Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Donald J. Harman ( 2019 )

2019 WI 108
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2018AP1263-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Donald J. Harman, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant-Respondent,
v.
Donald J. Harman,
Respondent-Appellant.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST HARMAN
OPINION FILED: December 18, 2019
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the respondent-appellant, there was a brief filed by
Donald J. Harman, La Crosse, WI.
For the complainant-respondent, there was a brief filed by
Matthew F. Anich and Dallenbach Anich & Wickman SC, Ashland.
2019 WI 108
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2018AP1263-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Donald J. Harman, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation, FILED
Complainant-Respondent, DEC 18, 2019
v. Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
Donald J. Harman,
Respondent-Appellant.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license
suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. Attorney Donald J. Harman has appealed a
report and recommendation filed by Referee Allan E. Beatty,
concluding that Attorney Harman committed three counts of
professional misconduct and recommending that his license to
practice law in Wisconsin be suspended for six months. Rather
than challenging the referee's findings of fact or conclusions of
law, Attorney Harman argues on appeal that the referee should have
recused himself. Attorney Harman did not request a substitution
of the referee pursuant to SCR 22.13(4). When he subsequently
No. 2018AP1263-D
raised the issue of the referee's participation, he refused to
participate in a scheduled telephone conference at which the
recusal issue would have been addressed. Based on these facts, we
find that Attorney Harman waived his objection to the referee's
participation in this matter.
¶2 Upon careful review of this matter, we uphold the
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law, and we agree
that a six-month suspension of Attorney Harman's Wisconsin law
license is an appropriate sanction for the misconduct at issue.
We further agree with the referee that, as a condition of the
reinstatement of his license, Attorney Harmon should be required
to satisfy a judgment entered against him. We also find it
appropriate to follow our usual custom of imposing the full costs
of this proceeding, which are $7,662.28 as of May 13, 2019, on
Attorney Harman.
¶3 Attorney Harman was admitted to practice law in
Wisconsin in 1960. He has been disciplined on four prior
occasions. In 1987 he was publicly reprimanded for having charged
one client an excessive fee and for failing to turn over another
client's files upon termination of representation, notwithstanding
a court order to do so. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Harman, 137 Wis. 2d 148, 403 N.W.2d 459 (1987). In 1989 he
received a consensual public reprimand for having acted in the
presence of a conflict of interest, failing to maintain complete
trust account records and render proper accounting of funds held
in trust, and failing to cooperate. Public Reprimand of Donald J.
Harman, April 26, 1989. In 1998 he received another public
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reprimand for failing to act promptly in his client's matter and
failing to notify the client of a significant procedural
development. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Harman, 221
Wis. 2d 238, 584 N.W.2d 537 (1998). In 2001, Attorney Harman's
license was suspended for six months for eight counts of misconduct
that included trust account violations, dishonesty, presence of a
conflict of interest without obtaining written consent, failing to
keep client confidences, knowingly disobeying the rules of a
tribunal, and on two separate occasions using information obtained
during the representation of a former client to that former
client's disadvantage. In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Harman, 2001 WI 71, 244 Wis. 2d 438, 628 N.W.2d 351 (2001).
¶4 On July 6, 2018, the Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR)
filed a complaint alleging three counts of misconduct with respect
to Attorney Harman's representation of W.Z. in a divorce proceeding
in LaCrosse County. Attorney Harman represented W.Z. from February
11, 2016 until April 3, 2017. He did not charge W.Z. for his
representation. The petitioner in the divorce action, R.Z., was
represented by Attorney Rochelle Jones of Legal Action of
Wisconsin, Inc.
¶5 On September 11, 2015, a domestic abuse injunction was
entered against W.Z. On February 11, 2016, LaCrosse County Family
Court Commissioner (FCC) Elizabeth A. Wright issued a temporary
order in the divorce requiring the parties to file joint federal
and state income tax returns with the tax refunds to be equally
divided after being processed through Attorney Jones' trust
account.
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¶6 On April 20, 2016, with no motion or order to show cause
pending, Attorney Harman sent an unsolicited letter to FCC Wright
asking her to "dismiss the injunction sua sponte and vacate the
order awarding custody of the two children to [R.Z.]." The letter
informed the family court commissioner that Attorney Harman and
his client "are also asking that the police investigate [R.Z.'s]
lies" and said if police were satisfied that R.Z. did lie, she
should be charged with obstruction.
¶7 Attorney Harman's April 20, 2016 letter to FCC Wright
enclosed a "claim of [W.Z.'s]," apparently provided in an attempt
to satisfy the requirements of Wis. Stat. § 893.80. The "claim"
alleged that W.Z. had been damaged through the negligence of an
officer of the LaCrosse Police Department, the office of the
LaCrosse County District Attorney, the office of the Wisconsin
State Public Defender, and Legal Action of Wisconsin, Inc., acting
through Attorney Jones. The claim sought damages of $550,000.
¶8 On April 25, 2016, Attorney Harman sent an additional
unsolicited letter to FCC Wright, with various enclosures,
including medical records of W.Z. and purported "transcripts" of
conversations between W.Z. and his wife. Attorney Harman's letter
stated:
I challenge [R.Z.] or [the assistant district attorney]
or [an attorney with the Office of the State Public
Defender] to show me where in the medical records of
[W.Z.] any opinion of any doctor that [W.Z.] has a mental
illness and/or that a doctor prescribed medication for
his mental illness.
¶9 On April 25, 2016, Attorney Jones sent Attorney Harman
a letter enclosing the Z.'s state income tax refund check in the
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No. 2018AP1263-D
amount of $871, as well as the Z.'s federal income tax refund check
in the amount of $8,803, with a request that Attorney Harman have
his client endorse both checks and return them to Attorney Jones'
office so she could deposit them in her client trust account and
distribute the funds, pursuant to the February 11, 2016 temporary
order in the divorce.
¶10 On May 2, 2016, Attorney Harman sent another unsolicited
letter to FCC Wright to "present information to you about [R.Z.'s]
untruthfulness." Among other things, the letter said, "[R.Z.]
should have her child visits supervised so as to try and insulate
her children from a mother who has no moral compass and whose life
is driven by sex, greed and a desire to dominate others." None of
Attorney Harman's letters to FCC Wright constituted motions for
relief and the letters failed to conform to basic requirements of
Wisconsin civil procedure rules.
¶11 On May 16, 2016, Attorney Harman filed a motion on W.Z.'s
behalf in the divorce action seeking dismissal of the domestic
abuse injunction which had been entered in a separate case. On
June 17, 2016, Attorney Harman sent yet another letter to FCC
Wright along with a purported "transcript" of a conversation
between W.Z. and his daughter with an employee of "The Parenting
Place." The June 17, 2016 letter concluded, "I have reported three
instances of [R.Z.'s] inappropriate behavior. As a result I am
asking the Family Court Commissioner what corrective action she
would recommend be taken with respect to [R.Z.]."
¶12 On June 27, 2016, Attorney Jones filed a notice of motion
and motion for remedial contempt and a supporting affidavit in the
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No. 2018AP1263-D
divorce action relating to W.Z.'s failure to endorse and return
the tax refund checks as required under the terms of the February
11, 2016 temporary order. At the same time, Attorney Jones filed
a response opposing Attorney Harman's motion, request for
dismissal of motion and request for costs. Attorney Jones
requested sanctions against Attorney Harman as well as costs
associated with defending the action.
¶13 On July 6, 2016, Attorney Harman filed a counterclaim
for annulment on W.Z.'s behalf in the Z. divorce. The grounds
asserted for an annulment in the counterclaim were frivolous.
¶14 On August 9, 2016, Attorney Harman sent another letter
to FCC Wright, this time including letters to a clinical therapist,
a nurse practitioner, a generalized response from the therapist,
and a printout defining mental illness.
¶15 On August 18, 2016, FCC Wright issued an order denying
W.Z.'s motion seeking relief from the domestic abuse injunction,
finding the motion unwarranted under the law and frivolous. The
order also denied W.Z.'s motion to dismiss the temporary order
that had been entered on February 11, 2016. The order stated the
family court commissioner did not have authority to enter a
judgment of annulment, and the FCC declined to enter a ruling
regarding W.Z.'s counterclaim for an annulment that had been filed
on July 6, 2016. The order denied W.Z.'s motion requesting the
imposition of sanctions against Attorney Jones, finding the motion
not in accordance with the law and frivolous. The order also found
W.Z. and Attorney Harman in contempt of the February 11, 2016
temporary order relating to the parties' income tax refunds and
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No. 2018AP1263-D
found that W.Z. had willfully withheld the refund checks. The FCC
deferred a ruling as to the amount of R.Z.'s award of fees, costs,
and sanctions pending her attorney filing a petition for fees with
a supporting affidavit.
¶16 Attorney Harman sent a letter dated August 9, 2016 to
FCC Wright saying, "please consider the following factual material
in making your decision about dismissing the Domestic Abuse
Injunction now in force against [W.Z.] that allows one half hour
of visitation with his children one week, and two visits every
other week."
¶17 On August 10, 2016, W.Z. purged the contempt by endorsing
the federal and state income tax refund checks and providing them
to Attorney Jones.
¶18 On August 19, 2016, Attorney Harman filed requests for
de novo hearings in the Z. divorce along with a request for
substitution of LaCrosse County Circuit Court Judge Levine. The
substitution request was untimely and was denied.
¶19 On August 24, 2016, Judge Levine issued an order
dismissing W.Z.'s motions for de novo hearings due to his failure
to appear. The order noted that W.Z.'s de novo motion regarding
the domestic abuse injunction case was untimely. The order also
stated that upon receipt of affidavits in support of an award for
fees, costs, and sanctions, W.Z. would have 10 days to object to
the amount of fees requested by R.Z.'s attorney. Attorney Jones
and her supervisor from Legal Action of Wisconsin filed affidavits
that same day.
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No. 2018AP1263-D
¶20 After sending FCC Wright the April 20, 2016, April 25,
2016, May 2, 2016, June 17, 2016, and August 9, 2016 letters with
voluminous enclosures, Attorney Harman sent Judge Levine a
September 2, 2016 letter alleging that FCC Wright was "precluded
from hearing the Motion to Rescind the Domestic Abuse Injunction
because she was to avoid an impropriety as per SCR 60.3 [sic] when
she knew that respondent had filed a claim against her prior to
the motion hearing."
¶21 In the September 2, 2016 letter, Attorney Harman also
responded to the court's order finding W.Z. and himself in
contempt. The letter stated that Attorney Harman had held the tax
refund checks until FCC Wright denied his motion and that his
client had not participated in making the decision to hold the tax
refund check. Attorney Harman further stated he was never given
written notice of the change of hearing date for the de novo
hearing before Judge Levine.
¶22 After alleging in the September 2, 2016 letter to Judge
Levine that FCC Wright was precluded from acting in the Z. divorce,
on September 7, 2016, Attorney Harman sent FCC Wright a letter
suggesting that W.Z. meet with the child support agency without
R.Z. being present, saying "what can we do to facilitate such a
meeting?"
¶23 On September 6, 2016, Attorney Harman sent a letter with
enclosures, including various pictures and text messages, to
Attorney Jones and FCC Wright claiming that R.Z. was falsely
advertising herself as divorced.
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No. 2018AP1263-D
¶24 A hearing was held before FCC Wright on September 12,
2016 with respect to W.Z.'s request for dismissal of the domestic
abuse injunction; his request to dismiss the temporary order; his
request for a judgment of annulment; and R.Z.'s request for
attorney's fees for having to respond to Attorney Harman's
submissions.
¶25 On September 13, 2016, Judge Levine entered a $4,400
judgment in favor of Legal Action of Wisconsin for having to
respond to Attorney Harman's various motions in the Z. divorce.
¶26 Attorney Harman sent a letter dated September 14, 2016
to FCC Wright commenting on the award of attorney's fees to
Attorney Jones and noting his continued objection to FCC Wright
participating in the proceedings.
¶27 On October 12, 2016, Nunc Pro Tunc September 12, 2016,
FCC Wright issued an order stemming from the September 12, 2016
hearing. The order stated:
The respondent's request for dismissal of the domestic
abuse injunction is frivolous, on grounds that the court
has no authority in the divorce action to dismiss an
injunction issued in a separate matter; the respondent's
request to dismiss the temporary order is frivolous,
because the available remedies were to either file a
request for a de novo hearing or a motion to amend the
temporary order; the respondent's request to the family
court for a judgment of annulment is frivolous because
the family court commissioner has no authority to enter
such a judgment; the respondent's request for sanctions
against the petitioner's attorney is frivolous because
petitioner's pleadings complied with statutory
requirements and the respondent failed to state with any
specificity any impropriety with those pleadings; the
petitioner's attorney had to respond to a 618-page
submission of the respondent containing duplicative
documents, Chinese text, improper transcripts, and
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No. 2018AP1263-D
personal information about the parties irrelevant to the
matter; Attorney Jones correctly filed a motion for
contempt for respondent's failure, until the September
12, 2016 hearing, to comply with the 2015 tax refund
provisions of the February 11, 2016 temporary order
(attributing this to Harman having failed to obtain his
client's endorsement on the refund checks and then
return them to Attorney Jones); [W.Z.] is not personally
responsible for any of the aforesaid actions; and the
petitioner's request for attorneys fees in the amount of
$4,400 is reasonable.
¶28 Attorney Harman was ordered to pay the $4,400 within 60
days. To date, the judgment remains unpaid.
¶29 In May 2017, Attorney Harman sent a letter to Attorney
Jones and included two satisfactions of judgments relating to the
obligations owed by Attorney Harman and W.Z. Attorney Jones
responded that since Attorney Harman was no longer the attorney of
record for W.Z., she could not discuss any issues that pertained
to him. Attorney Jones also informed Attorney Harman that a
satisfaction of judgment as to Attorney Harman's obligation was
not possible since he had not paid anything on the judgment, nor
had he made any arrangements to do so.
¶30 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of
misconduct with respect to Attorney Harman's representation of
W.Z.:
Count One: By seeking relief from and providing evidence
to the family court commissioner in a manner
inconsistent with proper civil procedures and deemed
frivolous by the family court commissioner, Attorney
Harman violated SCR 20:1.1.1
1 SCR 20:1.1 provides: "A lawyer shall provide competent
representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably
necessary for the representation."
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No. 2018AP1263-D
Count Two: By failing until at least the August 10,
2016 hearing2 to comply with the tax refund provisions
of the February 11, 2016 temporary order, Attorney
Harman violated SCR 20:3.4(c).3
Count Three: By failing to comply with the court's order
that he personally pay the $4,400 judgment to Legal
Action of Wisconsin for attorney fees in LaCrosse County
Case 2016FA22, Attorney Harman violated SCR 20:3.4(c).
¶31 The referee was appointed on July 24, 2018. On August
27, 2018, Attorney Harman filed a motion to dismiss the OLR's
complaint along with a supporting affidavit. He filed an answer
and an affirmative defense on August 31, 2018. The answer denied
the three paragraphs of the OLR's complaint stating the counts of
misconduct. The answer did not deny, or even mention, any of the
paragraphs in the complaint setting forth the facts of Attorney
Harman's representation of W.Z. The answer accused FCC Wright of
"impropriety" and alleged that she ignored the civil rights claim
filed against her by W.Z. Attached to the answer was a copy of a
June 5, 2018 letter from the Executive Director of the State of
Wisconsin Judicial Commission to Attorney Harman acknowledging
receipt of Attorney Harman's correspondence to the Judicial
Commission accusing FCC Wright and Judge Levine of misconduct.
2 There is an October 12, 2016 order (Nunc Pro Tunc September
12, 2016) that refers to finding Attorney Harman in contempt until
a September 12, 2016 hearing. However, there is also an August
18, 2016 order indicating that W.Z. purged the contempt by
endorsing and giving the checks to Attorney Jones during an August
10, 2016 hearing.
3 SCR 20:3.4(c) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for an
open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists."
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No. 2018AP1263-D
¶32 Since Attorney Harman's answer did not deny any of the
factual allegations contained in the complaint, the OLR filed a
motion for summary judgment on September 21, 2018. The referee
sent an email to the OLR's counsel and Attorney Harman on September
26, 2018 to set a date for a telephonic scheduling conference.
¶33 On September 26, 2018, although he had not requested a
substitution of the referee within ten days of the referee's
appointment, as required by SCR 22.13(4), Attorney Harman sent the
referee and the OLR's counsel an email saying,
I will ask that you recuse yor self [sic] on the grounds
that OLR primary witness the FCC Wright was a former co-
employee, or a relationship where you were in charge of
the office and the FCC was working for you. The Judicial
Code requires that you abstain from further proceedings.
¶34 The referee sent an email to Attorney Harman and the
OLR's counsel on September 26, 2018, stating that a telephone
scheduling conference would be held at 9:00 a.m. on October 3,
2018. The email stated that the recusal issue would be addressed
during the scheduling conference.
¶35 On October 2, 2018, Attorney Harman sent an email to the
referee and the OLR's counsel saying he would not participate in
the telephone scheduling conference and that, "I think that Ref
Beatty wants to get me to a phine [sic] call sohe [sic] can say I
waived my right to object to his effort to act as Referee."
¶36 The referee responded by sending an October 2, 2018 email
to Attorney Harman and the OLR's counsel saying:
You are required to participate in phone conferences
relating to your disciplinary matter. If you choose not
to participate, then decisions may be made with you in
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No. 2018AP1263-D
default. As I have indicated in previous emails, we
will discuss in tomorrow's phone conference how to
address the issues you have raised. If you do not
participate, those issues may be considered waived.
Further, email is not the proper forum for addressing
the merits of issues in this case. I urge you to
participate in tomorrow's phone conference.
¶37 On October 3, 2018, at 9:00 a.m., as instructed by the
referee, the OLR's counsel initiated a telephone conference call
by first calling Attorney Harman's office. There was no answer at
Attorney Harman's office, so the OLR's counsel left a telephone
message for Attorney Harman. The OLR's counsel then called the
referee to complete the scheduled telephone conference and
reported that he had called Attorney Harman's office but no one
had answered the phone.
¶38 Following Attorney Harman's refusal to participate in
the October 3, 2018 telephone scheduling conference, the referee
signed an order finding that Attorney Harman's choice not to
participate in the telephone scheduling conference represented
egregious conduct on Attorney Harman's part. The referee denied
Attorney Harman's motion to dismiss and granted the OLR's motion
for summary judgment. The referee stated that he would decide the
appropriate sanction based on written submissions from the
parties, to be simultaneously filed by November 1, 2018. The
referee stated if Attorney Harman filed a written request for a
hearing on the issue of sanction within 15 days of the date of the
order, the referee would schedule such a hearing. The referee
stated he did not want to schedule a hearing if Attorney Harman
was not going to show up.
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No. 2018AP1263-D
¶39 On October 4, 2018, Attorney Harman sent an email to the
referee and the OLR's counsel. The subject of the email was "Void
order." The email stated, "a provision of the Judicial Code
prohibits Judges from appearing in cases involving former
employees' naughty naughty Al baby [sic]."
¶40 Attorney Harman did not request a hearing on the issue
of sanction, so no hearing was scheduled. Both sides submitted
written briefs regarding the sanction recommendation.
¶41 The referee issued his report and recommendation on
November 28, 2018. The referee found that the OLR had proved by
clear, satisfactory, and convincing evidence that Attorney Harman
committed each of the violations alleged in the OLR's complaint.
The referee found that a six-month suspension of Attorney Harman's
Wisconsin law license was an appropriate sanction for his
misconduct.
¶42 The referee noted there were multiple aggravating
factors in this case, including the fact that Attorney Harman has
four prior disciplinary proceedings, the most recent one resulting
in a six-month license suspension. The referee noted that some of
the same problems evident in the previous disciplinary proceedings
were also present in this one. For example, the referee noted
that in its 2001 decision this court agreed with the referee's
observation that Attorney Harman's pattern of misconduct
demonstrated a disregard of the legal system and showed his
willingness to ignore established procedures for dispute
resolution in favor of his perceived personal expediency.
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No. 2018AP1263-D
¶43 The referee said Attorney Harman has continued to
demonstrate a disregard for and a lack of understanding of the
rules of civil procedure and the rules of disciplinary proceedings.
The referee said Attorney Harman persists in engaging in
"litigation by correspondence" and rather than filing motions and
briefs and making arguments, he instead sends letters. The referee
noted that in the Z. divorce, Attorney Harman sent FCC Wright eight
letters between April 20, 2016 and September 14, 2016. The referee
said the correspondence demonstrates Attorney Harman's inability
to accept the finality of judicial officers' decisions as he kept
trying to reargue what had previously been decided. The referee
noted that Attorney Harman's one motion seeking to obtain a de
novo review was dismissed due to his non-appearance, and the
referee also noted the judge further found that the motion was
untimely.
¶44 The referee said despite the filings in the Z. case being
in the form of correspondence rather than motions, FCC Wright
addressed them as motions and found four of them to be frivolous.
The referee said the one motion Attorney Harman did file, to
dismiss the domestic abuse injunction, was incorrectly filed in
the divorce action rather than in the separate injunction case.
¶45 The referee said Attorney Harman showed the same pattern
of litigation by correspondence in this disciplinary proceeding,
litigating by email rather than by motion. The referee commented
that having been the respondent in four prior disciplinary
proceedings, Attorney Harman should be especially knowledgeable
about the rules.
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No. 2018AP1263-D
¶46 The referee found another aggravating factor in the case
to be the potential harm to W.Z. when Attorney Harman withheld the
income tax refund checks from W.Z., exposing his client to the
possibility of a finding of contempt. Further, the referee found
it particularly troubling that when Attorney Harman does not like
a judicial officer's decisions, or fears what the decisions could
be, he attacks the judicial officer. The referee noted that in
the 2001 disciplinary proceeding Attorney Harman alleged that the
referee had a conflict of interest and asked her to recuse herself.
The referee said in the Z. case, Attorney Harman tried to get the
family court commissioner removed, and in this disciplinary
proceeding, Attorney Harman asked the referee to recuse himself
and then refused to participate in a scheduling conference when
the recusal did not automatically occur.
¶47 The referee said Attorney Harman has not demonstrated
acceptance of responsibility, nor has he demonstrated an
understanding of the issues. The referee said Attorney Harman's
responses in the disciplinary proceeding have primarily been
attempts to re-litigate the issues in the Z. divorce. The referee
said it does not appear that Attorney Harman is able to move on
from court decisions with which he disagrees. The referee also
said it is clear that Attorney Harman failed to provide W.Z. with
competent representation. The referee said Attorney Harman failed
to demonstrate the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness, and
preparation reasonably necessary for that representation, and he
also demonstrated an inability or unwillingness, or both, to follow
required procedures and to focus on the relevant issues.
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No. 2018AP1263-D
¶48 The referee concluded that a six-month suspension of
Attorney Harman's license to practice law in Wisconsin was an
appropriate sanction. The referee also recommended that, as a
condition to the reinstatement of Attorney Harman's law license,
that he be ordered to satisfy the $4,400 judgment entered against
him in the divorce case, and he be ordered to obtain a neuro-
psychological examination addressing his ability to understand and
conform his conduct to the Rules of Professional Conduct for
Attorneys.
¶49 In his appeal, Attorney Harman argues that the OLR
falsely claimed, in its summary judgment motion, that Attorney
Harman did not deny facts in his answer and affirmative defense,
which then allowed the OLR to take a default judgment against him.
Attorney Harman devotes the bulk of his argument to reiterating
his claim that the referee should have recused himself due to the
fact that for five years both the referee and FCC Wright were
employed at the state public defender's LaCrosse office. Attorney
Harman also continues to argue that FCC Wright should have recused
herself from the Z. divorce proceeding, because he and his client
had accused her of violating W.Z.'s civil rights. He says, "it
appears that FCC Wright has imposed her revenge against both
Harman's client and Harman by not recusing herself and not setting
aside the domestic abuse injunction against Harman's client and at
the same time imposing a judgment of $4,400 for attorney's fees
upon Harman." Attorney Harman accuses the OLR of failing to
disclose exculpatory facts, in violation of Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), which requires a prosecutor to disclose any
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No. 2018AP1263-D
evidence favorable to the accused that goes toward the
creditability of a witness.
¶50 Attorney Harman concludes his brief by saying that,
"OLR's participation in this disciplinary proceeding is
oderiferous [sic]." He says, "if disciplined . . . because of the
antics of the OLR prosecution team, Respondent shall imagine
himself to be like a member of a den of thieves whose members
ousted a fallen member for being honest."
¶51 The OLR responds that Attorney Harman's brief should be
stricken because it fails to comply with the requirements of Wis.
Stat. § 809.19(1). The OLR goes on to argue that Attorney Harman
never moved the referee to recuse himself, nor did he ever move to
disqualify the referee. In addition, the OLR points out that
Attorney Harman refused to participate in the October 3, 2018
telephone scheduling conference at which the referee indicated he
would address the recusal issue. For these reasons, the OLR
asserts that Attorney Harman either waived or forfeited his right
to appeal the recusal issue since this court has held that failure
to preserve issues means they are waived. See, e.g., In re Ambac
Assurance Corp., 2012 WI 22, ¶36, 339 Wis. 2d 48, 810 N.W.2d 450.
¶52 Turning to the merits of Attorney Harman's claim that
the referee should have recused himself, the OLR notes that the
referee disclosed on the record the information he believed the
parties might consider relevant to the question of his recusal,
and the referee noted that he and FCC Wright were both attorneys
in the LaCrosse Office of the State Public Defender before Attorney
Wright became the LaCrosse County Family Court Commissioner and
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No. 2018AP1263-D
before the referee retired from the state public defender's office
in 2015. The OLR notes the referee stated he never held a
supervisory position in the public defender's office and was never
FCC Wright's supervisor.
¶53 The OLR says even if Attorney Harman had participated in
the October 3, 2018 telephone scheduling conference and had filed
or made a motion asking the referee to recuse himself, the referee
was not required to do so since the fact that the referee once
worked in the same office with FCC Wright, who was apparently the
person who filed the grievance against Attorney Harman with the
OLR, is not a fact or circumstance where the referee's own interest
may be perceived to impair his impartiality. In addition, the OLR
says a basic premise of Attorney Harman's contention is apparently
that FCC Wright was the OLR's primary witness. The OLR says in
fact it had no need to call FCC Wright, or anyone else, as a
witness given that Attorney Harman had already admitted all of the
factual allegations in the complaint.
¶54 The OLR says while Attorney Harman argues that he was
denied a due process hearing, the only reason no hearing was held
in this case was that Attorney Harman unilaterally and voluntarily
decided to refuse to participate. The OLR argues there is no
denial of due process when someone who has had timely notice of a
proceeding fails to appear and present evidence. The OLR says
even after Attorney Harman refused to participate in the telephone
scheduling conference, the referee still gave him an opportunity
to request a hearing on the issue of appropriate sanction, but
Attorney Harman declined that opportunity.
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No. 2018AP1263-D
¶55 Turning to the question of the appropriate level of
discipline, the OLR reiterates that this is Attorney Harman's fifth
disciplinary proceeding, and it notes that the referee identified
a pattern of misconduct which would warrant a six-month suspension.
¶56 A referee's findings of fact are affirmed unless clearly
erroneous. Conclusions of law are reviewed de novo. See In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269
Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The court may impose whatever sanction
it sees fit, regardless of the referee's recommendation. See In
re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261
Wis. 2d 45, 660 N.W.2d 686.
¶57 We conclude there has been no showing that any of the
referee's findings of fact are clearly erroneous. Accordingly, we
adopt them. We further agree with the referee's conclusions of
law that Attorney Harman violated the supreme court rules set forth
above.
¶58 Attorney Harman does not challenge the referee's
findings of fact or his conclusions of law. Instead, he argues
that the proceeding was unfair, and even violative of due process,
because the referee refused to recuse himself. As the OLR points
out, SCR 22.13(4) provides that within ten days after notice of
appointment of the referee, either the OLR or the respondent may
file a motion for substitution of the referee, which shall be
granted as a matter of right. Additional motions shall be granted
for good cause. Attorney Harman never invoked his right for
substitution of the referee under SCR 22.13. Instead, he raised
the issue in an email. When the referee informed the parties that
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No. 2018AP1263-D
the recusal issue would be addressed in the course of a telephone
scheduling conference, Attorney Harman announced he would not
participate in the conference. Under the circumstances, we find,
as we did in Attorney Harman's 2001 disciplinary proceeding, that
Attorney Harman waived any objection to the referee's
participation in this matter.
¶59 In addition, we reject Attorney Harman's claim that he
was denied due process in the course of this proceeding. He was
given notice of the telephone scheduling conference and refused to
participate in it. The consequences of his refusal are his alone.
¶60 As to the appropriate level of discipline, we agree with
the referee that a six-month suspension of Attorney Harman's law
license is appropriate. This is Attorney Harman's fifth
disciplinary proceeding. In the 2001 proceeding, which also
resulted in a six-month license suspension, we noted that Attorney
Harman's pattern of conduct demonstrated a disregard of the legal
system. The same holds true here. Attorney Harman's course of
conduct in his representation of W.Z. resulted in Legal Action of
Wisconsin having to incur the time and expense of responding to a
series of frivolous filings. Although Attorney Harman was ordered
to pay $4,400 to Legal Action of Wisconsin within 60 days of
September 12, 2016, that amount remains unpaid. Attorney Harman's
conduct in representing W.Z. was unprofessional, and his continued
attacks on the family court commissioner, the judge, and the
referee in this disciplinary proceeding are also troubling and
demonstrate a lack of respect for the legal system and the judicial
process.
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No. 2018AP1263-D
¶61 Although no two disciplinary proceedings are identical,
we find that In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Mauch, 2010 WI
2, 322 Wis. 2d 79, 777 N.W.2d 637 is somewhat analogous. In Mauch,
as here, the attorney had been disciplined on four separate
occasions. In imposing a six-month suspension, this court agreed
with the referee that in light of Attorney Mauch's apparent
indifference to the seriousness of the proceedings, a suspension
that would require the attorney to petition for reinstatement will
provide assurance that he can be safely recommended to the
profession, the courts, and the public as a person who is fit and
capable to practice law in this state. Mauch, 322 Wis. 2d at 90.
The same rationale applies here, and we agree with the referee
that a six-month license suspension is appropriate. As is our
usual custom, we find it appropriate to assess the full costs of
this proceeding against Attorney Harman.
¶62 Finally, we agree with the referee's recommendation
that, as a condition to the reinstatement of his license to
practice law in Wisconsin, Attorney Harman should be ordered to
satisfy the $4,400 judgment entered against him in the Z. divorce
case. We do not agree with the referee that the reinstatement of
Attorney Harman's license to practice law should be conditioned
upon his obtaining a neuro-psychological examination.
¶63 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Donald J. Harman to
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six months,
effective January 29, 2020.
¶64 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, as a condition of the
reinstatement of his license to practice law in Wisconsin, Donald
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No. 2018AP1263-D
J. Harman shall satisfy the $4,400 judgment entered against him in
the Z. divorce case in LaCrosse County.
¶65 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Donald J. Harman shall comply
with the provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person
whose license to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.
¶66 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date of
this order, Donald J. Harman shall pay to the Office of Lawyer
Regulation the cost of this proceeding, which are $7,662.28 as of
May 13, 2019.
¶67 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all
conditions with this order is required for reinstatement. See
SCR 22.29(4).
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No. 2018AP1263-D
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