State v. John Patrick Wright ( 2019 )

2019 WI 45
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2017AP002006-CR
COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
v.
John Patrick Wright,
Defendant-Respondent.
REVIEW OF DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at 383 Wis. 2d 602,918 N.W.2d 128
(2018 – unpublished)
OPINION FILED: April 30, 2019
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: January 16, 2019
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Milwaukee
JUDGE: Hannah C. Dugan
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the plaintiff-appellant-petitioner, there were briefs
filed by David H. Perlman, assistant attorney general, with whom
on the briefs is Brad D. Schimel, attorney general. There was an
oral argument by David H. Perlman.
For the defendant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Carly M. Cusack, assistant state public defender. There was an
oral argument by Carly M. Cusack.
2019 WI 45
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2017AP2006-CR
(L.C. No. 2016CM2845)
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Appellant-Petitioner,
FILED
v.
APR 30, 2019
John Patrick Wright,
Sheila T. Reiff
Defendant-Respondent. Clerk of Supreme Court
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed and
cause remanded.
¶1 SHIRLEY S. ABRAHAMSON, J. This is a review of an
unpublished decision of the court of appeals affirming an order
of the Circuit Court for Milwaukee County, Hannah Dugan, Judge,
granting John Patrick Wright's motion to suppress evidence.1 The
1State v. Wright, No. 2017AP2006-CR, unpublished slip op.
(Wis. Ct. App. June 12, 2018).
No. 2017AP2006-CR
appeal was decided by one judge, Joan F. Kessler, pursuant to
Wis. Stat. § 752.31(2)(f) (2015-16).2
¶2 John Patrick Wright, the defendant, was charged with
unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wis.
Stat. § 941.23(2). The weapon was discovered in Wright's
vehicle's glove compartment during a traffic stop. Wright did
not hold a valid permit to carry a concealed weapon, commonly
referred to as a CCW permit.
¶3 Wright filed a motion to suppress the evidence.
Wright admitted that the traffic stop was lawfully initiated
because it was supported by reasonable suspicion that Wright was
violating the traffic code.
¶4 Wright argued, however, that the police violated the
Fourth Amendment by taking three actions unsupported by
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity: (1) the police asked
Wright whether he had a weapon in the vehicle; (2) the police
asked Wright whether he held a permit to carry a concealed
weapon; and (3) the police verified whether Wright in fact had a
valid CCW permit (a CCW permit check).
¶5 The circuit court, relying on Rodriguez v. United
States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015), held that the officer unlawfully
extended the traffic stop by asking Wright whether he had a
weapon in the vehicle and whether he held a permit to carry a
2 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2015-16 version unless otherwise indicated.
2
No. 2017AP2006-CR
concealed weapon. The court of appeals affirmed, adopting the
same reasoning as the circuit court.
¶6 The case presents three Fourth Amendment issues: (1)
in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, may
an officer ask a lawfully stopped motorist about the presence of
weapons; (2) in the absence of reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity, may an officer ask a lawfully stopped motorist whether
the motorist holds a CCW permit; and (3) in the absence of
reasonable suspicion of criminal activity, may an officer
conduct a CCW permit check.
¶7 We conclude that, in the instant case, none of the
officer's questions or actions violated the Fourth Amendment.
¶8 A traffic stop constitutes a seizure for Fourth
Amendment purposes.3 The United States Supreme Court has
described a routine traffic stop as more akin to a Terry4 stop
than a formal arrest. It has held that, like a Terry stop, "the
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop
context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related
safety concerns."5
3 Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609, 1614 (2015);
State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶20, 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898
N.W.2d 560.
4 Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
5 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citations omitted); see
also Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 330 (2009); Illinois v.
Caballes, 543 U.S. 405, 407 (2005); Knowles v. Iowa, 525
U.S. 113, 117 (1998).
3
No. 2017AP2006-CR
¶9 The "mission" of a traffic stop includes: (1)
addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop; (2)
conducting ordinary inquiries incident to the stop; and (3)
taking negligibly burdensome precautions to ensure officer
safety.6 Authority for the seizure ends when these tasks are, or
reasonably should have been, completed.7
¶10 This is not to say, however, that police action
unrelated to the traffic stop's mission necessarily violates the
Fourth Amendment. To the contrary, the Supreme Court has
recognized "that the Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain
unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the roadside
detention."8 In other words, "[t]he seizure remains lawful only
'so long as [unrelated] inquiries do not measurably extend the
duration of the stop.'"9
¶11 We conclude that Wright's Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated when the officer asked Wright about the presence of
weapons in the vehicle. As this court stated in State v. Floyd,
2017 WI 78, ¶28 377 Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560, questioning a
6 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15; Caballes, 543 U.S. at
408.
7
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; see also United States v.
Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 686 (1985) (in determining the reasonable
duration of a stop, "it is appropriate to examine whether the
police diligently pursued [the] investigation").
8
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; see also Johnson, 555 U.S.
at 327-28; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 406-08.
9
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (brackets in original)
(quoting Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333).
4
No. 2017AP2006-CR
lawfully stopped motorist about the presence of weapons relates
to officer safety and is negligibly burdensome. The question is
part of the traffic stop's mission.10
¶12 Neither the officer's question nor the subsequent CCW
permit check "measurably extend[ed] the duration of the
[traffic] stop."11 Thus, neither the officer's questioning
whether Wright held a CCW permit, nor the officer's subsequent
CCW permit check, violated the Fourth Amendment.
¶13 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of
appeals, vacate the circuit court's order granting Wright's
motion to suppress, and remand the cause to the circuit court
for further proceedings.
I
¶14 The following facts are taken from the transcript of
the evidentiary hearing on Wright's motion to suppress, as well
as the transcript of the circuit court's oral decision granting
Wright's motion.
¶15 On June 15, 2016, Milwaukee Police Officers Jesus
Gloria and Kristopher Sardina stopped Wright's car because the
passenger-side headlight was out.
¶16 While Officer Gloria approached the passenger-side
window of Wright's vehicle, Officer Sardina approached the
driver's-side window and made contact with Wright. Officer
10 Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28.
11 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.
5
No. 2017AP2006-CR
Sardina asked Wright for his driver's license, asked whether he
was a CCW permit holder, and asked whether Wright had any
weapons in the car. Officer Sardina testified on cross-
examination that although he does not recall how many questions
he asked or the order in which he asked them, all of these
questions usually "come pretty fast" after he makes initial
contact with a motorist.
¶17 Wright responded to the officer that he had just
finished the CCW permit class and that he did have a firearm in
his vehicle.12 Officer Sardina asked Wright if the officers had
his permission to remove the firearm from the vehicle for the
duration of the stop. Wright consented, stating that the
firearm was in the glove compartment; Officer Gloria retrieved
the firearm.13
¶18 Officer Sardina took Wright's license and went back to
the squad car to "run [Wright's] information."14 During this
12
At this point, Officer Sardina arguably had reasonable
suspicion that Wright was violating Wis. Stat. § 941.23(2). The
State, however, does not argue that reasonable suspicion
existed. We therefore do not resolve the issues in the instant
case on that basis.
13 The firearm was loaded.
14
We infer that Officer Sardina was checking Wright's
driver's license and/or determining whether Wright had any
outstanding warrants. See Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615
(quoting Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408) (explaining that the
"ordinary inquiries" incident to the traffic stop include
"checking the driver's license [and] determining whether there
are outstanding warrants against the driver").
6
No. 2017AP2006-CR
time, Officer Sardina also ran a CCW permit check to see if
Wright was a valid CCW permit holder. Officer Sardina
discovered that Wright did not have a valid CCW permit. Officer
Sardina then arrested Wright under suspicion of unlawfully
carrying a concealed weapon. Wright was later charged with
unlawfully carrying a concealed weapon in violation of Wis.
Stat. § 941.23(2).
¶19 Wright moved to suppress the gun evidence, and, after
an evidentiary hearing, the circuit court granted Wright's
motion. The circuit court concluded, relying on Rodriguez, that
asking the CCW permit question and the question about the
presence of weapons unlawfully extended the traffic stop in
violation of the Fourth Amendment.
¶20 The State appealed, and the court of appeals affirmed.
The court of appeals, relying on Rodriguez, concluded that
asking the CCW permit question and the question about the
presence of weapons unlawfully extended the traffic stop.
Although the State briefed the application of this court's
decision in State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶28, 377 Wis. 2d 394,
898 N.W.2d 560, a decision that was released after the circuit
court's decision but before the court of appeals' decision, the
court of appeals failed to address Floyd.
¶21 The State petitioned this court for review.
II
7
No. 2017AP2006-CR
¶22 Whether evidence should be suppressed is a question of
constitutional fact.15 When presented with a question of
constitutional fact, this court engages in a two-step inquiry.
"First, we review the circuit court's findings of historical
fact under the clearly erroneous standard. Second, we
independently apply constitutional principles to these
historical facts."16
III
¶23 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution
prohibits unreasonable seizures.17 A traffic stop constitutes a
seizure for constitutional purposes, and "[a] seizure for a
traffic violation justifies a police investigation into that
violation."18 The United States Supreme Court has characterized
a routine traffic stop as more akin to a Terry stop than to a
15
State v. Reed, 2018 WI 109, ¶51, 384 Wis. 2d 469, 920
Wis. 2d 56; State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 675,
729 N.W.2d 182; State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶19, 285
Wis. 2d 86, 700 N.W.2d 899.
16
Reed, 384 Wis. 2d 469, ¶51 (footnotes omitted); Johnson,
299 Wis. 2d 675, ¶13; Knapp, 285 Wis. 2d 86, ¶19.
17 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
Wright also argues that his rights under Article 1, Section
11 of the Wisconsin Constitution were violated. However,
Wright's only developed argument pertains to the Fourth
Amendment. See State v. Grandberry, 2018 WI 29, ¶30 n.19, 380
Wis. 2d 541, 910 N.W.2d 214 (explaining that we typically do not
address undeveloped arguments). Thus, we confine our analysis
to the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution.
18 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
8
No. 2017AP2006-CR
formal arrest. It has held that, like a Terry stop, "the
tolerable duration of police inquiries in the traffic-stop
context is determined by the seizure's 'mission'——to address the
traffic violation that warranted the stop and attend to related
safety concerns."19
¶24 The "mission" of a traffic stop includes: (1)
addressing the traffic violation that warranted the stop; (2)
conducting ordinary inquiries incident to the stop;20 and (3)
taking negligibly burdensome precautions to ensure officer
safety.21 Authority for the seizure ends when these tasks are,
or reasonably should have been, completed.22
¶25 Because traffic stops are "especially fraught with
danger to police officers,"23 the Supreme Court has explained
that "an officer may need to take certain negligibly burdensome
precautions in order to complete his mission safely."24 Indeed,
19Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614 (citations omitted)
(emphasis added).
20"Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration
and proof of insurance." Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408).
21Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614-15; Caballes, 543 U.S. at
408; Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 658-60 (1979); see also 4
Wayne R. LaFave, Search & Seizure § 9.3(c) (5th ed. 2012).
22 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614.
23Johnson, 555 U.S. at 330 (quoting Michigan v. Long, 463
U.S. 1032 (1983)).
24 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.
9
No. 2017AP2006-CR
the Supreme Court has stated that the Fourth Amendment
categorically authorizes the police to order the driver25 and all
passengers26 out of the vehicle for the duration of the traffic
stop in order to ensure the safety of the officer.
¶26 The police may take these precautions because "the
government's officer safety interest stems from the mission of
the stop itself."27 As this court has explained, questions
related to officer safety are part of the traffic stop's
mission, and therefore, those questions do not cause an
extension of the stop.28
¶27 Moreover, the Supreme Court has "concluded that the
Fourth Amendment tolerate[s] certain unrelated investigations
that [do] not lengthen the roadside detention."29 That is, the
seizure remains lawful despite these unrelated inquiries "so
25 Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977).
26 Md. v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411 (1997).
27 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1616.
28
Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28 ("[B]ecause the questions
related to officer safety and were negligibly burdensome, they
were part of the traffic stop's mission, and so did not cause an
extension.").
29
Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1614; see also Johnson, 555 U.S.
at 327-28; Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407-08.
10
No. 2017AP2006-CR
long as those inquiries do not measurably extend the duration of
the stop."30
¶28 With these principles in mind, we now examine whether
the questions posed by Officer Sardina fall under the "mission"
of the stop, and if they do not, whether they "measurably
extend[ed] the duration of the stop."31 If they constitute part
of the mission of the stop, they will not be considered an
extension of that stop. If, however, they are unrelated to the
mission of the stop, they will violate the Fourth Amendment if
they measurably extended the duration of the stop.
IV
A
¶29 We first address Officer Sardina's question regarding
the presence of weapons in Wright's vehicle. We conclude that
this question constitutes part of the stop's mission because the
question is a negligibly burdensome precaution taken to ensure
officer safety.
¶30 In Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106, 111 (1977),
the Supreme Court created a rare bright-line, categorical rule
under the Fourth Amendment: In the interest of officer safety,
30
Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333; see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct.
at 1615 ("An officer, in other words, may conduct certain
unrelated checks during an otherwise lawful traffic stop.");
Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407 (cautioning that a traffic stop "can
become unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably
required to complete th[e] mission" of the stop).
31 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.
11
No. 2017AP2006-CR
a police officer may order a driver out of his or her vehicle
for the duration of the traffic stop. This rule was
subsequently expanded in Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408, 411
(1997), to include all passengers in the vehicle.
¶31 Asking a lawfully stopped motorist about the presence
of weapons is significantly less burdensome than ordering all
occupants out of the vehicle for the duration of the stop. If a
police officer may, in the interest of officer safety, order all
occupants out of the vehicle for the duration of the stop
without violating the Fourth Amendment, the officer may take a
less burdensome precaution to ensure officer safety.
¶32 The State correctly points out that this court's
recent decision in State v. Floyd, 2017 WI 78, ¶28, 377
Wis. 2d 394, 898 N.W.2d 560, supports the conclusion that a
police officer may ask about the presence of weapons during a
traffic stop without violating the Fourth Amendment.
¶33 In Floyd, "Deputy Ruffalo asked Mr. Floyd if he had
any weapons or anything that could harm him. When Mr. Floyd
said he didn't, Deputy Ruffalo asked if he could perform a
search for his safety."32 The Floyd court explained that "[b]oth
questions specifically related to the officer's safety."33 The
Floyd court concluded that "because the questions related to
officer safety and were negligibly burdensome, they were part of
32 Floyd, 377 Wis. 2d 394, ¶28.
33 Id.
12
No. 2017AP2006-CR
the traffic stop's mission, and so did not cause an extension"
of the stop.34
¶34 Floyd controls. Officer Sardina's question to Wright
regarding whether Wright was carrying any weapons directly
related to officer safety and was negligibly burdensome. As
such, it was part of the traffic stop's mission. It did not
cause an extension of the stop.
B
¶35 We now turn to Officer Sardina's question about the
CCW permit and the CCW permit check.
¶36 Neither the question regarding the CCW permit nor the
CCW permit check addresses the traffic violation that warranted
the stop.35 Further, the parties agree, as do we, that the CCW
permit question and the CCW permit check are not part of the
"ordinary inquiries incident to [the traffic] stop."36
¶37 Instead, the parties focus on whether the CCW permit
question and the CCW permit check further the interest of
34 Id.
35 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. 1614 (traffic stop's "mission"
includes "address[ing] the traffic violation that warranted the
stop").
36Caballes, 543 U.S. at 408; see also Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct.
at 1615 ("Typically such inquiries involve checking the driver's
license, determining whether there are outstanding warrants
against the driver, and inspecting the automobile's registration
and proof of insurance. These checks serve the same objectives
as enforcement of the traffic code: ensuring that vehicles on
the road are operated safely and responsibly.").
13
No. 2017AP2006-CR
officer safety.37 On this issue, we agree with Wright. Knowing
whether or not an individual has a valid CCW permit does not
make the officer any safer than the officer otherwise would have
been in the absence of that knowledge. It is the potential
presence of a weapon that implicates the safety of the officer,
not whether that weapon is being lawfully carried under Wis.
Stat. § 941.23. In the absence of reasonable suspicion of
criminal activity, asking whether a motorist holds a CCW permit
and conducting a CCW permit check constitute an unrelated
investigation into whether the motorist is unlawfully carrying a
concealed weapon.
¶38 Our conclusion that the CCW permit question and CCW
permit check are unrelated to the mission of the stop does not,
however, mean that the question and the permit check violated
the Fourth Amendment. "[T]he Fourth Amendment tolerate[s]
certain unrelated investigations that [do] not lengthen the
roadside detention."38 Inquiries unrelated to the original
justification for the stop are permissible under the Fourth
Amendment "so long as those inquiries do not measurably extend
the duration of the stop."39
¶39 To illustrate this principle, it is helpful to compare
the facts of Illinois v. Caballes and Rodriguez v. United
37
Rodriguez, 543 U.S. at 1614 (traffic stop's "mission"
includes "safety concerns" related to the stop).
38 Id.
39 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.
14
No. 2017AP2006-CR
States. Both of these cases involved a K-9 dog sniff unrelated
to the mission of the traffic stop, but the cases reached
different results as to the constitutionality of the dog sniff.
¶40 In Caballes, the Supreme Court concluded that the dog
sniff did not violate the Fourth Amendment. The Supreme Court
acknowledged that "[a] seizure that is justified solely by the
interest in issuing a warning ticket to the driver can become
unlawful if it is prolonged beyond the time reasonably required
to complete that mission."40 However, the dog sniff at issue in
Caballes did not prolong the stop beyond the time reasonably
required to complete the mission of the stop. Rather, the dog
sniff occurred while the traffic stop's mission was still being
completed. That is, while one officer was in the process of
writing Caballes a warning ticket, a different officer arrived
at the scene and walked his K-9 around Caballes's car. There
was no extension of the stop beyond the time reasonably
necessary to complete the mission of the stop. The Caballes
Court explained:
In the state-court proceedings, however, the judges
carefully reviewed the details of Officer Gillette's
conversations with respondent and the precise timing
of his radio transmissions to the dispatcher to
determine whether he had improperly extended the
duration of the stop to enable the dog sniff to occur.
We have not recounted those details because we accept
the state court's conclusion that the duration of the
stop in this case was entirely justified by the
40 Caballes, 543 U.S. at 407.
15
No. 2017AP2006-CR
traffic offense and the ordinary inquiries incident to
such a stop.41
¶41 In Rodriguez, however, the Supreme Court concluded
that the dog sniff did violate the Fourth Amendment. The
Rodriguez Court reached this conclusion because, unlike the dog
sniff at issue in Caballes, the dog sniff in Rodriguez prolonged
the stop beyond the time reasonably required to complete the
mission of the stop.
¶42 The officer in Rodriguez admitted that by 12:27 a.m.
or 12:28 a.m., he finished explaining the warning that he had
issued to Rodriguez and returned both Rodriguez's and the
passenger's documents.42 At this point, the "mission" of the
traffic stop was complete. However, the officer continued to
conduct an investigation into unrelated criminal activity. The
officer asked Rodriguez for permission to walk his K-9 around
Rodriguez's vehicle.43 When Rodriguez said no, the officer
instructed Rodriguez to turn off the ignition and wait for a
second officer to arrive.44 At around 12:33 a.m., the second
officer arrived, the two officers led the K-9 around Rodriguez's
vehicle, the dog alerted to the presence of drugs, and the
41 Id. at 408.
42 Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1613.
43 Id.
44 Id.
16
No. 2017AP2006-CR
officer discovered a large bag of methamphetamine in Rodriguez's
car.45
¶43 The key fact driving the different conclusions in
Caballes and Rodriguez is that in Caballes, the dog sniff added
no time at all to the traffic stop because it was conducted
simultaneously with mission-related activities. In Rodriguez,
all mission-related activities had been completed, and thus, the
dog sniff unlawfully extended the duration of the stop.
¶44 Accordingly, although we have concluded that the CCW
permit question and the CCW permit check were unrelated to the
mission of the traffic stop, they are nonetheless permissible
under the Fourth Amendment "so long as those inquiries do not
measurably extend the duration of the stop."46
¶45 In the instant case, there is no evidence that the CCW
permit question or the CCW permit check measurably extended the
duration of the traffic stop. Although the circuit court record
is not richly detailed, the record is sufficient to conclude
that the CCW permit question and the CCW permit check in the
instant case were conducted while mission-related activities
were occurring.
¶46 Although Officer Sardina admitted that he could not
recall the order in which he asked his questions when he first
approached Wright's vehicle, he testified that all of the
45 Id.
46 Johnson, 555 U.S. at 333.
17
No. 2017AP2006-CR
questions "come pretty fast" after he makes initial contact with
a motorist. That is, within a few moments of approaching the
vehicle, Officer Sardina asked for Wright's driver's license,
asked whether Wright was carrying any weapons, and asked whether
Wright had a CCW permit.
¶47 We conclude that Officer Sardina's question about
whether Wright held a CCW permit did not "measurably extend the
duration of the stop."47 Obviously, Officer Sardina's CCW permit
question took some amount of time to ask. However, we view the
time it took Officer Sardina to ask the CCW question as de
minimis and virtually incapable of measurement. Thus, the CCW
question did not violate the Fourth Amendment in the instant
case.
¶48 As for the CCW permit check, Officer Sardina testified
that he took Wright's license and returned to his squad car in
order to "run [Wright's] information." Officer Sardina
testified that, in addition to "run[ning] [Wright's]
information[,]" he also ran a CCW permit check.
¶49 We conclude that the CCW permit check in the instant
case did not violate the Fourth Amendment because it was
conducted concurrently with mission-related activities, namely,
running Wright's information. Like the dog sniff in Caballes,
it cannot be said that the CCW permit check measurably extended
the duration of the stop in violation of the Fourth Amendment.
47 Id.
18
No. 2017AP2006-CR
¶50 Because neither the CCW permit question nor the CCW
permit check measurably extended the duration of the traffic
stop in the instant case, Wright's Fourth Amendment rights were
not violated.
¶51 Accordingly, we reverse the decision of the court of
appeals, vacate the circuit court's order granting Wright's
motion to suppress, and remand the cause to the circuit court
for further proceedings.
By the Court.—The decision of the court of appeals is
reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court.
19
No. 2017AP2006-CR
1