Farnsworth v. Armstrong ( 2022 )

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE 9 10 CHARLES V. FARNSWORTH, CASE NO. 3:20-cv-5007 11 Plaintiff, ORDER ON DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR 12 v. RECONSIDERATION OF THE COURT’S ORDER REQUESTING 13 TEDDI ARMSTRONG, et al., COUNSEL 14 Defendant. 15 16 This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration of the Court’s 17 Order Requesting Counsel. (Dkt. No. 117.) The Court has reviewed the Motion and the relevant 18 portions of the record and DENIES Defendants’ Motion. 19 BACKGROUND 20 Plaintiff Charles Farnsworth is a pro se litigant proceeding in forma pauperis. He brought 21 a civil right action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against several Washington State Department of 22 Corrections employees. The Court recently adopted in part and declined to adopt in part the 23 Report and Recommendation of Magistrate Judge Michelle L. Peterson. (“Order on R&R” (Dkt. 24 1 No. 113).) The Court declined to grant summary judgment in favor of Defendants on 2 Farnsworth’s Eighth Amendment claim against Defendant Teddi Nee (née Armstrong), but 3 granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants on Farnsworth’s remaining claims. The Court 4 also determined that the appointment of counsel was necessary to assist Farnsworth with his 5 remaining claim. (See Order Requesting Counsel (Dkt. No. 114).) Defendants bring this Motion 6 for Reconsideration asking the Court to reconsider its appointment of pro bono counsel for 7 Farnsworth. 8 ANALYSIS 9 Motions for reconsideration are disfavored. The court will ordinarily deny such motions in the absence of a showing of manifest error in the prior ruling or a 10 showing of new facts or legal authority which could not have been brought to its attention earlier with reasonable diligence. 11 Local Rule 7(h)(1). 12 It is well established that “[t]he decision to appoint counsel in a civil suit is one of 13 discretion and a district court’s determination will be overturned only for abuse of that 14 discretion.” Cano v. Taylor, 739 F.3d 1214, 1218 (9th Cir. 2014) (internal citation omitted). The 15 court must consider whether there is a “likelihood of success on the merits” and whether “the 16 prisoner is unable to articulate his claims in light of the complexity of the legal issues involved.” 17 Id. Defendants argue that the Court erred when it did not consider the issue of qualified 18 immunity for Farnsworth’s claim against Nee and that had the Court considered it, it could not 19 find Farnsworth likely to succeed on the merits. 20 Qualified immunity shields officials from civil liability so long as their conduct “ ‘does 21 not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person 22 would have known.’ ” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223 (1982) (internal citation and quotation 23 omitted). “We do not require a case directly on point, but existing precedent must have placed 24 1 the statutory or constitutional question beyond debate.” Ashcroft v. al-Kidd, 563 U.S. 731 2 (2011). Put simply, qualified immunity protects “all but the plainly incompetent or those who 3 knowingly violate the law.” Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 335 (1986). Though the Court has yet to 4 consider Defendants’ Motion for Reconsideration on the issue of qualified immunity, it finds that 5 the issue does not change the Court’s decision to request counsel for Farnsworth. 6 Farnsworth brings an Eighth Amendment claim against Nee alleging deliberate 7 indifference to a serious medical need. The Court noted in its Order on R&R that the Ninth 8 Circuit has stated that deliberate indifference may be found where prison officials intentionally 9 interfere with treatment once prescribed. (See Order on R&R at 9.) This is in part what 10 Farnsworth has alleged against Nee. As such, there is at least some case law to suggest that 11 Farnsworth could overcome a qualified immunity defense. And the Court found there was a 12 genuine dispute of fact with regard to Farnsworth’s claim against Nee that made summary 13 judgment inappropriate. Defendants’ Motion lacks both a showing of manifest error on the part 14 of the Court and the introduction of new evidence or law which could not have been reasonably 15 provided earlier. The Court reiterates its finding that Farnsworth has demonstrated enough merit 16 to his claim to survive a motion for summary judgment to satisfy the “likelihood of success” 17 prong. And Defendants do not contend that Farnsworth is able to articulate his claims in light of 18 the complexity of the legal issues involved. 19 Defendants point to no legal authority or facts that demonstrate the Court’s manifest error 20 in its request to appoint counsel. Having failed to satisfy any of the criteria for reconsideration, 21 Defendants’ motion is DENIED. 22 // 23 // 24 1 The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel. 2 Dated December 30, 2022. A 3 4 Marsha J. Pechman United States Senior District Judge 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24