Caldwell v. Spencer ( 2022 )


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  • 1 2 3 4 5 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 6 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA 7 KELLEY CALDWELL, CASE NO. C19-6095 BHS 8 Plaintiff, ORDER GRANTING 9 v. DEFENDANT’S MOTION TO STRIKE THE JURY 10 CARLOS DEL TORO, 11 Defendant. 12 13 This matter comes before the Court on Defendant Carlos Del Toro’s1 Motion to 14 Strike the Jury, Dkt. 38. This case is based on Plaintiff Kelley Caldwell’s request for 15 reasonable accommodation for noise cancelling earmuffs and alleged subsequent 16 retaliation for making such a request. See Dkt. 1. The facts of this case have been detailed 17 elsewhere and the Court need not repeat them here. See, e.g., Dkt. 26. 18 The Navy moved for summary judgment in June 2021. Dkt. 14. The Court granted 19 summary judgment on Caldwell’s reasonable accommodation claim, concluding she had 20 21 1 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 25(d), when a public officer ceases to hold office, “[t]he officer’s successor is automatically substituted as a party.” Carlos Del Toro is the 22 current Secretary of the Department of the Navy. 1 failed to administratively exhaust that claim. Dkt. 26 at 5–7. The Court denied summary 2 judgment on Caldwell’s retaliation claim, concluding there were disputes of material fact 3 as to whether the Navy had denied her a promotion and student loan forgiveness because 4 of her reasonable accommodation request. Id. at 7–9. Thus, Caldwell’s retaliation claim 5 remains before the Court. The parties are set to go to trial on that claim on June 14, 2022. 6 Dkt. 30. 7 The Navy moves to strike the jury, mere weeks before the trial is set to commence. 8 Dkt. 38. It argues that Caldwell’s retaliation claim under the Rehabilitation Act is 9 equitable in nature and therefore must be tried to the Court. Id. Caldwell argues that 10 compensatory damages are available for retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act 11 and therefore the claim should be heard by a jury. Dkt. 42. 12 The rules regarding whether and when compensatory damages are available under 13 the Rehabilitation Act, along with under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 14 are unclear. The Ninth Circuit has not addressed this issue specifically, and district courts 15 in this circuit are split on the question. Compare Lee v. Natomas Unified School Dist., 93 16 F. Supp. 3d 1160, 1170–71 (E.D. Cal. 2015) (holding compensatory damages are 17 available for retaliation claims against public entities under the Rehabilitation Act) and 18 Herrera v. Giampietro, No. 1:09-cv-01466-OWW-SKO, 2010 WL 1904827, at *9 (E.D. 19 Cal. May 10, 2010) (holding compensatory damages are available for retaliation claims 20 against public entities under the ADA) with Iceberg v. Martin, No. 15-cv-1232 JLR, 2017 21 WL 396438, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 30, 2017) (holding compensatory damages are not 22 1 available for retaliation claims under the Rehabilitation Act) and McCoy v. Dep’t of 2 Army, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1221, 1234 (E.D. Cal. 2011) (same). 3 The Rehabilitation Act does not itself has a retaliation provision but incorporates 4 the ADA’s retaliation provision, 42 U.S.C. § 12203. See 29 U.S.C. § 791(f). “[R]emedies 5 for violations of the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act are co-extensive with each 6 other . . . and are linked to Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.” Ferguson v. City of 7 Phoenix, 157 F.3d 668, 673 (9th Cir. 1998). In Alvarado v. Cajun Operating Co., the 8 Ninth Circuit held that compensatory damages are not available for retaliation claims 9 under the ADA. 588 F.3d 1261, 1270 (9th Cir. 2009). It therefore follows under 10 Ferguson, that compensatory damages are not available under the Rehabilitation Act. 11 Nevertheless, there is a district court split in this circuit regarding whether 12 compensatory damages are available under the Rehabilitation Act for retaliation claims 13 against public entities. The ADA has different remedy provisions for public and private 14 entities. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 12117 (ADA remedies provision citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 15 5 which clarifies that only equitable remedies are available for ADA retaliation claims 16 against private entities receiving federal funding) with Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 17 186–87 (holding that the remedies available in the ADA provision 42 U.S.C. § 12133, 18 governing public entities, are co-extensive with the remedies available in Title VI claims, 19 which include monetary damages). The courts in this circuit that have concluded 20 monetary damages are available for Rehabilitation Act retaliation claims have relied on 21 the private-public distinction, distinguishing Alvarado because it was a suit against a 22 private entity. See, e.g., Lee, 93 F. Supp. 3d at 1170–71. 1 Other courts in this circuit, however, have followed the Ninth Circuit’s 2 unambiguous holding in Alvarado, that compensatory damages are not available for 3 retaliation claims under the ADA. See McCoy, 789 F. Supp. 2d at 1234; Iceberg v. 4 Martin, 2017 WL 396438, at *6. While Alvarado involved a claim against a private 5 entity, the Ninth Circuit did not distinguish between public and private entities in its 6 holding. It therefore follows that compensatory damages are not available for retaliation 7 claims against either private or public entities under the Rehabilitation Act in this circuit. 8 The Court sees no reason to stray from the analysis in Alvarado. 9 Therefore, it is hereby ORDERED that Defendant Carlos Del Toro’s Motion to 10 Strike the Jury, Dkt. 38, is GRANTED. The jury is stricken and the trial will be a bench 11 trial. 12 Dated this 27th day of May, 2022. A 13 14 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE 15 United States District Judge 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

Document Info

Docket Number: 3:19-cv-06095

Filed Date: 5/27/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/4/2024