State v. Darryl J. Badzinski , 352 Wis. 2d 329 ( 2014 )

2014 WI 6SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2011AP2905-CR
COMPLETE TITLE: State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
v.
Darryl J. Badzinski,
Defendant-Appellant.
REVIEW OF A DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
Reported at 345 Wis. 2d 398, 824 N.W.2d 928(Ct. App. 2012 – Unpublished)
OPINION FILED: January 29, 2014
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT: October 22, 2013
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT: Circuit
COUNTY: Milwaukee
JUDGE: Dennis Cimpl
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
For the plaintiff-respondent-petitioner, the cause was
argued by Jeffrey J. Kassel, assistant attorney general, with
whom on the briefs was J.B. Van Hollen, attorney general.
For the defendant-appellant, there was a brief by Basil M.
Loeb and Schmidlkofer, Toth, & Loeb, LLC, Wauwatosa, and oral
argument by Basil M. Loeb.
2014 WI 6NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2011AP2905-CR
(L.C. No. 2009CF4756)
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
State of Wisconsin,
Plaintiff-Respondent-Petitioner,
FILED
v. JAN 29, 2014
Darryl J. Badzinski, Diane M. Fremgen
Clerk of Supreme Court
Defendant-Appellant.
REVIEW of a decision of the Court of Appeals. Reversed.
¶1 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J. The State of Wisconsin seeks
review of an unpublished decision of the court of appeals that
reversed both a judgment of conviction and a circuit court order
denying post-conviction relief.1
¶2 The defendant, Darryl Badzinski, was charged with
sexually assaulting his niece, A.R.B. At trial, A.R.B.
testified that the assault occurred in the laundry room at a
family gathering. During jury deliberations, the jury asked the
circuit court if it needed to agree on the location of the
1
State v. Badzinski, No. 2011AP2905-CR, unpublished slip
op. (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2012) reversing a judgment and order
of the circuit court for Milwaukee County, Dennis R. Cimpl,
Judge.
No. 2011AP2905-CR
assault. The court responded "no." The court of appeals
determined, however, that this permitted the jury to speculate
beyond the evidence and remanded the case for a new trial.
¶3 The State argues that the court of appeals erred in
reversing the circuit court. It contends that the jury did not
have to unanimously agree on the location because it is not an
essential element of the crime charged. The State further
asserts that the court's response of "no" did not mislead the
jury into speculating beyond the evidence.
¶4 In reply, Badzinski maintains that the circuit court's
response of "no" deprived him of a unanimous verdict. He
further argues that the circuit court's response of "no"
violated his due process rights in that it impermissibly misled
the jury into believing that the victim's credibility was
irrelevant and that it could speculate beyond the evidence.
¶5 We conclude that the circuit court's response of "no"
did not deprive Badzinski of a unanimous verdict. Jury
unanimity is required only on the essential elements of the
crime. Here, the location of the crime was not one of those
elements. Thus, it was not something that the jurors needed to
agree upon unanimously.
¶6 We further conclude that Badzinski failed to show that
the court's response of "no" was ambiguous or reasonably likely
to cause the jury to apply the jury instructions in a manner
which violates due process. Given the evidence presented, the
parties' closing arguments, and the court's other instructions,
the response was unlikely to mislead the jury into believing
2
No. 2011AP2905-CR
that the victim's credibility was irrelevant and that it could
speculate beyond the evidence.
¶7 Accordingly, we reverse the court of appeals.
I
¶8 In 2006, Badzinski's then 15-year-old niece, A.R.B.,
told a sheriff's deputy that she had a history of sexual abuse
but declined to provide any details. Three years later, A.R.B.
revealed to her mother that Badzinski molested her when she was
five or six years old. She said that it happened at a holiday
gathering held at her grandparents' house.
¶9 After A.R.B. and her mother reported the incident to
the police, the State charged Badzinski with first-degree sexual
assault of a child. The complaint and information alleged that
the assault occurred either at Christmas or Easter time between
October 2, 1995, and April 30, 1998. After Badzinski objected,
the State filed an amended information limiting its case to the
six dates between 1995 and 1998 when A.R.B.'s grandparents
hosted Easter and Christmas gatherings.
¶10 In support of the charges, the State had four
witnesses testify at trial: A.R.B., Dr. Liz Ghilardi, Deputy
Steven Schmitt, and A.R.B.'s mother.
¶11 A.R.B. testified that during a Christmas or Easter
gathering, when she was four to six years old, she stumbled upon
Badzinski in the laundry room in her grandparents' basement.
A.R.B. did not recall why she entered the laundry room, but
guessed she may have been playing hide-and-seek. She remembered
that she was looking for a place to hide. She stated that when
3
No. 2011AP2905-CR
she entered, Badzinski was sitting against the freezer
masturbating. Badzinski then closed the door to the room, had
her sit next to him, told her his penis was a toy, and tried to
make her touch it. At one point he took her hand and placed it
on his penis. She did not recall how long the incident lasted
or how it ended.
¶12 Dr. Ghilardi testified as an expert witness on child
sexual abuse victims. When discussing their ability to recall
events, she explained that it is not uncommon for victims to
have trouble remembering peripheral details outside the fact of
the assault itself:
It is quite common they will remember the core details
of the assault itself and what happened to their
bodies or what they were made to do, whatever the case
may be. But they may not be able to remember all of
what we call peripheral details, the things going on
around them, the party, who was there, what they were
wearing, what the perpetrator was wearing, where the
dog was, those kind of things. Those memories may
fall off more quickly for them than the core event,
because that is something that really stood out in
their mind.
Dr. Ghilardi further explained that it was quite common for
child victims to delay reporting the abuse. She also testified
that children who have not disclosed the abuse might manifest
their distress in other ways, such as abusing drugs or alcohol
or engaging in other self-harming behavior like cutting.
¶13 Deputy Schmitt testified that in April 2006 he was
dispatched to the Children's Hospital to do an emergency
detention evaluation of A.R.B., who was 15 years old at the
time. After noticing numerous cuts on her body, he asked her if
4
No. 2011AP2905-CR
she was an abuse or assault victim. A.R.B. responded "yes," but
refused to talk about it. The only detail Deputy Schmitt was
able to get was that the abuser was a male family member.
¶14 Likewise, A.R.B.'s mother testified that she was
unable to get any information about the incident from A.R.B. at
that time. It was not until 2009, after another family
gathering, that A.R.B. told her mother that Badzinski had been
the perpetrator.
¶15 Badzinski had 11 family members testify on his behalf.
Their stories were largely consistent. The family got together
for Christmas and Easter at A.R.B.'s grandparents' house.
Approximately 20 to 25 people would attend. The house was a
one-story ranch home with a finished basement and three bedrooms
upstairs.2 The gatherings mainly took place in the basement.
The laundry room was in the basement and it contained a freezer.
Guests would regularly go to the laundry room to get ice from
the freezer and frosted beer mugs. They would also pass by the
laundry room when going to the bathroom, which was located next
to it. The witnesses agreed that the door to the laundry room
was usually kept open. None of the witnesses saw the assault or
believed it could have occurred in the laundry room.
¶16 Some of the witnesses also indicated that they were
not always in the basement during these gatherings. Some of the
witnesses testified that on Easter, if the weather was nice, the
2
The witnesses used the term "upstairs" to refer to the
first floor.
5
No. 2011AP2905-CR
family would go outside on the deck. Badzinski's sister stated
that the children would play games like hide-and-seek upstairs
during the events. His brother-in-law agreed that there were
other rooms in the house, such as the upstairs bedrooms, where
someone could masturbate unnoticed.
¶17 After the close of evidence, the court read the
instructions to the jury. These included the instruction that
the jury must follow all the jury instructions and "consider
only the evidence received during this trial." The court
informed the jury that the State must prove: "One, that this
defendant had sexual contact with [A.R.B.]. Two, that [A.R.B.]
was under the age of 13 years at the time of alleged sexual
contact." It stated that "[t]he burden of establishing every
fact necessary to constitute guilt is upon the State." It
further instructed "[d]raw your own conclusions from the
evidence and decide upon your verdict according to the evidence,
under the instructions given to you by the court."
¶18 The jury instructions also addressed the issue of
credibility. The court told the jurors that they "are the sole
judges of credibility." It suggested numerous factors that the
jurors could consider in determining credibility, in addition to
"all other facts and circumstances during the trial which tend
to support or discredit testimony." The court concluded that
instruction by stating, "[i]n every day life you determine for
yourselves the reliability of the things people say to you. You
should do the same here."
6
No. 2011AP2905-CR
¶19 After closing arguments the court reminded the jurors
that "it is a violation of the juror's oath . . . [to] rely on
any information outside the evidence." It then indicated that
if the jury had any questions during deliberations, it should
send a note and the court would respond either orally or in
writing.
¶20 During deliberations the jury asked the judge if it
must agree where the assault occurred. With the parties'
consent, the judge responded that the jury must agree that the
assault took place at the address of the gathering.3 The jury
subsequently asked if it needed to agree that the assault
occurred in the laundry room. Over the defendant's objections,
the judge responded, "no."
¶21 The jury found Badzinski guilty. Badzinski filed a
motion for post-conviction relief, arguing that the long delay
in reporting by the victim and the non-precise nature of the
allegations prevented him from being able to properly prove a
defense. He further argued that no rational trier of fact would
have believed the victim and that the real controversy had not
been tried.
¶22 The State responded that the time period of the
alleged assault was sufficiently specific. It further asserted
that the verdict was supported by the evidence, as the jury
3
At oral argument, the State maintained that this initial
response was error, but that the error was harmless. It stated
that the judge "gave a wrong answer, with the consent of both
parties, and the error inured to Mr. Badzinski's benefit."
7
No. 2011AP2905-CR
could have chosen to believe A.R.B. In addition, the State
averred that the real controversy was fully tried because the
jury did not have to agree on the location of the assault, only
that the elements of the offense were met. The State advanced
that a juror may be convinced that the crime occurred while
maintaining a question about a non-essential or peripheral fact.
Further, the jury was not required to believe all of A.R.B.'s
testimony. The circuit court denied Badzinski's motion,
adopting the the arguments in the State's brief.
¶23 On appeal, Badzinski argued that: (1) the amended
information was unconstitutionally vague because it gave six
possible dates over three years on which the allegation could
have occurred, (2) there was insufficient evidence to support
the conviction, (3) the real controversy was not fully tried,
and (4) he was denied his right to an unanimous verdict when the
trial court told the jurors that they did not need to agree on
whether the sexual assault occurred in the laundry room. State
v. Badzinski, No. 2011AP2905-CR, unpublished slip op., ¶8 (Wis.
Ct. App. Nov. 27, 2012).
¶24 Although the judges on the court of appeals were in
agreement on the conclusion that the amended information was
sufficiently clear, they were split on the other arguments
before them. Id., ¶32. Two of the three judges departed from
the lead opinion4 and joined in a "concurring" opinion that
ordered a new trial. Id., ¶37.
4
The court of appeals refers to the opinion written by
Judge Brennan as "the Lead Opinion." Badzinski, No. 2011AP2905-
8
No. 2011AP2905-CR
¶25 The "concurrence" determined that the circuit court's
response to the questions from the deliberating jury permitted
the jury to speculate beyond the evidence:
[t]he only evidence that Badzinski assaulted his
niece, more than a decade before the 2009 trial, was
that the assault happened in a room where, if jurors
believed Badzinski's witnesses, that was not possible
. . . [I]f the jurors believed Badzinski's niece, the
assault did not happen anywhere other than in the
basement laundry room. The trial court, in effect,
told the jury to ignore this, and let the jurors pick
any room in the house.
Id., ¶35 (emphasis in original). It reasoned that a guilty
verdict cannot rest on matters beyond the evidence. Id., ¶36.
Accordingly, the court reversed the circuit court and concluded
it was error to tell the jury that it did not have to agree on
the room where the incident occurred. Id., ¶34.
II
¶26 This case presents two questions for our review.
First, we must determine whether the circuit court's response of
"no" to the jury's question deprived Badzinski of a unanimous
verdict. Whether jury unanimity requires jurors to agree on a
particular fact is a question of law. State v. Giwosky, 109
Wis. 2d 446, 452, 326 N.W.2d 232 (1982). We review questions of
law independently of the determinations rendered by the circuit
court and the court of appeals. State v. West, 2011 WI 83, ¶21,
336 Wis. 2d 578, 800 N.W.2d 929.
CR at ¶33. The "concurring" opinion written by Judge Fine and
joined by Judge Curley is the opinion of the majority.
9
No. 2011AP2905-CR
¶27 Second, we must determine whether the response
violated Badzinski's due process rights by misleading the jurors
into believing that the victim's credibility was irrelevant and
that they could speculate beyond the evidence. Whether a jury
instruction given by the circuit court violates a defendant's
due process rights is a question of law, which this court
reviews independently of the determinations rendered by the
circuit court and the court of appeals. State v. Kuntz, 160
Wis. 2d 722, 735, 467 N.W.2d 531 (1991); State v. Zelenka, 130
Wis. 2d 34, 43, 387 N.W.2d 55 (1986).
III
¶28 We begin our analysis by turning first to the issue
of unanimity. "In criminal cases, the right to a jury trial
implies the right to a unanimous verdict on the ultimate issue
of guilt or innocence." State v. Tulley, 2001 WI App 236, ¶14,
248 Wis. 2d 505, 635 N.W.2d 807. However, "[u]nanimity is
required only with respect to the ultimate issue of the
defendant's guilt or innocence of the crime charged, [it] is not
required with respect to the alternative means or ways in which
the crime can be committed." State v. Holland, 91 Wis. 2d 134,
143, 280 N.W.2d 288 (1979); State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶14,
236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d 833 (quoting Holland, 91 Wis. 2d at
143); Giwosky, 109 Wis. 2d at 453-54 (quoting Holland, 91 Wis.
2d at 143).5
5
Our cases have suggested that where a statute creates one
crime with alternative modes of commission, unanimity may be
required if the alternative modes are conceptually distinct.
State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶22, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613 N.W.2d
10No. 2011AP2905-CR
¶29 The United States Supreme Court illustrated this rule
using a hypothetical where the element to be proven was threat
of force, and the jurors disagreed on whether the defendant used
a knife or a gun to make that threat. Richardson v. United
States, 526 U.S. 813, 817 (1999) (citing McKoy v. North
Carolina, 494 U.S. 433, 449 (1990)). The Court explained "that
disagreement -- a disagreement about means -- would not matter
as long as all 12 jurors unanimously concluded that the
Government had proved the necessary related element, namely that
the defendant had threatened force." Id. As such, it is
ultimately the elements of the crime charged that must be
accepted by a unanimous jury and not the peripheral details.
¶30 The crime charged in this case was sexual assault of a
child. Pursuant to Wis. Stat. § 948.02(1)(e)6, "[w]hoever has
sexual contact with a person who has not attained the age of 13
833; State v. Lomagro, 113 Wis. 2d 582, 592, 355 N.W.2d 583(1983). For example, in Manson v. State, 101 Wis. 2d 412, 304
N.W.2d 729 (1981), this court looked at whether Wis. Stat. §
943.32, which made robbery by force or by threat of force a
crime, created a unanimity problem. It determined that
unanimity was not an issue because force and the threat of force
were conceptually similar. Id. at 429-30. More recently, the
court has reframed the analysis to look at whether a statute's
definition of a crime including multiple modes of commission
represents fundamentally unfair or irrational policy choices.
State v. Norman, 2003 WI 72, ¶¶62-63, 262 Wis. 2d 506, 664
N.W.2d 97.
This is not the type of issue we address in this case.
Here only one mode of commission of the crime is alleged: that
Badzinski placed A.R.B.'s hand on his penis.
6
All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
the 2009-10 version unless otherwise indicated.
11
No. 2011AP2905-CR
years is guilty of a Class B felony." Thus, the elements of the
offense are: (1) that the defendant had sexual contact with
A.R.B. and (2) that A.R.B. was under the age of 13 years at the
time of the alleged sexual contact. Wis JI——Criminal 2102E
(2008). It is these elements that the jury must have agreed
upon unanimously.
¶31 Badzinski argues that the jury could not unanimously
agree that the sexual contact occurred unless there was also
agreement that it occurred in the laundry room. He asserts that
because the only evidence of the crime was A.R.B.'s testimony,
and that A.R.B. testified that the assault occurred in the
laundry room, it is a fact necessary to prove an essential
element of the crime.
¶32 We disagree. The location of the room is not a fact
necessary to prove either of the essential elements in this
case. A.R.B. testified that Badzinski's actions occurred in the
laundry room. The contrary evidence regarding the location of
the assault was relevant to A.R.B.'s credibility. See Kohlhoff
v. State, 85 Wis. 2d 148, 154, 270 N.W.2d 63 (1978). However, a
jury does not need to accept a witness's testimony in its
entirety. State v. Balistreri, 106 Wis. 2d 741, 762, 317 N.W.2d
493 (1982); State v. Kimbrough, 2001 WI App 138, ¶29, 246 Wis.
2d 648, 630 N.W.2d 752. The jury could have believed A.R.B.'s
testimony about the sexual contact itself without believing that
it occurred in the laundry room. Indeed, Dr. Ghilardi testified
that child victims do not always remember the peripheral details
of the assault.
12
No. 2011AP2905-CR
¶33 Furthermore, contrary to Badzinski's assertion, there
was evidence in the record from which the jury could have
concluded that the assault occurred elsewhere in the house.
A.R.B. indicated that the assault occurred when she was playing
hide-and-seek. Badzinski's sister testified that the children
would play games such as hide-and-seek upstairs. His brother-
in-law testified that it would be possible for someone to
masturbate in one of the upstairs bedrooms without anyone
noticing. The jury could have reasonably inferred from this
evidence that the assault occurred somewhere other than in the
laundry room.
¶34 Regardless of whether the assault occurred in the
laundry room or some other room, the exact location was not a
fact necessary to prove that the sexual contact occurred.
Accordingly, we conclude that the circuit court's response of
"no" did not deprive Badzinski of a unanimous jury.
IV
¶35 We turn next to whether the circuit court's statement
to the jury that it did not have to agree that the assault
happened in the laundry room violated Badzinski's due process
rights. We start with the premise that if there is a reasonable
likelihood that the jury applied an instruction in a manner that
violates the constitution, a defendant is entitled to a new
trial. State v. Burris, 2011 WI 32, ¶45, 333 Wis. 2d 87, 797
N.W.2d 430. "A jury is unconstitutionally misled if there is a
reasonable likelihood that the instruction was applied in a
manner that denied the defendant 'a meaningful opportunity for
13
No. 2011AP2905-CR
consideration by the jury of his defense. . . . to the detriment
of a defendant's due process rights.'" Id., ¶50 (quoting State
v. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d 183, 192, 556 N.W.2d 90 (1996)). Such is
the case if the jury believes an instruction precludes the
consideration of constitutionally relevant evidence. Id., ¶50
(citing Boyde v. California, 494 U.S. 370, 380 (1990)).
¶36 Badzinski claims that is what occurred here. He
asserts that by telling the jury it did not have to agree on the
location of the assault, the court impermissibly misled the jury
to believe that it did not have to consider the victim's
credibility. According to Badzinski, the court's instruction
allowed the jury to disregard A.R.B.'s testimony that the
assault occurred in the laundry room. Therefore, he concludes,
the jury was allowed to speculate beyond the evidence,7 denying
him a meaningful opportunity to have the jury consider his
defense that the assault did not happen because it could not
have happened in the laundry room.
¶37 To prevail on an argument that the jury was
unconstitutionally misled in violation of a defendant's due
process rights, a defendant must show: (1) "that the instruction
was ambiguous" and (2) "that there was a reasonable likelihood
that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the
State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond
7
Although Badzinski's brief focused on the speculation
aspect of his argument, at oral argument he spent a substantial
amount of time discussing credibility. To the extent that both
arguments relate to whether the court's instruction deprived him
of due process, we address them together here.
14
No. 2011AP2905-CR
a reasonable doubt." Burris, 333 Wis. 2d 87, ¶48 (quoting
Waddington v. Sarausad, 555 U.S. 179, 190 (2009)).
¶38 In evaluating these factors, we consider the
instruction "in light of the proceedings as a whole, instead of
viewing a single instruction in artificial isolation."
Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 193. For example, in Burris, the court
determined that it was not reasonably likely that a potentially
confusing instruction led the jury to apply it in an
unconstitutional manner. 333 Wis. 2d 87, ¶23. Burris argued
that the judge's instruction regarding "utter disregard" misled
the jury into minimizing the weight of the defendant's post-
shooting behavior. Id., ¶43. The court concluded that Burris
did not prove the instruction led to a misapplication in light
of the "extensive evidence of Burris's after-the-fact conduct
presented at trial, counsel's focus on this evidence in closing
statements, and language in both the pattern and supplemental
jury instructions indicating that it could consider this conduct
in its determination." Id., ¶63. Thus, there was no due
process violation.
¶39 Similarly, in Lohmeier, the court found that a
potentially confusing instruction on contributory negligence did
not lead the jury to believe that it could not consider evidence
of an affirmative defense. Lohmeier, 205 Wis. 2d at 187. In
that case, most of the evidence presented at trial related to
the affirmative defense, as did the defendant's opening and
closing arguments. Id. at 197. The State also addressed the
affirmative defense in its rebuttal and closing statement.
15
No. 2011AP2905-CR
Additionally, the court instructed the jury to consider all of
the instructions as a whole, twice instructing the jury on the
affirmative defense. Id. On this record, the court concluded
that a single instruction did not negate the emphasis on the
evidence throughout the proceedings. Id. Therefore the
instruction did not violate the defendant's due process rights.
Id. at 200.
¶40 Following the examples in Burris and Lohmeier, our
analysis here considers the evidence presented at trial, the
parties' closing statements, the initial jury instructions, the
jury's question, and the court's response. Burris, 333 Wis. 2d
87, ¶51. Looking at the challenged language in light of the
rest of the proceedings, we conclude that Badzinski has not
shown that the instruction was ambiguous, or that it was
reasonably likely to cause the jury to ignore the victim's
credibility and rely on speculation in violation of his due
process rights.
¶41 The State's main evidence in this case was A.R.B.'s
testimony. She testified that during a family gathering at her
grandparents' house Badzinski took her hand and placed it on his
penis. According to A.R.B. this occurred in the laundry room,
which she probably entered while playing hide-and-seek. The
State's expert witness further testified that a child victim
would remember the assault, but not necessarily the peripheral
details.
¶42 Badzinski's defense focused on his assertion that an
assault could not have occurred in the laundry room. Multiple
16
No. 2011AP2905-CR
family members testified on his behalf that the gatherings
mainly took place near the laundry room, that the door was kept
open, and that the family members would regularly go into the
laundry room to get ice and frosted beer mugs.
¶43 The State's closing argument focused on A.R.B.'s
testimony and why the jury should find her credible. It
stressed that the core event was Badzinski placing A.R.B.'s hand
on his penis, and that was not something she was likely to
forget. Badzinski's closing argument also focused on A.R.B.'s
credibility. He sought to undermine it with the fact that
according to his witnesses, the assault could not have occurred
in the laundry room.
¶44 In giving the jury instructions, the court stressed
that the jurors could consider only the evidence presented at
trial. It gave the elements of sexual assault and stated that
it was the State's burden to prove each element beyond a
reasonable doubt. The jury instructions also spoke at length
about credibility and stressed that it was an issue for the
jurors. The court later reiterated that the jury was not to
rely on evidence outside of the record.
¶45 During deliberations, the jury asked if it must agree
where the assault occurred. The court responded that it must
agree that the assault took place at the location of the
gathering. The jury subsequently asked if it must agree that
the assault occurred in the laundry room. The court responded
"no."
17
No. 2011AP2905-CR
¶46 In this context, the circuit court's instructions were
not ambiguous. It told the jury what elements the State needed
to prove, that it could rely only on the evidence, that
credibility was for the jury to decide, and that it did not have
to agree on the room where the assault occurred. The court's
instructions were accurate. As long as the jury followed the
instructions literally, it would be prevented from speculating
beyond the evidence and would not be required to ignore evidence
that may discredit A.R.B.
¶47 Even if the instructions were potentially ambiguous,
considering the proceeding as a whole, it is not reasonably
likely that the jury believed it could not consider the victim's
credibility and could reach conclusions based on speculation.
The focus of the trial was on credibility and the room in which
the assault occurred. Further, the jury instructions informed
the jurors that credibility was an issue for them to decide, and
required them to base their decisions on evidence and not rely
on evidence outside the record. Under the instructions, the
jury was free to consider and weigh all of the evidence
presented at trial, including A.R.B's credibility. It is
unlikely that a single word answer from the court during
deliberations would negate everything that preceded it.
¶48 Contrary to Badzinski's assertions, the jury's guilty
verdict does not show that it speculated beyond the evidence.
Juries are allowed to draw reasonable inferences based on the
evidence. See State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 506, 451
N.W.2d 752 (1990) ("It is the function of the trier of
18
No. 2011AP2905-CR
fact . . . to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to
weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic
facts to ultimate facts."); Johnson v. State, 55 Wis. 2d 144,
147, 197 N.W.2d 760 (1972) ("Reasonable inferences drawn from
the evidence can support a finding of fact.").
¶49 Here, there was evidence from which the jurors could
have inferred that the assault occurred somewhere else in the
house and found Badzinski guilty. A.R.B. testified that the
assault occurred at one of the family gatherings in her
grandparents' house. She indicated that it may have occurred
while she was playing hide-and-seek. There was evidence that
the children played hide-and-seek upstairs at the gathering and
that an individual could have masturbated in one of the upstairs
bedrooms. From this evidence, the jury could infer that the
assault occurred upstairs.
¶50 Because we conclude that the circuit court's response
of "no" to the jury was not ambiguous and was not reasonably
likely to cause the jury to misapply the instruction in an
unconstitutional manner, Badzinski has not met his burden. In
light of the facts of this case, we reverse the court of
appeals' determination that the instruction unconstitutionally
misled the jury.
V
¶51 In sum, we conclude that the circuit court's response
of "no" did not deprive Badzinski of a unanimous verdict. Jury
unanimity is required only on the essential elements of the
crime. Here, the location of the crime was not one of those
19
No. 2011AP2905-CR
elements. Thus, it was not something that the jurors needed to
agree upon unanimously.
¶52 We further conclude that Badzinski failed to show that
the court's response of "no" was ambiguous or reasonably likely
to cause the jury to apply the jury instructions in a manner
which violates due process. Given the evidence presented, the
parties' closing arguments, and the court's other instructions,
the response was unlikely to mislead the jury into believing
that the victim's credibility was irrelevant and that it could
speculate beyond the evidence.
By the Court.–The decision of the court of appeals is
reversed.
20
No. 2011AP2905-CR
1