Thompson v. Gate Gourmet Inc ( 2021 )

THE HONORABLE JOHN C. COUGHENOUR 1 2 3 4 5 6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON 8 AT SEATTLE 9 LINDA THOMPSON, CASE NO. C21-0510-JCC 10 Plaintiff, ORDER 11 v. 12 GATE GOURMET INC., et al., 13 Defendants. 14 15 This matter comes before the Court on the Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) of the 16 Honorable David W. Christel, United States Magistrate Judge (Dkt. No. 15) and Plaintiff Linda 17 Thompson’s objections thereto (Dkt. No. 16). Having thoroughly considered the parties’ briefing 18 and the relevant record, the Court finds oral argument unnecessary and hereby ADOPTS the 19 R&R and OVERRULES the objections for the reasons explained herein. 20 Ms. Thompson initiated this wrongful termination lawsuit against Gate Gourmet in King 21 County Superior Court, raising nine causes of action. (See Dkt. No. 1-2 at 5–10.) After Gate 22 Gourmet removed the case to federal court, Ms. Thompson moved for voluntary dismissal of her 23 breach of contract claim. (See Dkt. Nos. 1, 6.) Shortly thereafter, Ms. Thompson moved to 24 remand. (See Dkt. Nos. 8, 14.) Judge Christel issued an R&R recommending that the Court deny 25 both motions. (See generally Dkt. No. 15.) Ms. Thompson lodged objections to the R&R, which 26 are presently before the Court. (See Dkt. No. 16.) 1 A district judge reviews objections to a magistrate judge’s R&R de novo. Fed. R. Civ. P. 2 72(b)(3). The Court may accept, reject, or modify the recommended disposition; receive further 3 evidence; or return the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions. Id. 4 Ms. Thompson argues that Judge Christel erred in concluding that voluntary dismissal 5 pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) cannot be used to dismiss individual claims 6 against a defendant. (See Dkt. No. 16 at 2.) The Court disagrees with Ms. Thompson. The Ninth 7 Circuit has held that the provision cannot be used in this manner. See Hells Canyon Preservation 8 Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 403 F.3d 683, 687–88 (9th Cir. 2005) (the rule “does not allow 9 for piecemeal dismissals”). 10 Ms. Thompson next argues that Judge Christel erred in finding that the Railway Labor 11 Act (“RLA”), 45 U.S.C. § 151 et seq., controls her breach of contract claim, thereby establishing 12 this Court’s federal question jurisdiction. (See Dkt. No. 16 at 3–4.) She suggests that preemption 13 in this context is an affirmative defense and therefore cannot serve as the anchor for federal 14 question jurisdiction. (Id. at 3–4.) Again, the Court disagrees with Ms. Thompson. “The RLA 15 creates ‘a comprehensive framework for resolving labor disputes’ in the rail and airline 16 industries.” Alaska Airlines Inc. v. Schurke, 898 F.3d 904, 916 (9th Cir. 2018) (quoting 17 Hawaiian Airlines, Inc. v. Norris, 512 U.S. 246, 252 (1994)). “Once preempted, ‘any claim 18 purportedly based on [a] . . . state law is considered, from its inception, a federal claim, and 19 therefore arises under federal law.’” Burnside v. Kiewit Pac. Corp., 491 F.3d 1053, 1059 (9th 20 Cir. 2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 393 21 (1987)). 22 For the foregoing reasons, the Court OVERRULES Ms. Thompson’s objections (Dkt. 23 No. 16) and ADOPTS Judge Christel’s R&R. Ms. Thompson’s motions for voluntary dismissal 24 (Dkt. No. 6) and remand (Dkt. No. 8) are DENIED. 25 // 26 // 1 DATED this 5th day of August 2021. A 2 3 4 John C. Coughenour 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26