Smith v. Wiger ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 RONALD SMITH, JR., 8 Cause No. C22-1654RSL Plaintiff, 9 v. ORDER REQUIRING A MORE 10 DEFINITE STATEMENT C. WIGER, et al., 11 Defendants. 12 13 On November 28, 2022, plaintiff’s application to proceed in forma pauperis was granted 14 and his complaint was accepted for filing. Plaintiff identifies four City of Auburn police officers 15 and three King County Superior Court judges as defendants. He alleges that King County 16 17 Commissioner Mark Hillman signed an order allowing Officers C. Wiger, G. Lyons, J. Triplett, 18 and J. Matt to remove plaintiff’s child from his home based on uninvestigated and untrue 19 allegations made by his ex-partner, that King County Judge Matthew Williams failed to “ask an 20 important question that [plaintiff] needed to be asked” in a case involving plaintiff’s ex-partner 21 (Dkt. # 4 at 6), and that King County Judge Jamie Sutton failed to make sufficiently clear that, in 22 23 light of an existing protective order, his ex-partner had to ask plaintiff questions through the 24 Judge and not directly. Plaintiff asserts claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and seeks to hold his ex- 25 partner responsible for the lies she told to the courts, to have the restraining order against him 26 dismissed, money damages of $1 million, and to have his reputation as a parent restored. 27 ORDER REQUIRING A MORE 1 The Court, having reviewed the record as a whole under the standards articulated in 28 2 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and having construed the allegations of the complaint liberally (see 3 Bernhardt v. Los Angeles County, 339 F.3d 920, 925 (9th Cir. 2003)), finds that plaintiff’s 4 complaint is deficient for the following reasons: 5 1. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires “a short and plain statement of the 6 7 claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” A complaint will be dismissed unless it 8 states a cognizable legal theory that is supported by sufficient facts to state a “plausible” ground 9 for relief. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007); Shroyer v. New Cingular 10 Wireless Servs., Inc., 622 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 2010). Although a complaint need not 11 provide detailed factual allegations, it must give rise to something more than mere speculation 12 that plaintiff has a right to relief. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. With regards to the police officer 13 14 defendants, the only allegation is that they carried out a court order, conduct which does not, 15 without more, give rise to legal liability. 16 2. To the extent plaintiff is asserting claims against judicial officers directly, “[i]t has long 17 been established that judges are absolutely immune from liability for acts ‘done by them in the 18 exercise of their judicial functions.’” Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1145 (9th Cir. 2008) 19 20 (quoting Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 347 (1871)). Judicial immunity is “absolute” 21 in that it protects the decisionmaker from exposure to the litigation process in its entirety: the 22 official is not only free from the risk of a damage award, but also free from suit. Saucier v. Katz, 23 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001). “[V]arious forms of immunity, including . . . judicial, reflect a policy 24 that the public is better served if certain public officials exercise their discretionary duties with 25 independence and without fear of the burdens of a civil suit for damages.” Schrob v. Catterson, 26 27 ORDER REQUIRING A MORE 1 967 F.2d 929, 937 (3rd Cir. 1992). Immunity is particularly appropriate in situations, such as 2 this, where procedural or substantive errors can be challenged through a motion for 3 reconsideration and/or on appeal: resort to a separate lawsuit is unnecessary. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 4 472 U.S. 511, 522-23 (1985) (“[T]he judicial process is largely self-correcting: procedural rules, 5 appeals, and the possibility of collateral challenges obviate the need for damages actions to 6 7 prevent unjust results.”).1 8 9 For all of the foregoing reasons, the Court declines to issue a summons in this matter. 10 Plaintiff is hereby ORDERED to file on or before January 17, 2023, an amended complaint 11 which clearly and concisely identifies the acts of which each named defendant is accused and 12 how those acts violated plaintiff’s legal rights. The key to filing an acceptable amended 13 14 complaint will be providing facts from which one could plausibly infer that plaintiff has a viable 15 legal claim and a right to relief against each defendant. The amended complaint will replace the 16 existing complaint in its entirety. Failure to timely file an amended complaint that asserts a 17 plausible claim for relief will result in dismissal of this action. 18 19 20 // 21 22 23 1 If, on the other hand, plaintiff is seeking review of the state court’s judgments, such as the issuance of a temporary restraining order, the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction under the 24 Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), and Dist. of Columbia Ct. of App. v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462 (1983). The doctrine arises from 28 U.S.C. § 1257 which grants 25 jurisdiction to review a state court judgment in the United States Supreme Court and, by negative 26 inference, prohibits lower federal courts from doing so. Kougasian v .TMSL, Inc., 359 F.3d 1136, 1139 (9th Cir. 2004). 27 ORDER REQUIRING A MORE 1 The Clerk of Court is directed to place this Order Requiring More Definite Statement on 2 the Court’s calendar for consideration on Friday, January 20, 2023. 3 4 Dated this 15th day of December, 2022. 5 6 Robert S. Lasnik 7 United States District Judge 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 ORDER REQUIRING A MORE