Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Bridget E. Boyle ( 2013 )

2013 WI 103SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2011AP1767-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against
Bridget E. Boyle, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant-Respondent,
v.
Bridget E. Boyle,
Respondent-Appellant.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST BOYLE
OPINION FILED: December 26, 2013
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the respondent-appellant, there were briefs by Bridget
E. Boyle and Boyle, Boyle & Boyle, S.C., Milwaukee.
For the Office of Lawyer Regulation, there was a brief by
Robert G. Krohn, Edgerton.
2013 WI 103NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2011AP1767-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Bridget E. Boyle, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation, FILED
Complainant-Respondent,
DEC 26, 2013
v.
Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court
Bridget E. Boyle,
Respondent-Appellant.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license
suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney Bridget E. Boyle appeals the
report of James J. Winiarski, referee, recommending discipline
of a four-month license suspension, the imposition of costs, and
restitution to a client in the amount of $2,500. The referee
found that Attorney Boyle committed nine of the ten charged
counts of misconduct that were tried at a hearing before the
referee. The ethical violations which the referee determined
Attorney Boyle committed included failing to keep a client
No. 2011AP1767-D
reasonably informed about the status of a matter; failing to
promptly comply with reasonable requests by the client for
information; failing to communicate the basis for her fees and
expenses; failing to promptly respond to a client's request for
information concerning fees and expenses; failing to timely
return a client's file after the client's request; charging an
unreasonable fee; failing to hold unearned fees and advanced
payments of fees in trust until earned; and failing to return
unearned fees to her client upon termination of her
representation.
¶2 After our independent review of the record, we approve
the referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and adopt
them. We agree that Attorney Boyle should pay restitution in
the amount of $2,500 as described below, and we agree that
Attorney Boyle should pay the full costs of this disciplinary
proceeding.
¶3 We do not, however, accept the referee's
recommendation that Attorney Boyle's misconduct be sanctioned by
a four-month suspension. The serious nature of Attorney Boyle's
misconduct, combined with her substantial disciplinary history,
render a four-month suspension an insufficient response. It is
imperative that to resume the practice of law in Wisconsin,
Attorney Boyle must show this court that she has taken steps to
avoid similar misconduct in the future. We therefore impose a
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No. 2011AP1767-D
six-month suspension of Attorney Boyle's Wisconsin law license.
See SCR 22.28(3).1
¶4 Attorney Boyle was licensed to practice law in
Wisconsin in 1995 and practices in Milwaukee. In 2008 Attorney
Boyle was privately reprimanded for failing to act with
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a client;
failing to keep the client reasonably informed about the status
of a matter; failing to promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information; and failing to explain a matter to the extent
reasonably necessary to permit the client to make informed
decisions regarding the representation.
¶5 In 2012 Attorney Boyle was suspended for 60 days for
failing to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in
representing a client; failing to communicate appropriately with
a client; failing to promptly respond to a client's request for
information concerning fees and expenses; failing to take steps
to the extent reasonably practicable to protect a client's
interest; failing to cooperate with an OLR investigation into
her conduct; willfully failing to provide relevant information,
fully answer questions, or furnish documents in the course of an
OLR investigation; and engaging in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Boyle, 2012 WI 54, 341 Wis. 2d 92, 813
1
SCR 22.28(3) states, "The license of an attorney that is
revoked or suspended for misconduct for six months or more shall
be reinstated pursuant to the procedure set forth in SCR 22.29
to 22.33 and only by order of the supreme court."
3
No. 2011AP1767-D
N.W.2d 215. Also in 2012, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
disbarred Attorney Boyle from further practice in that court for
her abandonment of her client in a criminal case. In re Bridget
Boyle-Saxton, 668 F.3d 471 (7th Cir. 2012).
¶6 This disciplinary matter began with 13 counts, three
of which the referee dismissed during the disciplinary hearing
at the OLR's request. The remaining ten counts concern Attorney
Boyle's work for two clients, C.M. and C.P. We take the
following facts from the referee's report.
CLIENT C.M.
¶7 Counts Four through Nine arise out of Attorney Boyle's
representation of an individual, C.M., who had been convicted of
one count of possessing firearms after having been previously
convicted of a felony, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(l),
and five counts of violating 26 U.S.C. § 5861(d) for possessing
firearms not registered in the National Firearms Registration
and Transfer Record. The United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin sentenced C.M. to six concurrent
terms of 84 months imprisonment, with two years of supervised
release.
¶8 In early 2007 C.M. asked Attorney Boyle, who had not
previously represented him, to appeal his conviction. Attorney
Boyle offered to represent C.M. for a total of $20,000. C.M.
agreed and paid Attorney Boyle that amount of money.
¶9 No written fee agreement existed between Attorney
Boyle and C.M. Attorney Boyle did not communicate to C.M. the
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No. 2011AP1767-D
basis or rate for her fee or the precise legal services covered
by the fee.
¶10 C.M. and Attorney Boyle did not reach agreement on
what services the $20,000 fee would cover. C.M. believed the
fee covered a direct appeal to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, including a motion for
rehearing, a motion for rehearing en banc, a petition for writ
of certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, a petition
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2255 to vacate the sentence, a motion
pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3143 for bail pending appeal, and
various filings with the department of probation to correct the
presentence report. Attorney Boyle maintains she did not
promise any particular legal services for the agreed upon fee of
$20,000 other than an appeal to the Seventh Circuit and a
possible 28 U.S.C. § 2255 petition, and that the precise nature
of services she would render for the $20,000 fee was dependent
upon her review of the file. However, even after reviewing the
file, Attorney Boyle never stated the precise nature of the
legal services that she would provide for C.M.
¶11 Although C.M. requested that Attorney Boyle seek bail
pending appeal, Attorney Boyle never filed a motion asking for
this relief. On numerous occasions, C.M. wrote and called
Attorney Boyle concerning his requested motion for bail, but
Attorney Boyle did not respond to his inquiries.
¶12 On numerous occasions, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle to
inquire about issues he wanted Attorney Boyle to raise in his
Seventh Circuit appeal, and to request that Attorney Boyle
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No. 2011AP1767-D
schedule a telephone conference with him. Attorney Boyle did
not respond to these letters.
¶13 During a two-month period surrounding the oral
argument of his case in the Seventh Circuit, C.M. called
Attorney Boyle 84 times from prison. Attorney Boyle was
consistently unavailable to speak with C.M. and answer his
questions concerning the appeal. C.M.'s friend, C.S., also
called and e-mailed Attorney Boyle regularly in an attempt to
assist C.M. in obtaining the status of his case, but was unable
to reach Attorney Boyle.
¶14 In an opinion dated January 22, 2008, the Seventh
Circuit affirmed C.M.'s conviction. Attorney Boyle did not
advise C.M. of the unsuccessful outcome of his appeal, nor did
she respond to his telephone calls during the months following
the Seventh Circuit's decision. C.M. finally learned of the
Seventh Circuit's decision in July 2008 from an individual
within the prison where he resided.
¶15 On December 30, 2008, Attorney Boyle filed a motion
with the United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin to vacate C.M.'s sentences pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255. Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 is considered an
extraordinary remedy, appropriate only for an error of law that
is jurisdictional, constitutional, or constitutes a fundamental
defect resulting in a complete miscarriage of justice. Harris
v. United States, 366 F.3d 593, 594 (7th Cir. 2004).
Notwithstanding this high burden, Attorney Boyle did not attach
6
No. 2011AP1767-D
any affidavits to support her position, and her supporting
arguments were minimal.
¶16 On January 9, 2009, the district court denied the 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion, noting the motion lacked legal or
evidentiary support. Attorney Boyle did not advise C.M. of the
unsuccessful outcome of this motion. Attorney Boyle claims she
did not see the decision because the district court sent her the
decision via e-mail only; she surmises that she must have
accidently deleted the decision from her computer.
¶17 On January 29, 2009, Attorney Boyle sent C.M. a copy
of the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion, despite the fact that the
district court had already denied the motion.
¶18 On February 5, 2009, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle and
asked about the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion. He also asked for a
copy of his retainer agreement or engagement letter and "a full
written accounting of the time you have spent on my matter."
Attorney Boyle did not respond to this letter.
¶19 On May 13, 2009, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle and noted
she had not responded to his last several letters.
¶20 On August 8, 2009, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle to
request information on his case. He stated that he had not been
able to speak with her despite his numerous requests to do so.
He further stated that he had heard from a third party that the
district court had denied his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.
¶21 From June 2009 through September 2009, C.M. made many
unsuccessful attempts to call Attorney Boyle. C.M.'s friend,
C.S., also attempted to reach Attorney Boyle by telephone.
7
No. 2011AP1767-D
Attorney Boyle's staff repeatedly told C.M. and C.S. that the
district court had not ruled on the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.
¶22 On September 3, 2009, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle again
and asked about the status of the 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.
¶23 On September 30, 2009, C.M. wrote the clerk of court
for the Seventh Circuit, asking the Chief Judge of that court to
order Attorney Boyle to communicate with him.
¶24 By early 2010 C.M. learned, from a source other than
Attorney Boyle, that the district court had denied his 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 motion. C.M. filed a pro se motion with the district
court to reopen the time for appealing the denial of the 28
U.S.C. § 2255 motion, claiming that he did not receive timely
notice of the denial. The district court denied C.M.'s motion.
¶25 On February 12, 2010, C.M. wrote Attorney Boyle and
requested a copy of his file and a refund of fees.
¶26 On February 24, 2010, C.M. again wrote Attorney Boyle,
terminating his relationship with her and requesting a copy of
his file, a return of unearned fees, and an accounting of her
time.
¶27 By mid-2010 Attorney Boyle had not returned C.M.'s
file, returned any unearned fees, or provided an accounting of
her time. After C.M. alerted the OLR of these facts, the OLR
wrote to Attorney Boyle and advised her to provide C.M. with a
copy of the file.
¶28 In July 2010 the OLR issued a notice to appear to
Attorney Boyle for an investigative interview. Attorney Boyle
complied with the notice and appeared and answered questions
8
No. 2011AP1767-D
posed by the OLR. Attorney Boyle also gave the OLR a complete
copy of C.M.'s file, which the OLR copied and forwarded to C.M.
Attorney Boyle did not furnish any accounting for her fees or
return any portion of the $20,000 paid by C.M.
¶29 The OLR's complaint alleges that, by virtue of her
conduct while representing C.M., Attorney Boyle:
 failed to keep her client reasonably informed about
the status of his 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion and his
Seventh Circuit appeal, and failed to promptly comply
with her client's reasonable requests for information
about these matters, in violation of former
SCR 20:1.4(a)2 and SCRs 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4)3 (Counts
Four, Five, and Six);
 failed to communicate the basis for her fee, in
violation of former SCR 20:1.5(b)4 (Count Seven);
2
Former SCR 20:1.4(a) (effective prior to July 1, 2007),
provided, "A lawyer shall keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable
requests for information."
3
SCRs 20:1.4(a)(3) and (4) state that a lawyer shall "(3)
keep the client reasonably informed about the status of the
matter;" and "(4) promptly comply with reasonable requests by
the client for information; . . . ."
4
Former SCR 20:1.5(b) (effective prior to July 1, 2007)
provided as follows: "When the lawyer has not regularly
represented the client, the basis or rate of the fee shall be
communicated to the client, preferably in writing, before or
within a reasonable time after commencing the representation."
9
No. 2011AP1767-D
 failed to promptly respond to a client's request for
information concerning fees and expenses, in violation
of SCR 20:1.5(b)(3)5 (Count Eight); and
 failed to return a client's file upon termination of
representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d)6 (Count
Nine).
CLIENT C.P.
¶30 Counts Ten through Thirteen arise out of Attorney
Boyle's representation of an individual, C.P., who in 2008 was
convicted after a jury trial of one count of burglary—armed with
a dangerous weapon, and one count of second-degree endangering
safety while armed. The circuit court sentenced C.P. to five
years of imprisonment and five years of extended supervision on
each count, with the sentences to run consecutively to each
other and to any other sentence C.P. might be serving.
5
SCR 20:1.5(b)(3) states, "A lawyer shall promptly respond
to a client's request for information concerning fees and
expenses."
6
SCR 20:1.16(d) states as follows:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable
to protect a client's interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and
property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers
relating to the client to the extent permitted by
other law.
10
No. 2011AP1767-D
¶31 In August 2010, after his deadline for pursuing a
direct appeal had expired, C.P. filed multiple pro se motions
with the circuit court seeking postconviction relief. On
August 25, 2010, the circuit court issued an order denying
C.P.'s postconviction motions.
¶32 C.P.'s longtime companion, B.T., asked Attorney Boyle
to file an appeal following the denial of C.P.'s postconviction
motions. B.T. mistakenly believed that any such filing was due
within 20 days of the circuit court's August 25, 2010 denial
order; i.e., by September 14, 2010. B.T. paid Attorney Boyle
$2,500 with the understanding that Attorney Boyle would file an
appeal by September 14, 2010. Attorney Boyle deposited the
$2,500 into the firm's operating account and not the firm's
trust account.
¶33 By September 14, 2010, Attorney Boyle had taken
minimal action on C.P.'s case. She filed nothing with the court
of appeals or any other court. Although Attorney Boyle
determined that C.P. and B.T. were mistaken in believing that a
September 14, 2010 filing deadline was in effect, she did not
inform either C.P. or B.T. that no such deadline applied to
C.P.'s case.
¶34 Between September 15, 2010, and September 27, 2010,
after learning that Attorney Boyle had filed nothing in the
courts, B.T. called Attorney Boyle multiple times and informed
her that she wished to terminate the representation and recover
the $2,500 advanced fee. Attorney Boyle returned C.P.'s file to
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No. 2011AP1767-D
B.T. Attorney Boyle did not account for or refund any advanced
fees.
¶35 The OLR's complaint alleges that, by virtue of her
conduct while representing C.P., Attorney Boyle:
 failed to act with reasonable diligence and promptness
in representing a client, in violation of SCR 20:1.37
(Count Ten);
 charged an unreasonable fee in violation of
SCR 20:1.5(a)8 (Count Eleven);
7
SCR 20:1.3 states, "A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client."
8
SCR 20:1.5(a) provides as follows:
A lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge,
or collect an unreasonable fee or an unreasonable
amount for expenses. The factors to be considered in
determining the reasonableness of a fee include the
following:
(1) the time and labor required, the novelty and
difficulty of the questions involved, and the skill
requisite to perform the legal service properly;
(2) the likelihood, if apparent to the client,
that the acceptance of the particular employment will
preclude other employment by the lawyer;
(3) the fee customarily charged in the locality
for similar legal services;
(4) the amount involved and the results obtained;
(5) the time limitations imposed by the client or
by the circumstances;
(6) the nature and length of the professional
relationship with the client;
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No. 2011AP1767-D
 failed to hold unearned fees and advanced payments of
fees in trust until earned, in violation of
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4)9 (Count Twelve); and
 failed to refund unearned fees, in violation of
SCR 20:1.16(d) (Count Thirteen).
¶36 After a hearing on Counts Four through Thirteen, the
referee determined that the OLR had proven misconduct in all
counts except Count Ten, which, as mentioned above, alleged that
Attorney Boyle failed to act with reasonable diligence and
promptness during her representation of C.P.10 See SCR 20:1.3.
The referee recommended that Attorney Boyle receive a four-month
suspension, as the OLR had requested. In support of this
recommendation, the referee noted that, in both this
disciplinary matter and Attorney Boyle's earlier 60-day
suspension, Attorney Boyle displayed a pattern of failing to
communicate appropriately with her clients. The referee also
noted that throughout this disciplinary proceeding, Attorney
(7) the experience, reputation, and ability of
the lawyer or lawyers performing the services; and
(8) whether the fee is fixed or contingent.
9
SCR 20:1.15(b)(4) state: Unearned fees and cost advances.
Except as provided in par. (4m), unearned fees
and advanced payments of fees shall be held in trust
until earned by the lawyer, and withdrawn pursuant to
sub. (g). Funds advanced by a client or 3rd party for
payment of costs shall be held in trust until the
costs are incurred.
10
The OLR does not challenge the referee's determination on
Count Ten.
13
No. 2011AP1767-D
Boyle did not express any remorse over her conduct, was quick to
blame her own clients for communication problems, and offered
the "greatly exaggerated" defense that it was too dangerous for
her to engage in meaningful written communications with clients
in federal prison. The referee also expressed concern over
whether Attorney Boyle appreciated the error in her ways,
writing:
I am not sure this disciplinary case or the prior
disciplinary cases have impressed upon [Attorney]
Boyle the need to communicate with her clients from
the beginning to the end of her representation. I
also do not believe she accepts the need to have a
clear understanding of what legal services she will
perform for criminal clients, both at the beginning of
her representation and as the case develops. I sense
she remains most reluctant to put anything in writing.
¶37 As to the appropriate monetary sanctions, the referee
recommended that Attorney Boyle should be assessed the entire
costs of the disciplinary proceeding, which total $22,989.06 as
of March 11, 2013. The referee further recommended that
Attorney Boyle be ordered to refund the $2,500 retainer in the
C.P. matter. In making this restitution recommendation, the
referee dismissed as "not credible" Attorney Boyle's insistence
that she had earned the $2,500 by reading transcripts in C.P.'s
case. The referee found that Attorney Boyle performed no
meaningful legal services for C.P. other than checking the
state's Consolidated Court Automation Programs (CCAP) system to
determine the status of C.P.'s case. As to C.M.'s case, the
referee recommended that no restitution is owed, as Attorney
Boyle spent significant time on the case, and "[w]hile [C.M.]
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No. 2011AP1767-D
may not be happy with the result . . . , OLR has not requested
and has not proven . . . that any portion of the [$20,000] fee
should be returned."
¶38 Attorney Boyle appeals. In conducting our review, we
will affirm the referee's findings of fact unless they are found
to be clearly erroneous, but we will review the referee's
conclusions of law on a de novo basis. See In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Inglimo, 2007 WI 126, ¶5, 305 Wis. 2d 71,
740 N.W.2d 125. The court may impose whatever sanction it sees
fit regardless of the referee's recommendation. See In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶39 Although Attorney Boyle identifies only a single issue
for our review——whether the referee's recommended sanction is
appropriate——she devotes considerable time in her briefs to
challenging the factual bases for many of the referee's
determinations of misconduct. For example, Attorney Boyle
argues that the referee undercounted or undervalued the
communications she had with C.M., which, she claims, were
sufficient to ward off a determination that she failed to
appropriately communicate with him. Similarly, Attorney Boyle
argues that the referee failed to account for all of the legal
work she performed on C.P.'s case, which, she claims, justified
the $2,500 she was paid.
¶40 Tellingly, Attorney Boyle's briefs barely mention——
much less apply——the standard of review relevant to a referee's
factual findings: the clearly erroneous standard. See Inglimo,
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No. 2011AP1767-D
305 Wis. 2d 71, ¶5. This omission leads Attorney Boyle to
overlook the fact that our review of the referee's factual
findings is deferential rather than plenary. Thus, instead of
leaving us with a definite and firm conviction that the referee
has made a factual mistake, Attorney Boyle leaves us with the
impression that she would rather not confront the damning
evidence against her.
¶41 The record overwhelmingly shows that in the matters
under review, Attorney Boyle failed to carry out her
responsibilities to her clients. She habitually neglected her
duty to communicate with clients, often leaving her clients
entirely in the dark. There is no justifiable reason, for
example, for a client to have to discover the outcome of an
important motion or an appeal from someone other than his or her
lawyer, months after the relevant court issued its decision——as
C.M. did, twice. There is no justifiable reason for a client's
reasonable requests——for progress updates, for information on
fees, for the case file, for news of the very outcome of their
case——to be wholly ignored by their lawyer for vast expanses of
time.
¶42 Perhaps most troubling is the fact that, throughout
this disciplinary hearing, Attorney Boyle has strenuously
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No. 2011AP1767-D
avoided taking responsibility for the bulk of the conduct at
issue,11 instead offering a variety of excuses. They include:
 C.M. wrote and called her too frequently.
 Telephone calls from prisons are not clearly
identified on telephone systems.
 She was out of the office or busy when C.M. called.
 Her failure to respond to C.M.'s communications was
reasonable given that there was no ongoing activity in
his case at that time.
 C.M. could relay messages to her through his family
and friends.
 Written communications to a client in the federal
prison system are risky because other inmates may
steal them.
 Keeping memos or notes of her communications with
clients is dangerous for her clients.
 Setting up telephone conferences through the prison
system is difficult.
 She is too busy to document all communications with
clients.
 She could not send C.M. his file because it was too
large to transmit to the prison.
11
We note that Attorney Boyle admits the facts and
misconduct alleged by the OLR in Count Eight (failure to
promptly respond to C.M.'s request for information concerning
fees and expenses, in violation of SCR 20:1.5(b)(3)), and Count
Nine (failure to return C.M.'s file upon termination of
representation, in violation of SCR 20:1.16(d)).
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No. 2011AP1767-D
 The precise nature of services to be rendered in
criminal matters is difficult to state in writing at
the commencement of representation.
 She was unaware and therefore did not inform C.M. of
the district court's denial of relief under 28 U.S.C.
§ 2255 because of the "unique nature" of the federal
court's electronic filing system.
¶43 The referee was not persuaded by these and other
excuses. We are similarly unpersuaded. We therefore affirm the
referee's findings of fact and agree with the referee that those
factual findings demonstrate that Attorney Boyle committed the
misconduct alleged in Counts Four through Nine and Eleven
through Thirteen.
¶44 With respect to the discipline to be imposed, we
depart from the referee's recommendation and from the OLR's
suggestion that a four-month suspension is sufficient. We are
particularly concerned by the blame-shifting strategy that
Attorney Boyle frequently uses to try minimize her ethical
missteps. This strategy demonstrates that Attorney Boyle does
not fully understand her ethical obligations as a lawyer. The
purpose of lawyer discipline is to protect the public, the
courts, and the legal profession in Wisconsin from incompetent
and unfit attorneys. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Hankel, 126 Wis. 2d 390, 394, 376 N.W.2d 848 (1985). The
public, the courts, and the Wisconsin legal profession need
protection from Attorney Boyle until she demonstrates to this
court, before she resumes practice, that she has made efforts to
18
No. 2011AP1767-D
remedy the causes of her repeated failures to serve her clients
ethically. A six-month suspension is therefore necessary. See
SCR 22.28(3). It is also consistent with the range of
discipline this court has imposed for similar misconduct. See,
e.g., In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Joset, 2008 WI 41,
309 Wis. 2d 5, 748 N.W.2d 778 (six-month suspension for failing
to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
clients, failing to keep clients reasonably informed about the
status of a matter and promptly comply with reasonable requests
for information, failing to comply with court orders, and
failing to cooperate with the investigation into misconduct); In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Glynn, 2000 WI 117, 238
Wis. 2d 860, 618 N.W.2d 740 (nine-month suspension for failing
to act with reasonable diligence and promptness in representing
clients, failing to explain matters reasonably necessary to
permit clients to make informed decisions regarding their
representation, and failing to cooperate with the investigation
into misconduct).
¶45 We further conclude that full costs are to be imposed
on Attorney Boyle. Neither the OLR nor Attorney Boyle disputes
the appropriateness of assessing Attorney Boyle with the full
costs of this disciplinary proceeding.
¶46 Finally, we conclude that Attorney Boyle must
reimburse C.P.'s companion, B.T., for the $2,500 B.T. paid to
Attorney Boyle. Attorney Boyle asks this court to send the
issue of her entitlement to the $2,500 fee payment to
arbitration. However, Attorney Boyle surely knew, or should
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No. 2011AP1767-D
have known, that professional discipline may include restitution
"to the person whose money or property was misappropriated or
misapplied in the amount or value of such money or property as
found in the disciplinary proceedings." See SCRs 21.16(1m)(em)
and (2m)(a)1. Attorney Boyle had ample opportunity to verify
the amounts she earned or expended while working on C.P.'s case.
She has failed to do so. The referee found Attorney Boyle's
justification for the $2,500 fee to be incredible. This is not
the forum for reweighing Attorney Boyle's credibility.
¶47 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Bridget E. Boyle to
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six
months, effective January 30, 2014.
¶48 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Bridget E. Boyle shall
comply with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of
a person whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been
suspended.
¶49 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, Bridget E. Boyle shall pay restitution in the
amount of $2,500 to B.T.
¶50 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, Bridget E. Boyle shall pay to the Office of
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding.
¶51 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that restitution is to be
completed prior to paying costs to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation.
20
No. 2011AP1767-D
¶52 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all
conditions of this decision is required for reinstatement. See
SCR 22.29(4)(c).
21
No. 2011AP1767-D
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