Office of Lawyer Regulation v. Marchan (In Re Disciplinary Proceedings Against Karene S. Marchan) ( 2018 )

2018 WI 30
SUPREME COURT OF WISCONSIN
CASE NO.: 2016AP2436-D
COMPLETE TITLE: In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Karene S. Marchan, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation,
Complainant,
v.
Karene S. Marchan,
Respondent.
DISCIPLINARY PROCEEDINGS AGAINST MARCHAN
OPINION FILED: April 10, 2018
SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
ORAL ARGUMENT:
SOURCE OF APPEAL:
COURT:
COUNTY:
JUDGE:
JUSTICES:
CONCURRED:
DISSENTED:
NOT PARTICIPATING:
ATTORNEYS:
2018 WI 30
NOTICE
This opinion is subject to further
editing and modification. The final
version will appear in the bound
volume of the official reports.
No. 2016AP2436-D
STATE OF WISCONSIN : IN SUPREME COURT
In the Matter of Disciplinary Proceedings
Against Karene S. Marchan, Attorney at Law:
Office of Lawyer Regulation, FILED
Complainant,
APR 10, 2018
v.
Sheila T. Reiff
Clerk of Supreme Court
Karene S. Marchan,
Respondent.
ATTORNEY disciplinary proceeding. Attorney's license
suspended.
¶1 PER CURIAM. We review a report and recommendation of
Referee James J. Winiarski approving a stipulation filed by the
Office of Lawyer Regulation (OLR) and Attorney Karene S.
Marchan. In the stipulation, Attorney Marchan stipulated to the
facts underlying the eight counts of misconduct alleged in the
OLR's complaint and joined the OLR in jointly recommending a
six-month suspension of her Wisconsin law license. The referee
agreed that a six-month suspension was appropriate.
No. 2016AP2436-D
¶2 Upon careful review of the matter, we uphold the
referee's findings of fact and conclusions of law and agree that
a six-month suspension is an appropriate sanction for Attorney
Marchan's misconduct. We also find it appropriate to impose the
full costs of this proceeding, which are $6,953.07 as of January
19, 2018, on Attorney Marchan. Since Attorney Marchan has
already made restitution to her client, the OLR does not seek
restitution and we do not impose it.
¶3 Attorney Marchan was admitted to practice law in
Wisconsin in 1996. The most recent address furnished by
Attorney Marchan to the State Bar of Wisconsin is in Oak Creek,
Wisconsin. Attorney Marchan has no prior disciplinary history.
¶4 Attorney Marchan's law license was suspended,
effective March 7, 2016, due to her willful failure to cooperate
in the OLR's grievance investigation that formed the basis for
this disciplinary proceeding. Her license has also been
administratively suspended since October 2016 for failure to pay
State Bar dues and failure to file an OLR trust account
certificate.
¶5 On December 13, 2016, the OLR filed a complaint
against Attorney Marchan alleging eight counts of misconduct.
Attorney Marchan did not file an answer to the complaint, and
the OLR moved for default judgment. The referee was appointed
on March 22, 2017. Attorney Marchan did appear at a telephonic
scheduling conference in April 2017, and she subsequently filed
a response and affirmative defenses in May 2017.
2
No. 2016AP2436-D
¶6 On August 24, 2017, the parties filed a stipulation
whereby Attorney Marchan withdrew her response and affirmative
defenses and pled no contest to all eight counts of misconduct
set forth in the OLR's complaint. Attorney Marchan agreed that
the referee could use the allegations of the complaint as an
adequate factual basis in the record for a determination of
misconduct as to each of the eight counts.
¶7 In its complaint, the OLR had sought a nine-month
suspension of Attorney Marchan's law license and had also sought
an order requiring her to pay restitution to her client in the
amount of $76,730.56. The stipulation noted that since the
filing of the OLR's complaint, Attorney Marchan had voluntarily
made full restitution to the client. The OLR deemed Attorney
Marchan's voluntary payment of the full amount as a substantial
mitigating factor in assessing the appropriate level of
discipline. Accordingly, the OLR director modified his sanction
recommendation and sought an order suspending Attorney Marchan's
law license for six months.
¶8 The stipulation averred that it was not the result of
plea bargaining. Attorney Marchan verified that she fully
understood the misconduct allegations to which she stipulated;
fully understood her right to contest the matter; fully
understood the ramifications of her entry into the stipulation;
fully understood that she had the right to consult counsel; and
stated that her entry into the stipulation was made knowingly
and voluntarily. The referee agreed that a six-month suspension
was an appropriate sanction for Attorney Marchan's misconduct.
3
No. 2016AP2436-D
¶9 The misconduct alleged in the OLR's complaint arose
out of Attorney Marchan's representation of S.C. S.C. was
acquainted socially with Attorney Marchan. S.C. hired Attorney
Marchan in July 2014 to substitute as her counsel in a divorce
pending in Milwaukee County circuit court. The divorce was
contentious with allegations of marital waste on both sides, and
it had been pending for two years. Attorney Demetra
Christopoulos represented S.C.'s husband from May 2013 through
the conclusion of the case. The Honorable Marshall B. Murray
was the assigned judge.
¶10 Attorney Marchan did not have a law office, and she
met with S.C. either at S.C.'s home or in parks. Attorney
Marchan was apparently attorney of record in only one other
matter pending in the Wisconsin court system at the time she
represented S.C.
¶11 S.C. believed that she signed a fee agreement
providing that Attorney Marchan would be paid at the conclusion
of the divorce, but S.C. was unable to locate a copy of the
agreement. Invoices prepared by Attorney Marchan charged her
time at $200 per hour.
¶12 At the time Attorney Marchan substituted as counsel
for S.C., S.C.'s prior attorney was holding over $162,000 in
trust from the sale of a farm owned by the parties. Each party
had received half of the proceeds to be held in trust by their
respective counsel until the conclusion of the divorce. S.C.'s
prior attorney transferred the funds she was holding to Attorney
Marchan on July 28, 2014. Attorney Marchan opened a trust
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No. 2016AP2436-D
account at PNC Bank and deposited S.C.'s funds into that
account. No other client funds were deposited in the account
after S.C.'s funds were placed there.
¶13 At a pretrial conference on July 23, 2014, Judge
Murray issued an order setting a contested hearing date of
December 1, 2014. The order also set dates for the completion
of discovery. Judge Murray allowed each of the parties to
remove $12,000 from the funds being held in trust for living
expenses and to pay attorney fees. On July 31, 2014, Attorney
Marchan made two cash withdrawals from the trust account, one in
the amount of $10,000 and one in the amount of $2,000. Attorney
Marchan represented that the $10,000 disbursement went to S.C.
and that the $2,000 disbursement went to Attorney Marchan for
fees.
¶14 On August 5, 2014, Attorney Christopoulos served S.C.,
via Attorney Marchan, with interrogatories. Attorney Marchan
failed to timely respond. On September 23, 2014, Attorney
Christopoulos filed a motion for contempt based on S.C. and
Attorney Marchan's failure to respond to the interrogatories and
to otherwise comply with the scheduling order.
¶15 Judge Murray conducted a contempt hearing on October
29, 2014. Attorney Christopoulos informed Judge Murray she had
received some of the requested information on October 4, 2014,
and that Attorney Marchan had provided some additional materials
the day before the contempt hearing. Attorney Marchan told the
court she had been meeting with S.C. at S.C.'s home about three
days of every week from late afternoon until as late as
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No. 2016AP2436-D
11:00 p.m. in an effort to prepare the information requested by
Attorney Christopoulos.
¶16 Judge Murray declined to find S.C. in contempt and
encouraged the parties to resolve the matter. He warned S.C.
and Attorney Marchan that if they were not prepared to proceed
to trial on the scheduled date and if they did not comply with
his orders, they may lose the opportunity to present evidence.
¶17 S.C. subsequently told the OLR that Attorney Marchan's
visits to her home were not for the purpose of discussing the
divorce but instead were unscheduled social visits initiated by
Attorney Marchan. S.C. told the OLR she did not need Attorney
Marchan to provide her emotional support and that Attorney
Marchan talked about her own marital problems during these
meetings.
¶18 In mid-November 2014, Attorney Marchan provided
Attorney Christopoulos a written proposal to divide the marital
assets. The parties and counsel later met to discuss a
settlement but could not reach an agreement. On November 26,
2014, Attorney Marchan filed a petition to have a guardian ad
litem appointed for S.C. She had not discussed the appointment
of a guardian ad litem with S.C.
¶19 On December 1, 2014, Judge Murray conducted a
contested divorce hearing. He denied Attorney Marchan's
petition for the appointment of a guardian ad litem for S.C.
Attorney Marchan then moved to withdraw as counsel, but Judge
Murray denied that motion as well. The divorce hearing lasted a
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No. 2016AP2436-D
full day but the case was not concluded, and Judge Murray
continued the matter to March 10, 2015.
¶20 Attorney Marchan requested that she be allowed to
disburse an additional $10,000 from the funds she was holding in
trust for payment of her attorney fees. Judge Murray did not
review Attorney Marchan's billing statement but granted the
request and signed an order on December 5, 2014, allowing each
party to withdraw $5,000 from funds being held in their
respective trust accounts for living expenses and an additional
$10,000 for payment of attorney's fees. Attorney Marchan
disbursed $10,000 for her fees from the trust account and also
disbursed $5,000 to S.C.
¶21 Immediately after the December 1, 2014 hearing,
Attorney Marchan provided S.C. a billing statement charging
$34,813.85 in legal fees but told S.C. the amount was
negotiable. This was the first bill Attorney Marchan had
provided to S.C., despite her normal practice of billing clients
on a monthly basis. S.C. told the OLR that if she had been
aware of the amount of fees Attorney Marchan was charging she
would have terminated the representation.
¶22 Between December 1, 2014 and the continued hearing
date of March 10, 2015, Attorney Marchan did not contact S.C. to
prepare for the hearing. S.C. tried to contact Attorney Marchan
via email numerous times but received no response.
¶23 On March 9, 2015, one day prior to the continued
hearing date, Attorney Marchan hand-delivered a letter to Judge
Murray asking that the case be adjourned due to her illness.
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No. 2016AP2436-D
Attorney Marchan charged S.C. for mileage to the court to
deliver the adjournment request. Judge Murray granted the
adjournment request and rescheduled the final divorce hearing
for June 22, 2015.
¶24 On May 15, 2015, Attorney Marchan emailed S.C.
proposing that they meet "to go over a budget for the remainder
of your case." Attorney Marchan acknowledged that their
original agreement called for her to be paid at the conclusion
of her case, but said "as the case has continued so long we need
to set up payment arrangements." At this point, Attorney
Marchan had been representing S.C. for less than one year.
Attorney Marchan said that she was owed over $30,000 by S.C. and
that having such a large account receivable was hurting her
ability to join a good law firm.
¶25 In mid-May 2015, S.C. sent a communication to Attorney
Marchan attempting to terminate her representation due to her
failure to communicate with S.C., failure to respond to S.C.'s
questions, and failure to prepare for the final hearing. S.C.
subsequently emailed Attorney Marchan raising numerous concerns
about the billing and saying they needed to discuss it. No
meeting ever took place.
¶26 On June 12, 2015, Attorney Marchan emailed S.C. saying
she would be filing a motion to withdraw as counsel. On June
15, 2015, Attorney Marchan sent S.C. via email the motion to
withdraw that she had filed, along with two invoices. One
invoice was dated June 12, 2015, indicating that $31,429 was
due. An updated invoice was dated June 15, 2015, adjusting the
8
No. 2016AP2436-D
total amount owed to $35,257.75. The June 15 invoice included
$2,520 in additional charges for "trial preparation" or "file
preparation" that Attorney Marchan claimed to have performed
prior to June 12, 2015, but which did not appear on the June 12
bill. Both invoices also included numerous charges in
connection with Attorney Marchan's withdrawal from the
representation, including researching her ethical obligations
and traveling to the Milwaukee County courthouse to file the
motion to withdraw. The motion to withdraw as counsel that
Attorney Marchan filed with the court requested that Judge
Murray issue an order allowing her to withdraw $35,247.751 from
S.C.'s funds being held in trust.
¶27 Attorney Marchan appeared for the June 22, 2015 final
divorce hearing. Judge Murray met with Attorney Marchan and
Attorney Christopoulos in chambers about Attorney Marchan's
motion to withdraw. S.C. was late getting to court for the
hearing and was not present for Judge Murray's consideration of
the motion to withdraw. Judge Murray allowed Attorney Marchan
to make a statement on the record. Attorney Marchan said:
. . . in my motion, I asked for payment of my attorney
fees at that point. It is my understanding we have
come to an agreement with opposing counsel that I
would be paid $20,000 right now out of the funds in my
firm's trust account and the remainder of that would
be decided, depending upon outcome of the case and I
also discussed with you under the terms of my retainer
1
There is no indication in the record why the amount stated
in Attorney Marchan's court filing was $10 less than the amount
stated in the June 15, 2015 invoice she sent to S.C.
9
No. 2016AP2436-D
payment agreement, I will be, we will go to either the
binding arbitration through the State Bar of Wisconsin
or the Milwaukee Bar Association for the remaining
issues.
¶28 Judge Murray signed an order allowing Attorney Marchan
to withdraw and reduced the amount to be paid to Attorney
Marchan to $20,000. Attorney Marchan then had an exchange with
Judge Murray about the funds she was still holding in trust and
Judge Murray directed that the funds be transferred to Attorney
Christopoulos.
¶29 Attorney Marchan never submitted the fee dispute for
any remaining claimed amount to either the State Bar of
Wisconsin Fee Arbitration Program or the Milwaukee Bar
Association's Committee on Resolution of Fee Disputes.
¶30 Once S.C. arrived for the divorce hearing, Judge
Murray reconvened the case and took testimony. Since Attorney
Marchan had just been permitted to withdraw, S.C. was forced to
proceed pro se. She was also forced to proceed without any
exhibits or documentary evidence because Attorney Marchan did
not leave any of S.C.'s trial materials for her use during the
contested hearing.
¶31 At the conclusion of the hearing, Judge Murray ruled
that the remaining property would be divided equally and that
there had not been marital waste by either party. S.C. was
awarded the marital home, which required that she make an
equalizing payment to her ex-husband. Judge Murray reiterated
that Attorney Marchan would be paid $20,000 for attorney fees
from S.C.'s funds being held in trust. S.C. did not dispute
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No. 2016AP2436-D
that amount because it was her understanding that it would be
the last amount that she would have to pay Attorney Marchan.
The findings of fact, conclusions of law, and judgment of
divorce entered on July 20, 2015, reflected Judge Murray's
ruling that Attorney Marchan would receive $20,000 for attorney
fees from the funds held in trust. The divorce judgment also
directed Attorney Marchan to disburse $38,556.14 to S.C.'s
former husband from the parties' funds Attorney Marchan was
holding in trust. Judge Murray awarded S.C. the remaining funds
held by Attorney Marchan in trust after those two disbursements.
¶32 Following the final hearing, S.C. requested that
Attorney Marchan return her file materials to her. Attorney
Marchan refused to give S.C. her file unless S.C. paid for a
copy that Attorney Marchan could keep for her own records. On
June 22, 2015, Attorney Marchan issued a check payable to
herself in the amount of $20,000 in payment of her fees as
ordered by Judge Murray. On August 15, 2015, Attorney Marchan
issued a check payable to Attorney Christopoulos's trust account
in the amount of $38,556.14. After those disbursements,
$76,730.56 remained from the S.C. funds deposited in Attorney
Marchan's trust account. Despite repeated requests from S.C.,
Attorney Marchan did not disburse the remaining funds.
¶33 In August 2015, S.C. contacted the City of Oak Creek
Police Department to report her fear that Attorney Marchan had
stolen her funds. S.C. filed a grievance against Attorney
Marchan in September 2015. Attorney Marchan requested an
extension of time to respond and said she planned to offer S.C.
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No. 2016AP2436-D
an opportunity to settle the fee dispute. The OLR authorized an
extension of time for Attorney Marchan to respond. Attorney
Marchan never did respond, and the OLR subsequently filed a
motion requesting this court to order Attorney Marchan to show
cause why her law license should not be suspended for willful
failure to cooperate in the OLR's investigation. This court
issued the requested order to show cause. Attorney Marchan
failed to respond to it, and on March 7, 2016, this court issued
an order temporarily suspending Attorney Marchan's license.
¶34 The OLR's complaint alleged that in total, Attorney
Marchan paid herself $32,000 from the funds she held in trust in
connection with S.C.'s divorce. The billing invoices that
Attorney Marchan produced did not support fees in that amount,
and Attorney Marchan failed to produce evidence to substantiate
that she earned those fees or that she was entitled to
additional fees beyond the $20,000 approved by Judge Murray for
Attorney Marchan's representation of S.C. As of the date of
filing of the OLR's complaint, $76,730.56 in S.C.'s funds
remained on deposit in Attorney Marchan's client trust account.
¶35 The OLR's complaint alleged the following counts of
misconduct:
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No. 2016AP2436-D
Count One: By making two cash withdrawals from her
client trust account on July 31, 2014, Attorney
Marchan violated former SCR 20:1.15(e)(4)a.2
Count Two: By failing to take any action to resolve
S.C.'s divorce between December of 2014 and June of
2015, Attorney Marchan violated SCR 20:1.3.3
Count Three: By failing to communicate or consult
with S.C. regarding her case from December of 2014
through June of 2015 despite S.C.'s repeated requests,
Attorney Marchan violated SCR 20:1.4(a)(2)4 and
SCR 20:1.4(a)(3).5
Count Four: By failing to deliver to S.C. funds held
in trust which, per the Judgment of Divorce entered
July 31, [sic]6 2015, S.C. was entitled to receive, and
which funds S.C. repeatedly requested, Attorney
Marchan violated former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1).7
2
Effective July 1, 2016, substantial changes were made to
Supreme Court Rule 20:1.15, the "trust account rule." See S. Ct.
Order 14-07, (issued Apr. 4, 2016, eff. July 1, 2016). Because
the conduct underlying this case arose prior to July 1, 2016,
unless otherwise indicated, all references to the supreme court
rules will be to those in effect prior to July 1, 2016.
Former SCR 20:l.15(e)(4)a provided: "No disbursement of
cash shall be made from a trust account or from a deposit to a
trust account, and no check shall be made payable to 'Cash.'"
3
SCR 20:1.3 provides: "A lawyer shall act with reasonable
diligence and promptness in representing a client."
4
SCR 20:1.4(a)(2) provides: "A lawyer shall reasonably
consult with the client about the means by which the client's
objectives are to be accomplished."
5
SCR 20:1.4(a)(3) provides: "A lawyer shall keep the
client reasonably informed about the status of the matter."
6
The actual date of the Judgment of Divorce was July 20,
2015.
7
Former SCR 20:1.15(d)(1) provided:
(continued)
13
No. 2016AP2436-D
Count Five: By failing to abide by Judge Murray's
order awarding to S.C. the funds remaining in Attorney
Marchan's trust account after the disbursements to
S.C.'s ex-husband and to Attorney Marchan for her
fees, Attorney Marchan violated SCR 20:3.4(c).8
Count Six: By claiming she was entitled to additional
fees, which included charges to the client for
activities that advanced her interests rather than the
client's, charges that were retroactively billed
despite not appearing on earlier invoices, and after
having already received $32,000 for a divorce
representation that lasted less than one year and
nevertheless being unprepared to proceed in that
litigation, Attorney Marchan violated SCR 20:1.5(a).9
Count Seven: By failing upon termination of the
representation to return S.C.'s file materials to her,
Attorney Marchan violated SCR 20:1.16(d).10
Upon receiving funds or other property in which a
client has an interest, or in which the lawyer has
received notice that a 3rd party has an interest
identified by a lien, court order, judgment, or
contract, the lawyer shall promptly notify the client
or 3rd party in writing. Except as stated in this
rule or otherwise permitted by law or by agreement
with the client, the lawyer shall promptly deliver to
the client or 3rd party any funds or other property
that the client or 3rd party is entitled to receive.
8
SCR 20:3.4(c) provides: "A lawyer shall not knowingly
disobey an obligation under the rules of a tribunal, except for
an open refusal based on an assertion that no valid obligation
exists."
9
SCR 20:1.5(a) provides: "A lawyer shall not make an
agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee or an
unreasonable amount for expenses."
10
SCR 20:1.16(d) provides:
Upon termination of representation, a lawyer
shall take steps to the extent reasonably practicable
to protect a client's interests, such as giving
reasonable notice to the client, allowing time for
employment of other counsel, surrendering papers and
(continued)
14
No. 2016AP2436-D
Count Eight: By failing to cooperate with the OLR's
investigation of the S.C. grievance, Attorney Marchan
violated SCR 22.03(2)11 and SCR 22.03(6),12 enforceable
via SCR 20:8.4(h).13
¶36 The referee's report and recommendation found that the
OLR met its burden of proof with respect to the eight counts of
misconduct set forth above. With respect to the appropriate
level of discipline, the referee noted that prior to entering
property to which the client is entitled and refunding
any advance payment of fee or expense that has not
been earned or incurred. The lawyer may retain papers
relating to the client to the extent permitted by
other law.
11
SCR 22.03(2) provides:
Upon commencing an investigation, the director
shall notify the respondent of the matter being
investigated unless in the opinion of the director the
investigation of the matter requires otherwise. The
respondent shall fully and fairly disclose all facts
and circumstances pertaining to the alleged misconduct
within 20 days after being served by ordinary mail
request for a written response. The director may
allow additional time to respond. Following receipt
of the response, the director may conduct further
investigation and may compel the respondent to answer
questions, furnish documents, and present any
information deemed relevant to the investigation.
12
SCR 22.03(6) provides: "In the course of the
investigation, the respondent's wilful failure to provide
relevant information, to answer questions fully, or to furnish
documents and the respondent's misrepresentation in a disclosure
are misconduct, regardless of the merits of the matters asserted
in the grievance."
13
SCR 20:8.4(h) provides: "It is professional misconduct
for a lawyer to fail to cooperate in the investigation of a
grievance filed with the office of lawyer regulation as required
by SCR 21.15(4), SCR 22.001(9)(b), SCR 22.03(2), SCR 22.03(6),
or SCR 22.04(1)."
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No. 2016AP2436-D
into the stipulation, Attorney Marchan had made full payment of
the remaining funds in her trust account to S.C. as ordered by
Judge Murray. Based on that payment, the referee noted the OLR
reduced their request for a suspension of Attorney Marchan's law
license from nine months to six months.
¶37 The referee noted that the OLR argued in its
memorandum in support of a six-month suspension that Attorney
Marchan had essentially abandoned S.C. in the divorce case, and
the OLR cited several cases dealing with the issue of
abandonment in support of the request for a six-month
suspension. Although the referee did not agree that Attorney
Marchan "abandoned" S.C., he nevertheless agreed that a six-
month suspension was appropriate.
¶38 The referee said he could reasonably infer that
Attorney Marchan lacked experience in divorce cases, had a
limited legal practice, and used poor judgment in becoming
involved in a complicated divorce on behalf of someone she knew
socially. The referee said that Attorney Marchan failed to keep
her client advised of substantial charges for legal services and
failed to communicate with her client for long periods of time.
The referee noted Attorney Marchan was also experiencing her own
personal difficulties at the time she was representing S.C.,
which caused the referee concern about Attorney Marchan's
fitness to practice law in a professional manner.
¶39 The referee said he was particularly concerned about
the need to protect the public, the courts, and the legal system
from the repetition of Attorney Marchan's misconduct, and he
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No. 2016AP2436-D
agreed with the OLR that a six-month suspension was appropriate
because it would require Attorney Marchan to petition for the
reinstatement of her license and prove that she was then fit to
practice law. The referee further recommended that Attorney
Marchan be responsible for the full costs of the disciplinary
proceeding.
¶40 This court will adopt a referee's findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous. Conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo. See In re Disciplinary Proceedings Against
Eisenberg, 2004 WI 14, ¶5, 269 Wis. 2d 43, 675 N.W.2d 747. The
court may impose whatever sanction it sees fit, regardless of
the referee's recommendation. See In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Widule, 2003 WI 34, ¶44, 261 Wis. 2d 45, 660
N.W.2d 686.
¶41 We adopt the referee's findings of fact and
conclusions of law that Attorney Marchan violated the supreme
court rules as alleged in the eight counts set forth above. We
further agree with the referee that a six-month suspension of
Attorney Marchan's license to practice law in Wisconsin is an
appropriate level of discipline. Since no two cases are
precisely the same, there is no standard sanction for any
particular misconduct. We note that in In re Disciplinary
Proceedings Against Joset, 2008 WI 41, 309 Wis. 2d 5, 748
N.W.2d 778, an attorney's license was suspended for six months
for ten counts of misconduct involving three clients. The
misconduct included failing to advance the clients' interests,
failing to respond to the clients' requests for information, and
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No. 2016AP2436-D
failing to comply with court orders. In addition, in In re
Disciplinary Proceedings Against Christnot, 2004 WI 120, 275
Wis. 2d 289, 685 N.W.2d 788, an attorney's license was suspended
for six months for failing to keep a client reasonably informed
about the status of a matter, failing to promptly comply with
reasonable requests for information, and failing to cooperate
with the OLR's investigation of the grievance. We find the
misconduct at issue here to be somewhat analogous to that in
Joset and Christnot, and we find a similar suspension to be
appropriate. We also deem it appropriate, as is our usual
custom, to impose the full costs of this disciplinary proceeding
on Attorney Marchan. Since Attorney Marchan has already made
full restitution to S.C., we order no further restitution.
¶42 IT IS ORDERED that the license of Karene S. Marchan to
practice law in Wisconsin is suspended for a period of six
months, effective the date of this order.
¶43 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that within 60 days of the date
of this order, Karene S. Marchan shall pay to the Office of
Lawyer Regulation the costs of this proceeding, which are
$6,953.07.
¶44 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the temporary suspension of
Karene S. Marchan's license to practice law, which was effective
March 7, 2016, due to Karene S. Marchan's willful failure to
cooperate in the Office of Lawyer Regulation's grievance
investigation which gave rise to this disciplinary proceeding,
is hereby lifted.
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No. 2016AP2436-D
¶45 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, to the extent that she has
not already done so, Karene S. Marchan shall comply with the
provisions of SCR 22.26 concerning the duties of a person who is
licensed to practice law in Wisconsin has been suspended.
¶46 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that compliance with all
conditions of this order is required for reinstatement. See
SCR 22.28(3).14
14
In addition to obtaining reinstatement from the
disciplinary suspension imposed by this order, before she is
able to practice law in Wisconsin, Attorney Marchan will also be
required to complete the procedures for reinstatement from the
administrative suspensions currently in effect for failure to
comply with the mandatory CLE reporting requirements, for
failure to pay applicable bar dues and assessments, and for
failure to file a trust account certificate.
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