Drammeh v. Uber Technologies Inc ( 2022 )

1 The Honorable Barbara J. Rothstein 2 3 4 5 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 7 AT SEATTLE 8 DRAMMEH, et al., 9 Plaintiffs, Civil Action No. 2:21-cv-202-BJR 10 v. 11 ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION 12 UBER TECHNOLOGIES INC., et al., FOR RECONSIDERATION OR FOR CERTIFICATION 13 Defendants. 14 15 16 ORDER 17 The Court granted summary judgment for Defendants in this wrongful death action on 18 19 September 27, 2022, and issued a final judgment closing the case. Dkt. 165. Plaintiffs have moved 20 for reconsideration of the Court’s order or, alternatively, for certification of underlying questions 21 of state law to the Washington Supreme Court. Dkt. 170. Having reviewed the motion, the record 22 of the case, and the relevant legal authorities, the Court will deny Plaintiffs’ motion. The reasoning 23 for the Court’s decision follows. 24 A. Reconsideration 25 A motion for reconsideration is only granted if there is newly discovered evidence, manifest 26 27 error in the prior ruling, or an intervening change in controlling law. Weeks v. Bayer, 246 F.3d 1 1231, 1236 (9th Cir. 2001). Plaintiffs seek reconsideration on the grounds that the Court (1) 2 “erroneously disregarded evidence establishing that Uber had a special relationship with Ceesay 3 and thus a legal duty to protect him from foreseeable risk”; (2) committed manifest error in its 4 “factual finding that Uber did not commit misfeasance causing Ceesay’s death”; and (3) committed 5 manifest error in its “factual finding that the carjacking and murder of Cherno Ceesay was not 6 7 foreseeable.” Dkt. 170 at 1-8. Plaintiffs’ motion does not contain any arguments or facts that were 8 not presented in the parties’ summary judgment briefing. Accordingly, the Court has already 9 considered them and made a determination. Plaintiffs have not cited any valid reason to reconsider 10 them here, other than that they disagree with the Court’s decision. 11 B. Certification 12 The Washington statute governing certification of state-law questions by a federal court 13 states: “[w]hen in the opinion of any federal court before whom a proceeding is pending, it is 14 necessary to ascertain the local law of this state in order to dispose of such proceeding and the local 15 16 law has not been clearly determined, such federal court may certify to the supreme court for answer 17 the question of local law involved . . . .” RCW 2.60.020. Plaintiffs seek certification on the grounds 18 that this case involves “unsettled, novel issues” of state law regarding the existence and scope of 19 duty that carry “significant policy implications.” Id. at 8. However, Plaintiffs make no attempt to 20 establish that these issues of state law are “necessary . . . to dispose of [a pending] proceeding.” 21 Certification is clearly not necessary to dispose of the case, as the Court has already disposed of it 22 23 by applying existing Washington law. The case is also not “pending”—it is closed. As Defendant 24 correctly notes, the Ninth Circuit has “long looked with disfavor upon motions to certify that are 25 filed after . . . the federal district court has issued a decision” and the moving party “did not mention 26 the possibility of certification until after the district court entered summary judgment against it.” 27 1 || Hinojos v. Kohl’s Corp., 718 F.3d 1098, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). A review of the record reveals that 2 || Plaintiffs never mentioned certification prior to the Court entering summary judgment against them. ; Accordingly, certification of questions to the Washington Supreme Court is improper in this case, and Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration or certification is denied. 6 CONCLUSION 7 Plaintiffs’ motion for reconsideration or certification (Dkts. 169, 170) is DENIED. The 8 || parties’ motions to seal various filings (Dkts. 168, 174) are GRANTED. 9 DATED this 19th day of December, 2022. 10 12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27