Ferguson v. Commissioner of Social Security ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 7 8 ERICA F., 9 Plaintiff, Case No. C22-850-MLP 10 v. ORDER 11 COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, 12 Defendant. 13 I. INTRODUCTION 14 Plaintiff seeks review of the denial of her application for Disability Insurance Benefits. 15 Plaintiff contends the administrative law judge (“ALJ”) erred in assessing one medical opinion. 16 (Dkt. # 11 at 1.) As discussed below, the Court AFFIRMS the Commissioner’s final decision and 17 DISMISSES the case with prejudice. 18 II. BACKGROUND 19 Plaintiff was born in 1990, has a high school diploma, and has worked as a grocery store 20 deli worker, fast-food manager, and casino restaurant server. AR at 177. Plaintiff was last 21 gainfully employed in 2017. Id. 22 In May 2019, Plaintiff applied for benefits, alleging disability as of August 10, 2016. AR 23 at 159-60. Plaintiff’s application was denied initially and on reconsideration, and Plaintiff 1 requested a hearing. Id. at 94-96, 98-102. After the ALJ conducted a hearing in December 2020 2 (id. at 39-70), the ALJ issued a decision finding Plaintiff not disabled before her date last insured 3 (“DLI”), June 30, 2019. Id. at 20-34. 4 As the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, the ALJ’s decision is the 5 Commissioner’s final decision. AR at 6-11. Plaintiff appealed the final decision of the 6 Commissioner to this Court. (Dkt. # 4.) 7 III. LEGAL STANDARDS 8 Under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), this Court may set aside the Commissioner’s denial of social 9 security benefits when the ALJ’s findings are based on legal error or not supported by substantial 10 evidence in the record as a whole. Bayliss v. Barnhart, 427 F.3d 1211, 1214 (9th Cir. 2005). As a 11 general principle, an ALJ’s error may be deemed harmless where it is “inconsequential to the 12 ultimate nondisability determination.” Molina v. Astrue, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) 13 (cited sources omitted). The Court looks to “the record as a whole to determine whether the error 14 alters the outcome of the case.” Id. 15 “Substantial evidence” is more than a scintilla, less than a preponderance, and is such 16 relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 17 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971); Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 750 (9th 18 Cir. 1989). The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical 19 testimony, and resolving any other ambiguities that might exist. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 20 1035, 1039 (9th Cir. 1995). While the Court is required to examine the record as a whole, it may 21 neither reweigh the evidence nor substitute its judgment for that of the Commissioner. Thomas v. 22 Barnhart, 278 F.3d 947, 954 (9th Cir. 2002). When the evidence is susceptible to more than one 23 rational interpretation, it is the Commissioner’s conclusion that must be upheld. Id. 1 IV. DISCUSSION 2 Dean Williams, M.D., Plaintiff’s treating physician, completed a form opinion in 3 December 2019 indicating that, inter alia, Plaintiff could occasionally lift 10 pounds and 4 frequently lift less than 10 pounds, could stand/walk less than two hours in an eight-hour 5 workday, and could sit less than six hours in an eight-hour workday. AR at 814-20. Dr. Williams 6 also found that Plaintiff could occasionally climb ramps and stairs, balance, and stoop, but could 7 never climb ladders/rope/scaffolds, kneel, crouch, or crawl. Id. at 816. 8 The ALJ found Dr. Williams’s opinion unpersuasive because: (1) it was written months 9 after Plaintiff’s DLI, “and is therefore of limited relevance to the claimant’s functioning during 10 the period at issue”; and (2) Dr. Williams’s conclusions are inconsistent with the records dating 11 to the adjudicated period, which show that Plaintiff did not require crutches for ambulation and 12 did not have other significant deficits in physical functioning. AR at 31-32. The ALJ 13 acknowledged that Dr. Williams’s opinion was well-supported with references to clinical 14 findings, and that she agreed that Plaintiff had reaching limitations on the left, but otherwise 15 found Dr. Williams’s opinion to be inconsistent with evidence dating to the adjudicated period. 16 Id. at 32. 17 Under regulations applicable to this case, the ALJ is required to articulate the 18 persuasiveness of each medical opinion, specifically with respect to whether the opinions are 19 supported and consistent with the record. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(a)-(c). An ALJ’s consistency 20 and supportability findings must be supported by substantial evidence. See Woods v. Kijakazi, 32 21 F.4th 785, 792 (9th Cir. 2022). 22 Plaintiff contends that the ALJ’s consistency finding is erroneous because Dr. Williams 23 explicitly referenced evidence dating to the adjudicated period, which indicates that although he 1 completed his form opinion after Plaintiff’s DLI, the opinion nonetheless refers back to her 2 functioning during the adjudicated period and thus should not have been discounted based on 3 timing. (Dkt. # 11 at 4-5.) As support for this argument, Plaintiff cites Dr. Williams’s reference 4 to Plaintiff’s left shoulder rotator cuff tendinopathy diagnosed via ultrasound in April 2018, as 5 well as her April 2019 lumbar MRI showing disc herniation with displacement of the left L5 6 nerve root, and her use of crutches to ambulate. (Id. (citing AR at 815).) 7 But Dr. Williams’s reference to various conditions diagnosed during the adjudicated 8 period does not establish that those conditions resulted in the functional limitations identified by 9 Dr. Williams during the adjudicated period. For example, the ALJ found that Plaintiff’s lumbar 10 spine condition was not severe at step two due to Plaintiff’s lack of treatment for or complaints 11 of lumbar problems during the adjudicated period (AR at 24), and Plaintiff did not challenge that 12 finding, which undermines Plaintiff’s contention that her lumbar spine condition caused 13 disabling limitations during the adjudicated period. Plaintiff herself acknowledges that the 14 evidence supporting her allegations of back pain during the adjudicated period is “scant” (dkt. # 15 11 at 6-7) and does not explain why this dearth of evidence must be construed as supporting the 16 existence of disabling limitations. The ALJ reasonably found that minimal evidence of back 17 complaints/treatment during the adjudicated period undermined Plaintiff’s allegation of disabling 18 back-related limitations, and the Court finds no error in that interpretation. See Morgan v. 19 Comm’r of Soc. Sec. Admin., 169 F.3d 595, 599 (9th Cir. 1999) (“Where the evidence is 20 susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, it is the ALJ’s conclusion that must be 21 upheld.”). 22 The ALJ also acknowledged that Plaintiff was diagnosed with left shoulder rotator cuff 23 tendinopathy during the adjudicated period and found that the evidence confirmed that Plaintiff 1 would have reaching limitations with her left arm (AR at 31, 32), but the ALJ also cited findings 2 of improvement with treatment and full arm strength and normal sensation on testing. Id. at 29- 3 30 (citing id. at 265-66, 290-91, 591-92). Dr. Williams did not point to objective clinical findings 4 that corroborate the limitations he identified, and the ALJ’s decision cites objective evidence that 5 can be reasonably found inconsistent with Dr. Williams’s opinion that Plaintiff had limited 6 function of her left arm beyond those limitations acknowledged by the ALJ. 7 For these reasons, the Court finds that Dr. Williams’s reference to Plaintiff’s diagnoses 8 made during the adjudicated period does not undermine the ALJ’s assessment of Dr. Williams’s 9 opinion. The ALJ cited substantial evidence supporting her finding that those conditions did not 10 result in disabling limitations during the adjudicated period. 11 Furthermore, although Dr. Williams also referenced Plaintiff’s use of crutches for 12 ambulation as support for his conclusions, the ALJ noted that Plaintiff was not prescribed 13 crutches until after the adjudicated period and Plaintiff did not challenge this finding. See AR at 14 29 (citing id. at 933). The ALJ reasonably found that because Plaintiff did not require crutches 15 for ambulation during the adjudicated period, Dr. Williams’s reference to Plaintiff’s crutches 16 suggested that his opinion was based on post-DLI evidence and did not reflect Plaintiff’s 17 functioning during the adjudicated period. See id. at 32. 18 For all of these reasons, Plaintiff has failed to satisfy her burden to show that the ALJ 19 harmfully erred when finding Dr. Williams’s opinion inconsistent with the medical evidence 20 dating to the adjudicated period and discounting it on that basis. 21 V. CONCLUSION 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Commissioner’s final decision is AFFIRMED, and this 23 case is DISMISSED with prejudice. 1 Dated this 12th day of December, 2022. 2 A 3 MICHELLE L. PETERSON United States Magistrate Judge 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23