Office of Lawyer Regulation v. James C. Ritland , 2021 WI 36 ( 2021 )

2021 WI 36SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2018AP1832-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against James C. Ritland, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant-Respondent-Cross-
Appellant,
v.
James C. Ritland,
Respondent-Appellant-Cross-Respondent.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST RITLAND
OPINION FILED: April 22, 2021
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
Per Curiam. ROGGENSACK, C.J. dissents, joined by ZIEGLER and
REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, JJ.
ATTORNEYS:
For the respondent-appellant-cross-respondent, there were
briefs filed by James C. Ritland, Black River Falls.
For the complainant-respondent-cross-appellant, there was a
brief filed by Kim M. Kluck and Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Madison.
2021 WI 36NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2018AP1832-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against James C. Ritland, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant-Respondent-Cross-
FILED
Appellant,
APR 22, 2021
v.
Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
James C. Ritland,
Respondent-Appellant-Cross-
Respondent.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license
suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. This disciplinary matter comes to the
court on Attorney James C. Ritland's appeal and the Office of
Lawyer Regulation's (OLR) cross-appeal of a report and
recommendation of Referee Allan Beatty. After holding an
evidentiary hearing, the referee concluded that the OLR had
proven the sole misconduct charge asserted in its complaint;
namely, that Attorney Ritland's conduct resulting in convictions
No. 2018AP1832-D
for two counts of attempted adultery and one count of disorderly
conduct reflected adversely on his honesty, trustworthiness, and
fitness as a lawyer in other respects. See Supreme Court Rule
(SCR) 20:8.4(b).1 As a sanction, the referee recommended that
the court suspend Attorney Ritland's Wisconsin law license for
three months and order him to pay the full costs of this
disciplinary matter, which total $21,017.24 as of March 2, 2020.
Restitution is not at issue; because this case solely concerns
Attorney Ritland's sexual misconduct, there are no funds to
restore.
¶2 Both Attorney Ritland and the OLR have appealed the
referee's report and recommendation. In his appeal, Attorney
Ritland generally contests the sufficiency of the evidence
against him and claims his behavior merits, at most, a public
reprimand. In its cross-appeal, the OLR argues that a six-month
suspension——not a three-month suspension, as the referee
recommended——is warranted.
¶3 After reviewing this matter and considering Attorney
Ritland's appeal and the OLR's cross-appeal, we accept the
referee's factual findings, and we agree with the referee that
Attorney Ritland committed the charged SCR 20:8.4(b) violation.
We deem the referee's recommended three-month suspension
1 SCR 20:8.4(b) provides: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to commit a criminal act that reflects adversely on
the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in
other respects."
2
No. 2018AP1832-D
insufficient: Attorney Ritland's conduct and our case law call
for a two-year suspension. We impose full costs.
¶4 The OLR initiated this disciplinary proceeding with
the filing of a one-count complaint in September 2018, alleging
an SCR 20:8.4(b) violation. Attorney Ritland filed an answer in
which he denied any misconduct.
¶5 The case proceeded through discovery and to an
evidentiary hearing in August 2019, which featured testimony
from thirteen witnesses.
¶6 In October 2019, the referee filed his report. The
following factual summary is drawn from that report.
¶7 Attorney Ritland has held a Wisconsin law license
since 1978, and has an otherwise clean disciplinary history.
The wrongdoing involved in this case centered on his sexual
misconduct with two women: Z.H. and M.F.
¶8 In 2013, Attorney Ritland met Z.H. while in the
checkout line at a Walmart. After Z.H. exited the store,
Attorney Ritland invited her into his car, gave her his business
card for his law office, and told her to contact him if she
needed help or money. Several months later, Z.H. called
Attorney Ritland, and he invited her to come to his law office
after regular business hours. Upon luring Z.H. to his office
and isolating her as he was the only one present, he gave her
$40, touched her breasts outside of her clothing, and received
oral sex from her. On another occasion, Z.H. again called
Attorney Ritland and went to his office. He gave her $40, after
which she displayed her breasts and then left, promising to
3
No. 2018AP1832-D
return to complete the sexual encounter. Subsequent to these
two incidents, Attorney Ritland visited Z.H. in jail, at a time
when she was represented by a different attorney. Attorney
Ritland informed jail personnel that he was visiting Z.H. as her
attorney.
¶9 Attorney Ritland knew the other woman involved in this
case, M.F., through his representation of her in numerous
criminal matters. Attorney Ritland knew that M.F. had substance
addiction problems. Attorney Ritland also knew that M.F. had
financial troubles, as she consistently did not have the
resources to pay modest bail amounts.
¶10 Attorney Ritland occasionally paid M.F.'s bail. For
example, in January 2015, Attorney Ritland signed a surety bond
form and posted a $100 cash bail for M.F. in a matter in which
he represented her. The following day, Attorney Ritland revoked
his surety bond but informed the clerk of court that the $100
belonged to M.F.
¶11 Attorney Ritland ceased representing M.F. in February
2015, after the district attorney warned him that he may have a
conflict of interest in continuing to represent her given that
his personal checkbook was found amongst items believed to be
stolen by M.F.
¶12 Attorney Ritland admitted at his deposition in this
matter that after he withdrew from representing M.F., he had
sexual contact with her at his office on a number of occasions.
The sexual contact included Attorney Ritland touching M.F.'s
breasts, and, in one instance, M.F. performing oral sex on him.
4
No. 2018AP1832-D
¶13 After he withdrew from representing M.F., Attorney
Ritland continued to provide money and other benefits to her.
In March 2015, Attorney Ritland posted a $250 cash bail for M.F.
in a criminal matter. In May 2015, Attorney Ritland and M.F.
went to a casino together, where Attorney Ritland provided M.F.
with money. In August 2015, Attorney Ritland told law
enforcement that he did not want to pursue charges against M.F.
even though she had altered a check originally made payable to
him by making herself the payee. In March 2016, Attorney
Ritland posted $300 cash bail for M.F. in a criminal matter;
visited her in jail, identifying himself on the jail visitor log
as an attorney even though he did not represent her; and gave
her a note, received as a hearing exhibit, that said: "I still
want 6 free ones. I got you out of jail." The referee found
that the phrase "6 free ones" referred to sexual interactions.
¶14 As of September 2016, M.F. owed Attorney Ritland
hundreds or perhaps thousands of dollars in legal fees. After
Attorney Ritland learned he would be charged with criminal
offenses pertaining to his sexual contacts with M.F., he removed
information pertaining to M.F. from his office's billing
records.
¶15 In 2017, the State charged Attorney Ritland with four
counts of solicitation of prostitution, two counts of attempted
adultery, four counts of prostitution, one count of disorderly
conduct, and one count of maintaining a drug trafficking place.
Attorney Ritland ultimately pled no contest to, and was
convicted of, one count of attempted adultery related to his
5
No. 2018AP1832-D
conduct with Z.H., another count of attempted adultery related
to his conduct with M.F., and one count of disorderly conduct.
See State v. Ritland, Jackson County Case No. 2016CF177. The
remaining counts were dismissed and read-in for sentencing
purposes.
¶16 The circuit court withheld sentence for Attorney
Ritland, placed him on probation for twelve months, and required
him to serve twenty-five days in jail. According to the
sentencing transcript included in the record before us, the
circuit court commented at sentencing that Attorney Ritland's
conduct "behind closed doors" made him "a totally different
person" than the one the public knew. The circuit court
observed that Attorney Ritland's "character is sort of split
down the middle" between his "public persona and [his] secret[]
life."
¶17 This disciplinary case followed. The OLR alleged a
single count in its complaint:
By engaging in conduct which included paying money to
M.F. and Z.H. to perform sex acts and being convicted
on two counts of attempted adultery and one count of
disorderly conduct for that underlying conduct,
[Attorney] Ritland violated SCR 20:8.4(b).
¶18 In his report, the referee determined that "[b]y
evidence which is clear, satisfactory and convincing," Attorney
Ritland "has committed the violation alleged in the Complaint."
Briefly summarized, the referee determined in his report that
Attorney Ritland abused his professional status as a lawyer in
committing his criminal acts, which consisted of cajoling
6
No. 2018AP1832-D
vulnerable women into having adulterous contact with him at his
law office. His actions showed a lack of trustworthiness and
reflected poorly on his professional judgment and ability.
¶19 In evaluating the appropriate level of discipline, the
referee weighed various aggravating and mitigating factors. On
the aggravating side of the scale, Attorney Ritland's victims
were vulnerable because they were burdened with substance abuse
and/or financial problems. He engaged in a pattern of
misconduct. He did not appreciate the wrongful nature of his
conduct, notwithstanding having been criminally convicted of
three offenses. He showed no remorse. On the mitigating side
of the scale, the referee noted that Attorney Ritland has no
prior discipline, and he has contributed to the community
through volunteer efforts in his church and with youth
organizations. Ultimately, the referee recommended that this
court suspend Attorney Ritland for three months and impose full
costs against him.
¶20 As mentioned above, both Attorney Ritland and the OLR
have appealed from the referee's report. We turn first to the
arguments in Attorney Ritland's appeal.
¶21 Attorney Ritland has taken a scattershot approach to
his appeal, raising seven separate issues, one of which has
seven subparts. We address the minimally developed claims as
best we can, grouping like contentions where possible. Some
arguments, however, are too inadequately developed to warrant a
response. See State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646–47, 492
N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992).
7
No. 2018AP1832-D
¶22 Generally speaking, Attorney Ritland challenges the
sufficiency of the evidence against him. He dismisses Z.H.'s
testimony as not credible and unsupported by physical evidence.
He argues that "no facts concerning [M.F.] should be considered
since she did not testify at the [disciplinary] hearing" (all
caps removed). He claims that he never pressured M.F. into
unwanted sexual contact. He suggests that M.F., and not he,
wrote the note recovered by jail authorities that stated, "I
still want 6 free ones. I got you out of jail." He claims that
it was appropriate for him to visit M.F. in jail and sign the
jail visitor log as an attorney, even though he did not
represent M.F. at the time. He claims that there is no factual
connection between his convictions for attempted adultery and
disorderly conduct and his fitness to practice law. Ultimately,
Attorney Ritland argues, "the Court should find that there was
no ethical violation which would warrant discipline in this
case."
¶23 Attorney Ritland alternatively argues that, if he did
commit an ethical violation, the referee's recommended three-
month suspension is excessive. Attorney Ritland claims that the
referee gave insufficient weight to certain alleged mitigating
factors; e.g., his volunteer work within the community. He also
claims that this court should be closely guided by two cases
arising out of a shared set of facts, In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Butler, 2012 WI 37, 340 Wis. 2d 1, 811
N.W.2d 807, and In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Addison,
2012 WI 38, 340 Wis. 2d 16, 813 N.W.2d 201. The Butler and
8
No. 2018AP1832-D
Addison cases held that discipline identical to that imposed in
Illinois——30- and 60–day suspensions, respectively——was
warranted as reciprocal discipline for convictions pursuant to
Attorney Butler's and Attorney Addison's negotiated no contest
pleas to one felony count of second-degree reckless endangerment
and, in Attorney Addison's case, two additional misdemeanor
counts of sexual gratification in public, related to their
close-in-time sexual activity with the same woman. Attorney
Ritland argues that Attorney Butler's and Attorney Addison's
conduct was far worse than his, for at most, "the disputed
testimony may have established that I paid [Z.H.] for sex on one
occasion. This act of prostitution, although illegal, and
involves taking advantage of her financial weakness using my
money, is far different" than the conduct at issue in Butler and
Addison, Attorney Ritland claims. Attorney Ritland argues that
because Attorney Butler and Attorney Addison received "brief
suspensions, my discipline should be far less: I suggest a
public reprimand."
¶24 In its appellate response and cross-appeal, the OLR
criticizes Attorney Ritland's appellate arguments as amorphous
and insufficiently developed. It submits that Attorney Ritland
failed to show that any of the referee's factual findings are
clearly erroneous. The OLR also argues that the referee
properly determined that Attorney Ritland's criminal acts
reflect poorly on his fitness as a lawyer. Finally, the OLR
insists that the referee's recommended three-month suspension is
inadequate, and that a six-month suspension is appropriate so
9
No. 2018AP1832-D
that, before resuming practice, Attorney Ritland will need to
demonstrate all of the fitness criteria in SCR 22.29 and
SCR 22.31 to the satisfaction of the court.
¶25 The matter is now before this court to review the
referee's report and recommendation, informed by the parties'
arguments made in their briefs. When reviewing a referee's
report and recommendation, we affirm the referee's findings of
fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but we review the
referee's conclusions of law on a de novo basis. In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305
Wis. 2d 71, 740 N.W.2d 125. We determine the appropriate level
of discipline to impose given the particular facts of each case,
independent of the referee's recommendation, but benefiting from
it. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34,
¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶26 To begin, we reject Attorney Ritland's challenges to
the referee's factual findings. We may overturn a referee's
factual findings only if those findings are clearly erroneous.
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Boyle, 2015 WI 110, ¶41,
365 Wis. 2d 649, 872 N.W.2d 637. Here, the referee chose to
believe the version of events to which Z.H. testified: that
Attorney Ritland gave her his business card in a Walmart parking
lot and said she should call him if she needed help or money,
and that on two occasions in the months following this
encounter, he paid her money to engage in sexual activity at his
law office. The referee also chose to believe evidence showing
that Attorney Ritland provided money or benefits to M.F. in
10
No. 2018AP1832-D
exchange for engaging in sexual activity. It is not our place
to reappraise the evidence unless it plainly fails to support
the findings of the referee——and that is not the case here.2
¶27 We also reject any attempt by Attorney Ritland to
argue that the outcome of his criminal case, which included the
dismissal of the most serious charges against him, requires this
court to close its eyes to what the OLR proved Attorney Ritland
had done. Supreme Court Rule 20:8.4(b) provides that it is
professional misconduct to "[c]ommit a criminal act that
reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty, trustworthiness or
fitness as a lawyer in other respects." (Emphasis added.) The
rule does not require that an attorney actually have been
convicted of a crime for the rule to apply; we discipline for
conduct, not convictions. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶47 n.12, 305 Wis. 2d 71, 740
N.W.2d 125 ("[A]n attorney's criminal act can support a
SCR 20:8.4(b) violation even if the attorney is never charged or
convicted.") Thus, an SCR 20:8.4(b) violation may be found——
even absent a conviction——if the record contains clear,
satisfactory, and convincing evidence that the attorney engaged
in criminal acts that reflect adversely on his or her fitness to
Contrary to Attorney Ritland's argument, the fact that
2
M.F. did not testify at the disciplinary hearing does not mean
that "no facts concerning [M.F.] should be considered."
See, e.g., Guillaume v. Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co.,
161 Wis. 636, 639, 155 N.W. 143 (1915) (Facts in a civil case
may be established by circumstantial evidence alone, where the
circumstances lead fairly and reasonably to the conclusion
sought to be established.)
11
No. 2018AP1832-D
practice. See, e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Peterson, 2006 WI 41, 290 Wis. 2d 74, 713 N.W.2d 101 (affirming
an SCR 20:8.4(b) violation where the sole factual basis was an
attorney's use of cocaine). Relatedly, we have held that a
conviction alone——even a very serious one——does not necessarily
demonstrate an attorney's unfitness to practice. See In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Johns, 2014 WI 32, 353
Wis. 2d 746, 847 N.W.2d 179 (finding no SCR 20:8.4(b) violation
despite an attorney's conviction for the vehicular homicide of
his brother in light of evidence showing the exceedingly
anomalous nature of the attorney's conduct and his full
acceptance of responsibility for its tragic consequences).
¶28 Thus, whether Attorney Ritland's conduct violated
SCR 20:8.4(b) is a "fact dependent inquiry," driven by the facts
established in this disciplinary proceeding. See In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Horsch, 2020 WI 10, ¶11, 390
Wis. 2d 99, 937 N.W.2d 925. To the extent that Attorney Ritland
believes that the State's dismissal of certain charges
automatically immunizes the conduct proven here from
professional discipline, he is mistaken.
¶29 We are also unpersuaded by Attorney Ritland's argument
that there is no factual connection between his convictions for
attempted adultery and disorderly conduct and his fitness to
practice law. It is true, as Attorney Ritland points out in his
briefs, that the American Bar Association ("ABA") Comment [2] to
ABA's Model Rule 8.4, upon which SCR 20:8.4 was based, states:
12
No. 2018AP1832-D
Many kinds of illegal conduct reflect adversely on
fitness to practice law, such as offenses involving
fraud and the offense of willful failure to file an
income tax return. However, some kinds of offenses
carry no such implication. Traditionally, the
distinction was drawn in terms of offenses involving
"moral turpitude." That concept can be construed to
include offenses concerning some matters of personal
morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses,
that have no specific connection to fitness for the
practice of law.
(Emphasis added.) Seizing on the highlighted language, Attorney
Ritland argues that adultery necessarily is not an offense that
reflects adversely on a lawyer's fitness to practice law.
¶30 This argument ignores the record before us. While
Attorney Ritland asks us to look the other way because, in his
view, his conviction was for an offense that has no connection
to his fitness to practice law, we refuse to ignore the
overwhelming evidence that bears squarely on his fitness to
practice law; namely, evidence that he engaged in coerced or
quid pro quo sexual relationships with vulnerable women.
Attorney Ritland used his standing as an attorney and his law
office to lure, isolate, and access Z.H. and M.F.; as the
referee observed in his report, Attorney Ritland:
[d]irectly involved his practice of law in his
interactions with both [women] by giving [Z.H.] his
business card, by hosting both of them at his law
office and engaging in sexual activities with them
there, [and] by visiting both of them at the [county]
jail using his status as an attorney for access.
Furthermore, Attorney Ritland knew that both Z.H. and M.F. had
financial troubles and, in M.F.'s case, substance abuse and
legal troubles. Z.H.'s testimony——that Attorney Ritland paid
13
No. 2018AP1832-D
her to perform sex acts at his law office——is essentially
undisputed; although Attorney Ritland claims her testimony was
not credible, the referee decided otherwise, and we decline to
second-guess him. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Nunnery, 2009 WI 89, ¶40, 320 Wis. 2d 422, 769 N.W.2d 858 ("The
referee is best situated to judge the credibility of
witnesses.") As for Attorney Ritland's conduct with M.F., it
was clearly exploitive of M.F.'s subordinate and vulnerable
position; his jailhouse note that he expected "six free ones"
from her in exchange for paying her bail says it all. On these
facts, we have no hesitation finding that an ethical violation——
here, a violation of SCR 20:8.4(b)——has occurred.
¶31 In sum, then, based on the non-clearly-erroneous facts
found by the referee, we hold that Attorney Ritland's behavior
fell well below the standards of honesty, trustworthiness, and
integrity required of all attorneys. We therefore adopt the
referee's recommendation and hold that Attorney Ritland violated
SCR 20:8.4(b).
¶32 We now turn to the question of the appropriate
discipline to be meted out. As noted above, Attorney Ritland
argues that, at most, a public reprimand is warranted, citing as
support the relatively light suspensions (30 and 60 days)
imposed in Butler and Addison.
¶33 We are not persuaded. Butler and Addison are not
helpful authorities, as they were presented to us in the context
of reciprocal discipline matters. In reciprocal discipline
matters, our rules require that we impose the identical
14
No. 2018AP1832-D
discipline rendered by the other jurisdiction unless one of the
three exceptions listed in SCR 22.22(3)3 applies. The OLR did
not assert that any of these exceptions applied to Attorney
Butler's or Attorney Addison's conduct, and thus we imposed
discipline reciprocal to that imposed in Illinois. See Butler,
340 Wis. 2d 1, ¶24; Addison, 340 Wis. 2d 16, ¶24. Here, we are
not constrained by the rules governing reciprocal disciplinary
proceedings.
¶34 The OLR argues that the referee's recommended three-
month suspension is too light, and insists that a six-month
suspension is in order. It cites two cases that it claims are
particularly analogous to the facts of this case. In In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Ridgeway, 158 Wis. 2d 452, 462
N.W.2d 671 (1990), we suspended an attorney for six months for
having initiated and engaged in sexual contact with a client he
3 SCR 22.22(3) provides:
(3) The supreme court shall impose the identical
discipline or license suspension unless one or more of
the following is present:
(a) The procedure in the other jurisdiction was
so lacking in notice or opportunity to be heard as to
constitute a deprivation of due process.
(b) There was such an infirmity of proof
establishing the misconduct or medical incapacity that
the supreme court could not accept as final the
conclusion in respect to the misconduct or medical
incapacity.
(c) The misconduct justifies substantially
different discipline in this state.
15
No. 2018AP1832-D
was representing as a public defender, where the client was
facing probation revocation after absconding from a halfway
house, and where the attorney furnished her with alcohol
contrary to the terms of her probation. In In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Gamino, 2005 WI 168, 286 Wis. 2d 558, 707
N.W.2d 132, we suspended an attorney for six months for having
engaged in a sexual relationship with a client in one matter and
a sexual relationship with a juvenile client's mother in another
matter, and for making false representations about his conduct
to a court and to the OLR investigators in that matter. In both
cases, we noted that the disciplined attorneys had taken
advantage of individuals in a vulnerable position for their own
personal gratification. Ridgeway, 158 Wis. 2d at 453; Gamino,
286 Wis. 2d 558, ¶56. So too here, the OLR says.
¶35 We agree with the OLR that Ridgeway and Gamino are
instructive cases. But we also note that these cases are 31-
and 16-years-old, respectively. Over the ensuing years, we have
applied increasing scrutiny to attorneys' sexual misconduct.
¶36 For example, in 2007, we adopted SCR 20:1.8(j), which
deems sexual relations between an attorney and a current client
to be professional misconduct, unless the sexual relationship
predates the attorney-client relationship. The comments to this
rule specifically address the fiduciary nature of the attorney-
client relationship and the professional boundaries this
fiduciary relationship necessitates:
[17] The relationship between lawyer and client
is a fiduciary one in which the lawyer occupies the
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No. 2018AP1832-D
highest position of trust and confidence. The
relationship is almost always unequal; thus, a sexual
relationship between lawyer and client can involve
unfair exploitation of the lawyer's fiduciary role, in
violation of the lawyer's basic ethical obligation not
to use the trust of the client to the client's
disadvantage. . . . [T]his Rule prohibits the lawyer
from having sexual relations with a client regardless
of whether the relationship is consensual and
regardless of the absence of prejudice to the client.
¶37 We have very recently reiterated these same
principles, making it exceedingly clear that attorneys who
engage in sexual misconduct do so at their professional peril:
We have traveled a far way from tolerance of sexual
misconduct in the workplace and in our profession. We
recognize the psychological damage that can be
inflicted on the victims of sexual abuse, who silently
suffer and do not complain because they feel powerless
to do so. The sexual abuse of a client is
unacceptable in any profession and in any business
setting, and cannot be tolerated in our profession,
which holds as sacred the dignity of the individual.
. . . Attorneys who commit sexual crimes against
their clients take from their victims something more
profound than money or goods; they take from their
victims their dignity and psychological well-being.
Such conduct is grossly incompatible with the
standards of professionalism expected of attorneys.
In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hanes, 2020 WI 89, ¶31,
394 Wis. 2d 585, 951 N.W.2d 426 (quoting In Re Gallo, 178 N.J.
115 (2003).
¶38 These principles are reflected and reinforced by the
lengthy suspensions imposed in recent years on attorneys who
engaged in sexual misconduct with either clients or non-clients.
For example:
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No. 2018AP1832-D
 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Voss, 2011
WI 2, 331 Wis. 2d 1, 795 N.W.2d 415, we suspended an
attorney for a period of four years, eight months,
based on the attorney's sexual relationship with a
client who had a history of mental illness and alcohol
abuse, and the attorney's subsequent attempts to
intimidate and discredit the client and her family.
The attorney had one public reprimand on his
disciplinary record. We criticized the respondent-
attorney for "repeatedly [taking] advantage of his
position of power and victimiz[ing] a very vulnerable
person for his own selfish motives," and we warned
that the "egregious nature of [his] conduct caused us
to give serious consideration to the sanction of
revocation." Id., ¶39.
 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Evenson,
2015 WI 38, 361 Wis. 2d 629, 861 N.W.2d 786, we
imposed a 30-month suspension on an attorney based on
criminal conduct with a non-client that resulted in
two misdemeanor convictions for fourth-degree sexual
assault and one felony count of delivery of a
controlled substance. The attorney, who already had a
public reprimand on his disciplinary record, engaged
in two acts of sexual intercourse with an obviously
intoxicated woman after providing her with ecstasy and
alcohol.
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No. 2018AP1832-D
 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Baratki,
2017 WI 89, 378 Wis. 2d 1, 902 N.W.2d 250, we imposed
a six-month suspension on an attorney who, among other
things, made sexual comments to a client and on one
occasion lifted her shirt and kissed her abdominal
area. The attorney had been privately reprimanded
twice before and, in the case at hand, had also failed
to act with reasonable diligence and failed to
cooperate with the disciplinary investigation, among
other things. We chastised the lawyer for his
"efforts to leverage his position of trust for
personal gratification," and we quoted with approval a
previous case in which we described an attorney's
sexual misconduct with a client as "'egregious'"
behavior that "'perverts the very essence of the
lawyer-client relationship.'" Id., ¶32 (citation
omitted).
 In In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Hanes, 2020
WI 89, 394 Wis. 2d 585, 951 N.W.2d 426, we imposed a
four-year suspension on an attorney based on criminal
conduct with a non-client that resulted in a
misdemeanor criminal conviction for fourth-degree
sexual assault and three felony criminal convictions
for second-degree recklessly endangering safety,
fleeing/eluding an officer, and bail jumping. The
attorney, who had no disciplinary history, twice
sexually assaulted a woman (first while she was asleep
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No. 2018AP1832-D
and later when she awoke), and later engaged in a
high-speed car chase with police while released on
bail in his sexual assault case. We warned that
"severe sanctions are appropriate when attorneys
engage in predatory sexual misconduct against a
vulnerable individual." Id., ¶29.
¶39 The disconnect between the above-cited authorities and
Attorney Ritland's and the referee's recommendations——calling
for a public reprimand or a three-month suspension——gives us
pause. Both are wholly inadequate given the seriousness with
which we view acts of attorney sexual misconduct and the
egregious nature of Attorney Ritland's behavior, which included,
in the referee's words, "preying on vulnerable people" with
financial or substance abuse problems. At the risk of
redundancy, we emphasize that sexual misconduct by attorneys,
whether with clients or non-clients, is not taken lightly.
¶40 Even giving Attorney Ritland credit for his otherwise
clean disciplinary history and his consistent engagement in
community service, we conclude that a lengthy, two-year
suspension appears necessary to impress upon him the seriousness
of his professional misconduct, particularly in light of the
referee's observation——which we have no reason to doubt——that
Attorney Ritland "has not shown any remorse or even recognition
of how wrong his behavior is." Importantly, too, a two-year
suspension will require Attorney Ritland to successfully
complete the formal reinstatement procedure set forth in
SCRs 22.29 through 22.33.
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No. 2018AP1832-D
¶41 We turn next to the issue of costs. They are
considerable: $21,017.24 as of March 2, 2020. We impose them
fully on Attorney Ritland, in part because he has not stated an
objection to them, and in part because his litigation approach
no doubt helped drive them.
¶42 Attorney Ritland fought tooth and nail to avoid
discipline, deploying sometimes questionable litigation tactics.
As just one example, even though the misconduct charge against
him was founded on his sexual misbehavior, he refused to answer
any of the OLR's deposition questions on this topic, claiming
they were irrelevant. The OLR was forced to file a motion to
compel, and after a hearing, the referee ordered Attorney
Ritland to appear for a second deposition and answer the OLR's
questions, which he ultimately did. We note, too, the referee's
observation in his report that "[d]uring this proceeding
[Attorney Ritland] appeared to be disingenuous when he claimed
to not remember matters of importance to him personally." The
referee additionally pointed out in his report that Attorney
Ritland attempted to disavow at the disciplinary hearing a
concession he made in his own letter to the referee, in which he
wrote that "I certainly violated the law; I would not attempt to
minimize that." At the disciplinary hearing, Attorney Ritland
pivoted away from this statement, claiming he "didn't draft" the
letter, but rather "a friend" had, and "I thought I edited that
[statement] out, but I guess not." These examples are not
exhaustive but illustrate the type of recalcitrant litigation
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No. 2018AP1832-D
tactics that Attorney Ritland has engaged in during this
disciplinary matter.
¶43 Attorney Ritland had every right to vigorously contest
the misconduct charge against him. But SCR 22.24(1m) makes
clear that when a lawyer ultimately found guilty of misconduct
imposes costs on the disciplinary system, he or she must expect
to pay them. Throughout this case, Attorney Ritland has proven
to be a difficult litigant, prone to obstinate conduct and
obfuscation. Such litigation practices come at a cost; Attorney
Ritland will pay it in full.
¶44 IT IS ORDERED that the license of James C. Ritland to
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of two
years, effective June 3, 2021.
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that James C. Ritland shall
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been
suspended.
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, James C. Ritland shall pay to the Office of
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are
$21,017.24 as of March 2, 2020.
¶47 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See
SCR 22.29(4)(c).
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No. 2018AP1832-D.pdr
¶48 PATIENCE DRAKE ROGGENSACK, C.J. (dissenting). I
dissent because the discipline imposed for sexual misconduct is
not consistent with our past disciplinary decisions for lawyers
who had no prior misconduct of any type.
¶49 I am authorized to state that Justices ANNETTE
KINGSLAND ZIEGLER and REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY join this dissent.
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