’s decision. 20 II BACKGROUND 21 Plaintiff moved for Magistrate Judge Christel’s recusal from his case, alleging Judge 22 Christel was prejudice against him in a prior case involving his Eighth Amendment claim. (Dkt. 23 No. 32 at 2.) Plaintiff alleged Magistrate Judge Christel dismissed his claims for failure to 24 1 properly define the Eighth Amendment, even though Plaintiff did so on three separate occasions. 2 (Id.) Plaintiff further alleged he “now has an [Eighth] Amendment, cruel and unusual 3 punishment claim in which David W. Christel will prejudice that prior case was in 2021 and 4 became a strike.” (Id.) 5 III DISCUSSION 6 A. Legal Standard 7 Local Civil Rule 3(f) requires a challenged judge to review motions filed pursuant to 28 8 U.S.C. § 144 or 28 U.S.C. § 455 and to determine whether to recuse voluntarily. LCR 3(f). If 9 the challenged judge declines to recuse voluntarily, they must direct the court clerk to refer the 10 motion to the chief judge for their review. Id. 11 28 U.S.C. § 455(a) provides that a judge of the United States shall disqualify himself or 12 herself in any proceeding in which their “impartiality might reasonably be questioned.” 28 13 U.S.C. § 455(a). 28 U.S.C. § 144 similarly requires recusal when a party to a proceeding in 14 district court files a “timely and sufficient affidavit that the judge before whom the matter is 15 pending has a personal bias or prejudice either against him or in favor of any adverse party.” 28 16 U.S.C. § 144. The standard for recusal under both statutes is the same—“[w]hether a reasonable 17 person with knowledge of all the facts would conclude that the judge's impartiality might 18 reasonably be questioned.” United States v. McTiernan, 695 F.3d 882, 891 (9th Cir. 2012) 19 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[A] judge’s prior adverse ruling is not sufficient cause for 20 recusal.” United States v. Studley, 783 F.2d 934, 939 (9th Cir. 1986); see also Liteky v. United 21 States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994) (“[J]udicial rulings almost never constitute a valid basis 22 for a or partiality motion.”). alone 23 bia s 24 1 B. Plaintiff’s Motion to Recuse Judge Christel 2 Plaintiff’s motion does not allege facts sufficient to require Magistrate Judge Christel’s 3 recusal. Plaintiff’s sole ground for recusal appears to be that Magistrate Judge Christel 4 previously presided over and dismissed a prior case filed by Plaintiff. (See Dkt. No. 32 at 3.) 5 Plaintiff does not offer additional evidence that would indicate bias or prejudice on the part of 6 Magistrate Judge Christel. Prior adverse rulings are almost never sufficient to establish bias 7 necessary for recusal absent further evidence of deep-seated prejudice. See McTiernan, 695 F.3d 8 at 891–92. As such, the Court ORDERS that Magistrate Judge Christel’s refusal to recuse 9 himself from this matter is AFFIRMED. 10 IV CONCLUSION 11 Accordingly, and Court hereby ORGERS that Magistrate Judge Christel’s refusal to 12 refuse himself from this matter (Dkt. No. 34) is AFFIRMED. 13 14 Dated this 4th day of November 2022. 15 A 16 David G. Estudillo 17 United States District Judge 18 19 20 21 22 23 24