Richard Teigen v. Wisconsin Elections Commission ( 2022 )


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    2022 WI 64
    SUPREME COURT            OF   WISCONSIN
    CASE NO.:              2022AP91
    COMPLETE TITLE:        Richard Teigen and Richard Thom,
    Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners,
    v.
    Wisconsin Elections Commission,
    Defendant-Co-Appellant,
    Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,
    Intervenor-Defendant-Co-Appellant,
    Disability Rights Wisconsin,
    Wisconsin Faith Voices for Justice and
    League of Women Voters of Wisconsin,
    Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants.
    ON BYPASS FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
    OPINION FILED:         July 8, 2022
    SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
    ORAL ARGUMENT:         April 13, 2022
    SOURCE OF APPEAL:
    COURT:              Circuit
    COUNTY:             Waukesha
    JUDGE:              Michael O. Bohren
    JUSTICES:
    REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of
    the Court with respect to ¶¶4–10, 12–13, 52–63, and 73–85, in
    which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and
    an opinion with respect to ¶¶1–3, 11, 14–51, 64–72, 86, n.29,
    and 87, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.
    ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion. REBECCA GRASSL
    BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J.,
    and ROGGENSACK, J., joined. HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring
    opinion. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
    which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
    NOT PARTICIPATING:
    ATTORNEYS:
    For the defendant-co-appellant, there were briefs filed by
    Steven C. Kilpatrick, assistant attorney general, with whom on
    the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general. There was an
    oral argument by Steven C. Kilpatrick.
    For      the     intervenor-defendant-co-appellant,              there     were
    briefs filed by Charles G. Curtis, Jr., Michelle M. (Umberger)
    Kemp, Will M. Conley, John M. Devaney, Elisabeth C. Frost, and
    Perkins COie, LLP, Madison and Washington, D.C., and Elias Law
    Group   LLP,   Washington,      D.C.    There    was   an    oral    argument      by
    Charles G. Curtis.
    For      the     intervenors-defendants-appellants,              there     were
    briefs filed by Jeffrey A. Mandell, Douglas M. Poland, Rachel E.
    Snyder,     Carly    Gerads,    Scott    B.     Thompson,    Mel     Barnes,    and
    Stafford Rosenbaum LLP, Madison, and Law Forward, Inc., Madison.
    There was an oral argument by Jeffrey A. Mandell.
    For     the     plaintiffs-respondents-petitioners,             there    was    a
    brief filed by Richard M. Esenberg, Brian W. McGrath, Luke N.
    Berg, Katherine D. Spitz,          and Wisconsin Institute for Law &
    Liberty, Milwaukee. There was an oral argument by Richard M.
    Esenberg.
    An    amicus     curiae    brief    was   filed    by   James    R.   Troupis,
    Joseph W. Voiland, and Troupis Law Office, Cross Plains, and
    Veterans Liberty Law, Cedarburg, for Senator Ron Johnson. There
    was an oral argument by James R. Troupis.
    An    amicus     curiae    brief    was   filed    by    James    Bopp,    Jr.,
    Michael D. Dean, and James Madison Center for Free Speech, Terre
    Haute, and First Freedoms Foundation, Brookfield, for True the
    Vote, Inc.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by                     Cameron T. Norris,
    James P. McGlone, Matthew M. Fernholz, and Consovoy McCarthy
    2
    PLLC, Arlington, and Gramer, Multhauf & Hammes, LLP, Racine, for
    Honest Elections Project.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Kurt A. Goehre and
    Conway, Olejniczak & Jerry S.C., Green Bay, for the Republican
    National   Committee,   the   National   Republican   Senatorial
    Committee, and the Republican Party of Wisconsin.
    An amicus curiae brief was filed by Claire Silverman and
    Maria Davis for the League of Wisconsin Municipalities.
    3
    
    2022 WI 64
    NOTICE
    This opinion is subject to further
    editing and modification.   The final
    version will appear in the bound
    volume of the official reports.
    No.   2022AP91
    (L.C. No.   2021CV958)
    STATE OF WISCONSIN                      :            IN SUPREME COURT
    Richard Teigen and Richard Thom,
    Plaintiffs-Respondents-Petitioners,
    v.
    Wisconsin Elections Commission,
    FILED
    Defendant-Co-Appellant,
    JUL 8, 2022
    Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee,
    Sheila T. Reiff
    Intervenor-Defendant-Co-Appellant,            Clerk of Supreme Court
    Disability Rights Wisconsin, Wisconsin Faith
    Voices for Justice and League of Women Voters
    of Wisconsin,
    Intervenors-Defendants-Appellants.
    REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., delivered the majority opinion of
    the Court with respect to ¶¶4–10, 12–13, 52–63, and 73–85, in
    which ZIEGLER, C.J., ROGGENSACK, and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined, and
    an opinion with respect to ¶¶1–3, 11, 14–51, 64–72, 86, n.29,
    and 87, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.
    ROGGENSACK, J., filed a concurring opinion.      REBECCA GRASSL
    BRADLEY, J., filed a concurring opinion, in which ZIEGLER, C.J.,
    and ROGGENSACK, J., joined.    HAGEDORN, J., filed a concurring
    opinion. ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in
    which DALLET and KAROFSKY, JJ., joined.
    No.     2022AP91
    APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the Circuit Court
    for Waukesha County, Michael O. Bohren, Judge.              Affirmed.
    ¶1     REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.             This case concerns two
    documents     created   by    employees     of    the    Wisconsin       Elections
    Commission ("WEC").         These documents authorize municipal clerks
    and local election officials to establish ballot drop boxes.
    According to one of the documents:
    A drop box is a secure, locked structure operated by
    local election officials.    Voters may deposit their
    ballot in a drop box at any time after they receive it
    in the mail up to the time of the last ballot
    collection Election Day.    Ballot drop boxes can be
    staffed or unstaffed, temporary or permanent.
    The other document adds, "[a] family member or another person
    may . . . return the ballot on behalf of the voter," i.e., an
    agent of the voter may place the voter's absentee ballot in a
    drop box.
    ¶2     Two Wisconsin voters filed this case under 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
          (2019–20),1     challenging        the    validity     of     these
    documents.2     They advanced two arguments:            (1) the documents are
    unpromulgated     administrative     rules;       and    (2) under       Wisconsin
    statutes, drop boxes are illegal because a voter must personally
    mail or deliver in person the voter's absentee ballot to the
    1 All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
    the 2019–20 version unless otherwise indicated.
    2 The Wisconsin voters also sought relief under the Uniform
    Declaratory Judgment Act, 
    Wis. Stat. § 806.04
    .       We do not
    address whether relief would be proper had the Wisconsin voters
    sought relief only under § 806.04.
    2
    No.    2022AP91
    municipal clerk, not to an inanimate object.             The Democratic
    Senatorial   Campaign   Committee   ("DSCC")   and    Disability   Rights
    Wisconsin et al. ("DRW") intervened to defend WEC's documents.
    ¶3   The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of
    the Wisconsin voters.3     The court declared the documents were
    administrative rules, which had not been properly promulgated,
    and, among other things, "the use of [ballot] drop boxes, as
    described in the [documents], is not permitted under Wisconsin
    law unless the drop box is staffed by the [municipal] clerk and
    located at the office of the clerk or a properly designated
    alternate site under 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
    ."             The circuit court
    also issued a permanent injunction, requiring WEC to rescind the
    documents and enjoining WEC from issuing further interpretations
    of law in conflict with the court's order.           An appeal followed,
    and we granted the Wisconsin voters' petition to bypass the
    court of appeals.4
    ¶4   We hold the documents are invalid because ballot drop
    boxes are illegal under Wisconsin statutes.          An absentee ballot
    must be returned by mail or the voter must personally deliver it
    3 The Honorable Michael O. Bohren, Waukesha County Circuit
    Court, presided.
    4 "Elections are the foundation of American government and
    their integrity is of such monumental importance that any threat
    to their validity should trigger not only our concern but our
    prompt action."     Trump v. Biden, 
    2020 WI 91
    , ¶152, 
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    , 
    951 N.W.2d 568
     (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J.,
    dissenting) (quoting State ex rel. Zignego v. Wis. Elec. Comm'n,
    2020AP123-W, unpublished order (Wis. June 1, 2020) (Rebecca
    Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting)).
    3
    No.       2022AP91
    to the municipal clerk at the clerk's office or a designated
    alternate    site.      We    do    not    address     whether          the     documents
    constitute     unpromulgated        administrative           rules       because        the
    documents are invalid regardless.
    ¶5      The    circuit   court       declared:      (1)       "an    elector       must
    personally    mail . . . his        or    her   own    absentee          ballot";       and
    (2) only    two    lawful    methods      for   casting      an    absentee         ballot
    pursuant to 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. exist, one of which is
    "for the elector to place the envelope containing the ballot in
    the mail[.]"       The documents do not address whether voters who
    mail an absentee ballot must personally place the ballot into a
    mailbox or if a voter's agent may do so.                     We therefore do not
    decide at this time whether the law permits a voter's agent to
    place an absentee ballot in the mail on the voter's behalf.
    I.    BACKGROUND
    ¶6      In spring 2020, many people wanted to minimize their
    time spent in public spaces due to the COVID-19 pandemic.                               For
    this reason, more voters wanted to vote absentee for the spring
    2020 election than had voted absentee in past elections.                                 In
    response,    WEC     Administrator        Meagan     Wolfe    issued          the    first
    document ("Memo one"), which was directed to municipal clerks
    and other local election officials.                The memo states:             "[Ballot]
    drop boxes can be used for voters to return ballots but clerks
    should ensure they are secure, can be monitored for security
    purposes, and should be regularly emptied."                   It also says, "[a]
    family member or another person may . . . return the [absentee]
    4
    No.     2022AP91
    ballot on behalf of a voter."                         WEC's commissioners never voted
    to adopt this memo.
    ¶7         A    few    months       later,       Administrator         Wolfe       and     the
    assistant administrator issued the second document ("Memo two")
    ahead      of    the       fall    2020    election.           It     encourages         "creative
    solutions"           to     facilitate       the       use     of     ballot     drop      boxes.
    Specifically, Memo two informs municipal clerks that drop boxes
    can be "unstaffed," and states "[a]t a minimum, you should have
    a   drop    box       at    your    primary       municipal         building,    such      as   the
    village         hall."        WEC    commissioners           never     voted    on       Memo   two
    either.
    ¶8         Municipal clerks acted on these memos.                         Administrator
    Wolfe avers she is aware of 528 ballot drop boxes utilized for
    the     fall         2020    election.            By     the     spring      2021        election,
    Administrator             Wolfe    says    municipal         clerks    and     local      election
    officials reported 570 drop boxes, spanning 66 of Wisconsin's 72
    counties.
    ¶9         The Wisconsin voters filed a lawsuit challenging the
    validity of these memos.                    In resolving the suit, the circuit
    court      declared,         "WEC's       Memos    are    administrative           rules       under
    Chapter          227         of      the      Wisconsin              statutes        and         are
    invalid . . . because               they     should       have       been,   but     were       not,
    promulgated as rules."                It also declared:
    WEC's interpretation of state statutes in the Memos is
    inconsistent with state law, to the extent they
    conflict with the following:     (1) an elector must
    personally mail or deliver his or her own absentee
    ballot, except where the law explicitly authorizes an
    agent to act on an elector's behalf, (2) the only
    5
    No.     2022AP91
    lawful methods for casting an absentee ballot pursuant
    to 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. are for the elector to
    place the envelope containing the ballot in the mail
    or for the elector to deliver the ballot in person to
    the municipal clerk, (3) the use of drop boxes, as
    described in the Memos, is not permitted under
    Wisconsin law unless the drop box is staffed by the
    clerk and located at the office of the clerk or a
    properly designated alternate site under 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
    .
    The circuit court permanently enjoined WEC and ordered it to
    "withdraw the Memos and issue a statement to clerks notifying
    them that WEC's interpretation of 
    Wis. Stat. §§ 6.87
     and 6.855
    in the Memos has been declared invalid by this Court[.]"                                    The
    injunction      also     ordered          WEC       not    to     "issue     any      further
    interpretations . . . that                conflict[]            with . . . §§ 6.87          and
    6.855,   as    described       above."          The       defendants      appealed.         The
    Wisconsin     voters     filed       a    petition         to    bypass    the      court   of
    appeals, which we granted.
    II.       STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶10     Two threshold arguments have been raised.                       First, DSCC
    argues the Wisconsin voters lack standing.                               The existence of
    standing      presents     a        question         of     law,     which       we   review
    independently,     although         we     benefit        from     the    circuit     court's
    analysis.      Friends of the Black River Forest v. DNR, 
    2022 WI 52
    ,
    ¶10, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (quoting City of Mayville v.
    DOA, 
    2021 WI 57
    , ¶15, 
    397 Wis. 2d 496
    , 
    960 N.W.2d 416
    ); see also
    T.L.E.-C. v. S.E., 
    2021 WI 56
    , ¶13, 
    397 Wis. 2d 462
    , 
    960 N.W.2d 391
       (citing     State        v.        Stephenson,        
    2020 WI 92
    ,        ¶18,     
    394 Wis. 2d 703
    , 
    951 N.W.2d 819
    ).
    6
    No.     2022AP91
    ¶11    Second,       DRW    argues        Wisconsin      law    bars       this     suit
    because the Wisconsin voters did not first file their complaint
    with WEC, which DRW claims 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
     requires.                                    DRW
    offers two independent bases for this argument:                           (1) sovereign
    immunity and (2) competence.5                  Whether sovereign immunity bars
    this lawsuit is a question of law.                   Aesthetic & Cosmetic Plastic
    Surgery Ctr., LLC v. Wis. Dep't of Trans., 
    2014 WI App 88
    , ¶12,
    
    356 Wis. 2d 197
    , 
    853 N.W.2d 607
     (quoting Canadian Nat'l R.R. v.
    Noel,    
    2007 WI App 179
    ,         ¶5,      
    304 Wis. 2d 218
    ,         222–23,     
    736 N.W.2d 900
    ).       Likewise, whether the circuit court was competent
    to adjudicate this case is a question of law.                       City of Cedarburg
    v. Hansen, 
    2020 WI 11
    , ¶13, 
    390 Wis. 2d 109
    , 
    938 N.W.2d 463
    ,
    modified on reconsideration, 
    2020 WI 45
    , 
    391 Wis. 2d 671
    , 
    943 N.W.2d 544
     (citing City of Eau Claire v. Booth, 
    2016 WI 65
    , ¶6,
    
    370 Wis. 2d 595
    , 
    882 N.W.2d 738
    ).
    ¶12    On the merits, we must interpret Wisconsin statutes to
    determine       whether    the        memos       correctly     describe        the      law.
    Statutory    interpretation           presents       a    question       of    law.       See
    T.L.E.-C.,      
    397 Wis. 2d 462
    ,      ¶13     (citing    Stephenson,          
    394 Wis. 2d 703
    , ¶18).
    ¶13    Lastly,       DRW    raises       a    federal     preemption           argument.
    Preemption presents a question of law.                        Town of Delafield v.
    Cent. Transp. Kriewaldt, 
    2020 WI 61
    , ¶4, 
    392 Wis. 2d 427
    , 944
    5 DRW conflated            these    two       bases,     but   we    resolve        them
    independently.
    7
    No.        2022AP91
    N.W.2d 819 (citing Partenfelder v. Rohde, 
    2014 WI 80
    , ¶25, 
    356 Wis. 2d 492
    , 
    850 N.W.2d 896
    ).
    III.    ANALYSIS
    A.    Threshold Issues
    1.     The Wisconsin Voters Have Standing
    ¶14       DSCC        argues        the    Wisconsin            voters        lack        standing,
    asserting they "have not demonstrated 'a personal stake in the
    outcome of the controversy' separate and apart from the public
    at   large,       nor        have    they    shown         they    have       'suffered          or    [are]
    threatened            with    an     injury       to       an    interest           that    is     legally
    protectable.'"6               We reject this argument because the Wisconsin
    voters do have a "stake in the outcome" and are "affected by the
    issues in controversy."                     Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 
    2020 WI 42
    ,
    ¶12, 
    391 Wis. 2d 497
    , 
    942 N.W.2d 900
    .                                  WEC's memos "interfere[]
    with or impair," or at the very least, "threaten[] to interfere
    with       or    impair,"           the    Wisconsin            voters'       "legal        rights        and
    privileges"——specifically,                       their          rights        and     privileges           as
    registered            voters.         See    
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (1).              For     this
    reason,         the    Wisconsin          voters     have        standing       under       Wisconsin's
    permissive, policy-oriented approach toward standing.
    ¶15       DSCC's        argument          appears          to     be     grounded          in      the
    inaccurate assumption that Wisconsin courts follow federal law
    on standing.            For example, DSCC cites a Fifth Circuit case from
    2021       rejecting           claims        "that         drive-thru           voting       hurt         the
    Quoting Marx v. Morris, 
    2019 WI 34
    , ¶35, 
    386 Wis. 2d 122
    ,
    6
    
    925 N.W.2d 112
     (emphasis added).
    8
    No.     2022AP91
    'integrity' of the election process," in violation of the United
    States     Constitution,      because        the        claims     were     "far      too
    generalized to warrant standing."                  See Hotze v. Hudspeth, 
    16 F.4th 1121
    , 1124 (5th Cir. 2021).
    ¶16    While standing in federal court is constitutionally
    confined,    in    Wisconsin      it    is      limited     only     by    prudential
    considerations.      The United States Constitution extends "[t]he
    judicial    power"   only    to   "cases"         and    "controversies."            U.S.
    Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.             No similar language exists in the
    Wisconsin    Constitution.             See   Wis.        Const.    art.     VII,      § 8
    (creating, as a general rule, "original jurisdiction" in the
    circuit courts over "all matters civil and criminal within this
    state").          "Because     our      state       constitution          lacks       the
    jurisdiction-limiting        language        of    its     federal        counterpart,
    'standing in Wisconsin is not a matter of jurisdiction, but of
    sound judicial policy.'"          Friends of the Black River Forest, __
    Wis. 2d __, ¶17 (quoting McConkey v. Van Hollen, 
    2010 WI 57
    ,
    ¶15, 
    326 Wis. 2d 1
    , 
    783 N.W.2d 855
    ).7
    ¶17    Judicial    policy         favors      hearing        cases    presenting
    "carefully developed and zealously argued" issues.                              McConkey,
    7  Although Justice Brian Hagedorn now criticizes this
    court's well-established consideration of judicial policy in
    determining standing, Justice Hagedorn's Concurrence, ¶160, he
    just joined the majority's expression of the test in Friends of
    the Black River Forest v. DNR, 
    2022 WI 52
    , ¶17, __ Wis. 2d __,
    __ N.W.2d __ (quoting McConkey v. Van Hollen, 
    2010 WI 57
    , ¶15,
    
    326 Wis. 2d 1
    , 
    783 N.W.2d 855
    ).      Perhaps the court should
    reconsider its jurisprudence on standing but no party has asked
    us to do so in this case.
    9
    No.   2022AP91
    
    326 Wis. 2d 1
    , ¶16.                  To ensure a full vetting of the issues, we
    typically require plaintiffs to possess some personal stake in
    the        case:     "the        gist     of     the    requirements           relating       to
    standing . . . is to assure that the party seeking relief has
    alleged a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
    give       rise     to        that    adverseness       necessary        to        sharpen   the
    presentation             of     issues[.]"             Moedern      v.        McGinnis,       
    70 Wis. 2d 1056
    , 1064, 
    236 N.W.2d 240
     (1975).                           This standard is
    quite liberal; even "'a trifling interest' may suffice" provided
    the    asserted          interest       generates      sufficient       adversity.           See
    McConkey,          
    326 Wis. 2d 1
    ,           ¶15    (quoting    Fox         v.     DHSS,   
    112 Wis. 2d 514
    , 524, 
    334 N.W.2d 532
     (1983)).
    ¶18     In resolving standing challenges, Wisconsin courts may
    also consider judicial efficiency.                      
    Id.,
     ¶¶17–18.          The judiciary
    has "inherent power to protect itself against any action that
    would . . . materially impair its efficiency."                           State v. Holmes,
    
    106 Wis. 2d 31
    , 40, 
    315 N.W.2d 703
     (1982) (quoting In re Court
    Room, 
    148 Wis. 109
    , 121, 
    134 N.W. 490
     (1912)).                                As a practical
    matter,       courts          should     not     devote    time     or         resources      to
    adjudicating disputes only to ultimately conclude a party is not
    entitled to any relief.8
    While courts should consider whether relief may be
    8
    granted, they should not turn an issue of standing into a full
    adjudication on the merits.    See Wis. Voters Alliance v. Wis.
    Elec. Comm'n, No. 2020AP1930-OA, unpublished order, at 4 (Wis.
    Dec. 4, 2020) (Roggensack C.J., dissenting) ("We grant petitions
    to exercise our jurisdiction based on whether the legal issues
    presented are of state wide concern, not based on the remedies
    requested." (citation omitted)).
    10
    No.    2022AP91
    ¶19    Against     the    backdrop        of     these        policies,    we    have
    developed a two-prong test for standing to challenge an agency
    action under chapter 227 of the Wisconsin statutes.                         See Friends
    of    the    Black     River    Forest,         __    Wis. 2d __,        ¶18     (quoting
    Wisconsin's Env't Decade, Inc. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Wis.
    (WED), 
    69 Wis. 2d 1
    , 10, 
    230 N.W.2d 243
     (1975)).                          In WED, this
    court   described       the     elements        of    the      inquiry     as    follows:
    "(1) Does the challenged action cause the petitioner injury in
    fact?   and (2) is the interest allegedly injured arguably within
    the   zone   of   interests      to   be    protected          or    regulated    by   the
    statute or constitutional guarantee in question?"                          
    Id.
     (citing
    Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 
    397 U.S. 150
    , 153 (1970)).
    ¶20    Under   the      first   prong,         "injury    in     fact,"    "we   ask
    'whether the petition alleges injuries that are a direct result
    of the agency action.'"           Friends of the Black River Forest, __
    Wis. 2d __, ¶21 (quoting WED, 
    69 Wis. 2d at 13
    ).                            This prong
    presents a low bar.        "[A]n '[i]njury alleged, which is remote in
    time or which will only occur as an end result of a sequence of
    events set in motion by the agency action challenged, can be a
    sufficiently direct result of the agency's decision to serve as
    a basis for standing.'"               
    Id.
     (quoting WED, 
    69 Wis. 2d at 14
    (second modification in the original)).                     Under the second prong,
    "we ask whether 'the injury is to an interest which the law
    recognizes or seeks to regulate or protect.'"                         Id., ¶23 (quoting
    Waste Mgmt. of Wis., Inc. v. DNR, 
    144 Wis. 2d 499
    , 505, 
    424 N.W.2d 685
     (1988)).            Recently, in Friends of the Black River
    11
    No.     2022AP91
    Forest, we recognized "the 'zone of interests' terminology [for
    the    second        prong]   is     untethered      to     the   text    of     Wis.    Stat.
    ch. 227[.]"9          Id., ¶25.       We explained, "determination of whether
    a     statute      protects,       recognizes,       or     regulates       the       asserted
    interest        is     a    purely       statutory     inquiry,       from       which      the
    judicially subjective consideration of the 'zone of interests'
    is properly omitted."              Id.
    ¶21   The       Wisconsin      voters       allege    they    have      suffered      an
    injury in fact to their right to vote.                      See 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (1)
    ("The legislature finds that voting is a constitutional right,
    the vigorous exercise of which should be strongly encouraged.").
    As the Wisconsin voters argue, "voters[] are entitled to have
    the elections in which they participate administered properly
    under the law.             Allowing WEC to administer the 2022 elections in
    a manner other than that required by law causes doubts about the
    fairness of the elections and erodes voter confidence in the
    electoral        process."            Similarly,          the     Republican          National
    Committee et al., an amicus curiae, emphasizes, "[e]lections are
    one    of    the      most     important      features       of     our   Republic,         and
    upholding       the    rules    and      procedures       prescribed      for     elections,
    Friends of the Black River Forest involved a challenge to
    9
    an agency action under 
    Wis. Stat. §§ 227.52
     and 227.53.     With
    respect to standing, the case is analogous to this dispute.
    Many of the cases on which we relied in Friends of the Black
    River Forest discuss standing under chapter 227 of the Wisconsin
    statutes generally.    See Foley-Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove
    Condominium Ass'n, Inc., 
    2011 WI 36
    , ¶¶43–44, 
    333 Wis. 2d 402
    ,
    
    797 N.W.2d 789
     (lead op.) (suggesting the same framework applies
    for "an administrative rule or decision").
    12
    No.   2022AP91
    according to the laws enacted by the Legislature, reinforces the
    sanctity of the rule of law and reassures all Americans of the
    integrity of our elections."              We agree.
    ¶22   If the right to vote is to have any meaning at all,
    elections     must    be    conducted      according     to     law.     Throughout
    history, tyrants have claimed electoral victory via elections
    conducted in violation of governing law.                      For example, Saddam
    Hussein was reportedly elected in 2002 by a unanimous vote of
    all eligible voters in Iraq (11,445,638 people).10                      Examples of
    such corruption are replete in history.                   In the 21st century,
    North Korean leader Kim Jong-un was elected in 2014 with 100% of
    the vote while his father, Kim Jong-il, previously won 99.9% of
    the vote.11       Former President of Cuba, Raul Castro, won 99.4% of
    the vote in 2008 while Syrian                   President Bashar al-Assad was
    elected with 97.6% of the vote in 2007.                       Even if citizens of
    such    nations    are     allowed   to    check    a   box   on   a   ballot,   they
    possess only a hollow right.12              Their rulers derive their power
    from force and fraud, not the people's consent.                    By contrast, in
    Saddam Scores 100% in Leadership Ballot, The Guardian
    10
    (Oct.                          16,                     2002),
    https://www.theguardian.com/world/2002/oct/16/iraq.
    The World of 100% Election Victories, BBC (Mar. 11,
    11
    2014), https://www.bbc.com/news/blogs-magazine-monitor-26527422.
    Justice Hagedorn seems to disagree, indicating the right
    12
    to vote encompasses nothing more than the mere ability to cast a
    ballot.    He fails to recognize that a lawful vote loses its
    operative effect if the election is not conducted in accordance
    with the rule of law.
    13
    No.        2022AP91
    Wisconsin elected officials "deriv[e] their just powers from the
    consent of the governed."          See Wis. Const. art. I, § 1.
    ¶23   The right to vote presupposes the rule of law governs
    elections.    If elections are conducted outside of the law, the
    people have not conferred their consent on the government.                            Such
    elections are unlawful and their results are illegitimate.                            "If
    an election . . . can be procured by a party through artifice or
    corruption, the Government may be the choice of a party for its
    own ends, not of the nation for the national good."                        John Adams,
    Inaugural Address in the City of Philadelphia (Mar. 4, 1797),
    reprinted in Inaugural Addresses of the Presidents of the United
    States at 10 (1989).
    ¶24   The Wisconsin voters' injury in fact is substantially
    more concrete than the "remote" injuries we have recognized as
    sufficient in the past.         Friends of the Black River Forest, __
    Wis. 2d __, ¶21 (quoting WED, 
    69 Wis. 2d at 14
    ).                           The record
    indicates hundreds of ballot drop boxes have been set up in past
    elections, prompted by the memos, and thousands of votes have
    been cast via this unlawful method, thereby directly harming the
    Wisconsin voters.          The illegality of these drop boxes weakens
    the   people's     faith    that    the        election   produced         an    outcome
    reflective of their will.           The Wisconsin voters, and all lawful
    voters,     are    injured     when       the     institution        charged          with
    administering      Wisconsin    elections         does    not    follow         the   law,
    leaving the results in question.
    ¶25   DSCC    misunderstands         the     nature       of   the        Wisconsin
    voters' injury in fact.            It argues the Wisconsin voters cannot
    14
    No.    2022AP91
    show their votes were diluted by unlawful votes.                 It states, "it
    is equally likely that any such [unlawful] voters may vote for
    the same candidates who[m] [the Wisconsin voters] support, which
    would seem to benefit, not harm them."                   The Wisconsin voters'
    injury, however, is more nuanced than DSCC suggests.                          DSCC's
    claim    about   "equal"      likelihood     is    pure     speculation.           In
    contrast, the failure to follow election laws is a fact which
    forces     everyone——even     DSCC——to       question      the   legitimacy        of
    election    results.       Electoral       outcomes      obtained     by    unlawful
    procedures corrupt the institution of voting, degrading the very
    foundation of free government.              Unlawful votes do not dilute
    lawful   votes    so   much   as    they    pollute      them,   which      in   turn
    pollutes the integrity of the results.                See Clark v. Quick, 
    36 N.E.2d 563
    , 566 (Ill. 1941) ("There is nothing in the record
    before us to indicate that any of [the absentee ballots] were
    actually tampered with by any unauthorized person, but it is
    entirely obvious that the opportunity to do so was present.").
    When the level of pollution is high enough, the fog creates
    obscurity, and the institution of voting loses its credibility
    as a method of ensuring the people's continued consent to be
    governed.    See State ex rel. Bell v. Conness, 
    106 Wis. 425
    , 428,
    
    82 N.W. 288
        (1900)   ("He     failed    to   show    that   he    received     a
    majority of the votes cast at the election, but he succeeded in
    showing a condition of affairs that taints the whole proceeding
    and calls for careful consideration.               The purity and integrity
    of elections is a matter of such prime importance, and affects
    so many important interests, that the courts ought never to
    15
    No.       2022AP91
    hesitate, when the opportunity is offered, to test them by the
    strictest legal standards.").                 A man with an obscured vote may
    as well be "a man without a vote," and without the opportunity
    for judicial review, such a man "is without protection; he is
    virtually      helpless."             See   106    Cong.   Rec. 5082,    5117      (1960)
    (statement of Sen. Lyndon B. Johnson).
    ¶26     DSCC quotes this court's statement in McConkey that it
    was    "troubled"      by    "broad         general    voter      standing[.]"         
    326 Wis. 2d 1
    ,      ¶17.        For       context,     that    case    involved    a    voter
    challenge to a process by which the people of Wisconsin adopted
    the following constitutional amendment in 2006:
    Only a marriage between one man and one woman shall be
    valid or recognized as a marriage in this state.     A
    legal status identical or substantially similar to
    that of marriage for unmarried individuals shall not
    be valid or recognized in this state.
    Wis. Const. art. XIII, § 13, superseded by Obergefell v. Hodges,
    
    576 U.S. 644
     (2015).              "McConkey claimed that the two sentences
    of the marriage amendment constituted two amendments, not one,
    and that because voters were not able to vote for or against
    each sentence, the marriage amendment was not validly adopted."
    McConkey, 
    326 Wis. 2d 1
    , ¶2.                 McConkey conceded if he would have
    been able to vote on each individual sentence, he would have
    voted "no" on both.               Id., ¶14.          On this basis, the attorney
    general challenged McConkey's standing, claiming, "he suffered
    no    actual    injury      to    a    legally     protectable      interest."         Id.
    McConkey       maintained         his       "basic     voting . . . rights"           were
    violated.      Id.
    16
    No.    2022AP91
    ¶27    McConkey does not support DSCC's argument.                      While this
    court was "troubled," it nonetheless proceeded to decide the
    case:       "whether      as   a   matter   of     judicial      policy,     or    because
    McConkey has at least a trifling interest in his voting rights,
    we believe the unique              circumstances of this case render the
    merits of McConkey's claim fit for adjudication."                             Id., ¶17.
    The injury in fact McConkey claimed to suffer is analogous to
    the   injury    in     fact     suffered     by    the    Wisconsin     voters;       both
    plaintiffs claim proper voting procedures were not followed.
    ¶28    DSCC    also      argues    "[t]heir     voting       rights    are    in   no
    sense 'diluted' by other voters' reliance on carefully monitored
    secure      [ballot]      drop     boxes    under        local    municipal        clerks'
    jurisdiction,        custody,      and     control."         The     memos,       however,
    purport to authorize unstaffed drop boxes as lawful means of
    returning ballots.             Even if secured and monitored, a drop box
    falls short of the statutorily-recognized security surrounding a
    polling place.         See 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (1) ("[V]oting by absentee
    ballot is a privilege exercised wholly outside the traditional
    safeguards of the polling place.").
    ¶29    The Wisconsin voters satisfy the second standing prong
    as well.       "[T]he law recognizes" and "seeks to . . . protect"
    the Wisconsin voters' right to vote.                     See Friends of the Black
    River    Forest,     __    Wis. 2d __,       ¶23    (quoting       Waste    Mgmt.,       
    144 Wis. 2d at 505
    ).           Wisconsin    Stat.     § 227.40(1)       affords       them
    relief because the memos "interfere[] with or impair[]," or at
    the very least, "threaten[] to interfere with or impair," their
    "legal rights and privileges[.]"
    17
    No.     2022AP91
    ¶30     A    broader     review      of    judicial       policy      supports         our
    application of the two-prong test.                   Like McConkey, this case has
    been    "zealously       argued,"      demonstrating            the    Wisconsin         voters'
    interest       in     their     right       to     vote     is        more       than    merely
    "trifling[.]"           See   
    326 Wis. 2d 1
    ,         ¶18.         We   can    discern      no
    negative       impact    on     "judicial        efficiency"          stemming         from   our
    decision to resolve it.              
    Id.
    ¶31     Lastly,    "as    a    law    development          court,"        we     owe   the
    public an answer to the important questions of law this case
    raises.13       
    Id.
         "The right of voting for representatives is the
    primary right by which other rights are protected."                                      Thomas
    Paine, Dissertation on First Principles of Government (1795),
    reprinted in Thomas Paine:                   Rights of Man, Common Sense and
    Other       Political    Writings      398       (2008).        As    the    United       States
    Supreme Court has recognized, "[n]o right is more precious in a
    free country than that of having a voice in the election of
    those who make laws under which, as good citizens, we must live.
    Other rights, even the most basic, are illusory if the right to
    vote    is    undermined."           Wesberry       v.     Sanders,        
    376 U.S. 1
    ,      17
    (1964).       Unlawfully conducted elections threaten to diminish or
    even eliminate some voices, destabilizing the very foundation of
    "Since the 2020 presidential election, many Wisconsin
    13
    voters have raised serious concerns about the conduct of
    elections because of directives given by the Wisconsin Elections
    Commission (WEC) to the municipal clerks who run the elections.
    We have been petitioned repeatedly to accept cases that address
    very similar concerns."    Kleefisch v. Wis. Elections Comm'n,
    No. 2021AP1976-OA, unpublished order, at 1–2 (Wis. Feb. 4, 2022)
    (Roggensack, J., dissenting).
    18
    No.    2022AP91
    free government.      The Wisconsin voters have standing to ensure
    they retain their electoral voices.           See generally        Trump v.
    Evers, No. 2020AP1971-OA, unpublished order, at 6 (Wis. Dec. 3,
    2020) (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting) ("[T]he integrity
    of every election will be tarnished by the public's mistrust
    until the Wisconsin Supreme Court accepts its responsibility to
    declare what the election laws say.").
    ¶32    Justice   Brian   Hagedorn   disagrees   with   our    standing
    analysis, proffering an alternative basis for standing divined
    from searching the penumbra of 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06.14
                    Although
    § 5.06 appears nowhere in the complaint15 and sets forth specific
    procedures that were never invoked, Justice Hagedorn concludes
    it nevertheless confers standing on the Wisconsin voters.16              It
    can't.
    14   Justice Hagedorn's Concurrence, ¶164.
    15Pointing out that § 5.06 appears nowhere in the complaint
    isn't a "complaint"; it's just a fact. Id., ¶164 n.3.
    16Justice Hagedorn asserts the 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
     standing
    argument is "in their brief[.]"      
    Id.
      He continues, "[they]
    unquestionably" "raise[d]" this argument. 
    Id.
    19
    No.     2022AP91
    ¶33   Wisconsin Stat. § 5.06(1) allows "any elector" to file
    "a written sworn complaint" with WEC if the elector "believes
    that a decision or action" of "an election official" related to
    the   "conduct     of   elections      is    contrary   to    law[.]"        "The
    commission may conduct a hearing on the matter in the manner
    prescribed for treatment of contested cases under ch. 227 if it
    believes    such   action   to    be   appropriate."         § 5.06(1).       The
    Wisconsin voters, however, have not brought a case against any
    local election official but only against WEC—-in circuit court.
    As we explain in greater detail below, it would be nonsensical
    to have WEC adjudicate a claim against itself under 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    (1).
    ¶34   If 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    (1)    is the only source of the
    Wisconsin voters' legal right to sue, their failure to first
    file the complaint with WEC is no minor matter.               Section 5.06(2)
    declares, "[n]o person who is authorized to file a complaint
    The portion of the Wisconsin voters' response brief dealing
    with standing is about two pages.     Those two pages have two
    sentences on 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    :         (1) "
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    recognizes that 'any elector' has an interest in raising
    violations of the election laws"; and (2) "The § 5.06 process
    does not apply here, for reasons explained below, infra Part
    IV.B, but § 5.06 shows that electors have a 'right' and interest
    in elections conducted in accordance with state law."     § 5.06
    "recognizes" or "shows" that the electors have a "right" to
    ensure local election officials comply with the law, but on its
    face the statute simply does not confer a right relevant to the
    claims brought in this case. In contrast, 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (1)
    includes   a   legislative  "find[ing]"    that  "voting  is   a
    constitutional right[.]"      Justice Hagedorn dismisses this
    language as merely an expression of policy, with apparently no
    operative effect. A right that lacks a vehicle for vindication
    is a hollow one.
    20
    No.      2022AP91
    under sub. (1), other than the attorney general or a district
    attorney,     may       commence   an   action    or    proceeding      to       test    the
    validity of any decision, action or failure to act on the part
    of any election official with respect to any matter specified in
    sub. (1) without first filing a complaint under sub. (1), nor
    prior to disposition of the complaint by the commission."                                 No
    one        suggests          the        Wisconsin            voters         are          not
    "person[s] . . . authorized to file a complaint under sub. (1)."
    § 5.06(2).         As    Justice   Hagedorn      acknowledges,        "§     5.06    gives
    [Wisconsin     voters]      a   statutory      right    to    have    local      election
    officials     in    the     area[s]     where    [they]       live[]       comply       with
    election laws."17           That statute says "the elector may file a
    written sworn complaint with the commission requesting that the
    official be required to conform his or her conduct to the law,
    be restrained from taking any action inconsistent with the law
    or be required to correct any action or decision inconsistent
    with the law or any abuse of the discretion vested in him or her
    by law."       § 5.06 (emphasis added).                But § 5.06 says nothing
    about filing a complaint in order to force WEC to correct any
    action it make take or any decision it may make, which are
    inconsistent with the law.               If § 5.06 does not apply to the
    Wisconsin     voters'       complaint    against       WEC,    then    how       could    it
    confer standing?          Justice Hagedorn does not explain.
    ¶35    Justice Hagedorn's cognitively dissonant criticisms of
    our standing analysis apply equally to his own.                            He says our
    17   Justice Hagedorn's Concurrence, ¶164.
    21
    No.      2022AP91
    standing analysis "suggests [we] create[] broad voter standing
    against any election official or WEC by any elector for nearly
    any purported violation of any election law."18                             But Justice
    Hagedorn      articulates      an       indistinguishably        broad          basis    for
    standing, concluding the Wisconsin voters have "a legal right
    protected by 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
     to have local election officials
    in   [their]    area     comply     with    the      law."19     He    complains          our
    standing      analysis is       not      "tether[ed] . . . to              an     on-point
    text[.]"20       But     our   analysis         is   "tethered"       to     
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (1),     which     incontrovertibly            applies     to    the       Wisconsin
    voters, while Justice Hagedorn's analysis is tethered only to a
    concededly inapplicable statute.                 Unlike our standing analysis,
    Justice Hagedorn's penumbra standing is not limited to election
    disputes but logically extends across the Wisconsin statutes.21
    ¶36    Even under the stricter standing test federal courts
    apply,      impairment    of      the    right       to   vote   has       been     deemed
    sufficient     to   confer     standing.          While   so-called        "generalized
    grievances" "do not normally constitute a particularized injury
    necessary to establish standing," "the fact that 'a harm is
    18   Id., ¶167.
    19   Id., ¶165.
    20   Id., ¶167.
    Justice Hagedorn insists his "standing analysis applies
    21
    only to challenges under 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (1) to WEC rules and
    guidance documents when that guidance threatens to cause local
    election officials to behave illegally[.]" 
    Id.,
     ¶167 n.8. His
    reasoning   logically   extends  further,   notwithstanding  his
    artificial narrowing in a footnote.
    22
    No.     2022AP91
    widely    shared     does    not       necessarily         render    it    a    generalized
    grievance.'"        Donald J. Trump for President, Inc. v. Bullock,
    
    491 F. Supp. 3d 814
    ,           828    (D.    Mont.       2020)    (quoting         Novak   v.
    United States, 
    795 F.3d 1012
    , 1018 (9th Cir. 2015)).                             "In fact,
    the [United States] Supreme Court has been clear that 'where a
    large number of voters suffer interference with voting rights'
    the   interests      related      to    that       are     sufficiently        concrete      to
    obtain the standing necessary to seek redress in an Article III
    Court."     
    Id.
     (quoting F.E.C. v. Akins, 
    524 U.S. 11
    , 24 (1998));
    see also        
    id.
     ("Because the alleged injuries to the members'
    voting    rights     at     issue      in     this    case    could       conceivably        be
    asserted     by    any     Montanan         does     not    eradicate      the        standing
    necessary to assert these claims.                    On the contrary, the Supreme
    Court     has     repeatedly      enumerated         the     principle         that     claims
    alleging a violation of the right to vote can constitute an
    injury in fact despite the widespread reach of the conduct at
    issue.").         Wisconsin voters have alleged an injury to their
    right to vote sufficient to confer standing.
    2.    The Law Does Not Require Wisconsin Voters to File Their
    Complaint Against WEC with WEC
    ¶37    Article IV, Section 27 of the Wisconsin Constitution
    provides:        "The legislature shall direct by law in what manner
    and in what courts suits may be brought against the state."
    "From this provision the rule developed that the state cannot be
    sued without its consent."              Lister v. Bd. of Regents of Univ. of
    Wis. Sys., 
    72 Wis. 2d 282
    , 291, 
    240 N.W.2d 610
     (1976).                                    DRW,
    quoting     part    of    this    sentence         from    Lister,    argues         sovereign
    23
    No.     2022AP91
    immunity bars this lawsuit because the Wisconsin voters did not
    first file their complaint with WEC, which DRW asserts is a
    jurisdictional prerequisite under 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    (1).
    ¶38     Importantly,     the     only    party       that    could         claim   to
    represent    the    sovereign   in    this       case——WEC——has     abandoned          any
    sovereign    immunity     argument.         In    its    answer,    WEC        asserted,
    "[s]ome     of   [the    Wisconsin     voters']         claims     are    barred       by
    sovereign immunity," but it did not say which ones.                      WEC did not
    discuss sovereign immunity at all in its briefing.                        When asked
    for WEC's position on this issue during oral argument before
    this court, WEC's attorney responded:
    Counsel: Well, to be consistent we did not take a
    position on it one way or the other in
    briefing, and I'm not going to take a position
    on behalf of the Commission in oral argument
    either, so it's a "no position" type of
    response, for standing and for sovereign
    immunity, because although we raised it, we're
    content with the other parties pushing that
    forward.   We chose for strategic purposes to
    focus our briefs on other things.
    Court:         That leaves me perplexed.   Do you agree with
    their   standing    and   sovereign    immunity
    arguments, even though you are not advancing
    them?   I don't want to necessarily pin you
    down, but I do want clarity.      Revisit that
    answer, if you will.
    Counsel: I understand you don't like the non-answer
    that I provided.    But the position of the
    Commission is, yes, we raised them in the
    answer, but we chose not to put them forward
    in our brief. We did not choose to adopt by
    incorporation or by reference those arguments;
    we did not say we are in disagreement with
    them either.
    24
    No.     2022AP91
    DRW's argument fails because a private party cannot raise and
    maintain an affirmative defense that belongs to the State.
    ¶39    "Sovereign immunity is a defense which can be raised
    by the state alone and does not go to the merits or primary
    object of the action.              For this reason, sovereign immunity is a
    defense to personal jurisdiction which can be waived."                             City of
    Kenosha      v.    State,    
    35 Wis. 2d 317
    ,           328,   
    151 N.W.2d 36
        (1967)
    (emphasis         added);    Cords        v.    State,      
    62 Wis. 2d 42
    ,      46,    
    214 Wis. 2d 405
     (1974) ("The general rule in Wisconsin . . . is that
    sovereign immunity is a defense to the personal jurisdiction of
    the    court       which     can     be        waived.        Objection    to     personal
    jurisdiction must be raised specifically or be deemed waived.
    It    is   not     sufficient      to      make      a    general   demurrer      that   the
    complaint does not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause
    of action.").
    ¶40    DRW does not address City of Kenosha or Cords, instead
    claiming in conclusory fashion, "because sovereign immunity is a
    jurisdictional bar to the court's jurisdiction, it is properly
    raised at any juncture, and, once raised, must be adjudicated
    before the merits."            The two cases DRW cites in support of this
    proposition        have     nothing     to      do   with    sovereign    immunity       (the
    phrase does not even appear in the opinions), and the cases are
    actually       about       subject        matter         jurisdiction,    not     personal
    jurisdiction.
    ¶41    The first case DRW cites, Bartus v. DHSS, states:
    Jurisdictional challenges may be                          raised at any
    juncture during a court proceeding.                        In the instant
    25
    No.     2022AP91
    case, the circuit court was reviewing the propriety of
    a Department decision to revoke a probationer's term
    for   failure    to   pay   restitution.       Bartus's
    jurisdictional challenge to the 1988 sentence which
    imposed the restitution, was therefore central to the
    subject matter jurisdiction of the court on review.
    
    176 Wis. 2d 1063
    ,          1082–83,       
    501 N.W.2d 419
            (1993)       (emphasis
    added).        Bartus merely recites a well-known rule, repeated in
    many cases, that arguments against subject matter jurisdiction
    cannot    be    forfeited        or    waived.      See      City   of   Cedarburg,      
    390 Wis. 2d 109
    , ¶49 (citing Booth, 
    370 Wis. 2d 595
    , ¶1); see also
    United States v. Cotton, 
    535 U.S. 625
    , 630 (2002) ("[S]ubject-
    matter jurisdiction, because it involves a court's power to hear
    a   case,   can      never    be      forfeited    or    waived.").        Equally     well
    established       is   the     rule      that     personal      jurisdiction       can   be
    forfeited or waived.             Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 802.06(8)(a).
    ¶42      The only other case DRW cites in support of its claim
    that sovereign immunity can raised at any juncture similarly
    demonstrates DRW's failure to distinguish between subject matter
    jurisdiction         and     personal      jurisdiction.            See    Harrigan      v.
    Gilchrist, 
    121 Wis. 127
    , 224, 
    99 N.W. 909
     (1904) ("A challenge
    to the jurisdiction of the trial court of the subject matter of
    the action is proper at any time[.]"                    (Emphasis added)).
    ¶43      DRW   is    not     a    state     agency,      so   it    cannot    assert
    sovereign immunity.              Although WEC asserted in its answer that
    sovereign       immunity      barred      "some"        of   the    Wisconsin      voters'
    claims, it did not say which ones.                       No reasonable judge could
    view WEC's briefing and answers at oral argument as maintaining
    a sovereign immunity defense.                   WEC's attorney even said at oral
    26
    No.     2022AP91
    argument that WEC takes "no position" on the matter.                            Although
    DRW    argued      sovereign    immunity    in    its      brief,   WEC's        attorney
    demurred at oral argument:                "We did not choose to adopt by
    incorporation or by reference those arguments."                     Such statements
    conflict      with    any    claimed    refusal     to     submit    to    a      court's
    jurisdiction.           We     conclude     WEC    knowingly        abandoned,         and
    therefore waived, sovereign immunity.
    ¶44    At     best,   DRW's     objection      implicates       the        court's
    competency,          which     lacks      any     constitutional           importance.
    "[S]ubject matter jurisdiction and competence are related but
    distinct concepts."            City of Cedarburg, 
    390 Wis. 2d 109
    , ¶49.
    "Subject      matter     jurisdiction . . . refers            'to    the     power       of
    a . . . court to decide certain types of actions.'"                        Booth, 
    370 Wis. 2d 595
    , ¶7 (quoting State v. Smith, 
    2005 WI 104
    , ¶18, 
    283 Wis. 2d 57
    , 
    699 N.W.2d 508
    ).               "In other words, subject matter
    jurisdiction is about the type or category of case brought."
    City    of    Cedarburg,        
    390 Wis. 2d 109
    ,        ¶49.       In        contrast,
    "[c]ompetence . . . is about a court's ability to exercise its
    jurisdiction in an individual case."                 
    Id.
         With few exceptions,
    "a circuit court is never without subject matter jurisdiction;"
    however, "[a] circuit court's ability to exercise its subject
    matter jurisdiction in individual cases . . . may be affected by
    noncompliance        with    statutory     requirements       pertaining          to     the
    invocation of that jurisdiction."                 See Booth, 
    370 Wis. 2d 595
    ,
    ¶12 (quoting Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut, 
    2004 WI 79
    , ¶¶1–
    2,    
    273 Wis. 2d 76
    ,       
    681 N.W.2d 190
    ).         Noncompliance          with    a
    required statutory procedure can trigger a competence question,
    27
    No.     2022AP91
    but   a   lack    of    competence      is    not    jurisdictional.           City    of
    Cedarburg, 
    390 Wis. 2d 109
    , ¶47 (citing Mikrut, 
    273 Wis. 2d 76
    ,
    ¶¶12, 34).
    ¶45   DRW's argument is underdeveloped, perhaps because it
    spent     large   swaths       of     its     briefing     trying   to     create       a
    constitutional         issue   when   one     does   not   exist.    We        need   not
    address underdeveloped arguments.                 Papa v. Wis. Dep't of Health
    Servs., 
    2020 WI 66
    , ¶42 n.15, 
    393 Wis. 2d 1
    , 
    946 N.W.2d 17
    .                            We
    nonetheless choose to resolve this one because of the issue's
    importance in the context of election law.
    ¶46   DRW cites 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    , which states, in relevant
    part:
    (1) Whenever any elector of a jurisdiction or district
    served by an election official believes that a
    decision or action of the official or the failure
    of the official to act with respect to any matter
    concerning . . . election administration or conduct
    of elections is contrary to law, or the official
    has abused the discretion vested in him or her by
    law with respect to any such matter, the elector
    may file a written sworn complaint with the
    commission requesting that the official be required
    to conform his or her conduct to the law, be
    restrained from taking any action inconsistent with
    the law or be required to correct any action or
    decision inconsistent with the law or any abuse of
    the discretion vested in him or her by law.
    (2) No person who is authorized to file a complaint
    under sub. (1), other than the attorney general or
    a district attorney, may commence an action or
    proceeding to test the validity of any decision,
    action or failure to act on the part of any
    election official with respect to any matter
    specified in sub. (1) without first filing a
    complaint under sub. (1), nor prior to disposition
    of the complaint by the commission. . . .
    28
    No.     2022AP91
    According to DRW, the law bars the Wisconsin voters' complaint
    against       WEC   because      they   did      not   first      file    it     with     WEC.
    Section 5.06, read in context, does not mean what DRW claims.
    See Brey v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 
    2022 WI 7
    , ¶11, 
    400 Wis. 2d 417
    ,        
    970 N.W.2d 1
         (explaining          statutes      are        read   in
    context).
    ¶47     First, 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    (1) applies only to complaints
    against       "election         official[s]."          "Election         officials"          are
    specific "individuals" (not "person[s]")22 who are "charged with
    any duties relating to the conduct of an election."                             
    Wis. Stat. § 5.02
    (4e).         The Wisconsin voters brought this lawsuit against
    WEC, not any individual, alleging WEC's memos do not comport
    with    the    law.       "In    chs.   5   to    10   and   12    [of    the        Wisconsin
    statutes]," the word "commission" is used to refer to WEC.                                
    Wis. Stat. § 5.025
    .        Section 5.06 does not require voters to complain
    to the "commission" when they believe WEC has violated the law——
    only when they believe an "election official" has.                          Intuitively,
    this distinction makes sense:                 "No man is allowed to be a judge
    in his own cause; because his interest will certainly bias his
    judgment,      and,   not       improbably,      corrupt     his    integrity."              The
    Federalist No. 10, at 107 (James Madison) (John C. Hamilton ed.,
    1882); see also The Code of Justinian 3.5.1 (Valens, et al. 378)
    ("[N]o one shall act as judge in his own case, or interpret the
    law for himself, as it would be very unjust to give anyone the
    See 
    Wis. Stat. § 990.01
    (26) ("'Person' includes all
    22
    partnerships, associations and bodies politic or corporate.").
    29
    No.     2022AP91
    right to render a decision in an affair which is his own.").
    DRW's     reliance       on     cases        involving      claims     against       election
    officials——not WEC——is misplaced.                      See Kuechmann v. Sch. Dist.
    of La Crosse, 
    170 Wis. 2d 218
    , 
    487 N.W.2d 639
     (Ct. App. 1992).
    ¶48     Second, the remedies WEC can impose under 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    (6) would be senseless if they were applied by WEC against
    itself.     Is WEC supposed to "order" itself to "conform" its (not
    "his or her") "conduct to the law"?                         § 5.06(1).       Can WEC order
    itself    "restrain[ed]"             or    "require[]"       itself     to   "correct      any
    action or decision" it has taken that is "inconsistent with the
    law"?     Id.        The plain language of § 5.06(6) does not contemplate
    giving      an       election        official    a     chance     to     reconsider        the
    official's           position;       it     contemplates        WEC     issuing       binding
    directives to such officials.
    ¶49     Third, the legislature knows how to write a statute
    accomplishing the work DRW would have 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
     perform.
    See   State      v.     Yakich,       
    2022 WI 8
    ,    ¶24,     
    400 Wis. 2d 549
    ,        
    970 N.W.2d 12
     (explaining plain meaning may be derived by looking at
    differences          between    two       statutes    and    noting     "the   legislature
    knew how to draft [different] language" (quoting Milwaukee J.
    Sentinel        v.     City     of    Milwaukee,       
    2012 WI 65
    ,       ¶¶36–37,      
    341 Wis. 2d 607
    , 
    815 N.W.2d 367
    ) (modification in the original)).
    For   example,         
    Wis. Stat. § 68.09
    (2),       which     governs       municipal
    administrative review, states, "[a] review under this section
    may be made by the officer, employee, agent, agency, committee,
    board, commission or body who made the initial determination."
    No    similar         explicit        language        appears     in     § 5.06.           The
    30
    No.     2022AP91
    commissioners of WEC guard elections; if the legislature wanted
    the guards to guard themselves, it would have drafted § 5.06 to
    mirror § 68.09(2).23
    ¶50     Fourth,      the   Wisconsin         voters       filed       this    case    under
    
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    .                Subsection (1) of that statute states,
    "[a] declaratory judgment may be rendered whether or not the
    plaintiff      has    first       requested         the       agency    to    pass        upon    the
    validity       of    the     rule    or    guidance             document       in    question."
    Although 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
     could be construed to conflict with
    § 227.40(1), such a reading would be erroneous.                               When reasonably
    possible, we read statutes in harmony, and a harmonious reading
    is     quite    reasonable          in    this       case.           See      T.L.E.-C.,          
    397 Wis. 2d 462
    , ¶30 ("The statutory provisions we construe exist in
    harmony."); Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:                                        The
    Interpretation of Legal Texts 180 (2012) ("The provisions of a
    text     should      be     interpreted        in         a    way     that     renders          them
    compatible,         not    contradictory.").                  Accordingly,      we        need    not
    consider DRW's argument that § 5.06 is a more specific statute
    that    trumps      § 227.40.24          See     Milwaukee           Dist.    Council        48   v.
    The
    23    Wisconsin   voters ask,   "quis  custodiet   ipsos
    custodes?"   Translated to English, "who will be guarding the
    guards?" See The Satires of Juvenal 78 (Rolfe Humphries trans.,
    1958) (emphasis removed).
    If we were to address the specific-general canon on which
    24
    defendants rely, which statute should govern is unclear.
    Wisconsin Stat. § 5.06 is more specific in the sense that it
    references election disputes, but 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
     is more
    specific in governing judicial review of administrative rules
    and guidance documents.
    31
    No.     2022AP91
    Milwaukee       County,    
    2019 WI 24
    ,       ¶11,    
    385 Wis. 2d 748
    ,     
    924 N.W.2d 153
     ("Therefore, statutory language is interpreted in the
    context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a
    whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-
    related        statutes;    and         reasonably,         to     avoid     absurd      or
    unreasonable results."            (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct.
    for    Dane      Cnty.,    
    2004 WI 58
    ,          ¶46,    
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    ,        
    681 N.W.2d 110
    )); Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 183 (explaining
    the general-specific canon applies "when conflicting provisions
    simply cannot be reconciled").
    ¶51     For each of these reasons, we reject DRW's argument.
    Whether framed in terms of sovereign immunity or competency, it
    fails.        Neither the statutes nor judicial policy precludes this
    court from resolving the Wisconsin voters' claims against WEC.
    B.    The Merits
    ¶52     WEC's staff may have been trying to make voting as
    easy     as    possible    during       the        pandemic,     but     whatever     their
    motivations,       WEC     must     follow          Wisconsin      statutes.           Good
    intentions never override the law.25
    25Justice Ann Walsh Bradley accuses the court of
    "erect[ing] yet another barrier for voters," dissent, ¶205, but
    to the extent any "barriers" to voting exist, they are of the
    legislature's making.   Establishing rules governing the casting
    of ballots outside of election day rests solely within the power
    of the people's representatives because such regulations affect
    only the privilege of absentee voting and not the right to vote
    itself. Justice Ann Walsh Bradley says "[a] ballot drop box is
    a simple and perfectly legal solution to make voting easier[.]"
    Id., ¶207. While they might be a simple solution, the decision
    to devise solutions to make voting easier belongs to the
    legislature, not WEC and certainly not the judiciary. While the
    dissenters would permit ballot drop boxes, the court must
    32
    No.        2022AP91
    1.    Legislative Policy Directs Us to Take a Skeptical View of
    Absentee Voting
    ¶53     Subchapter IV of chapter 6 of the Wisconsin statutes
    begins with a statement of legislative policy that cannot be
    reconciled      with   the   statements      of    policy    contained        in    WEC's
    memos:
    LEGISLATIVE POLICY. The legislature finds that voting is
    a constitutional right, the vigorous exercise of which
    should be strongly encouraged. In contrast, voting by
    absentee ballot is a privilege exercised wholly
    outside the traditional safeguards of the polling
    place.     The legislature finds that the privilege of
    voting by absentee ballot must be carefully regulated
    to prevent the potential for fraud or abuse; to
    prevent overzealous solicitation of absent electors
    who may prefer not to participate in an election; to
    prevent undue influence on an absent elector to vote
    for or against a candidate or to cast a particular
    vote in a referendum; or other similar abuses.
    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (1); see also Mays v. LaRose, 
    951 F.3d 775
    , 792
    (6th    Cir. 2020)     ("[T]here   is     no      constitutional    right          to   an
    absentee ballot."        (citing McDonald v. Bd. of Elections Comm'rs
    of     Chi.,    
    394 U.S. 802
    ,   807–09          (1969)).        The        statutory
    requirements       governing    absentee          voting    must   be    completely
    satisfied or ballots may not be counted:
    INTERPRETATION.  Notwithstanding s. 5.01 (1), with
    respect to matters relating to the absentee ballot
    process, ss. 6.86, 6.87 (3) to (7) and 9.01 (1) (b) 2.
    and 4. shall be construed as mandatory. Ballots cast
    in contravention of the procedures specified in those
    provisions may not be counted.     Ballots counted in
    contravention of the procedures specified in those
    provisions may not be included in the certified result
    of any election.
    respect the constitutional restraints on our power and refuse to
    act as a super-legislature.       It poses a grave threat to
    democracy to mislead the people into believing we are one.
    33
    No.     2022AP91
    § 6.84(2).               "[M]andatory"       election        requirements       "must      be
    strictly adhered to" and "strictly observed."                              State ex rel.
    Ahlgrimm v. State Elections Bd., 
    82 Wis. 2d 585
    , 592–93, 
    263 N.W.2d 152
     (1978).
    ¶54      Despite these provisions, no defendant can point to
    any     statute          authorizing       ballot     drop        boxes;     instead,     the
    defendants      argue       no    statute       expressly       prohibits     them.       The
    absence of an express prohibition, however, does not mean drop
    boxes comport with "the procedures specified" in the election
    laws.     
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (2).                 Nothing in the statutory language
    detailing the procedures by which absentee ballots may be cast
    mentions drop boxes or anything like them.
    2.    Ballot Drop Boxes Are Unauthorized by Law
    ¶55      Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. provides, in relevant
    part, that absentee ballots "shall be mailed by the elector, or
    delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot
    or ballots."             The prepositional phrase "to the municipal clerk"
    is key and must be given effect.                        Wisconsin Stat. § 5.02(10)
    defines     "municipal           clerk"    as    "the      city    clerk,     town    clerk,
    village clerk and the executive director of the city election
    commission          and     their      authorized          representatives.             Where
    applicable, 'municipal clerk' also includes the clerk of a school
    district."          An    inanimate    object,       such    as    a   ballot   drop     box,
    cannot    be    the       municipal       clerk.      At    a     minimum,    accordingly,
    dropping a ballot into an unattended drop box is not delivery
    "to the municipal clerk[.]"
    34
    No.   2022AP91
    ¶56   Wisconsin Stat. § 6.855 further shows the unlawfulness
    of ballot drop boxes.   Subsection (1) of that statute states:
    The governing body of a municipality may elect to
    designate a site other than the office of the
    municipal clerk or board of election commissioners as
    the location from which electors of the municipality
    may request and vote absentee ballots and to which
    voted absentee ballots shall be returned by electors
    for any election.      The designated site shall be
    located as near as practicable to the office of the
    municipal clerk or board of election commissioners and
    no site may be designated that affords an advantage to
    any political party. An election by a governing body
    to designate an alternate site under this section
    shall be made no fewer than 14 days prior to the time
    that absentee ballots are available for the primary
    under s. 7.15 (1) (cm), if a primary is scheduled to
    be held, or at least 14 days prior to the time that
    absentee ballots are available for the election under
    s. 7.15 (1) (cm), if a primary is not scheduled to be
    held, and shall remain in effect until at least the
    day after the election.    If the governing body of a
    municipality makes an election under this section, no
    function related to voting and return of absentee
    ballots that is to be conducted at the alternate site
    may be conducted in the office of the municipal clerk
    or board of election commissioners.
    Subsection (3) declares an alternate absentee ballot site must
    be "staffed by the municipal clerk or the executive director of
    the board of election commissioners, or employees of the clerk
    or the board of election commissioners."    Subsection (5) allows
    the establishment of multiple alternate sites.
    ¶57   Ballot drop boxes are not alternate absentee ballot
    sites under 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
     because a voter can only return
    the voter's absentee ballot to a drop box, while an alternate
    site must also allow voters to request and vote absentee at the
    site.   If a drop box were an alternate ballot site, by the plain
    35
    No.     2022AP91
    language of the statute, "no function related to voting and
    return    of    absentee    ballots     that      is    to    be    conducted        at   the
    alternate site may be conducted in the office of the municipal
    clerk or board of election commissioners."                           § 6.855(1).          The
    defendants do not advance this construction of the statutes.
    ¶58     If ballot drop boxes are not alternate absentee ballot
    sites, "what [are] they?"             Trump v. Biden, 
    2020 WI 91
    , ¶101, 
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    ,       
    951 N.W.2d 568
            (Roggensack,           C.J.,    dissenting).
    Existing outside the statutory parameters for voting, drop boxes
    are a novel creation of executive branch officials, not the
    legislature.        The    legislature           enacted      a    detailed        statutory
    construct for alternate sites.               In contrast, the details of the
    drop box scheme are found nowhere in the statutes, but only in
    memos    prepared    by    WEC    staff,    who       did    not   cite     any    statutes
    whatsoever to support their invention.
    ¶59     Wisconsin Stat. § 6.855 identifies the sites at which
    in    person    absentee     voting     may      be    accomplished——either               "the
    office of the municipal clerk" or "an alternate site" but not
    both.        "An alternate site" serves as a replacement for "the
    office of the municipal clerk" rather than an additional site
    for absentee voting.             Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. requires
    the elector to mail the absentee ballot or deliver it in person,
    "to     the    municipal     clerk,"        which       is     defined       to     include
    "authorized      representatives."            This      subparagraph        contemplates
    only two ways to vote absentee:                  by mail and at "the office of
    the   municipal     clerk"       or   "an   alternate         site"    as    statutorily
    described.      No third option exists.
    36
    No.     2022AP91
    ¶60        Other election statutes are similarly silent on any
    other method of voting absentee other than by mail or at the
    office    of    the    municipal    clerk.       Wisconsin     Stat.        § 5.81(3)
    provides, in relevant part:               "If a municipality utilizes an
    electronic       voting   system     in     which   ballots        distributed      to
    electors are employed, absentee ballots may consist of ballots
    utilized with the system or paper ballots and envelopes voted in
    person in the office of the municipal clerk or voted by mail."
    The statute states, "absentee ballots may consist of" and then
    describes ballots cast "in person in the office of the municipal
    clerk" and ballots "voted by mail."              § 5.81(3).        The legislature
    did not contemplate absentee ballots "consist[ing]" of ballots
    cast via a drop box.
    ¶61        In 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. the prepositional phrase,
    "to the municipal clerk," modifies both the clause "mailed by
    the elector," i.e., absentee ballots "shall be mailed by the
    elector . . . to the municipal clerk" as well as "delivered in
    person."        The    defendants    contend     "to   the    municipal       clerk"
    encompasses      unstaffed   drop     boxes    maintained     by    the     municipal
    clerk.     A     hyper-literal     interpretation      of    this    prepositional
    phrase, taken out of context, would permit voters to mail or
    personally deliver absentee ballots to the personal residence of
    the municipal clerk or even hand the municipal clerk absentee
    ballots    at    the   grocery     store.       "Municipal    clerk,"        however,
    denotes a public office, held by a public official acting in an
    official       capacity   when     performing    statutory     duties        such   as
    accepting ballots.        The statutes do not authorize the municipal
    37
    No.     2022AP91
    clerk to perform any official duties related to the acceptance
    of ballots at any location beyond those statutorily prescribed.
    ¶62        The    fairest      interpretation           of    the    phrase       "to   the
    municipal clerk" means mailing or delivering the absentee ballot
    to the municipal clerk at her office or, if designated under
    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
    , an alternate site.                          "Properly applied, the
    plain-meaning           approach      is     not    'literalistic';               rather,      the
    ascertainment           of    meaning       involves       a    'process      of        analysis'
    focused on deriving the fair meaning of the text itself."                                   Brey,
    
    400 Wis. 2d 417
    , ¶11 (quoting Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶¶46, 52).
    Adopting a literalistic interpretation instead of applying the
    fair meaning of "to the municipal clerk" would similarly subject
    any "authorized representative" of the municipal clerk to the
    same intrusions of accepting ballots wherever a voter may find
    the municipal clerk's representative.                           
    Wis. Stat. § 5.02
    (10).
    Interpreting 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. to permit such methods of
    casting      an    absentee       ballot      would       contravene        the    legislative
    policy    expressed          in   
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (1)         and    border       on   the
    absurd.      See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 217 ("A preamble,
    purpose      clause,         or   recital      is     a    permissible        indicator        of
    meaning.").
    ¶63    Notwithstanding the detailed and unambiguous language
    of 
    Wis. Stat. §§ 6.84
     and 6.855, WEC asks this court to conclude
    the legislature "hid[] [an] elephant[] in [a] mousehole[.]"                                    See
    Whitman      v.    Amer.       Trucking      Ass'n,       
    531 U.S. 457
    ,      468     (2001)
    (citations omitted).                 Coined by Justice Antonin Scalia, this
    turn   of     phrase         means    the    legislature            "does   not     alter      the
    38
    No.     2022AP91
    fundamental details of a regulatory scheme in vague terms or
    ancillary provisions[.]"         Id.; see also Palm, 
    391 Wis. 2d 497
    ,
    ¶¶53–56.     WEC would have us believe, hiding within four words,
    "to the municipal clerk," is an expansive conception of voting
    methods never before recognized.               We decline to read into the
    statutes a monumentally different voting mechanism not specified
    by the legislature.          See E.P.A. v. EME Homer City Generation,
    L.P., 
    572 U.S. 489
    , 528 (2014) (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("It
    would be extraordinary for Congress, by use of the single word
    'significantly,'       to    transmogrify       a      statute    that       assigns
    responsibility on the basis of amounts of pollutants emitted
    into a statute authorizing EPA to reduce interstate pollution in
    the manner that it believes most efficient.").
    ¶64   WEC and DRW argue the drop box "elephant" is, in fact,
    no elephant at all.          WEC claims "the Commission did not create
    [ballot]     drop   boxes.      The     March    2020       memorandum      provided
    guidance in response to clerks' inquiries about their use, and
    there is testamentary evidence that drop boxes were used in
    Wisconsin before the August 2020 memorandum."                   Of course "there
    is . . . evidence" drop boxes were used before the issuance of
    Memo   two   because   WEC    issued    Memo    one    in   March,    which    comes
    before August.
    ¶65   The record evidence WEC cited does not support its
    argument     that   ballot    drop     boxes    have     been    in   common      and
    longstanding use in this state.                First, WEC cites Memo one,
    which says, "clerks have inquired about options for ensuring
    that the maximum number of ballots are returned to be counted
    39
    No.        2022AP91
    for the April 7, 2020 election."                     This statement suggests a
    state of uncertainty surrounding the legality of drop boxes,
    rather than documenting their ostensibly extensive use.
    ¶66    Second,    WEC    cites     a    third     memo    prepared        by    WEC's
    staff, responding to a recent study by the Legislative Audit
    Bureau (LAB), a non-partisan institution.                     In this report, LAB
    concluded    WEC      had     overstepped       its      lawful      authority           by
    authorizing ballot drop boxes.26              Citing no evidence, this third
    memo proclaims "[t]he use of ballot drop boxes at the local
    level in Wisconsin, and elsewhere in the country, predates the
    Wisconsin      Election        Commission's . . . August                 19,         2020,
    memorandum    on     the    topic[.]"         For    support,      WEC   noted,         "no
    Wisconsin    court     has    foreclosed       the    idea    of    lawfully         using
    absentee    ballot    drop    boxes,"       expressly    referencing       this        very
    case and adding, "[t]he case is ongoing and no resolution has
    been reached at this time."           For this third memo to be given any
    weight would require us to hold a government agency can be sued
    and then issue what amounts to a press release that it can cite
    as support for its interpretation of law.
    26 Legislative   Audit   Bureau,    Elections  Administration
    (2021),             https://legis.wisconsin.gov/lab/media/3288/21-
    19full.pdf; see also Off. of the Special Couns., Second Interim
    Investigative Report on the Apparatus & Procedures of the
    Wisconsin     Elections     System    78     (Mar.    1,    2022),
    https://legis.wisconsin.gov/assembly/22/brandtjen/media/1552/osc
    -second-interim-report.pdf ("In Wisconsin, election officials'
    unprecedented use of absentee ballot drop boxes facially
    violated Wisconsin law.").
    40
    No.     2022AP91
    ¶67     Third, WEC cites its own website, which has a page
    that is not significantly different than the third memo.                                  The
    page bears the heading "[w]hy did WEC allow clerks to use drop
    boxes    for     absentee    ballots?"                 WEC     offers     the       following
    conclusory statement:             "some clerks have used them prior to
    2020" but supplies no evidence.
    ¶68     Lastly, WEC (along with DRW) cites an affidavit from
    Administrator       Wolfe   as    evidence        of     the    supposedly      "extensive
    history"    of    ballot    drop       boxes      in    Wisconsin.        The       affidavit
    merely says, "[t]he use of absentee ballot drop boxes in the
    United     States    predates          the     [COVID-19]         pandemic."           Again,
    Administrator       Wolfe    offers          no        evidence     to    support         this
    statement.       Even if the assertions regarding the historical use
    of ballot boxes were true, they are irrelevant.                               Longstanding
    noncompliance with the law does not cure its illegality.
    ¶69     Perhaps     realizing            "delivery         in   person[]         to    the
    municipal clerk" does not mean nor has it been historically
    understood to mean delivery to an unattended ballot drop box,
    the defendants analogize these boxes to a mailbox.                              Of course,
    the law expressly allows a voter to place an absentee ballot in
    a mailbox.       
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. ("shall be mailed by the
    elector . . . .").           Ballot          drop       boxes,      however,        are   not
    mailboxes.
    ¶70     The ordinary meaning of "mailed by the elector" in
    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. contemplates involvement by a third-
    party    mail    carrier.        The    very      next       sentence    of   the     statute
    declares, "[i]f the envelope is mailed from a location outside
    41
    No.     2022AP91
    the United States, the elector shall affix sufficient postage
    unless the ballot qualifies for delivery free of postage under
    federal law."         § 6.87(4)(b)1.           To affix postage to an absentee
    ballot    placed     in    a   ballot     drop       box    would    be     a    waste     of   a
    perfectly     good     stamp.          Similarly,          § 6.87(3)(a)         directs,        in
    relevant    part,     "the         municipal    clerk      shall     mail       the    absentee
    ballot to the         elector's residence . . . .                    If the ballot is
    mailed, and the ballot qualifies for mailing free of postage
    under     federal    free      postage       laws,    the    clerk    shall        affix       the
    appropriate         legend         required     by        U.S.     postal        regulation.
    Otherwise, the clerk shall pay the postage required[.]"                                         In
    common     parlance,       "mail"      may     encompass         delivery       services        by
    private businesses such as FedEx or UPS, in addition to the
    United States Postal Service.27
    ¶71     If there were any lingering doubt about the difference
    between drop boxes and mailing, drop boxes trigger the very
    concerns the legislature expressly seeks to avoid.                              "[V]oting by
    absentee    ballot        is   a    privilege       exercised       wholly       outside       the
    traditional safeguards of the polling place.                              The legislature
    finds that the privilege of voting by absentee ballot must be
    carefully     regulated        to     prevent       the     potential       for        fraud    or
    abuse[.]"     
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (1).                 As the Wisconsin voters argue,
    "a drop box contains only ballots, and lots of them in one place
    27The plain meaning of "mail" supports this conclusion.
    See Mail, The American Heritage Dictionary of the English
    Language 1083 (3d ed. 1992) ("To send by mail;" "Materials, such
    as letters and packages, handled in a postal system.").
    42
    No.        2022AP91
    at   the     same    time,     making    it       a    prime     target      for    would-be
    tamperers, whereas mailboxes may or may not contain ballots at
    any given time."          While the legislature has recognized absentee
    voting has many benefits for voters, the legislature has also
    enacted      safeguards       designed       to       minimize    the     possibility         of
    fraud.          "Voting       fraud     is        a    serious     problem          in      U.S.
    elections[,] . . . and it is facilitated by absentee voting.                                  In
    this respect absentee voting is to voting in person as a take-
    home    exam    is   to   a   proctored       one."        Griffin      v.    Roupas,        
    385 F.3d 1128
    , 1130–31 (7th Cir. 2004) (internal citations omitted).
    ¶72     We conclude WEC's staff erred by authorizing a voting
    mechanism not authorized by law.                       The memos created a ballot
    drop box scheme entirely absent from Wisconsin's election code.
    The legislature's "carefully regulated" procedures for absentee
    voting do not permit voting via ballot drop boxes.
    3. "[I]n Person" Absentee Voting Requires the Voter to
    Personally Deliver the Ballot to the Municipal Clerk
    ¶73     WEC's staff also erred in Memo one by stating "[a]
    family member or another person may . . . return the ballot on
    behalf of the voter," i.e., an agent of the voter may place the
    voter's absentee ballot in a drop box.                      The law does not permit
    this.      Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. states, in relevant part,
    "[t]he envelope shall be mailed by the elector, or delivered in
    person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots."
    (Emphasis added.)         The key phrase is "in person" and it must be
    assigned its natural meaning.
    43
    No.    2022AP91
    ¶74     "[I]n     person"    denotes       "bodily     presence"       and   the
    concept of doing something personally.                 in person, The Oxford
    English Dictionary 598 (2d. ed. 1989) (defining "in person" as
    "with or by one's own action or bodily presence; personally;
    oneself"); Person, Webster's Third New International Dictionary
    1686 (2002) ("bodily presence —— usu. used in the phrase in
    person"); in person, The Random House Dictionary of the English
    Language 1445 (2d ed. 1987) ("in one's own bodily presence;
    personally; Applicants are requested to apply in person.").
    ¶75     As    used     throughout     Wisconsin's     election     code,     the
    phrase   "in     person"    refers   to    a   voter     acting   directly,      not
    through an agent.          See 5 Wis. Att'y Gen. 591, 592 (1916) ("The
    statute says:       'Application for such ballot shall be made in
    person.'    (Sec. 11.56.)       The ordinary meaning of the phrase 'in
    person' is that the request must come directly from the elector
    who was corporally present before the clerk.").                    For example,
    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.86
    (1)(a) states, in relevant part:
    (a) Any elector of a municipality who is registered to
    vote whenever required and who qualifies under ss.
    6.20 and 6.85 as an absent elector may make written
    application   to   the municipal   clerk  of   that
    municipality for an official ballot by one of the
    following methods:
    1. By mail.
    2. In person at the office of the municipal clerk
    or at an alternate site under s. 6.855, if
    applicable.
    . . . .
    4. By agent as provided in sub. (3).
    44
    No.     2022AP91
    (Emphasis        added.)             Section         6.86(1)(a)           unequivocally
    distinguishes between "in person" and "by agent."                               Subsection
    (3) then begins by stating, "[a]ny elector who is registered and
    who is hospitalized, may apply for and obtain an official ballot
    by agent."       § 6.86(3)(a)1. (Emphasis added.)                  It then describes
    the process of receiving a ballot by agent.                          The legislature
    obviously      knows   how    to    authorize    a    voter    to    act       through     an
    agent;    it    used   such    language    in    § 6.86       but    not       
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    .     See Yakich, 
    400 Wis. 2d 549
    , ¶24 (quoting Milwaukee J.
    Sentinel, 
    341 Wis. 2d 607
    , ¶¶36–37).
    ¶76      Other election statutes also explicitly describe an
    agency relationship.          For example, the phrase "municipal clerk"
    includes       "authorized     representatives."           
    Wis. Stat. § 5.02
    (10)
    ("'Municipal clerk' means the city clerk, town clerk, village
    clerk and the executive director of the city election commission
    and   their      authorized         representatives.              Where       applicable,
    'municipal       clerk'      also     includes       the    clerk        of     a     school
    district."); see also § 5.02(2) ("'County clerk' includes the
    executive director of the county board of election commissioners
    and their authorized representatives.").
    ¶77      Unlike "municipal clerk," the definition of "elector"
    does not encompass an agency relationship.                    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.02
    (1)
    ("Every U.S. citizen age 18 or older who has resided in an
    election district or ward for 28 consecutive days before any
    election       where   the    citizen    offers      to    vote     is     an       eligible
    elector."); see also 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.85
    (1) ("An absent elector is
    any otherwise qualified elector who for any reason is unable or
    45
    No.     2022AP91
    unwilling to appear at the polling place in his or her ward or
    election     district.");         
    Wis. Stat. § 5.02
    (12n)       ("'Overseas
    elector' means a U.S. citizen who is residing outside of the
    United States, who is not disqualified from voting under s.
    6.03, who has attained or will attain the age of 18 by the date
    of an election at which the citizen proposes to vote, who was
    last domiciled in this state or whose parent was last domiciled
    in this state immediately prior to the parent's departure from
    the United States, and who is not registered to vote or voting
    in any other state, territory, or possession.").
    ¶78     WEC    does     not    address     this      dispositive       statutory
    distinction       between    "in     person"       and   "by   agent,"      instead
    primarily emphasizing the presence of the passive voice in 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.:        "The envelope shall be . . . delivered in
    person[.]"     In support of its argument, WEC quotes a Seventh
    Circuit    decision    as   stating:          "a   legislature's     use     of   the
    passive    voice   sometimes       reflects    indifference     to   the     actor."
    Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 
    830 F.3d 470
    , 479 (7th Cir.
    2016), aff’d, 
    138 S. Ct. 816
     (2018).                 The paragraph from which
    WEC selectively seized that sentence defeats WEC's position:
    It's true that a legislature's use of the passive
    voice sometimes reflects indifference to the actor.
    See Dean v. United States, 
    556 U.S. 568
    , 572, 
    129 S.Ct. 1849
    , 
    173 L.Ed.2d 785
     (2009) ("The passive voice
    focuses on an event that occurs without respect to a
    specific actor. . . ."). But attributing indifference
    to Congress in this instance would be inconsistent
    with the FSIA's statutory declaration of purpose,
    which   explicitly  invokes   the  international   law
    understanding of foreign sovereign immunity:    "Under
    international law, states are not immune from the
    46
    No.     2022AP91
    jurisdiction of foreign courts insofar as their
    commercial   activities are  concerned,  and  their
    commercial property may be levied upon for the
    satisfaction of judgments rendered against them in
    connection with their commercial activities."    
    28 U.S.C. § 1602
    [.]
    
    Id.
        (emphasis      added).          Rubin    suggests       the   statement        of
    legislative policy in 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
     is a better indicator of
    statutory meaning than the passive voice used in § 6.87(4)(b)1.
    ¶79   A case cited by DRW is likewise unpersuasive because
    it    pre-dates    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    .     In    Sommerfeld      v.    Board   of
    Canvassers of the City of St. Francis, 18 absentee "voters did
    not return . . . absentee ballots in the envelopes by mail, or
    deliver[] the same in person, as provided by [a predecessor
    statute], but caused the same to be returned to the Clerk of the
    City of St. Francis by a third person, who returned the sealed
    envelopes to the said Clerk."              
    269 Wis. 299
    , 301, 
    69 N.W.2d 235
    (1955).      A majority of this court concluded:
    If our statute is construed to mean that the voter
    shall himself mail the ballot or personally deliver it
    to the clerk, then the statute would defeat itself in
    the case of those who are sick or physically disabled.
    They would be unable to mail ballots except through an
    agent.   Having made provision that these unfortunate
    people   can   vote,  we   cannot   believe  that  the
    legislature meant to disenfranchise them by providing
    a condition that they could not possibly perform.
    Id. at 303.       To the extent Sommerfeld has any relevance, it too
    undercuts the defendants' arguments.
    ¶80   First,       the     legislature          superseded       Sommerfeld's
    conclusion in 1986 by adopting 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    .                    1985 Wis. Act
    304,    § 68n.     Section 6.84(2)         provides     that    "with    respect      to
    matters      relating     to    the    absentee    ballot      process,"       several
    47
    No.    2022AP91
    statutes, including § 6.87(4), "shall be construed as mandatory.
    Ballots cast in contravention of the procedures specified in
    those       provisions    may    not    be    counted.           Ballots     counted     in
    contravention of the procedures specified in those provisions
    may not be included in the certified result of any election."
    The   adoption      of    § 6.84    renders           Sommerfeld    a    nullity.       The
    majority in that case relied on a different statutory provision:
    "Section 5.011 provides that Title II shall be construed so as
    to give effect to the will of the electors, if that can be
    ascertained, notwithstanding informality or failure to comply
    with some of its provisions."28               Sommerfeld, 
    269 Wis. at 302
    .
    ¶81     The Sommerfeld majority deemed the in person delivery
    requirement      "directory       only,"      so      it    reasoned    "a   delivery    of
    ballots by agent is a substantial compliance" permitting the
    counting of the ballots.               
    Id. at 304
    .            In election law, "[t]he
    difference       between        mandatory      and          directory    provisions      of
    election statutes lies in the consequence of nonobservance:                              an
    act done in violation of a mandatory provision is void, whereas
    an    act    done   in    violation      of       a    directory       provision,    while
    improper, may nevertheless be valid."                         
    Id. at 303
     (quoting 29
    C.J.S. § 214).           Much of the majority opinion in Sommerfeld is
    spent explaining why the majority deemed the relevant statute
    merely       directory    and    describing           the    "complaint"     as     "purely
    See 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.01
    (1) ("Except
    28                                                      as otherwise provided,
    chs. 5 to 12 shall be construed to give                        effect to the will of
    the electors, if that can be ascertained                        from the proceedings,
    notwithstanding informality or failure to                      fully comply with some
    of their provisions.").
    48
    No.     2022AP91
    technical."        Id. at 304.            This entire discussion of how to
    classify a statute——mandatory or directory——seemed to rest on
    the assumption that the statute was not followed; if the statute
    were followed, the majority would not have needed to declare the
    law merely directory.
    ¶82    Three       justices        dissented,          offering          a         statutory
    interpretation         consistent        with       our    reading      of         
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.         The dissent defined "in person" as "[b]y one's
    self; with bodily presence."               Id. at 304 (Gehl, J., dissenting)
    (quoting in person, Webster's New International Dictionary (2d
    ed. 1934)).       It then noted, "[h]ad the legislature intended that
    the ballot might be delivered by a representative, it might
    easily    have    so     declared."        Id.         "Nothing      is    found           in    the
    statutes concerning absentee voting that indicates legislative
    disposition to permit the absentee ballot to be delivered by
    agent."     Id. at 305.
    ¶83    Reading      the       election    statutes      in   context           and        as   a
    whole, we conclude an absentee ballot delivered in person under
    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. must be delivered personally by the
    voter.      Unlike 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.86
    , which allows the receipt of an
    absentee ballot through an agent under particular circumstances
    and   subject       to        detailed    procedures,         no     similar             language
    authorizes       voters       not    meeting    the       exceptions      outlined           under
    § 6.86 to cast a ballot through delivery by an agent.
    IV.    FEDERAL PREEMPTION
    ¶84    DRW argues federal law preempts the circuit court's
    interpretation           of      Wisconsin          statutes.             It        cites            52
    49
    No.     2022AP91
    U.S.C. § 10508 (2018), which provides, "[a]ny voter who requires
    assistance     to    vote     by    reason      of    blindness,     disability,        or
    inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person
    of     the   voter's       choice[.]"        DRW      claims     "[t]he    assistance
    addressed     [in    this     statute] . . . extends           to    returning         that
    ballot so it may be counted."                   DRW's discussion of § 10508 is
    limited to one paragraph in its opening brief.                      It cites nothing
    more than a single source of legislative history for support.
    DRW    selectively     quotes      from    this      report,   omitting     the    first
    sentence of the paragraph on which it relies, which states:
    "STATE PROVISIONS WOULD BE PREEMPTED ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT
    THEY UNDULY BURDEN THE RIGHT RECOGNIZED IN THIS SECTION, WITH
    THAT    DETERMINATION       BEING    A    PRACTICAL     ONE    DEPENDENT        UPON   THE
    FACTS."      See S. Rep. No. 97-417 (1982), 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at
    63.     Additionally, DRW does not address 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (5),
    which states:
    If the absent elector declares that he or she is
    unable to read, has difficulty in reading, writing or
    understanding English or due to disability is unable
    to mark his or her ballot, the elector may select any
    individual, except the elector's employer or an agent
    of that employer or an officer or agent of a labor
    organization which represents the elector, to assist
    in marking the ballot, and the assistant shall then
    sign his or her name to a certification on the back of
    the ballot, as provided under s. 5.55.
    The language of this subsection is similar to § 10508.
    ¶85   DRW    also    cites    the   Americans      with      Disabilities        Act
    (ADA), but, similarly, its discussion of the ADA is limited to a
    single paragraph in its opening brief.                    DRW does not cite any
    50
    No.    2022AP91
    binding cases supporting its preemption argument, nor does DRW
    discuss preemption in its reply brief, even though the Wisconsin
    voters complained the argument was underdeveloped.
    ¶86    As far as we can discern, DRW's argument largely rests
    on the practical impact of the circuit court's declarations on
    disabled voters who may be physically unable to vote if someone
    cannot place an absentee ballot in the mail on a voter's behalf.
    We   agree    with     the    Wisconsin    voters     that    DRW's   argument       is
    underdeveloped.        See State v. Gracia, 
    2013 WI 15
    , ¶28 n.13, 
    345 Wis. 2d 488
    , 
    826 N.W.2d 87
     (explaining we do not have to address
    underdeveloped arguments (cited source omitted)); see also In re
    Disciplinary      Proc.       Against     Johns,      
    2014 WI 32
    ,     ¶45,     
    353 Wis. 2d 746
    , 
    847 N.W.2d 179
     (per curiam) ("The OLR ignores the
    topic in its reply brief. . . .                We take this lack of reply by
    the OLR as a concession[.]" (cited source omitted)).                            Because
    "[p]reemption . . . is disfavored 'in the absence of persuasive
    reasons,'" the shallowness of the argument undermines it.                           See
    Town of Delafield, 
    392 Wis. 2d 427
    , ¶6 (quoting                       Chi. & N.W.
    Transp. Co. v. Kalo Brick & Tile Co., 
    450 U.S. 311
    , 317 (1981)).
    Whatever      accommodations       federal      law     requires,        
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (5)      seems     to    permit     them.         See    also      
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. ("The elector may receive assistance under sub.
    (5).").      We address the argument no further.
    51
    No.    2022AP91
    V.   CONCLUSION29
    ¶87    Only the legislature may permit absentee voting via
    ballot   drop   boxes.   WEC   cannot.   Ballot   drop   boxes   appear
    nowhere in the detailed statutory system for absentee voting.
    WEC's authorization of ballot drop boxes was unlawful, and we
    therefore affirm the circuit court's declarations and permanent
    injunction of WEC's erroneous interpretations of law except to
    the extent its remedies required absentee voters to personally
    mail their ballots, an issue we do not decide at this time, and
    we decline to decide at this time whether the memos are also
    invalid as unpromulgated administrative rules.
    By the Court.——The judgment and order of the Circuit Court
    is affirmed.
    29  "Finally, and most importantly, the dissent's resort to
    [ad hominem attacks on the majority] is a poor substitute for
    legal argument.   Such personal aspersions have no place in a
    judicial opinion. . . . [It] do[es] real damage to the public's
    perception of this court's work.    We must aspire to be better
    models   of  respectful  dialogue   to  preserve   the  public's
    confidence on which this court's legitimacy relies." Becker v.
    Dane County, 2022 WI __, ¶44, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __
    (Karofsky, J.).    Although Justice Jill J. Karofsky recently
    complained about the tone of a dissent she deemed too harsh
    (joined by Justice Hagedorn, who does not join this footnote),
    she nevertheless joins a dissent that accuses her colleagues of
    "blithely and erroneously seek[ing] to sow distrust in the
    administration of our elections and through its faulty analysis
    erect[ing] yet another barrier for voters[.]"     Dissent, ¶205.
    The dissent continues, "[s]uch a result, although lamentable, is
    not a surprise from this court.      It has seemingly taken the
    opportunity to make it harder to vote or to inject confusion
    into the process whenever it has been presented with the
    opportunity. . . . [W]ithout justification [the majority] fans
    the flames of electoral doubt that threaten our democracy."
    Id., ¶¶206, 208. Political talking points are no substitute for
    legal analysis.
    52
    No.   2022AP91
    53
    No.    2022AP991.pdr
    ¶88    PATIENCE       DRAKE        ROGGENSACK,          J.     (concurring).             The
    majority        opinion        concludes         that        the   Wisconsin           Elections
    Commission's      (WEC)     documents         (hereinafter          memos)       are    invalid
    because ballot drop boxes are not legal in Wisconsin and because
    absentee ballots must be personally delivered by the voter to
    the municipal clerk at the clerk's office.                            I agree, and join
    the majority opinion.                I write further to explain that, under
    Wisconsin       statutes,       it     is   the       elector      who   shall      mail      the
    absentee    ballot        to     the      municipal          clerk.       Accordingly,          I
    respectfully concur.
    I.     BACKGROUND1
    ¶89    During the COVID-19 pandemic, citizens of Wisconsin
    were advised to avoid large crowds and to socially distance from
    each other.        This advice changed the way that many citizens
    participated in personal tasks.                       For example, during the 2020
    Spring election, many voters opted to vote absentee and absentee
    voting increased.
    ¶90    The WEC issued multiple memos, which were directed at
    municipal       clerks    and     election           officials.          Relevant       to    our
    discussion, the first memo stated, among other things, that "[a]
    family member or another person may . . . return the ballot on
    behalf of a voter."            The "return" that was described referred to
    returns    to    drop     boxes.          Both       memos    focused     on     drop    boxes,
    describing their appearance, their locations and that they may
    be used by voters "without having to mail [ballots] back."                                   Drop
    1 The majority opinion capably sets out the background
    underlying this controversy.    Therefore, I describe here only
    that which is necessary to understand my writing below.
    1
    No.    2022AP991.pdr
    boxes were suggested as an alternative to mailing ballots for
    "voters [] motivated by lack of trust in the postal process,
    fear that their ballot could be tampered with, or concern that
    their information will be exposed.                   Voters may also be concerned
    about      ensuring       that   their    ballot     is    returned    in    time    to   be
    counted."2
    ¶91       Based on the WEC memos, Richard Teigen and Richard
    Thom       (collectively         Teigen),    filed        suit    seeking,     in    part,
    declaratory judgment under 
    Wis. Stat. § 806.04
    , which provides
    that any person "whose rights, status or other legal relations
    are affected by a statute . . . may have determined any question
    of          construction             or           validity         arising            under
    the . . . statute . . . and                obtain    a     declaration       of     rights,
    status      or    other     legal    relations       thereunder."            § 806.04(2).
    Teigen asserted that the WEC's memos violated the provisions of
    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. and 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
    (1); that his
    voting rights were affected by these statutes; and Teigen sought
    to     have       a      court    declare     the        correct      construction        of
    § 6.87(4)(b)1.
    ¶92       After     intervention      by      the     Democratic       Senatorial
    Campaign         Committee       (DSCC),     as     well     as    Disability        Rights
    Wisconsin, Wisconsin Faith Voices for Justice, and the League of
    Women Voters of Wisconsin (collectively DRW), Teigen moved for
    summary judgment, setting out what Teigen alleged was the proper
    construction of 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.                          The circuit court
    held a hearing in which it orally granted Teigen's motion in
    2   WEC memo August 19, 2020.
    2
    No.   2022AP991.pdr
    full.   The court explained that, unlike voting in person, voting
    by absentee ballot is "a privilege exercised wholly outside the
    traditional      safeguards      of    the       polling    place."         It    further
    concluded      that   the     legislature        required     that   absentee         voting
    must be carefully regulated to "prevent the potential for fraud
    or abuse, to prevent overzealous solicitation of absent electors
    who may prefer not to participate in an election, to prevent
    undue influence on the absent elector to vote for or against a
    candidate, or to cast a particular vote in a referendum or other
    similar abuses."
    ¶93   In regard to whom may return an absentee ballot, the
    circuit court explained that "[it did not] see any language in
    the statute that provides a basis for having agents, somebody
    other than the elector, actually deliver the ballot."                            Further,
    in   quoting    the    portion    of   the       memo   that    purported        to   allow
    family members or other persons to return a ballot on behalf of
    the voter, the court concluded that it did not "see anything in
    the statute that says that.            In reading the statute, the statute
    is clear.       It's not ambiguous.               It's not necessary to go to
    outside sources to determine how . . . return of the ballot is
    addressed."       In its judgment, the court was satisfied that the
    "portions of the [memo] that address that other people may bring
    the ballot in, it doesn't have to be the elector, are contrary
    to the statute."
    ¶94   The       court    declared          that   the     WEC's       memos      were
    inconsistent with state statutes and specifically concluded that
    an   elector    must    personally      mail       or   deliver      his    or   her    own
    3
    No.   2022AP991.pdr
    absentee ballot, except when otherwise specifically authorized
    by law.       The defendants appealed this ruling to the court of
    appeals.           Teigen    filed      a      petition    to   bypass     the    court   of
    appeals, which we granted.
    II.       DISCUSSION
    A. Standard of Review
    ¶95     I review Teigen's claim for declaratory relief under
    
    Wis. Stat. § 806.04
     and I apply 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. in
    regard to mailing absentee ballots.                       Therefore, I interpret the
    statutes at issue.            We interpret and apply statutes as questions
    of    law     subject        to     our        independent        determination,      while
    benefitting from the decision of the circuit court.                             Townsend v.
    ChartSwap, LLC, 
    2021 WI 86
    , ¶11, 
    399 Wis. 2d 599
    , 
    967 N.W.2d 21
    .
    B. Statutory Interpretation
    ¶96     "[T]he        purpose       of    statutory       interpretation       is   to
    determine what the statute means . . . ."                          State ex rel. Kalal
    v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
    2004 WI 58
    , ¶44, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    ,
    
    681 N.W.2d 110
    .       Judicial         deference     to    the    policy    choices
    enacted     into     law     by   the       legislature     requires      that    statutory
    interpretation focus primarily on the language of the statute.
    We assume that the legislature's intent is expressed                                 in the
    statutory language.               
    Id.
            Therefore, statutory interpretation
    begins      with    the     words     that      the   legislature        chose.     If    the
    meanings of the words are plain and unambiguous, the court's
    inquiry ends and there is no need to consult extrinsic sources
    of interpretation, such as legislative history.                          Id., ¶¶45, 46.
    4
    No.    2022AP991.pdr
    ¶97       In addition to examining the plain words of the text,
    context is part of a plain meaning interpretation.                              "So, too, is
    the structure of the statute in which the operative language
    appears."             Id.,    ¶46.     Therefore,        rather    than    in     isolation,
    "statutory language is interpreted in the context in which it is
    used; . . . in              relation       to   the    language    of     surrounding      or
    closely-related statutes; . . . to avoid absurd or unreasonable
    results; [and]              read, where possible to give effect to every
    word, in order to avoid surplusage."                     Id.
    ¶98       It    is    consistent         with   the   plain-meaning         rule   "to
    consider the intrinsic context in which statutory language is
    used;       a     plain-meaning            interpretation      cannot      contravene       a
    textually         or   contextually         manifest     statutory       purpose."        Id.,
    ¶49.        However, in "construing or interpreting a statute the
    court is not at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of
    [a] statute."           Id., ¶46.          Nor are courts permitted to read words
    into    a       statute      that    the    legislature      did   not    insert     itself.
    Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 
    2011 WI 77
    , ¶42, 
    336 Wis. 2d 318
    , 
    801 N.W.2d 316
    .
    1. Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act
    ¶99       The Uniform Declaratory Judgment Act is contained in
    
    Wis. Stat. § 806.04
    , which provides:
    (1) Scope. Courts    of   record   within   their
    respective jurisdictions shall have power to declare
    rights, status, and other legal relations whether or
    not further relief is or could be claimed . . . . The
    declaration may be either affirmative or negative in
    form and effect; and such declarations shall have the
    force and effect of a final judgment or decree, except
    that finality for purposes of filing an appeal as of
    5
    No.   2022AP991.pdr
    right   shall        be   determined           in     accordance       with
    s. 808.03(1).
    (2) Power    to   construe,    etc. Any    person
    interested under a deed, will, written contract or
    other writings constituting a contract, or whose
    rights, status or other legal relations are affected
    by a statute, municipal ordinance, contract or
    franchise, may have determined any question of
    construction or validity arising under the instrument,
    statute, ordinance, contract or franchise and obtain a
    declaration of rights, status or other legal relations
    thereunder.
    ¶100 In order to obtain declaratory judgment, there must be
    a justiciable controversy.              See Loy v. Bunderson, 
    107 Wis. 2d 400
    , 410, 
    320 N.W.2d 175
     (1982).                    A controversy is justiciable
    when the following factors are present:
    (1) A controversy in which a claim of right is
    asserted against one who has an interest in contesting
    it.
    (2) The controversy must            be       between       persons    whose
    interests are adverse.
    (3) The party seeking declaratory relief must have a
    legal interest in the controversy——that is to say, a
    legally protectible interest.
    (4) The issue involved in the controversy must be ripe
    for judicial determination.
    Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Se. Wis., Ltd. P'ship, 
    2002 WI 108
    ,    ¶41,   
    255 Wis. 2d 447
    ,   
    649 N.W.2d 626
        (citing    Loy,    
    107 Wis. 2d at 410
    ).         If all four factors are met, the controversy
    is     justiciable    and    a    court       may     entertain      an     action   for
    declaratory judgment.            Miller Brands-Milwaukee, Inc. v. Case,
    
    162 Wis. 2d 684
    , 694, 
    470 N.W.2d 290
     (1991).
    ¶101 Here,    I   conclude       that    all        four   factors     are    met.
    First, Teigen's suit is a controversy that opposes the WEC's
    6
    No.    2022AP991.pdr
    memos and intervenors' positions, each of whom have an interest
    in contesting Teigen's position.                     Second, Teigen and the WEC
    have adverse interests regarding the legality of the current
    memos and the WEC's authority to continue issuing similar memos
    in the future.         Third, as the majority concludes, Teigen has a
    legally protectable interest in making sure that his vote is not
    "pollute[d]" and that proper election procedures are followed.3
    And finally, Teigen's suit against the WEC is ripe for judicial
    determination.         The circuit court decided that the elector was
    required to personally mail his or her own completed ballot to
    the clerk's office.4           Affirming the circuit court's decision is
    expressed      in    several     briefs,       as    is     the   need      for   uniform
    guidance.5      The WEC has issued memos that encourage drop boxes
    over mail-in ballot returns, and municipal clerks and election
    officials have acted on those memos.                        Teigen is a Wisconsin
    voter    who    is    affected     by   the         WEC's    memos.         Because   the
    controversy is justiciable, I proceed to the merits of Teigen's
    statutory interpretation claim with regard to mailing absentee
    ballots, and conclude that the memos encourage drop boxes over
    mailing completed ballots and are inconsistent with 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.        Therefore, they are contrary to law.
    2. Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1.
    3   Majority op., ¶25.
    4 Teigen v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2022AP91, Order at 2
    (Jan. 20. 2022).
    5 See   e.g.,  Briefs: League    of   Wis.   Municipalities,
    Republican National Committee and Honest Elections Project.
    7
    No.      2022AP991.pdr
    ¶102 As a foundational matter, we construe closely related
    statutes in the context in which the legislature placed them.
    City of Janesville v. CC Midwest, Inc., 
    2007 WI 93
    , ¶24, 
    302 Wis. 2d 599
    , 
    734 N.W.2d 428
    .               "[W]e examine the language of
    surrounding or closely related statutes in order to interpret a
    statute in the context in which it is used."                 
    Id.
         Accordingly,
    we   do   not   interpret   
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.         in   isolation.
    Rather, we interpret it with the assistance of closely related
    statutes.
    ¶103 As    we   begin,   it    is     important   to     note       that   the
    legislature has supplied the lens through which absentee voting
    statutes are to be viewed.         Wisconsin Stat. § 6.84 provides:
    [V]oting by absentee ballot is a privilege exercised
    wholly outside the traditional safeguards of the
    polling place.      The legislature finds that the
    privilege of voting by absentee ballot must be
    carefully regulated to prevent the potential for fraud
    or abuse; to prevent overzealous solicitation of
    absent electors who may prefer not to participate in
    an election; to prevent undue influence on an absent
    elector to vote for or against a candidate or to cast
    a particular vote in a referendum; or other similar
    abuses.
    § 6.84.     Furthermore, regarding interpretation of the absentee
    voting statutes, the legislature has mandated that:
    [W]ith respect to matters relating to the absentee
    ballot   process,   ss. 6.86,   6.87(3) to  (7)  and
    9.01(1)(b)2. and 4. shall be construed as mandatory.
    Ballots cast in contravention of the procedures
    specified in those provisions may not be counted.
    Ballots counted in contravention of the procedures
    specified in those provisions may not be included in
    the certified result of any election.
    § 6.84(2).
    8
    No.    2022AP991.pdr
    ¶104 We      have     construed        statutes             relating           to   voting
    procedures and have strictly enforced them.                                 In State ex. rel.
    Stearns,    we    concluded       that     the     Secretary           of     State    correctly
    prohibited a candidate who turned in his nomination papers two
    minutes    after     the    statutory        deadline         from          appearing      on   the
    ballot.     State ex. rel. Stearns v. Zimmerman, 
    257 Wis. 443
    , 444-
    46, 
    43 N.W.2d 681
     (1950).                 We reasoned that, by setting the 5
    p.m.     deadline    within        the     statute,          "no       fact     or     situation
    appear[ed] except those contemplated and provided for by the
    legislature."        Id.    at     446.      However,             if    we    had     decided     to
    enlarge the time which the legislature has designated for the
    filing     of    nomination        papers,       we    would           be    "amend[ing]         the
    statute, not [construing] it."               Id.
    ¶105 Again, in State ex. rel. Ahlgrimm, we concluded that a
    candidate who filed his nomination papers in the wrong office
    was barred from appearing on the ballot by the terms of the
    statute.        State ex rel. Ahlgrimm v. State Elections Bd., 
    82 Wis. 2d 585
    ,     595-96,       
    263 N.W.2d 152
        (1978).            The    candidate
    argued that, because the                 statute      that outlined the place of
    filing nomination papers did not specify that noncompliance was
    fatal,    we    should     have    concluded          that    its       prescriptions           were
    directory rather than mandatory.                  
    Id. at 593
    .               We concluded that
    this argument was "without merit" and, as with the time for
    filing, the statute's instruction governing the place of filing
    nomination papers was mandatory.                 
    Id. at 595
    .
    ¶106 Turning        to      the     statute           at        issue,       
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1., it determines required procedures for absentee
    9
    No.    2022AP991.pdr
    voting when specially identified circumstances do not exist.6
    Section 6.87(4)(b)1. provides in regard to mailing that absentee
    ballots "shall be mailed by the elector . . . to the municipal
    clerk."       Electors      are     statutorily         defined    as     "[e]very        U.S.
    citizen age 18 or older who has resided in an election district
    or ward for 28 consecutive days before any election where the
    citizen offers to vote[.]"                  
    Wis. Stat. § 6.02
    .                Accordingly,
    when § 6.87(4)(b)1. says "the elector[,]" it means, the voter.
    ¶107 The plain statutory text, provides that if a ballot is
    returned by mail, it is the "elector" who does the mailing.
    Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)(1). requires that absentee ballots
    "shall be mailed by the elector . . . to the municipal clerk."
    The legislature could have said "may be mailed by the elector"
    if it were not mandatory that the elector do the mailing.                                  As
    the circuit court correctly concluded, "the statute is clear.
    It's not ambiguous.             It's not necessary to go to outside sources
    to   determine       how . . . return            of    the   ballot     is    addressed."
    Indeed, DRW concedes this point in its briefing.
    ¶108 DRW argues that, in spite of the unambiguous text, the
    statutes     allow    an    agent      of   an    elector    to    mail      the    absentee
    ballot on an elector's behalf.               This argument is based on a 1955
    case,     Sommerfeld       v.    Bd.   of    Canvassers       of   the       City    of    St.
    Francis.     In Sommerfeld, we concluded that "in order to fulfill
    the spirit of our election laws the last sentence of section
    11.59     [which   required       delivery        by   the   elector]        is    directory
    only, and that a delivery of ballots by agent is a substantial
    6   See ¶¶109-111 below.
    10
    No.    2022AP991.pdr
    compliance therewith."                Sommerfeld v. Bd. of Canvassers of the
    City of St. Francis, 
    269 Wis. 299
    , 304, 
    69 N.W.2d 235
     (1955).
    However, as the majority points out, Sommerfeld pre-dates 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84.7
               Its conclusion, that absentee voting procedures
    were directory, contradicts § 6.84, which requires that absentee
    voting     procedures          are        "mandatory[,]"             i.e.,    they       must     be
    followed.       Accordingly, to the extent that it described voting
    procedures          as   directory             and        substantial       compliance       being
    sufficient to satisfy § 6.84, Sommerfeld is no longer good law.8
    ¶109 Without Sommerfeld, DRW's argument falls apart.                                       The
    statutory       definition       of        "elector"          does    not    include      agents;
    rather, it defines a person who is eligible to vote.                                  
    Wis. Stat. § 6.02
    .        Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. requires that absentee
    ballots be mailed by the elector; who, as I note, is statutorily
    defined    in       § 6.02(1).            In    accord       with    the    circuit      court,   I
    conclude       that      the     plain          meaning        of     text    is     clear      and
    unambiguous; § 6.87(4)(b)1. does not permit an agent to mail an
    absentee ballot for a voter.
    ¶110 That agents are not permitted by the terms of 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.             to        mail       absentee    ballots       is    further
    supported by comparing the language in § 6.87(4)(b)1. with other
    statutes       in    which     the    legislature            has     explicitly      allowed      an
    agent    or     non-elector          to    participate          in    the    absentee      voting
    process.        Those statutes, in keeping with the policy in Wis.
    7   Majority op., ¶80.
    8   Id.
    11
    No.       2022AP991.pdr
    Stat.   §    6.84(1),    have   formalistic,       regulated       conditions
    attached.
    ¶111 For example, when a voter is a member of a sequestered
    jury, the legislature has provided very detailed instructions
    about   voting   and    returning   the   ballot     where     a     non-voter
    participates.    Wisconsin Stat. § 6.86(1)(b) provides in relevant
    part:
    If the application indicates that the reason for
    requesting an absentee ballot is that the elector is a
    sequestered juror, the application shall be received
    no later than 5 p.m. on election day.           If the
    application is received after 5 p.m. on the Friday
    immediately preceding the election, the municipal
    clerk or the clerk's agent shall immediately take the
    ballot to the court in which the elector is serving as
    a juror and deposit it with the judge.       The judge
    shall recess court, as soon as convenient, and give
    the elector the ballot. The judge shall then witness
    the voting procedure as provided in s. 6.87 and shall
    deliver the ballot to the clerk or agent of the clerk
    who shall deliver it to the polling place or, in
    municipalities where absentee ballots are canvassed
    under s. 7.52, to the municipal clerk as required in
    s. 6.88.
    § 6.86(1)(b).    Simply stated, voter assistance in voting and in
    return of the ballot is clearly set out in § 6.86(1)(b).                   When
    an agent is employed, the agent is identified.
    ¶112 Another example of the legislature's recognition of
    agents involved in voting or ballot return is found in 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.86
    (3)(a) for hospitalized electors.         It provides:
    1. Any elector who is registered              and who is
    hospitalized, may apply for and obtain             an official
    ballot by agent. . . .
    2. If a hospitalized elector is not registered,
    the      elector may  register  by   agent  under  this
    12
    No.    2022AP991.pdr
    subdivision at the same time that the elector applies
    for an official ballot by agent under subd. 1. . . . .
    § 6.86(3)(a)1. and 2.            Once again, when an agent is permitted to
    be    involved    in    absentee         voting,    the    legislature         has    clearly
    defined the factual circumstances that permit it, has identified
    who may function as an agent and has specified a procedure to
    follow.
    ¶113 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(5) also permits the use of an
    agent when the elector is disabled.                  It provides:
    If the absent elector declares that he or she is
    unable to read, has difficulty in reading, writing or
    understanding English or due to disability is unable
    to mark his or her ballot, the elector may select any
    individual, except the elector's employer or an agent
    of that employer or an officer or agent of a labor
    organization which represents the elector, to assist
    in marking the ballot . . . .
    Once again, when the legislature decided that use of an agent in
    voting    was    permissible,        it    specified       the    circumstances         under
    which    an     agent    could      be    employed       and    defined      criteria     for
    performing as an agent in regard to absentee ballots.                                I do not
    review the entirety of the statutes that provide for the use of
    an agent in voting because no party has raised them.
    ¶114 However, those examples cited above and others I do
    not   cite    differ     significantly        from       
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.
    because § 6.87(4)(b)1. carries none of the factual criteria for
    permitting       the    use   of     an     agent    and        none   of      the    factual
    safeguards       for    who   may    function       as    an    agent.         Accordingly,
    because the text and context of § 6.87(4)(b)1. instruct me to do
    so, I conclude that no one but the elector may mail an absentee
    ballot unless the elector and his or her designated agent fit
    13
    No.    2022AP991.pdr
    within   a    different    statutory        circumstance      that    explicitly
    permits it.
    III.   CONCLUSION
    ¶115 The majority opinion concludes that the WEC's memos
    are   invalid   because    ballot      drop    boxes   are    not    legal   under
    Wisconsin    statutes     and    because      an   absentee   ballot     must   be
    personally delivered by the voter to the municipal clerk at the
    clerk's office.     I agree, and I join the majority opinion.                    I
    have written further to explain that, under Wisconsin statutes,
    it is the elector who shall mail the absentee ballot to the
    municipal clerk.    Accordingly, I respectfully concur.
    14
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    ¶116 REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J.                (concurring).
    There should be a third Branch which . . . you may
    call a Governor whom I would invest . . . the whole
    Executive Power, after divesting it of most of those
    Badges of Domination called prerogatives.
    John       Adams,      Thoughts    on   Government        (1776),    in   11     The   State
    Records of North Carolina 325 (1895).
    ¶117 This court's binding precedent allows WEC——a creature
    of   the        legislature       authorized       only   to   implement        Wisconsin's
    election laws——to make law by executive fiat, thereby granting
    it a potent "Badge[] of Domination[.]"                         In Trump v. Biden, a
    majority of this court gave WEC's "advice" the force of law.
    
    2020 WI 91
    ,    ¶¶31–32,    
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    ,         
    951 N.W.2d 568
    .          It
    declared this "advice" is "the rulebook" for elections——never
    mind what the statutes enacted by the legislature say.                              See 
    id.
    (emphasis added).
    ¶118 The Trump majority's conversion of WEC's mere "advice"
    into "the rulebook" flouts the rule of law.                           Consistent with
    constitutional principles, the legislature explicitly declared
    that "[a] guidance document does not have the force of law."
    
    Wis. Stat. § 227.112
    (3) (2019–20).1                       Despite the constitutional
    vesting of lawmaking power in the legislature,2 Trump requires us
    to   uphold         documents      produced    by     executive-branch           employees,
    notwithstanding their inconsistency with the plain meaning of
    the statutes WEC employees purportedly interpreted.                             Trump, 
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    , ¶83 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting); see also Tetra
    All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
    1
    the 2019–20 version.
    2   Wis. Const. art. IV, § 1.
    1
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    Tech EC, Inc. v. Wis. Dep't of Revenue, 
    2018 WI 75
    , ¶3, 
    382 Wis. 2d 496
    , 
    914 N.W.2d 21
     (lead op.) (rejecting the "practice
    of deferring to administrative agencies' conclusions of law").
    Even properly promulgated administrative rules do not have this
    kind of weight; in the hierarchy of laws, rules fall beneath
    statutes (if rules may even be called law).                      I would overrule
    Trump, but it remains binding precedent under which the memos
    have the force of law.          Because a majority of this court accords
    them this effect, they must be rules.                     Because they were not
    promulgated according to statutorily prescribed procedures, they
    are invalid for this additional reason.
    ¶119 This court's decision in Trump exists in tension with
    Service Employees International Union, Local 1 v. Vos (SEIU),
    
    2020 WI 67
    , 
    393 Wis. 2d 38
    , 
    946 N.W.2d 35
     (Kelly, J., majority
    op.).       SEIU    struck    down     statutes        prescribing      pre-issuance
    procedures for guidance documents as facially unconstitutional.
    Id., ¶88.       We described guidance documents as "nothing but the
    written     manifestations       of     the       executive      branch's         thought
    processes[.]"        Id., ¶122.       Under the separation of powers, we
    denied    the     legislature    a    role       in   policing    the       executive's
    thoughts     or     preventing        the       executive      from     sharing       its
    interpretations of law with the public.                       Id., ¶96 (explaining
    "[h]e who is to execute the laws must first judge for himself of
    their     meaning"         (quoting     Alexander         Hamilton,         Letters    of
    Pacificus No. 1 (June 29, 1793), reprinted in 4 The Works of
    Alexander       Hamilton     438      (Henry          Cabot    Lodge        ed.     1904)
    (modification in the original)).
    2
    No.   2022AP91.rgb
    ¶120 Because this court's later decision in Trump gave mere
    guidance documents the force of law, the legislature necessarily
    has   an   interest    in      regulating         them    to     ensure    the    executive
    branch     enforces      the     laws    as       written.           Additionally,        the
    legislature has an interest in the courts upholding the laws the
    legislature enacts, not elevating guidance written by executive
    branch employees above the law.
    ¶121 This court's decision in Trump gave WEC the power to
    materially alter how elections in this state are conducted——
    without a single procedural check.                       Trump should be overruled,
    but   if   the   court    continues       to       hold    the     memos    need    not   be
    promulgated as administrative rules, they should at least be
    subject to the statutory procedures we struck down in SEIU.                                As
    the law stands, WEC's staff have absolute prerogative power.
    The   constitution        does     not    permit          such     corruption       of    the
    carefully calibrated powers among the branches of government.
    I.    The Definition of "Rule"
    ¶122 Wisconsin Stat. § 227.01(13) states, in relevant part:
    "Rule" means a regulation, standard, statement of
    policy, or general order of general application that
    has the force of law and that is issued by an agency
    to implement, interpret, or make specific legislation
    enforced or administered by the agency or to govern
    the organization or procedure of the agency.
    Under this definition, a rule must meet five elements:                               "(1) a
    regulation,      standard,       statement        of     policy      or   general    order;
    (2) of     general    application;        (3) having           the    [force]      of    law;
    (4) issued by an agency; (5) to implement, interpret or make
    specific legislation enforced or administered by such agency as
    3
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    to govern the interpretation or procedure of such agency."3                          Wis.
    Legislature        v.    Palm,    
    2020 WI 42
    ,     ¶22,    
    391 Wis. 2d 497
    ,       
    942 N.W.2d 900
     (quoting Citizens for Sensible Zoning, Inc. v. Dep't
    of Nat. Res., 
    90 Wis. 2d 804
    , 814, 
    280 N.W.2d 702
     (1979)).
    ¶123 In this case, no one has argued the memos are not
    "statements of policy," of "general application," issued by the
    WEC to "interpret" statutes "enforced or administrated" by the
    WEC.       The parties dispute only the third element, whether the
    memos have the "force of law."
    II.   The Majority's Error in Trump
    ¶124 Although the memos should not have the force of law,
    the majority erroneously concluded otherwise in Trump.                           In that
    case, Donald Trump, the incumbent President, and his campaign
    appealed the results of a recount in two Wisconsin counties.
    
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    , ¶¶5–6 (majority op.).                      The ballots President
    Trump sought to strike fell into four categories; two are most
    relevant in this case.              First, he argued "that a form used for
    in-person absentee voting [wa]s not a 'written application' and
    therefore        all    in-person    absentee      ballots    should     be     struck."
    Id.,       ¶2.     Second,       President       Trump    argued   "that       municipal
    officials        improperly      added    witness        information     on     absentee
    ballot certifications, and that these ballots [wer]e therefore
    invalid."        Id.
    ¶125 As the majority acknowledged, "Wisconsin law provides
    that a 'written application' is required before a voter can
    In 2017, the legislature changed "effect of law" to "force
    3
    of law," which is reflected in the modification of the quote.
    2017 Wis. Act 369, § 32.
    4
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    receive an absentee ballot, and that any absentee ballot issued
    without an application cannot be counted."                               Id., ¶14 (citing
    
    Wis. Stat. §§ 6.84
    (2), 6.86(1)(ar)).                        A majority of this court
    refused    to    consider       whether       the     form    utilized        for     in-person
    absentee voting, EL-122, constituted a written application.                                     It
    noted,    "both       counties       did   use      an     application        form     created,
    approved,       and    disseminated        by       the    chief   Wisconsin          elections
    agency."        Id., ¶15.           The majority emphasized "local election
    officials used form EL-122 in reliance on longstanding guidance
    from WEC."        Id., ¶25.           Therefore, it concluded, "[p]enalizing
    the voters election officials serve and the other candidates who
    relied on this longstanding guidance is beyond unfair."                                        Id.
    "To strike ballots cast in reliance on the guidance now, and to
    do so in only two counties, would violate every notion of equity
    that   undergirds        our    electoral           system."       Id.         In     Trump,     a
    majority    of    this     court      allowed        its    notions      of    "equity"        and
    "unfair[ness]" to trump the law.
    ¶126 Invoking          the     same      rationalizations,             the      majority
    declined    to        examine       whether      election        officials          violated    a
    statute by adding missing witness information to absentee ballot
    certifications.          Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(6d) provides, "[i]f a
    certificate is missing the address of a witness, the ballot may
    not be counted."          The majority defied this clear textual command
    because    it     was    concerned         that      "election      officials          followed
    guidance     that       WEC     created,         approved,         and    disseminated to
    counties    in    October       2016."          Id.,      ¶18.     It     continued,        "the
    5
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    election officials relied on this statewide advice and had no
    reason to question it."4         Id., ¶26.
    ¶127 Overall, the majority compared voting——the foundation
    of free government——to a football game:
    [E]lection officials in Dane and Milwaukee Counties
    followed the advice of WEC where given. . . .
    Our laws allow the challenge flag to be thrown
    regarding various aspects of election administration.
    The challenges raised by the Campaign in this case,
    however, come long after the last play or even the
    last game; the Campaign is challenging the rulebook
    adopted before the season began.    Election claims of
    this type must be brought expeditiously. The Campaign
    waited until after the election to raise selective
    challenges that could have been raised long before the
    election. . . .   The Campaign is not entitled to
    relief, and therefore does not succeed in its effort
    to strike votes and alter the certified winner of the
    2020 presidential election.
    Id.,       ¶¶31–32   (emphasis   added);   see    also   id.,   ¶34    (Dallet   &
    Karofsky,       JJ.,    concurring)   ("The      evidence   does      show   that,
    despite a global pandemic, more than 3.2 million Wisconsinites
    performed their civic duty.           More importantly as it relates to
    this lawsuit, these voters followed the rules that were in place
    at the time.           To borrow Justice Hagedorn's metaphor, Wisconsin
    voters complied with the election rulebook.                 No penalties were
    The majority also gave statements from Dane County
    4
    officials the status of supreme law based on the majority's
    subjective conception of fairness. Trump v. Biden, 
    2020 WI 91
    ,
    ¶27, 
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    , 
    951 N.W.2d 568
     (explaining voters in Dane
    County were "encouraged to utilize" "Democracy in the Park"
    events and that "17,000 voters did so in reliance on
    representations that the process they were using complied with
    the law").
    6
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    committed and the final score was the result of a free and fair
    election."    (emphasis added)).
    ¶128 Under         Trump,   statements       from     WEC's           staff    were
    transformed     into     super-statutes,       trumping       the     actual       law.
    "Rather than fulfilling its duty to say what the law is, a
    majority of this court unconstitutionally converts the Wisconsin
    Elections Commission's mere advice into governing 'law,' thereby
    supplanting the actual election laws enacted by the people's
    elected representatives in the legislature and defying the will
    of Wisconsin's citizens.        When the state's highest court refuses
    to uphold the law, and stands by while an unelected body of six
    commissioners     rewrites      it,   our      system     of        representative
    government is subverted."         Id., ¶140 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley,
    J., dissenting).
    ¶129 The holding in Trump requires a vote cast in reliance
    on a document produced by the WEC's staff to be counted even if
    the vote's counting is unlawful under the statute the staff
    purportedly   interpreted.        The       majority    did    not        ground   its
    decision in constitutional law but in equity.5                 Equitable powers
    may be broad, but they must always be lawfully exercised.                          Just
    5  Id., ¶73 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting) ("If WEC has been
    giving advice contrary to statute, those acts do not make the
    advice lawful.    WEC must follow the law.       We, as the law
    declaring court, owe it to the public to declare whether WEC's
    advice is incorrect.    However, doing so does not necessarily
    lead to striking absentee ballots that were cast by following
    incorrect WEC advice. The remedy Petitioners seek may be out of
    reach for a number of reasons."     (quoting Trump v. Evers, No.
    2020AP1917-OA,   unpublished   order    (Wis.   Dec.  3,   2020)
    (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting from the denial of the petition
    for leave to commence an original action)).
    7
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    this    term,       we    held    this     court      lacks       the   equitable       power    to
    rewrite statutes to enforce a subjective conception of fairness.
    See Johnson v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
    2021 WI 87
    , ¶¶62, 67, 72,
    
    399 Wis. 2d 623
    , 
    967 N.W.2d 469
    .                           The Trump majority abandoned
    this fundamental constraint on the judicial power.
    ¶130 At           the    same      time     the       majority     aggrandized           its
    "equitable"         powers,       it    ceded      its      law    declaring      function       to
    unelected bureaucrats.                   According to the Trump majority, the
    judiciary       may       not    even     opine       on    the    validity      of     purported
    guidance once voters have relied on it.                                 In so ruling, the
    majority    neglected             its     constitutional           duty    to     declare       the
    meaning    of       law,        instead    elevating          "guidance[]        given     by    an
    unelected committee" to the status of supreme law, which must be
    followed       in        derogation       of     enacted         statutes.            Trump,    
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    , ¶108 (Ziegler, J., dissenting); see also State ex
    rel.    Wis.        Senate       v.     Thompson,          
    144 Wis. 2d 429
    ,         436,     
    424 N.W.2d 385
     (1988) ("[I]t is this court's function to develop and
    clarify the law."               (citations omitted)).
    ¶131 The majority achieved these results by declaring WEC's
    guidance to be "the                rulebook."              Trump, 
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    ,              ¶32
    (majority op.) (emphasis added).                            "How astonishing that four
    justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court must be reminded that it
    is THE LAW that constitutes 'the rulebook' for any election——not
    WEC guidance——and election officials are bound to follow the
    law, if we are to be governed by the rule of law, and not of
    men."      Id.,          ¶147    (Rebecca        Grassl      Bradley,     J.,     dissenting).
    Notwithstanding SEIU's characterization of guidance as nothing
    8
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    more       than    executive    branch   "thought     processes,"      the     majority
    permitted "WEC . . . [to] treat their guidance as if it were
    law"——and a form of supreme law capable of overriding statutory
    language.          See id., ¶86 (Roggensack, C.J., dissenting) (citing
    SEIU,             
    393 Wis. 2d 38
    ,         ¶143        (Roggensack,             C.J.,
    concurring/dissenting)).             The majority's reinvention of guidance
    as something on par with the constitution is antithetical to the
    constitutional separation of powers and deprives the people of
    power over their own government.
    ¶132 Without offering any explanation, WEC has changed its
    position on the status of its so-called guidance.                           WEC did not
    file a brief in Trump, but in the case's precursor, Trump v.
    Evers,6 WEC argued in its brief, "[t]hese challenges come too
    late and would unconstitutionally punish voters who relied in
    good faith on election officials' guidance."                        Not only did WEC
    argue its guidance was the law, it argued that following the
    actual law instead of WEC's erroneous interpretations would be
    unconstitutional.            In Trump v. Biden, the majority avoided the
    constitutional issue, but it nonetheless adopted the thrust of
    the    WEC's       argument    about     fairness     by   abusing     this     court's
    equitable powers.            In contrast with its previous position, WEC
    now     characterizes          its   memos     as     inert,    merely        providing
    information to local officials who are free to ignore them as
    they please.            WEC cannot have it both ways.          Either disregarding
    these       documents      offends   the     constitution      or    they     are   mere
    Trump v. Evers was an original action raising the same
    6
    arguments, which a majority of this court declined to hear just
    days before Trump v. Biden.
    9
    No.   2022AP91.rgb
    "thoughts" of executive-branch employees.             This court chose the
    former in Trump, which means these documents must be properly
    promulgated, with checks and balances.
    ¶133 With no convincing response to Trump, WEC primarily
    argues the memos lack the force of law because they do not
    require municipal clerks to establish ballot drop boxes.                     But
    see Off. of the Special Couns., Second Interim Investigative
    Report on the Apparatus & Procedures of the Wisconsin Elections
    System    116   (Mar.     1,   2022)   ("Surprisingly,     many   clerks    have
    expressed to the OSC that they are under the impression that WEC
    guidance is binding, even when they believe such guidance (say,
    on drop boxes) is unlawful.").           Nonetheless, these memos purport
    to authorize drop boxes.          Under Trump, once a vote is placed in
    a drop box in reliance on a WEC document that has not been
    rescinded, it must be counted regardless of whether any statute
    actually authorizes drop boxes.              At least during and after an
    election, a majority of this court will not consider whether a
    statute    authorizes      drop   boxes,     effectively     establishing    the
    memos as the authorizing device.
    ¶134 As the Wisconsin voters accurately argue, "there are
    different    kinds   of    laws——some    impose    duties,    others   prohibit
    conduct, and still others authorize conduct.                 WEC's memos fall
    into the latter category[.]"           Since the time of Sir Edward Coke,
    "unlawful prerogative legislation" has included both legislation
    constraining the public and the "alteration" of "legally binding
    duties"     "more    generally,"       including    their     "relax[ation.]"
    Philip Hamburger, Is Administrative Law Unlawful? 84 (2014).                  At
    10
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    a minimum, the Trump decision allowed WEC to relax legal duties.
    Specifically, the Trump decision endorsed WEC's elimination of
    duties prescribed by law by counting ballots unlawfully cast in
    accordance with WEC's extra-legal directions.                     See 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (2) ("Notwithstanding s. 5.01 (1), with respect to matters
    relating to the absentee ballot process, ss. 6.86, 6.87 (3) to
    (7) and 9.01 (1) (b) 2. and 4. shall be construed as mandatory.
    Ballots cast in contravention of the procedures specified in
    those   provisions    may   not    be    counted.         Ballots       counted    in
    contravention of the procedures specified in those provisions
    may not be included in the certified result of any election.").
    To erase by executive fiat the legislature's duly enacted law is
    no less an alteration of law merely because it authorizes the
    unlawful   rather    than   prohibits        that   which    is    lawful.        See
    generally Case of Proclamations, [1610] EWHC KB J22, (1611) 12
    Co Rep 74, 75, 77 ER 1352 ("[T]he King cannot change any part of
    the common law, nor create any offence by his proclamation,
    which      was       not      an             offence        before,         without
    Parliament. . . .     [T]he King by his proclamation of other ways
    cannot change any part of the common law, or statute law, or the
    customs of the realm[.]"      (citations omitted)).
    ¶135 WEC also misses another critical point.                         While the
    memos may not require municipal clerks to set up ballot drop
    boxes, if they do so, Memo two regulates their use with clear,
    unambiguous, and mandatory language.                   For example, WEC says:
    "Ballot drop boxes must be secured and locked at all times" and
    "[c]hain of custody logs must be completed every time ballots
    11
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    are collected."7         The fact that these requirements attach only if
    a    municipal     clerk    decides       to    set    up     drop    boxes       makes   no
    difference.        Laws often take the form of "if/then" statements.
    A person may choose not to drive, but if the person chooses to
    drive, the person is bound to wear a seat belt by a statute with
    the force of law.          
    Wis. Stat. § 347.48
    (2m)(b).
    ¶136 The two propositions resulting from the Trump decision
    cannot both be true:
    1. Documents produced by WEC's staff——not the Wisconsin
    statutes——comprise "the rulebook" for elections; and
    2. WEC's memos are not administrative rules because they do
    not have the force of law.
    No   other    agency's      guidance——or        even    its    properly         promulgated
    rules,       for    that        matter——has       been        given       such      pseudo-
    constitutional       force.         The    Trump       decision       glorified       WEC's
    purported guidance with a supremacy over real law.                               This court
    should overrule its erroneous holding in Trump, restoring WEC's
    documents to their proper, and quite limited, role.
    ¶137 The way we described guidance documents in SEIU in
    2020 simply cannot be reconciled with the                          Trump        decision of
    2021.      In SEIU, we correctly concluded guidance documents "are
    not law, they do not have the force or effect of law, and they
    provide no authority for implementing standards or conditions."
    
    393 Wis. 2d 38
    , ¶102 (Kelly, J., majority op.).                       "They impose no
    obligations,       set     no    standards,       and       bind     no    one."          
    Id.
    "Functionally, and as a matter of law, they are entirely inert.
    7   Emphasis added.
    12
    No.   2022AP91.rgb
    That is to say, they represent nothing more than the knowledge
    and    intentions      of     their    authors.          It     is    readily    apparent,
    therefore, that the executive need not borrow any legislative
    authority,     nor     seek     the    legislature's           permission,      to     create
    guidance documents."           
    Id.
     (emphasis added).
    ¶138 Trump      transformed       purported        guidance       from    "entirely
    inert"    to   imperviously           potent.       See        
    id.
          Ironically,       the
    legislature      enacted         pre-issuance        procedures           for     guidance
    documents precisely because the nature of guidance documents is
    often misunderstood.            "Guidance documents can have a practical
    effect    similar        to     an     unpromulgated            rule."          Id.,     ¶142
    (Roggensack,         C.J.,    concurring/dissenting).                    Lawmakers      have
    "frequently      heard       from     constituents,           small    businesses      [and]
    local government" about "how guidance documents have been abused
    as a vehicle to actually change the law."                             Id., ¶143 (quoting
    Floor Speech by Andre Jacque, Floor Session on 2017 Assembly
    Bill      1072          (2017          Wis.        Act          369),       at          3:25,
    https://wiseye.org/2018/12/05/assembly-floor-session-part-2-8/
    (last visited June 25, 2020)).                  The Trump majority contradicted
    the SEIU court's treatment of executive agency communications.
    In    SEIU,    the    court     said,    "should         an     administrative         agency
    employee treat a guidance document as a source of authority,
    that employee would be making a mistake, not defining the nature
    of a guidance document."                Id., ¶134 (Kelly, J., majority op.)
    (emphasis added).           The court itself made a consequential mistake
    by declaring WEC's guidance not only a source of authority, but
    the supreme statement of election law.
    13
    No.   2022AP91.rgb
    ¶139 In his concurrence, Justice Brian Hagedorn attempts to
    backtrack        from        the    majority       opinion       he    authored       in     Trump.
    Whether         expressed          metaphorically          or    otherwise,           the     Trump
    majority        not    only        labeled    WEC's       guidance       the    "rulebook"——it
    treated it as such, elevating it over statutory law.                                   See supra
    ¶¶124–26.             This    concurrence          does    not        advance    a    new    legal
    analysis;        the    dissent        in    Trump    explained         the     upshot      of   the
    majority's treatment of WEC's pronouncements on the law, which
    the majority never disavowed:                      "the majority commits grave error
    by     according        WEC        guidance    the    force       of     law . . . .             How
    astonishing that four justices of the Wisconsin Supreme Court
    must       be   reminded       that    it     is    THE    LAW    that     constitutes           'the
    rulebook'        for     any        election——not         WEC    guidance——and             election
    officials are bound to follow the law, if we are to be governed
    by the rule of law, and not of men."                             Trump, 
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    ,
    ¶¶141, 147 (Rebecca Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).                                  Regardless
    of what WEC's pronouncements on the law are called, if this
    court is going to allow them to control an election, they should
    be promulgated as rules.                It was a "serious legal argument" then
    and remains so now.                 The majority grievously injured the rule of
    law in Trump, which the court should acknowledge and correct.8
    Justice Hagedorn now seems to minimize portions of his
    8
    Trump opinion as dicta.     Justice Hagedorn's Concurrence, ¶202
    ("the court used the word 'rulebook' in a metaphor regarding
    challenge flags in football.").    Our court does not recognize
    the concept of dicta, however.      "Wisconsin does not consider
    statements germane to a controversy as dicta."     Brandenburg v.
    Briarwood Forestry Servs., LLC, 
    2014 WI 37
    , ¶66 n.2, 
    354 Wis. 2d 413
    , 447, 
    847 N.W.2d 395
    , 413 (citing Zarder v. Humana
    Ins. Co., 
    2010 WI 35
    , ¶52 n.19, 
    324 Wis. 2d 325
    , 
    782 N.W.2d 682
    ). Metaphors can be a powerful tool in legal writing,
    but they should be used with care.
    14
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    III.   CONCLUSION
    ¶140 "In Wisconsin, we have a constitution, and it reigns
    supreme in this state.              'By section 1 of article 4 the power of
    the   state    to     deal    with    elections      except    as     limited    by    the
    Constitution        is     vested    in    the     senate     and    assembly     to    be
    exercised under the provisions of the Constitution; therefore
    the power to prescribe the manner of conducting elections is
    clearly within the province of the Legislature.'"                            Trump, 
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    ,        ¶141      (Rebecca     Grassl     Bradley,       J.,     dissenting)
    (quoting      State      v.   Kohler,      
    200 Wis. 518
    ,     
    228 N.W. 895
    ,       906
    (1930)).      In contravention of the Wisconsin Constitution, the
    majority's      decision       in    Trump       suppresses    the     power     of    the
    people's representatives in a manner reminiscent of a scene from
    William Shakespeare's Henry VI:
    Dick:         I have a suit unto your lordship.
    Cade:         Be it a lordship, thou shalt have it for that
    word.
    Dick:         Only that the laws of England may come out of
    your mouth.
    Holland: [to Smith] Mass, 'twill be sore law, then; for
    he was thrust in the mouth with a spear, and
    'tis not whole yet.
    Smith:        [to Holland] Nay, . . . it will be stinking
    law for his breath stinks with eating toasted
    cheese.
    Cade:         I have thought upon it, it shall be so. Away,
    burn all the records of the realm: my mouth
    shall be the parliament of England.
    Holland: [to himself] Then we are like to have biting
    statutes, unless his teeth be pulled out.
    William Shakespeare, Henry VI, Part II, act. 4, sc. 7, ll. 3–16.
    15
    No.      2022AP91.rgb
    ¶141 When the "mouth" of an employee at the WEC supplants
    the   legislature      of       Wisconsin,         we    are    left   with       "sore"    or
    "stinking" laws, irredeemably infected by their promulgation in
    violation of the constitution by an executive branch agency, and
    impervious     to    correction          by    our       constitutional           lawmakers.
    "Bicameralism       and     presentment        are       the     crucible      bills       must
    overcome to become law.                By design, it is much more difficult
    than rule by dictatorship."              In re Amending 
    Wis. Stat. §§ 48.299
    & 938.299 Regulating the Use of Restraints on Child. in Juv.
    Ct., 
    2022 WI 26
    , ¶55 n.11,              __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (Rebecca
    Grassl Bradley, J., dissenting).
    ¶142 A majority of this court permits Administrator Megan
    Wolfe's unilateral declarations regarding election procedures to
    have the force of law, subject only to judicial review (if the
    court even bothers to take the case).                          "No one man should have
    all that power."           Kanye West, Power (2010).                    "It is not the
    province [or the prerogative] of a state executive official to
    re-write the state's election code[.]"                     See Carson v. Simon, 
    978 F.3d 1051
    , 1060 (8th Cir. 2020) (cited sources omitted).                               WEC's
    "rulebook" should be subject to formal rulemaking under ch. 227.
    ¶143 "The      Founders          designed          our     'republic        to   be    a
    government of laws, and not of men . . . bound by fixed laws,
    which   the   people       have    a    voice       in    making,      and    a    right     to
    defend.'"     Trump,      
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    ,           ¶149     (quoting     John     Adams,
    Novanglus:      A History of the Dispute with America, from Its
    Origin, in 1754, to the Present Time, in Revolutionary Writings
    of John Adams (C. Bradley Thompson ed. 2000)).                               A majority of
    16
    No.    2022AP91.rgb
    this court defenestrated the people's ability to defend their
    laws.   Trump    should     be   overruled   to   restore    the     people's
    supremacy over their public servants.        I respectfully concur.
    ¶144 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE
    KINGSLAND   ZIEGLER   and   Justice    PATIENCE   DRAKE   ROGGENSACK      join
    this concurrence.
    17
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    ¶145 BRIAN        HAGEDORN,          J.        (concurring).            The        principal
    issue in this case involves the lawfulness of ballot drop boxes.
    This case is not about the risk of fraudulent votes being cast
    or   inspiring       confidence            in    elections.            This    is        not    about
    ensuring     everyone         who   wants        to     vote    can,    nor        should       we    be
    concerned      with      making       absentee          voting     more       convenient             and
    secure.      Those are policy concerns, and where the law does not
    speak, they are the business of the other branches, not the
    judicial     branch.           This    case        is    about     applying         the        law    as
    written; that's it.            To find out what the law is, we read it and
    give the words of the statutes the meaning they had when they
    were written.
    ¶146 The occasion for us to visit this question now is the
    issuance     of    two    memos       by    the       Wisconsin    Elections             Commission
    (WEC)   in    2020.           Those    memos          were     prepared       in    response          to
    questions from local clerks administering elections.                                           In the
    beginning stages of the COVID-19 pandemic, many wondered whether
    the mail system would be able to return absentee ballots on
    time.        The    memos      reflect          that     clerks    asked       for        guidance,
    including     whether         ballot       drop    boxes       could    be     established            to
    receive completed ballots.                      WEC said yes, and offered detailed
    best    practices        on     security          and     logistics       and        other       such
    administrative questions.                   The 2020 spring and fall elections
    came and went; no significant legal challenges to the memos were
    raised at the time.
    ¶147 This      lawsuit         was       filed     in    June    2021.            It     is     a
    declaratory        judgment     action          under    
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    ,         which
    1
    No.      2022AP91.bh
    authorizes       "judicial          review       of    the    validity     of        a    rule     or
    guidance document" issued by a state agency.                             § 227.40(1).             The
    focus is therefore on what the memos say, and whether their
    prescriptions are consistent with the law.
    ¶148 The law says this:               absentee ballots can be mailed by
    the elector or "delivered in person, to the municipal clerk."
    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.                 A    careful      study       of     the       text,
    including    its       history,          along       with    the   supporting            statutory
    context, reveals that unstaffed drop boxes for absentee ballot
    return are not permitted.                 Rather, this statute specifies return
    of absentee ballots through two and only two means:                                   mailing by
    the voter to the municipal clerk, or personal delivery by the
    voter to the municipal clerk.                         And personal delivery to the
    clerk contemplates a person-to-person exchange between the voter
    and the clerk or the clerk's authorized representative at either
    the clerk's office or a designated alternate site.                                    
    Wis. Stat. §§ 5.02
    (10),          6.855,       6.87(4)(b)1.,            6.88(1).       The        two       memos
    advising    otherwise          therefore         conflict       with   the      law       and    are
    properly void.
    ¶149 In        Part     II    of    this        concurrence,        I       address        the
    important procedural questions before us regarding standing and
    exhaustion       of    administrative            remedies.         While       I     agree      that
    Teigen may bring this claim, I do so on different grounds than
    those proffered by the majority/lead opinion.                              In Part III, I
    provide     additional         insight       into       the     statutory           context      and
    history     of    the        relevant      statutes          governing     where          and    how
    absentee    ballots          may    be    returned.           Finally,     in       Part     IV,   I
    2
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    address    whether    WEC's       memos    in    this   case   are    unpromulgated
    administrative rules.         I conclude they are not because they do
    not have what the statute requires:                  the "force of law."           See
    
    Wis. Stat. § 227.01
    (13).1
    ¶150 Before diving into the law, I offer two observations.
    First, the election law statutes we are asked to consider are by
    no means a model of clarity.              Many of the controlling provisions
    were originally enacted over 100 years ago and have been layered
    over with numerous amendments since.                      Reasonable minds might
    read them differently.         Significant questions remain despite our
    decision in this case, especially as absentee voting has become
    increasingly common.          Although our adjudication of this case
    will provide some assistance, the public is better served by
    clear    statutes    than    by    clear       judicial    opinions    interpreting
    unclear statutes.           The legislature and governor may wish to
    consider resolving some of the open questions these statutes
    present.
    ¶151 Second, some citizens will cheer this result; others
    will lament.        But the people of Wisconsin must remember that
    judicial decision-making and politics are different under our
    constitutional order.             Our obligation is to follow the law,
    which may mean the policy result is undesirable or unpopular.
    Even so, we must follow the law anyway.                        To the extent the
    citizens of Wisconsin wish the law were different, the main
    1 I join ¶¶4-10, 12-13, 52-63, 73-85 of the majority/lead
    opinion.
    3
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    remedy      is   to    vote   and    persuade      elected    officials        to   enact
    different laws.         This is the hard work of democracy.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    ¶152 Weeks before Wisconsin voters went to the polls in
    April 2020, the COVID-19 pandemic upended much of the world.
    Election administration was no exception.                    Due to the risk posed
    by    the    virus,     exponentially       more    voters     opted    to     vote     by
    absentee     ballot.          Complicating      things   further,       the    pandemic
    strained the United States Postal Service, causing fear that it
    would not be able to deliver absentee ballots on a timely basis.
    Faced with these constraints, local election officials reached
    out to WEC for guidance on how they could ensure all absentee
    ballots would be received in time to be counted.                      In response to
    these questions, WEC issued a memo on March 31, 2020, entitled,
    "FAQs:      Absentee Ballot Return Options:                  USPS Coordination and
    Drop Boxes."          The memo advised in relevant part that "drop boxes
    can   be    used      for   voters   to   return    ballots     but    clerks       should
    ensure they are secure."              It also noted its view that a "family
    member or another person may also return the ballot on behalf of
    the voter."        The April election proceeded without apparent legal
    controversy over these matters.
    ¶153 As preparations began for the November 2020 election,
    WEC    issued      another     memo.       Dated    August     19,     2020,    it     was
    entitled, "Absentee Ballot Drop Box Information."                       The document
    was "intended to provide information and guidance on drop box
    4
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    options for secure absentee ballot return for voters."               The memo
    explained:
    A ballot drop box provides a secure and convenient
    means for voters to return their by mail absentee
    ballot.   A drop box is a secure, locked structure
    operated by local election officials.       Voters may
    deposit their ballot in a drop box at any time after
    they receive it in the mail up to the time of the last
    ballot collection Election Day. Ballot drop boxes can
    be staffed or unstaffed, temporary or permanent.
    ¶154 In June 2021, Waukesha County voters Richard Teigen
    and Richard Thom (collectively "Teigen") sued WEC "seeking a
    declaratory judgment regarding the proper construction of state
    statutes that set forth the legal methods for Wisconsin voters
    to cast absentee ballots."        In his complaint, Teigen contended:
    "The March 2020 and August 2020 Memos are invalid because they
    exceed the statutory authority of WEC and because they were
    promulgated   without     compliance    with   statutory       procedures."
    Several parties intervened to defend the memos, including the
    Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee (DSCC) and Disability
    Rights Wisconsin, Wisconsin Faith Voices for Justice, and the
    League of Women Voters for Wisconsin (collectively "DRW").
    ¶155 Teigen   moved    for    summary   judgment,   and    the    circuit
    court granted his motion.        The circuit court declared the memos
    invalid because they conflicted with three principles it drew
    from the statutes:      (1) "an elector must personally mail or
    deliver his or her own absentee ballot, except where the law
    explicitly authorizes an agent to act on an elector's behalf";
    (2) the only ways to cast an absentee ballot under 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.   "are   for   the   elector    to   place     the    envelope
    5
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    containing the ballot in the mail or for the elector to deliver
    the ballot in person to the municipal clerk"; and (3) the use of
    drop boxes "is not permitted under Wisconsin law unless the drop
    box is staffed by the clerk and located at the office of the
    clerk or a properly designated alternate site under 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
    ."     The    circuit      court    also       held    that    the     memos   were
    unpromulgated       administrative        rules,        and     therefore       invalid.
    Finally,     the     court       enjoined       WEC      from        issuing     further
    interpretations that conflict with Wisconsin law and ordered WEC
    to withdraw the two memos.
    ¶156 After the circuit court's ruling, WEC, DRW, and DSCC
    appealed to the court of appeals.                Teigen petitioned this court
    for bypass.      We granted Teigen's petition and received briefing
    on three issues:          (1) whether Teigen's case is procedurally
    proper, (2) whether WEC's memos are inconsistent with Wisconsin
    election    law,    and   (3)    whether       WEC's    memos    are       unpromulgated
    administrative rules.
    II.    PROCEDURAL ISSUES
    ¶157 The       intervening      parties           raise        two      procedural
    challenges they contend forbid Teigen from bringing this suit.
    DSCC asserts Teigen lacks standing to seek declaratory relief.
    And   DRW   argues    Teigen's     claim       must    be     dismissed       because   he
    failed to exhaust the available administrative remedies.                              Both
    challenges fall short.
    6
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    A.   Standing
    ¶158 Teigen      seeks      declaratory      relief          under     
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    .        That statute permits "judicial review of the validity
    of   a    rule    or    guidance      document"      issued      by    a    state      agency.
    § 227.40(1).           Under such review, the court "shall declare" a
    rule      or      guidance      document         invalid      if       it      violates       a
    constitutional           provision,        exceeds     the       agency's            statutory
    authority, or was not issued in compliance with the relevant
    statutory procedures.              § 227.40(4)(a).
    ¶159 Chapter 227's broad right to declaratory relief is not
    without limits.           In particular, the statute requires that the
    challenged rule or guidance document have some practical and
    adverse effect on the party seeking relief:
    The court shall render a declaratory judgment in the
    action only when it appears from the complaint and the
    supporting evidence that the rule or guidance document
    or its threatened application interferes with or
    impairs, or threatens to interfere with or impair, the
    legal rights and privileges of the plaintiff.
    
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (1).            In     legal      parlance,             this   harm
    requirement is called standing.
    ¶160 Standing is the foundational principle that those who
    seek to invoke the court's power to remedy a wrong must face a
    harm which can be remedied by the exercise of judicial power.
    Krier      v.    Vilione,      
    2009 WI 45
    ,    ¶20,      
    317 Wis. 2d 288
    ,          
    766 N.W.2d 517
    .            Some   of    my   colleagues       have     begun       to     describe
    standing in far looser terms.               It is a really nice thing to have
    in a case, they seem to say, but not important at the end of the
    day.      I disagree.         We have said standing is not jurisdictional
    7
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    in the same sense as in federal courts and that its parameters
    are a matter of sound judicial policy.                         But as Justice Prosser
    put it, "Judicial policy is not, and has not been, carte blanche
    for the courts of Wisconsin to weigh in on issues whenever the
    respective members of the bench find it desirable."                                    Foley-
    Ciccantelli v. Bishop's Grove Condo. Ass'n, Inc., 
    2011 WI 36
    ,
    ¶131, 
    333 Wis. 2d 402
    , 
    797 N.W.2d 789
     (Prosser, J., concurring).
    The     judiciary     does    not    serve        as    a      roving     legal      advisor,
    answering any questions about the law that may arise.                              The power
    we have is "judicial."             Wis. Const. art. VII, § 2.                  The judicial
    power is the power decide disputes between parties about the law
    where there is harm to a party that can be remedied through the
    judicial process.            Gabler v. Crime Victims Rights Bd., 
    2017 WI 67
    , ¶37, 
    376 Wis. 2d 147
    , 
    897 N.W.2d 384
    .                           In this sense, the
    judicial policy buttressing our standing doctrine must stem from
    our constitutional role.              Standing is not a historical relic
    that should be dispensed with in an age of judicial supremacy.
    It serves as a vital check on unbounded judicial power.                                     A
    judiciary    that      understands         its    limited         and    modest      role   in
    constitutional        governance      will       take    it    seriously.           Doing   so
    brings our judgment to bear when necessary to resolve legal
    disputes between parties, but allows many legal debates to take
    place    where   the    constitution         places      them:          in   the    court   of
    public     opinion     and    by     and     between        the    other       branches     of
    government.
    ¶161 It    is    also    important         to     give    careful      attention      to
    standing     because     the       legislature          has,      in    many       instances,
    8
    No.     2022AP91.bh
    prescribed the ground rules for judicial review.                                 The rule of
    law requires that we pay heed to the procedural law enacted by
    the    legislature         no    less   than       other       laws.        Wisconsin       Stat.
    § 227.40(1)        is     one    such    statute         that       imposes      a    statutory
    standing requirement.               Ordinarily and at common law, citizens
    could not simply request and obtain a judicial declaration of
    what the law is in a given scenario.                             Miller v. Currie, 
    208 Wis. 199
    , 203, 
    242 N.W. 570
     (1932) ("Declaratory relief is a
    creation of the statute and was unknown to the common law.").
    Section 227.40(1) permits a declaration of rights, but only when
    a    "rule    or    guidance      document         or    its    threatened           application
    interferes with or impairs, or threatens to interfere with or
    impair, the legal rights and privileges of the plaintiff."
    ¶162 Thus,         the    question     is    whether         WEC's    memos        harm    or
    threaten harm to any of Teigen's "legal rights and privileges."
    Teigen       proffers      two     legal      rights       which        he    contends           are
    implicated by the memos:                his right as a taxpayer to challenge
    unlawful expenditures, and his right as a voter to have election
    officials comply with election laws.
    ¶163 We have held that taxpayers have a legal right "to
    contest governmental actions leading to an illegal expenditure
    of    taxpayer      funds."        Fabick     v.    Evers,       
    2021 WI 28
    ,       ¶10,      
    396 Wis. 2d 231
    , 
    956 N.W.2d 856
    .                  Teigen maintains he has taxpayer
    standing because tax dollars supported distribution of the memos
    and    the    salaries      of    WEC   staff      who     prepared       them.           Taxpayer
    standing,      however,          does   not     extend         as      broadly       as     Teigen
    suggests.          This    argument, if accepted, would mark a radical
    9
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    departure   in   the   law.   It   would   mean   any   taxpayer   could
    challenge almost any government action——as long as a government
    employee devoted some time and attention to the matter.            Since
    that is nearly always true, this would practically eliminate
    standing as a consideration in most challenges to government
    action.     It is true that the functional distance between an
    illegal government expenditure and staff time spent drafting a
    legally erroneous memo may be fuzzy, but it is meaningful and
    clear from our cases.2    We have never described taxpayer standing
    as broadly as Teigen asserts, and we should not grant Teigen's
    entreaty now.
    ¶164 Teigen's second argument, however, is more compelling.
    Teigen argues that 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
     gives voters like him a
    2 Our taxpayer standing cases have always involved an
    alleged illegal expenditure distinct from staff time. See Hart
    v. Ament, 
    176 Wis. 2d 694
    , 698-99, 
    500 N.W.2d 312
     (1993)
    (challenging the transfer of management of a county museum);
    Tooley v. O'Connell, 
    77 Wis. 2d 422
    , 439, 
    253 N.W.2d 335
     (1977)
    (challenging the constitutionality of a taxing provision); Buse
    v.   Smith,   
    74 Wis. 2d 550
    ,   563,    
    247 N.W.2d 141
       (1976)
    (challenging a negative-aid provision); Thompson v. Kenosha
    County,   
    64 Wis. 2d 673
    ,   679-80,    
    221 N.W.2d 845
        (1974)
    (challenging the adoption of a countywide assessor system); S.D.
    Realty Co. v. Sewerage Comm'n of City of Milwaukee, 
    15 Wis. 2d 15
    ,    21-22,    
    112 N.W.2d 177
         (1961)    (challenging
    construction of a tunnel); Federal Paving Corp. v. Prudisch, 
    235 Wis. 527
    ,   538,   
    293 N.W. 156
       (1940)    (challenging   a   city
    resolution directing that payment be made to a paving
    contractor); Chippewa Bridge Co. v. City of Durand, 
    122 Wis. 85
    ,
    107-08, 
    99 N.W. 603
     (1904) (challenging building of a bridge);
    J.F. Ahern Co. v. Wis. State Bldg. Comm'n, 
    114 Wis. 2d 69
    , 84,
    
    336 N.W.2d 679
         (Ct.    App.     1983)     (challenging     the
    constitutionality of a statue resulting in public expenditures).
    10
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    statutory right to have local election officials in the area
    where he lives comply with election laws.3            That statute says:
    Whenever any elector of a jurisdiction or district
    served by an election official believes that a
    decision or action of the official or the failure of
    the official to act with respect to any matter
    concerning . . . election administration or conduct of
    elections is contrary to law . . . the elector may
    file a written sworn complaint with [WEC] requesting
    that the official be required to conform his or her
    conduct to the law, be restrained from taking any
    action inconsistent with the law or be required to
    correct any action or decision inconsistent with the
    law or any abuse of the discretion vested in him or
    her by law.
    § 5.06(1).         According   to   this   statute,     if   local    election
    officials in the area where a voter lives violate election laws,
    the   voter   is   empowered   to   have   that   conduct    abated.4      This
    establishes not only a process to compel compliance with the
    law, but also a legal right held by the voter to have their
    local election officials follow the law.5              Other provisions of
    Chapter 5 work in similar ways.6
    3The majority/lead opinion complains 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
     is
    not in the petitioner's complaint. But it is in their briefing,
    which is usually where we look for legal arguments.    This was
    unquestionably an argument Teigen raised.
    4Additional recourse to a court is available if WEC does
    not take action on the voter's complaint.       See 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    (2).
    5The majority/lead opinion misses this distinction, stating
    that this legal right may only be vindicated by following the
    procedures set forth in 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    .        But 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
     provides an additional avenue to vindicate rights
    conferred   in   other   statutes——including   § 5.06——that   are
    threatened by unlawful guidance documents and rules.
    6See, e.g., 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.08
     (empowering voters who
    believe "that an election official has failed or is failing to
    11
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    ¶165 Returning to the standing question here, 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (1)     first    requires   the       challenge    be    to    a    "rule    or
    guidance document."        Teigen challenges two memos issued by WEC
    which all agree are either guidance documents or rules.                             The
    statute then inquires whether the memos or their "threatened
    application     interfere[]    with      or    impair[],    or    threaten[]         to
    interfere with or impair, the legal rights and privileges of the
    plaintiff."      § 227.40(1).       As I have explained, Teigen has a
    legal   right    protected    by    
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
         to     have    local
    election officials in his area comply with the law.                         The only
    question,   then,   is    whether     the     memos   at   least       threaten     to
    interfere with or impair Teigen's right to have local election
    officials comply with the law.           I conclude they do.
    ¶166 The two memos challenged in this case provide local
    election    officials     advice    on     absentee   ballot      return——advice
    Teigen contends is unlawful.             Regardless of whether the memos
    are themselves binding on local election officials (a question
    explored further below), they no doubt carry persuasive force
    with    those   administering       elections.         Many      local       election
    officials will follow advice offered by WEC, even when that
    advice is not legally binding.             Indeed, the record in this case
    comply with any law regulating the conduct of elections or
    election campaigns" to petition the district attorney with
    jurisdiction to prosecute the election official's failure); 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.061
     (directing voters to file a complaint if they
    observe a violation of the Help America Vote Act in a national
    election); 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.081
     (authorizing voters to contest
    perceived violations of § 2 of the Voting Rights Act by
    petitioning the attorney general, who then is directed to bring
    a lawsuit on the voters' behalf).
    12
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    reveals that many local election officials employed drop boxes
    consistent with WEC's advice after the memos issued.                     If that
    advice is contrary to law, it stands to reason that many local
    election officials, including those in Teigen's area, are likely
    to rely on and implement erroneous advice.                Applying the plain
    terms of 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (1), the memos Teigen challenges at
    the very least threaten to interfere with or impair his right to
    have local election officials comply with the law.                     In other
    words, unlawful WEC guidance can           threaten harm to the legal
    rights and privileges 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
     provides to voters like
    Teigen.     In this case, the question is whether WEC issued an
    allegedly   unlawful     rule   or   guidance    document    that      makes   it
    likely local election officials will not follow election laws.
    And on that question, Teigen has sufficiently alleged standing
    for purposes of § 227.40(1).7
    ¶167 The    majority/lead        opinion        concludes    Teigen       has
    standing, but for a different reason.           It says Teigen alleged an
    injury to his constitutional right to vote as recognized in 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (1).       Majority/lead op., ¶21.         That subsection is a
    statement of legislative policy.              It provides in part, "The
    legislature finds that voting is a constitutional right, the
    vigorous    exercise    of   which   should     be    strongly    encouraged."
    7 Significantly, the challenge to Teigen's standing in this
    case was brought by one of the intervenors, DSCC.       WEC——the
    agency that issued the challenged guidance——expressly declined
    to join DSCC's standing challenge, even when questioned about
    the challenge at oral argument.     If there is a clear bar to
    voters challenging allegedly unlawful WEC guidance, WEC itself
    did not think it worth raising.
    13
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    § 6.84(1).            This     statute      acknowledges          the        right        to    vote
    protected        in      Article     III,      Section        1        of    the        Wisconsin
    Constitution:           "Every United States citizen age 18 or older who
    is   a       resident    of   an    election      district        in    this        state       is   a
    qualified elector of that district."                    The majority/lead does not
    explain why the text of § 6.84(1)——or Article III, Section 1 for
    that matter——should be read to encompass a right for a voter to
    challenge any and all election practices.                               Section 6.84 sets
    forth rules of construction in a subchapter governing absentee
    voting.        Yet the majority/lead opinion suggests it creates broad
    voter        standing    against     any    election     official            or     WEC    by    any
    elector for nearly any purported violation of any election law.8
    Without        tethering      the    analysis      to    an       on-point          text,       this
    analysis is unpersuasive and does not garner the support of four
    members of this court.
    B.    Exhaustion
    ¶168 One       procedural    matter      remains.             DRW    argues           Teigen
    failed to exhaust his administrative remedies because he did not
    first         challenge       the    guidance      under          
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
    .
    Specifically, DRW points to subsec. (2) of that statute, which
    says:         "No person who is authorized to file a complaint under
    The majority/lead opinion does not disagree with this
    8
    characterization of the import of its argument. But it wrongly
    suggests my analysis under 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
     does the same. My
    standing analysis applies only to challenges under 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (1) to WEC rules and guidance documents when that
    guidance threatens to cause local election officials to behave
    illegally——a legal right protected by § 5.06. The majority/lead
    opinion brings heat, but little light, to the analysis.
    14
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    [this   section] . . . may         commence       an    action    or   proceeding     to
    test the validity of any decision, action or failure to act on
    the part of any election official . . . without first filing a
    complaint under [this section.]"               § 5.06(2).        DRW also relies on
    
    Wis. Stat. § 5.05
    (2m), which says WEC's "power to initiate civil
    actions . . . for the enforcement of chs. 5 to 10 or 12 shall be
    the exclusive remedy for alleged civil violations of chs. 5 to
    10 or 12."       § 5.05(2m)(k).
    ¶169 DRW        makes     reasonable       arguments        supporting        the
    proposition that these statutes apply to claimed failures of WEC
    as well.     But on balance, I conclude that these statutes do not
    apply here.        Wisconsin Stat. § 5.06 gives WEC an adjudicatory
    role when an "election official" violates the law.                      An "election
    official" in the elections statutes is "an individual who is
    charged with any duties relating to the conduct of an election."
    
    Wis. Stat. § 5.02
    (4e).        However,       WEC    is     separately    defined
    immediately following this as "the elections commission."                           
    Wis. Stat. § 5.025
    .         WEC's powers and duties are outlined in § 5.05
    and    include    a    direction    to    "investigate         violations     of   laws
    administered      by    the    commission"     and      "prosecute     alleged     civil
    violations of those laws."           § 5.05(2m)(a).            Similarly, § 5.06(4)
    authorizes       WEC    to     "investigate       and    determine      whether     any
    election   official . . . has            failed    to    comply     with     the   law."
    With respect to both §§ 5.05(2m) and 5.06, DRW's reading would
    mean WEC is directed to investigate and prosecute itself, which
    makes little sense.            That, along with the statutory distinction
    between an "election official" and the "commission" lead me to
    15
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    conclude the better reading is that the § 5.06 complaint process
    does not apply to complaints against acts of WEC as a body.9
    ¶170 In addition,           
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (1) expressly opens
    the courthouse doors to those challenging administrative rules
    or guidance documents:             "A declaratory judgment may be rendered
    whether or not the plaintiff has first requested the agency to
    pass       upon   the   validity    of   the    rule   or   guidance    document     in
    question."         This seems to carve out a particular kind of legal
    claim——a challenge to rules and guidance documents——and relieves
    the petitioner of pleading one's case with the agency first.10
    Applying this as written, and in the absence of other contrary
    arguments, I conclude Teigen was not required to take his case
    to WEC before seeking judicial relief under § 227.40(1).                          Thus,
    Teigen has not failed to exhaust his administrative remedies
    before bringing this claim.              I therefore proceed to the merits.
    III.   BALLOT DELIVERY & DROP BOXES
    ¶171 In the two memos at issue here, WEC advised clerks
    that absentee voters could cast their ballots via staffed or
    unstaffed drop boxes, that drop boxes may be placed at clerk's
    See also Note, Wis. Admin. Code ch. EL 20 (June 2016)
    9
    (referring to "complaints alleging a violation of election laws
    by a local election official under s. 5.06, Wis. Stat."
    (emphasis added)).
    The availability of relief under 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (1)
    10
    also means the State has waived its sovereign immunity from this
    type of claim——i.e., it has consented to suits of this type.
    See Wis. Const. art. IV, § 27; Lister v. Bd. of Regents of Univ.
    Wis.   Sys.,   
    72 Wis. 2d 282
    ,   291,   
    240 N.W.2d 610
       (1976)
    (explaining "the state cannot be sued without its consent").
    16
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    office or elsewhere, and that individuals other than the voter
    may deliver the voter's absentee ballot to the clerk.               These
    three   positions    are    inconsistent   with   Wisconsin's    election
    statutes.     The law requires that to return an absentee ballot in
    person, voters must personally deliver their ballot to the clerk
    or the clerk's authorized representative at either the clerk's
    office or a designated alternate site.        
    Wis. Stat. §§ 5.02
    (10),
    6.855, 6.87(4)(b)1., 6.88(1).      Because WEC's memos conflict with
    these statutory directives, they are invalid.
    A.    Statutory Framework
    ¶172 Our interpretive task centers on three statutes that
    together provide the framework for how absentee ballots may be
    returned and how clerks are to receive them.
    ¶173 The first one, 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1., details how
    an absentee voter should complete a ballot, and then directs how
    it should be returned:        "The envelope shall be mailed by the
    elector, or delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing
    the ballot or ballots."         § 6.87(4)(b)1.     A "municipal clerk"
    includes "authorized representatives" of the clerk.            
    Wis. Stat. § 5.02
    (10).
    ¶174 Wisconsin Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. was originally enacted
    as part of Wisconsin's earliest comprehensive absentee voting
    law in 1915.     § 1, ch. 461, Laws of 1915.      Regarding return of a
    ballot, the law provided:         "Said envelope shall be mailed by
    such voter, by registered mail, postage prepaid, to the officer
    issuing the ballot, or if more convenient it may be delivered in
    17
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    person."        Id.     This wording, plainly read, suggests both the
    mailing and the delivery must be done by the voter, and directed
    to the ballot-issuing officer.
    ¶175 When we construe statutes, we must read the words to
    mean what they were understood to mean at the time they were
    enacted, lest we find ourselves rewriting the law.                           Fortunately,
    we have clear evidence of how this language was originally read.
    Less than a year after enactment, the attorney general opined on
    the precise interpretive question before us today:                                "'Delivery
    in   person'     must    mean    handed    directly        by    an    elector       to     the
    officer; it means manual transmission by the one to the other."
    5 Wis. Op. Att'y Gen. 591, 593 (1916).                     When enacted, the text
    we are considering today was understood to require a person-to-
    person interaction between the voter and the clerk.                           So far as I
    can tell, this reading went unchallenged for 40 years.
    ¶176 In    1955,     this    court      had    occasion         to    examine        the
    statute    in    an   election     dispute.          In   Sommerfeld         v.     Board    of
    Canvassers of the City of St. Francis, 18 absentee ballots were
    returned to the clerk by a third person, and not by the voter.
    
    269 Wis. 299
    , 300-01, 
    69 N.W.2d 235
     (1955), abrogated in part by
    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (2).        The    question        in    that    case       concerned
    whether those ballots should be counted.                   Id. at 300.             All seven
    justices took it as a given that the law had been violated; the
    statute    required      delivery    from      the    voter      to    the        clerk,    not
    through a third person.             Id. at 301; id. at 304-05 (Gehl, J.,
    dissenting).          The   four-justice        majority,        however,          concluded
    those votes should nonetheless be counted because the statute,
    18
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    though    violated,      was    directory,       not    mandatory.            Id. at    304.
    Although legally binding, failure to comply with a directory
    statute may not produce the same consequence as a failure to
    comply    with   a    mandatory        statute.         See    State     v.    Rosen,     
    72 Wis. 2d 200
    ,      207,     
    240 N.W.2d 168
           (1976).         The     Sommerfeld
    majority      concluded        that     construing       the     in-person       delivery
    requirement as mandatory for votes to count could disenfranchise
    some disabled voters——a result it did not think the legislature
    meant    to   produce.         
    269 Wis. at 303-04
    .         Speaking       for    three
    justices, Justice Gehl wrote in dissent that "in person" means
    "[b]y one's self; with bodily presence," quoting a dictionary.
    
    Id. at 304
     (Gehl, J., dissenting).                      Voting by agent was not
    permitted by this statute, the dissent explained, and votes cast
    out of compliance with the law should not be counted.                                 
    Id. at 305
     (Gehl, J., dissenting).               Sommerfeld's holding that the in-
    person     delivery      requirement        is     directory       has        since    been
    abrogated.       Section 6.84(2) now provides that the requirement
    "shall be construed as mandatory."                      What remains is what no
    justice doubted——that the "in person" delivery requirement means
    personal delivery, in the flesh, by the voter, to the municipal
    clerk.
    ¶177 The legislature has instructed that a "revised statute
    is to be understood in the same sense as the original unless the
    change in language indicates a different meaning so clearly as
    to preclude judicial construction."                     
    Wis. Stat. § 990.001
    (7).
    There have been three significant iterations of the in-person
    delivery requirement; none convey a clear change in meaning from
    19
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    the    original.11            No    statutory     amendments,      cases,    or     Attorney
    General opinions since give cause to reconsider the long-held
    view        that   
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.'s         delivery        provision
    requires a person-to-person interaction between the voter and
    the clerk.
    ¶178 WEC         and    DRW      counter      that   because   the     statute      is
    written in the passive voice, the actor is indeterminate.                              While
    that can be true at times, it is not the case here.                                Wisconsin
    Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. is not agnostic as to the actor.                                It must
    be the voter who delivers the ballot.                       The history confirms this
    plain reading.           WEC also argues that delivery in person does not
    foreclose delivery by an agent.                        But statutory history shows
    this is incorrect as well.                    In the same comprehensive 1915 law,
    just two sections after the in-person-delivery requirement, the
    law    speaks      of    delivery        of    ballots      from   clerks    to     election
    inspectors "in person or by duly deputized agent."                                Wis. Stat.
    § 44m——8       (1915).             At   the   very    least,   this   shows        that   the
    legislature knew how to allow delivery by agent, but it chose
    not to provide for that form of delivery when it enacted this
    11   The three versions are as follows:
        1915:   "Said envelope shall be mailed by such voter, by
    registered mail, postage prepaid, to the officer issuing
    the ballot, or if more convenient it may be delivered in
    person." Wis. Stat. § 44m——6 (1915).
        1965:    "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector,
    postage prepaid, or delivered in person, to the municipal
    clerk issuing the ballot." 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4) (1967-68).
        Present: "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector, or
    delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the
    ballot or ballots." 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.
    20
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    law.        Our   decision   in    Sommerfeld     is    in    accord.           I   see   no
    evidence      supporting     a    different   reading        in    the    current     text
    either.12
    ¶179 In the end, there are two ways to return an absentee
    ballot under 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.                  A ballot may be "mailed
    by the elector," or the voter may deliver it "in person" to the
    clerk that issued it.            § 6.87(4)(b)1.        The elector is required——
    the statute uses the word "shall"——to utilize one of these two
    options.      This contemplates an in-person interaction between the
    voter       and   either     the     municipal    clerk           or     an     authorized
    representative of the clerk.
    ¶180 We turn next to two statutes that inform where clerks
    may     receive     absentee       ballots.      Wisconsin             Stat.    § 6.88(1)
    prescribes what happens after an absentee ballot is received by
    the clerk:
    When an absentee ballot arrives at the office of the
    municipal clerk, or at an alternate site under s.
    6.855, if applicable, the clerk shall enclose it,
    unopened, in a carrier envelope which shall be
    securely sealed and endorsed with the name and
    official title of the clerk, and [a statement
    The dissent suggests that the use of the phrase "ballot
    12
    or ballots" means that one voter may return other voters'
    ballots.   Dissent, ¶240 n.14.   This phrasing, however, appears
    to be holdover from an earlier time when a single voter would
    cast separate ballots for separate races. The original absentee
    voting law enacted in 1915 routinely discussed a single voter
    receiving and casting multiple ballots. See Wis. Stat. § 44m—4
    (1915) (providing that the municipal clerk "shall deliver said
    ballot or ballots to the applicant personally"); Wis. Stat.
    § 44m—6 (1915) (directing the voter to "mark such ballot or
    ballots" and that "such ballot or ballots shall then in the
    presence of such officer be folded by such voter so that each
    ballot will be separate and so as to conceal the marking").
    21
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    regarding the contents of the envelope]. . . .   The
    clerk shall keep the ballot in the clerk's office or
    at the alternate site, if applicable until delivered
    [to the appropriate election officials].
    This statute       ensures a strict chain of custody for ballots.
    Once a ballot is delivered by the voter, the clerk must take
    steps to secure it until the time comes to deliver it to the
    appropriate election officials.                The next subsection, § 6.88(2),
    provides detailed instructions regarding the secure transfer of
    ballots from clerks to the proper election officials, ensuring
    there is no opportunity to tamper with the ballots.                          Although
    neither 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. nor § 6.88(1) expressly state
    where the voter may deliver his or her ballot, reading the two
    sections together suggests that delivery must occur either at
    the clerk's office or an alternate site, if applicable.                           Given
    the detailed ballot custody regulations once the ballot arrives
    at the clerk's office or an alternate site, legislative silence
    with     respect    to    ballots     delivered         anywhere    else     strongly
    indicates delivery is not permitted anywhere else.                        See Alberte
    v.     Anew    Health     Care    Servs.,       Inc.,    
    2000 WI 7
    ,     ¶17,     
    232 Wis. 2d 587
    , 
    605 N.W.2d 515
     (noting that statutory silence "is
    strong        evidence"    that     the     legislature         "simply     did     not
    contemplate" a particular option).
    ¶181 Finally,       we     consider      
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
    ,       which
    authorizes         the     aforementioned          "alternate        sites"——i.e.,
    designated locations besides the clerk's office where elections
    may be administered.         It provides:
    The governing body of a municipality may elect to
    designate a site other than the office of the
    municipal clerk or board of election commissioners as
    22
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    the location from which electors of the municipality
    may request and vote absentee ballots and to which
    voted absentee ballots shall be returned by electors
    for any election. . . .    If the governing body of a
    municipality makes an election under this section, no
    function related to voting and return of absentee
    ballots that is to be conducted at the alternate site
    may be conducted in the office of the municipal clerk
    or board of election commissioners.
    § 6.855(1).13         The   strict   regulation    of     alternate     sites
    reinforces the interpretation that ballots must be returned to
    either the clerk's office or a designated alternate site.                Just
    as the statutes are not agnostic about who delivers ballots, a
    holistic reading indicates they are not agnostic about where
    those ballots are delivered either.          Ballot custody is carefully
    regulated at both clerks' offices and at alternate sites.                 The
    absence   of    any   careful   regulation    governing    ballot     custody
    elsewhere leads me to conclude that clerks may not take custody
    of ballots at other locations unless otherwise specified.14
    13Governing bodies "may designate more than one alternate
    site." 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
    (5).
    14In Trump v. Biden, among other issues, we were asked
    whether ballots delivered to certified election inspectors at
    temporary events in Madison parks were valid. 
    2020 WI 91
    , ¶¶9,
    19-21, 
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    , 
    951 N.W.2d 568
    .     The court concluded
    this claim was barred by the doctrine of laches and rejected it
    on that basis.    Id., ¶¶10, 29-31.    I authored a concurrence
    offering a preliminary review of the merits of the three claims
    rejected on the basis of laches, while recognizing that a
    "comprehensive analysis is not possible or appropriate in light
    of the abbreviated nature of this review and the limited factual
    record" in that case.     Id., ¶36 (Hagedorn, J., concurring).
    Regarding the so-called "Democracy at the Park" events, I
    concluded those events were lawful "based on the record before
    the court and the arguments presented." Id., ¶57 (Hagedorn, J.,
    concurring).   With the benefit of more comprehensive briefing
    and careful study, I now conclude that the better reading of the
    statutory scheme is that ballots may only be returned to the
    clerk's office or a designated alternate site.     To be clear,
    23
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    ¶182 The respondents argue that the directive to deliver
    ballots "to the municipal clerk" in 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.
    does    not      restrict   how    the    municipal      clerk     may     receive     the
    ballots.         If the municipal clerk wishes to receive the ballots
    in a drop box, the argument goes, that is sufficient.                          Moreover,
    other statutes speak of delivery to the office of the municipal
    clerk, and this one does not.              This is perhaps the best argument
    in the respondents' favor, but it is unpersuasive given the
    additional statutes that give great care to ballot security and
    custody.          While     § 6.87(4)(b)1.        says     how    ballots       must       be
    delivered and by whom, 
    Wis. Stat. §§ 6.88
    (1) and 6.855(1) are
    best read as limiting and defining where these ballots must be
    delivered.        Section 6.87(4)(b)1. requires in-person delivery by
    the voter to the municipal clerk.                  And §§ 6.88(1) and 6.855(1)
    specify where the municipal clerk can receive those ballots.15
    ¶183 Read together, these statutes direct that when voters
    choose      to    return    an    absentee      ballot   in      person,       they    must
    personally deliver their ballot to the clerk or the clerk's
    authorized        representative     at    either    the    clerk's      office       or   a
    designated alternate site.                With this interpretation in hand,
    the next task is to hold WEC's memos up against the statutes.
    this conclusion would not have changed the court's decision in
    Trump.
    As previously noted, these statutes are far from obvious.
    15
    While I conclude WEC's interpretation is incorrect, reasonable
    arguments can be made otherwise, especially with respect to the
    locations where ballots may be received. This lack of precision
    and certainty should serve as a call for our political branches
    to give clearer guidance to voters and those they have asked to
    administer elections.
    24
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    B.     Application
    ¶184 Teigen focuses his challenge to the March 2020 memo on
    the following sentence:            "A family member or another person may
    also return the ballot on behalf of the voter."                             Teigen argues,
    correctly,       that     this    advice       was     contrary            to     
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.          WEC's interpretation would permit an agent of
    the voter to return a ballot on the voter's behalf, contrary to
    § 6.87(4)(b)1.'s         requirement       that      there    be       a    voter-to-clerk
    interaction.        And    although       
    Wis. Stat. § 5.02
    (10)               permits   an
    agent to stand in for the clerk, no statute allows an agent to
    stand in for the voter in this context.16                     WEC's March 2020 memo
    is invalid.
    ¶185 Teigen         also     seeks    a     declaration       that           
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.      requires       voters      to    personally        place           their    own
    ballots in the mail——a declaration the circuit court granted.
    However, neither WEC's March 2020 memo nor its August 2020 memo
    offer     any   advice    about    how    a    ballot       may   be       "mailed        by    the
    elector."       Therefore, there simply is no guidance or rule for us
    to review under 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (1).                      Accordingly, the court
    should not and does not make any declaration on that question.17
    16Other more specific laws that are not at issue here do
    permit agents to complete certain tasks on a voter's behalf.
    See, e.g., 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.875
     (absentee voting in certain
    residential care facilities); 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.86
    (3) (hospitalized
    voters).
    17 Justice Roggensack's concurring opinion contends we
    should decide this question pursuant to our authority under the
    general   Declaratory  Judgments  Act,  
    Wis. Stat. § 806.04
    .
    However, unlike Teigen's other claims, he presents no evidence
    that WEC has or will violate 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.'s
    directives on returning ballots by mail. Teigen therefore does
    25
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    ¶186 Finally,            we   turn    to    WEC's      August      2020    memo,     which
    provides guidance on drop boxes.                    Teigen correctly contends the
    August 2020 memo improperly advises clerks on how to administer
    unstaffed drop boxes and drop boxes at locations other than the
    clerk's office or alternate sites.                     WEC's guidance is contrary
    to statute for two reasons.                First, unstaffed drop boxes do not
    satisfy 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.'s requirement that the voter
    deliver    his     or    her      ballot       to    the    municipal         clerk    or   an
    authorized       representative          of    the    clerk.           The     "in    person"
    interaction the statutes require is absent when a ballot is
    delivered to an unstaffed drop box.                         Second, the August memo
    offers    incorrect      guidance        regarding         drop   boxes       at     locations
    other    than    the    municipal        clerk's      office      or    alternate       sites.
    Because 
    Wis. Stat. §§ 6.88
    (1) and 6.855(1) contemplate delivery
    occurring at the clerk's office or an alternate site, but not
    elsewhere, this guidance is contrary to law.                           Accordingly, WEC's
    August 2020 memo is also invalid.
    ¶187 Both WEC's March 2020 and August 2020 memos provide
    advice that is inconsistent with Wisconsin's election statutes.
    The court therefore rightly affirms the circuit court's order
    declaring the memos invalid pursuant to 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (1).
    IV.    UNPROMULGATED RULE CHALLENGE
    ¶188 The foregoing analysis is sufficient to resolve the
    appeal before us.            I write further to address Teigen's argument
    that WEC's memos were unpromulgated administrative rules.
    not face any threatened harm which a declaration would remedy.
    26
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    ¶189 Not all statements that come from a state agency are
    created     equal.         Wisconsin's                Administrative          Procedure       Act
    recognizes this and draws a distinction between what it terms
    "guidance documents" on the one hand and administrative "rules"
    on the other.    
    Wis. Stat. § 227.01
    (3m) & (13).
    ¶190 A guidance document is just what it sounds like.                                     It
    is a "formal or official document or communication issued by an
    agency"——such        as        "a      manual,              handbook,        directive,        or
    informational    bulletin"——that                 explains        how     a    rule     will    be
    implemented or advises the public on how the agency is likely to
    apply   a   statute       or    rule       to    a     class    of     similarly       affected
    persons.    
    Wis. Stat. § 227.01
    (3m)(a).                       "A guidance document does
    not have the force of law and does not provide the authority for
    implementing     or        enforcing             a      standard,        requirement,          or
    threshold."      
    Wis. Stat. § 227.112
    (3).                 Agency    guidance       has
    existed informally for some time.                            In 2018, the legislature
    formalized guidance documents into law as a category of agency
    communication and added procedures for challenging them.                                      See
    2017 Wis. Act 369, §§ 31, 65-71.                       The legislature also required
    guidance documents to go through various processes to ensure
    public input and legislative oversight.                         Id., § 38.           However, a
    majority of the court concluded several of these statutes were
    facially    unconstitutional——incorrectly                      so   in   my    view.       Serv.
    Emps.   Int'l   Union,         Loc.    1    v.       Vos,    
    2020 WI 67
    ,    ¶¶90-91,       
    393 Wis. 2d 38
    ,     
    946 N.W.2d 35
    ;             id.,       ¶¶190-212        (Hagedorn,       J.,
    concurring in part, dissenting in part).                            Accordingly, agencies
    27
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    may     issue     guidance      documents           without           going        through   the
    procedures described in Wis. Stat. ch. 227.
    ¶191 "Rules" are different.                 The statutory definition of a
    rule    has     five   elements:          a    "rule"          is     (1)     "a    regulation,
    standard,       statement      of    policy,       or     general           order,"    (2)   "of
    general application," that (3) "has the force of law," and (4)
    "is issued by an agency," to (5) "implement, interpret, or make
    specific legislation enforced or administered by the agency or
    to govern the organization or procedure of the agency."                                      
    Wis. Stat. § 227.01
    (13).              If   all       five        of    these     elements      are
    satisfied,       the    rule        is   subject          to        numerous       promulgation
    requirements, most notably those described in subchapter II of
    Wis. Stat. ch. 227.            Any rule "promulgated or adopted without
    compliance with statutory rule-making or adoption procedures" is
    invalid.      
    Wis. Stat. § 227.40
    (4)(a).
    ¶192 Teigen contends that both of WEC's memos were rules
    under the five-part definition just articulated, and that they
    are invalid because WEC did not go through the steps required to
    promulgate a rule.           The dispute revolves around whether these
    memos have the force of law; rules by definition do, guidance
    documents by definition do not.
    ¶193 Few cases interpret whether a directive has the force
    of law.       The court of appeals has observed that "[m]aterials
    developed by an agency as a reference aid for its staff that are
    couched in terms of advice and guidelines rather than setting
    forth law-like pronouncements" do not have the force of law and
    are not rules.         County of Dane v. Winsand, 
    2004 WI App 86
    , ¶11,
    28
    No.       2022AP91.bh
    
    271 Wis. 2d 786
    ,         
    679 N.W.2d 885
          (cleaned    up).          By    contrast,
    materials       "using      express     mandatory       language       are        more     than
    informational."            Milwaukee Area Joint Plumbing Apprenticeship
    Comm. v. DILHR, 
    172 Wis. 2d 299
    , 321 n.12, 
    493 N.W.2d 744
     (Ct.
    App.    1992).        In    such    documents,       "the    agency    speaks       with    an
    official voice intended to have the effect of law."                           
    Id.
            How an
    agency uses a document can also indicate whether it has the
    force of law.              See Barry Lab'ys, Inc. v. Wis. State Bd. of
    Pharmacy,        
    26 Wis. 2d 505
    ,           516,     
    132 N.W.2d 833
               (1965).
    Additional instances where agency materials have been held to
    have the force of law include "where criminal or civil sanctions
    can result" or "where the interest of individuals in a class can
    be legally affected through enforcement of the agency action."
    Cholvin    v.    DHSF,      
    2008 WI App 127
    ,      ¶26,    
    313 Wis. 2d 749
    ,          
    758 N.W.2d 118
     (collecting cases).
    ¶194 While      these       cases     are   helpful,     a     more    fundamental
    question should be asked:              what is a law?          To be a law means to
    be binding and enforceable.                  Durkee v. City of Janesville, 
    28 Wis. 464
    , 471 (1871) (laws are "binding"); State ex rel. Mayer
    v. Schuffenhauer, 
    213 Wis. 29
    , 32, 
    250 N.W. 767
     (1933) (laws
    "must be followed").               A law orders and forbids and governs and
    establishes in an authoritative way.                   See U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co.
    v. Guenther, 
    281 U.S. 34
    , 37 (1930) (defining "law" as "the
    rules    of     action      or     conduct    duly    prescribed       by     controlling
    authority, and having binding legal force").                        Here, the statutes
    specify that a rule must have the "force of law."                                 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.01
    (13).         And "force" means to "compel by physical means or
    29
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    by legal requirement."             Black's Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
    This    suggests       something    has    the    force    of     law   if     it   compels
    compliance in the same manner as other laws——like a statute or
    constitutional           provision.              Administrative          rules,        once
    promulgated, bind agencies and regulated entities alike.                                But
    guidance documents do not; they inform and compel nothing.
    ¶195 Also important to our inquiry is the agency we are
    talking about.         Most agencies in state government operate with a
    wide    range     of    powers     and     have    broad     areas      of     regulatory
    authority.      WEC is different.           Wisconsin's method for conducting
    elections is unlike that of most other states in the union.                            Our
    election administration system is highly decentralized.                               State
    ex rel. Zignego v. WEC, 
    2021 WI 32
    , ¶13, 
    396 Wis. 2d 391
    , 
    957 N.W.2d 208
    .       "Rather than a top-down arrangement with a central
    state    entity    or    official     controlling         local    actors,      Wisconsin
    gives some power to its state election agency ([WEC]) and places
    significant responsibility on a small army of local election
    officials."       
    Id.
         It is local clerks who have the "primary role
    in running Wisconsin elections."                  Id., ¶15.         WEC is therefore
    given authority and oversight over some things, and not others.
    It may speak authoritatively at times, but not at all times.
    ¶196 Consistent with this structure, the statutes specific
    to WEC establish a process by which WEC can adopt formal or
    informal advisory opinions that "have legal force and effect."
    
    Wis. Stat. § 5.05
    (6a)(a)2.               This necessarily means some of WEC's
    opinions and advice do not have legal force and effect, and
    therefore, cannot be administrative rules.                         Statutes must be
    30
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    read together where possible, which means we must interpret the
    rulemaking        "force    of    law"       requirement      consistent       with     the
    particular circumstances where WEC can issue advisory opinions
    that "have legal force and effect."                  See § 5.05(6a)(a)1.
    ¶197 Considering all of this, the two memos in this case do
    not have the force of law.                The memos are self-labeled guidance
    documents.        They do not purport to be advisory opinions with
    legal force issued pursuant to 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.05
    (6a)(a)2.                               And
    again,      the    legislature        has    specifically      stated      that       WEC's
    opinions      have    legal       force      and     effect   only   under        certain
    circumstances; this is not one of them.
    ¶198 The language of the memos supports this view.                                The
    March 2020 memo is structured as an FAQ document addressed to
    local election officials.               It begins by observing, "Due to the
    increase in by-mail absentee ballots, clerks have inquired about
    options for ensuring that the maximum number of ballots are
    returned to be counted for the April 7, 2020 election."                                  It
    proceeds to advise clerks on how "to make ballot return more
    accessible and efficient," and says that it is "recommended"
    that clerks take various actions to inform voters how their
    ballots may be returned.              The memo then shifts to question-and-
    answer format, providing advice to clerks regarding drop boxes
    and   how    to    coordinate         ballot      return   with   the    U.S.     Postal
    Service.          Nothing        in    the     documents      suggests        there     are
    consequences for noncompliance.                    No legal interests are altered
    by the March 2020 memo.
    31
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    ¶199 The August 2020 memo is similarly entitled "Absentee
    Ballot Drop Box Information" and is addressed to Wisconsin's
    election officials.               The very first line of the memo reveals its
    limited     purpose:              "This     document      is    intended       to     provide
    information and guidance on drop box options for secure absentee
    ballot return for voters."                 It indicates the information in the
    memo was adapted from an advisory resource developed by the
    Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency.                                  It advises
    election officials regarding various types of drop boxes, where
    to place them, and how to keep the ballots collected in drop
    boxes    secure.            Again,   reading      the    August    2020      memo    in    full
    reveals     that       it    is    an     informational        document,      designed       to
    educate election officials regarding best practices.                                     It was
    never legally binding.
    ¶200 Teigen           disagrees.        He    argues      that    when       the    state
    entity responsible for administering Wisconsin election law says
    something        is    permissible——like           drop     boxes——WEC's           imprimatur
    gives    its     statement         the    force    of   law.      But     widely-followed
    advice can still simply be advice.                      Even general acceptance does
    not make guidance legally binding or otherwise give it the force
    of   law.        Wisconsin's         local   election      officials         who    lead    the
    charge      in        election          administration         have     an     independent
    responsibility to read and follow the law.                        WEC's memos provided
    advice and best practices which election officials could weigh
    and consider.          Many surely followed that advice.                     But the memos
    did not themselves "authorize" drop boxes or any other election
    practice in a legally binding way.
    32
    No.    2022AP91.bh
    ¶201 Justice Rebecca Grassl's Bradley concurrence concludes
    the memos are administrative rules, a position premised on a
    confused      interpretation            of     Trump       v.    Biden,     
    2020 WI 91
    ,    
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    , 
    951 N.W.2d 568
    .                    In that case, the court used the
    word    "rulebook"          in    a    metaphor       regarding         challenge      flags   in
    football.       Id., ¶32.         The logic of Justice Bradley's concurrence
    goes like this:          The court said WEC's memos were a rulebook, so
    the court held that WEC memos have the force of law and are
    administrative rules under 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.01
    (13).
    ¶202 To    state          the    obvious,       a    metaphor      is    "a    figure    of
    speech in which a term or phrase is applied to something to
    which it is not literally applicable."18                                The challenge flag
    metaphor      came     in    the       concluding          paragraph      to    reinforce      the
    importance of challenging election practices in a timely manner.
    Yet     the    concurrence            reasons     that          using   the     coincidentally
    similar word "rulebook" means the court determined that all WEC
    memos are "rules" within the statutory definition.                                    Except the
    court's       decision       in        Trump    did        not    involve       administrative
    rulemaking at all.                It did not cite 
    Wis. Stat. § 227.01
    (13).
    And no part of the analysis ascribed the force of law to WEC
    guidance.        Rather, the court's decision addressed whether the
    Trump       campaign    was       entitled       to        the     relief      it    sought——the
    striking of ballots cast in Dane and Milwaukee Counties.                                  Trump,
    https://www.dictionary.com/browse/metaphor
    18                                              (emphasis
    added); see, e.g., Thurl Ravenscroft, You're a Mean One, Mr.
    Grinch, on How the Grinch Stole Christmas (Mercury Records 1966)
    (referring to Mr. Grinch as a "bad banana" and to his heart as
    an "empty hole").
    33
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    , ¶32.           The court expressly withheld judgment on
    whether the widely followed WEC guidance was correct or not.
    
    Id.,
     ¶30 n.11 ("Our decision that the Campaign is not entitled
    to the relief it seeks does not mean the legal issues presented
    are foreclosed from further judicial scrutiny.").                        Simply put,
    neither       the    court's    reasoning      nor     its    concluding      metaphor
    suggested all such guidance has the force of law and must be
    followed.       It never even hinted this.              The idea that we should
    ascribe legal force to the two challenged memos in this case
    because this was somehow settled by a one-sentence metaphor in
    Trump v. Biden is not a serious legal argument.
    ¶203 In the end, neither the March 2020 memo nor the August
    2020 memo are unpromulgated administrative rules because neither
    have the force of law.            The memos here are guidance documents.
    They    are    not    subject    to    Wis.    Stat.    ch.    227's    promulgation
    requirements and cannot be invalidated on that basis.                        They can,
    however, be invalidated for being inconsistent with statute, as
    we hold today.19
    V.    CONCLUSION
    ¶204 The      majority/lead      opinion      correctly     concludes       that
    WEC's March 2020 and August 2020 memos are invalid because they
    are    inconsistent      with    Wisconsin      law.         Wisconsin's      election
    statutes require that to return an absentee ballot in person,
    Of course, if unstaffed drop boxes are not permitted by
    19
    statute, as a majority of this court holds today, then no
    rulemaking authorizing drop boxes would be permissible.        An
    administrative rule cannot make lawful what the statutes forbid.
    34
    No.   2022AP91.bh
    voters must personally deliver their ballot to the clerk or the
    clerk's authorized representative at either the clerk's office
    or a designated alternate site.      
    Wis. Stat. §§ 5.02
    (10), 6.855,
    6.87(4)(b)1.,   6.88(1).     WEC's    memos    conflict     with    these
    statutory requirements by advising that individuals other than
    the voter may return the voter's ballot to the municipal clerk,
    that unstaffed drop boxes are permissible, and that drop boxes
    may be located at places other than the municipal clerk's office
    or alternate sites.   I respectfully concur.
    35
    No.   2022AP91.awb
    ¶205 ANN WALSH BRADLEY, J.             (dissenting).     The right to
    vote is a "sacred right of the highest character."                  State ex
    rel. McGrael v. Phelps, 
    144 Wis. 1
    , 15, 
    128 N.W. 1041
     (1910).
    Yet the majority/lead opinion1 blithely and erroneously seeks to
    sow distrust in the administration of our elections and through
    its faulty analysis erects yet another barrier for voters to
    exercise this "sacred right."
    ¶206 Although it pays lip service to the import of the
    right    to   vote,   the   majority/lead    opinion   has   the    practical
    effect of making it more difficult to exercise it.                    Such a
    result, although lamentable, is not a surprise from this court.
    It has seemingly taken the opportunity to make it harder to vote
    or to inject confusion into the process whenever it has been
    presented with the opportunity.2
    ¶207 A ballot drop box is a simple and perfectly legal
    solution to make voting easier, especially in the midst of a
    1 I refer to Justice Rebecca Grassl Bradley's opinion as the
    "majority/lead opinion" because not all of the opinion has been
    joined by a majority of the court. Justice Brian Hagedorn does
    not join the following paragraphs:    1-3, 11, 14-51, 64-72, 86,
    n.29, 87.    Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶149 n.1.      Thus,
    those paragraphs do not constitute precedential authority. For
    further discussion of our procedure regarding lead opinions, see
    Koss Corp. v. Park Bank, 
    2019 WI 7
    , ¶76 n.1, 
    385 Wis. 2d 261
    ,
    
    922 N.W.2d 20
     (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., concurring).
    2 See, e.g., Teigen v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, No. 2022AP91,
    unpublished order (Wis. S. Ct. Feb. 11, 2022); League of Women
    Voters of Wis. Educ. Network, Inc. v. Walker, 
    2014 WI 97
    , 
    357 Wis. 2d 360
    , 
    851 N.W.2d 302
    ; Milwaukee Branch of NAACP v.
    Walker, 
    2014 WI 98
    , 
    357 Wis. 2d 469
    , 
    851 N.W.2d 262
    .        Each
    opinion had vigorous dissents.
    1
    No.    2022AP91.awb
    global pandemic.3     But it is apparently a bridge too far for a
    majority of this court, which once again rejects a practice that
    would expand voter participation.
    ¶208 The    majority/lead    opinion's   analysis   is    flawed     in
    three main ways.      It expands the doctrine of standing beyond
    recognition, is premised on a faulty statutory interpretation,
    and without justification fans the flames of electoral doubt
    that threaten our democracy.
    ¶209 Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
    I
    ¶210 At    the   outset,   the   majority/lead   opinion     makes   a
    significant misstep.      It begins with a lengthy discussion of
    3 A justice of the United States Supreme Court recently
    cited the existence of drop boxes in support of the assertion
    that    "[r]eturning    an    absentee   ballot   in    Wisconsin
    is . . . easy."      Democratic   Nat'l  Comm.  v.   Wis.   State
    Legislature, 
    141 S. Ct. 28
    , 36 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J.,
    concurring); see also id. at 29 (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
    ("Never mind that voters may return their ballots not only by
    mail but also by bringing them to a county clerk's office, or
    various 'no touch' drop boxes staged locally, or certain polling
    places on election day.").    After the result in this case, the
    idea that returning a ballot is so "easy" becomes less
    defensible.
    2
    No.   2022AP91.awb
    standing,4    and   in    the   process       extends     the    doctrine    beyond
    recognition.
    ¶211 In   the     majority/lead        opinion's    view,     Teigen5     has
    standing "under Wisconsin's permissive, policy-oriented approach
    toward standing" because he has a "stake in the outcome" and is
    "affected by the issues in controversy."                    Majority/lead op.,
    ¶14.       Teigen   has    suffered      an     "injury     in    fact"     to   his
    constitutional right to vote, the majority/lead opinion says,
    merely because he alleges that election law was not followed.
    In accepting Teigen's standing to bring this suit, it further
    states:      "the failure to follow election laws is a fact which
    forces     everyone . . . to    question       the   legitimacy      of     election
    results."     Id., ¶25.
    The majority/lead opinion additionally devotes a great
    4
    deal of ink to analyzing whether Teigen needed to file a
    complaint with WEC under 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.06
     before commencing
    this suit. See majority/lead op., ¶¶37-51. It determines that
    this statute does not require a complaint to be filed against
    WEC, in part because such a procedure would cause WEC to "be a
    judge in [its] own cause."    Id., ¶47. Rather than engage with
    each point the majority/lead opinion makes in its discussion, I
    simply observe that an agency reviewing its own decision at the
    beginning of an appeal process is a common occurrence and does
    not present the anomaly that the majority/lead opinion paints.
    See 
    Wis. Stat. § 283.63
     (providing for review by the Department
    of   Natural  Resources   of   a  permit  denial,   modification,
    termination, or revocation decision made by the Department)
    The majority/lead opinion refers to Teigen and Thom as the
    5
    "Wisconsin voters" throughout its opinion.        This could be
    misleading to the reader.     True enough, Teigen and Thom are
    voters who live in Wisconsin.     But the use of the term could
    lead the reader to believe that the plaintiffs here represent a
    wider swath of people than they actually do. Thus, I refer to
    the two plaintiffs collectively as "Teigen."
    3
    No.      2022AP91.awb
    ¶212 The majority/lead opinion attempts to create a free-
    for-all.         It       delineates      no     bounds       whatsoever         on     who     may
    challenge       election       laws.            Instead,          it      relies      on      broad
    pronouncements regarding the import of our election laws and
    their general effect on all people.                       But just because all people
    are subject to a law does not mean that any and all people are
    entitled to challenge it.
    ¶213 Indeed,          "Courts      are     not      the      proper    forum         to    air
    generalized        grievances           about         the         administration           of     a
    governmental       agency."           Cornwell         Personnel          Assocs.,      Ltd.     v.
    DILHR,     
    92 Wis. 2d 53
    ,        62,        
    284 N.W.2d 706
              (Ct.     App.       1979)
    (citations omitted); see also Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife,
    
    504 U.S. 555
    , 573-74 (1992) ("We have consistently held that a
    plaintiff       raising      only   a   generally           available       grievance         about
    government——claiming           only      harm        to     his     and    every       citizen's
    interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and
    seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits him
    than it does the public at large——does not state an Article III
    case or controversy.").
    ¶214 Yet        a    "generalized         grievance"         is     just     what    Teigen
    brings   to     this       court.       The     majority/lead           opinion       says      that
    Teigen's "rights and privileges as [a] registered voter[]" give
    him   standing        to   bring    this       action     challenging         the      statewide
    administration of elections.                   Majority/lead op., ¶14.                  Taken to
    its logical conclusion, the majority/lead opinion indicates that
    any registered voter would seemingly have standing to challenge
    any election law.             The impact of such a broad conception of
    4
    No.   2022AP91.awb
    voter standing is breathtaking and especially acute at a time of
    increasing,          unfounded      challenges         to     election        results       and
    election administrators.6
    ¶215 Rather than opening wide the barn doors, the doctrine
    of standing is important "because it reins in unbridled attempts
    to go beyond the circumscribed boundaries that define the proper
    role       of   courts."        Fabick    v.       Evers,    
    2021 WI 28
    ,       ¶92,   
    396 Wis. 2d 231
    , 
    956 N.W.2d 856
     (Ann Walsh Bradley, J., dissenting).7
    "Unbridled"          certainly      describes        the     majority/lead           opinion's
    approach        to   standing      in   this    case.        It     follows      a   standard
    untethered to any limiting principle, which in effect renders
    the concept of standing merely illusory.
    II
    ¶216 I        turn   next   to    the    substance      of    the    majority/lead
    opinion's statutory interpretation.8                        Even assuming Teigen has
    standing to bring this claim, the majority/lead opinion falters
    in its examination of the relevant statutes.
    See Election Officials Under Attack: How to Protect
    6
    Administrators and Safeguard Democracy, Brennan Center for
    Justice      and      the     Bipartisan       Policy     Center,
    https://www.brennancenter.org/our-work/policy-
    solutions/election-officials-under-attack (June 16, 2021).
    Justice Hagedorn's concurrence likewise recognizes that
    7
    the doctrine of standing "serves as a vital check on unbounded
    judicial power." Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶160.
    Although I address the majority/lead opinion's statutory
    8
    analysis, my critique also largely applies to Justice Hagedorn's
    concurrence, which reaches the same conclusion.
    5
    No.    2022AP91.awb
    A
    ¶217 Wisconsin         Stat.     § 6.87     addresses       absentee         voting
    procedure.      Subd. (4)(b)1., specifically at issue here, provides
    in relevant part:         "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector,
    or   delivered     in    person,      to   the    municipal     clerk   issuing       the
    ballot or ballots."
    ¶218 In the majority/lead opinion's view, "[n]othing in the
    statutory language detailing the procedures by which absentee
    ballots may be cast mentions drop boxes or anything like them."
    Majority/lead op., ¶54.            Further, it interprets the phrase "to
    the municipal clerk" to mean "mailing or delivering the absentee
    ballot to the municipal clerk at her office" or an alternate
    site under 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
    .               Id., ¶62.
    ¶219 The    majority/lead           opinion's    interpretation         of    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. ignores an important distinction.                          Section
    6.87(4)(b)1. uses the phrase "municipal clerk."                      It does not say
    "municipal clerk's office."
    ¶220 This    is    important        because     elsewhere      the     Wisconsin
    Statutes    are    replete     with     references      to   the     "office    of    the
    municipal clerk," the "office of the clerk," or the "clerk's
    office."     Not only is such an "office" referenced, but it is
    specified as a place where a delivery or an action takes place.
    See,    e.g.,     
    Wis. Stat. §§ 5.81
    (3)       (discussing      ballots       and
    envelopes    "voted      in    person      in    the   office   of    the     municipal
    clerk"); 6.18 (requiring that a form "shall be returned to the
    municipal    clerk's      office");        6.32(2)     (setting      forth     that     an
    elector "appear at the clerk's office"); 6.855(2) (addressing
    6
    No.    2022AP91.awb
    the    display         of     a    notice       "in     the      office       of     the       clerk");
    12.035(3)(d) (discussing a "building containing the office of
    the municipal clerk").9
    ¶221 From these statutes we can take the principle that the
    office of the municipal clerk is a location.                                  Indeed, a person
    "appear[s]" at a location.                     See 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.32
    (2).                       That the
    "office         of     the    municipal         clerk"       refers      to     a     location         is
    confirmed         by    the       fact       that     the     statutes        refer       to     it    as
    "contain[ed]"            within          a      "building."               See         
    Wis. Stat. § 12.035
    (3)(d).
    ¶222 We         also       know   that       a   "municipal        clerk"           under      the
    statutes is distinct from the "office of the municipal clerk,"
    because "municipal clerk" is specifically defined as "the city
    clerk, town clerk, village clerk and the executive director of
    the        city         election         commission              and      their            authorized
    representatives."                 
    Wis. Stat. § 5.02
    (10).                 In other words, the
    "municipal clerk" is a person, and the "office of the municipal
    clerk" is a location.
    ¶223 "If a word or words are used in one subsection but are
    not    used       in    another      subsection,            we    must    conclude          that      the
    legislature            specifically            intended          a     different            meaning."
    Responsible Use of Rural and Agr. Land v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n,
    
    2000 WI 129
    ,    ¶39,       
    239 Wis. 2d 660
    ,            
    619 N.W.2d 888
    .              If    the
    Further examples abound.
    9                           See 
    Wis. Stat. §§ 6.15
    (2)(bm),
    6.28(1)(b), 6.29(2)(a), 6.30(4), 6.32(3), 6.35(3), 6.45(1m),
    6.47(2),    6.50(1),    6.55(2)(cm),     6.56(4),    6.86(1)(a)2.,
    6.86(3)(c),   6.87(3)(a),   6.87(4)(b)4.,   6.88(1),   6.97(3)(b),
    7.41(1),    7.53(1)(b),    7.53(2)(d),    8.10(6)(c),    12.03(1),
    12.03(2)(a)2., 12.035(3)(c).
    7
    No.   2022AP91.awb
    legislature wanted to require return of a ballot to the clerk's
    office, it certainly could have done so, as it did in the litany
    of   provisions    using      such     language.             See,     e.g.,      Southport
    Commons,    LLC   v.   DOT,   
    2021 WI 52
    ,   ¶31,    
    397 Wis. 2d 362
    ,        
    960 N.W.2d 17
         (indicating      that     when          the    legislature         wants   to
    accomplish an object in a manner used in other areas of the
    statutes, "it knows how to do so").
    ¶224 But the legislature did not do that.                              Instead, it
    indicated that the ballot be delivered "to the municipal clerk,"
    not to the clerk's office.              Conflating "municipal clerk" with
    "office of the municipal clerk" is not——as the majority/lead
    opinion    claims——the     "fairest         interpretation"          of    the    statute.
    See majority/lead op., ¶62.            Instead, it is a rank distortion of
    the statutory text.
    ¶225    Can delivery to a drop box constitute delivery "to
    the municipal clerk?"         Absolutely.             A drop box is set up by the
    municipal clerk, maintained by the municipal clerk, and emptied
    by the municipal clerk.          This is true even if the drop box is
    located     somewhere    other       than       within      the     municipal      clerk's
    office.     As stated, the "municipal clerk" in the statutes is a
    person, and the "office of the municipal clerk" is a location.
    Applying this principle, there is nothing in the statute that
    even hints that unstaffed drop boxes are impermissible.                            Rather,
    a drop box, which the clerk or the clerk's designee10 sets up,
    10As stated, "municipal clerk" is statutorily defined as
    "the city clerk, town clerk, village clerk and the executive
    director of the city election commission and their authorized
    representatives."    
    Wis. Stat. § 5.02
    (10) (emphasis added).
    Thus, this job need not be accomplished by a single person.
    8
    No.   2022AP91.awb
    maintains,    and     empties,     is    simply     another      way   to    deliver   a
    ballot "to the municipal clerk."11                 The majority/lead opinion's
    attempt to avoid the statute's plain language fails.
    ¶226 The       majority/lead        opinion    additionally        invokes     
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
        in   an    attempt     to    "show[]      the   unlawfulness      of
    ballot drop boxes."            Id., ¶56.    Again, the majority/lead opinion
    flounders.     This statute simply does not apply to drop boxes and
    tells us nothing about whether their use is permissible.12
    ¶227 To        explain,      
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
             establishes     the
    procedures     by    which      municipal       clerks   can    set    up    "alternate
    absentee ballot sites."           These are commonly referred to as early
    11The circuit court in this case drew a distinction between
    staffed and unstaffed drop boxes, determining that drop boxes
    are not permitted "unless the drop box is staffed by the clerk
    and located at the office of the clerk or a properly designated
    alternate site."      See majority/lead op., ¶9.        Yet the
    majority/lead opinion does not address this distinction, raising
    more questions than it answers.    Does this distinction retain
    vitality?   If so, does a drop box located directly outside the
    front door to a clerk's office count as a "staffed" drop box?
    Must a staff member from the clerk's office be standing outside
    next to the drop box? Or is it sufficient if the clerk can see
    the box from a window while inside the office? Once again, the
    majority/lead opinion leaves municipal clerks and voters
    guessing.
    12Justice Hagedorn's concurrence also brings 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.88
     into the analysis. Justice Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶180.
    That statute likewise has no bearing on how ballots may be
    "delivered" to the municipal clerk. Rather, § 6.88(1) addresses
    what occurs when an absentee ballot "arrives at the office of
    the municipal clerk" (emphasis added), and subsec. (2) concerns
    what a clerk does with ballots after they are "received" by the
    clerk. In other words, § 6.88 speaks only of what happens to a
    ballot after it has been delivered to the municipal clerk, not
    how it gets there.
    9
    No.       2022AP91.awb
    in person absentee voting, or simply "early voting."                           Section
    6.855(1) provides:
    The governing body of a municipality may elect to
    designate a site other than the office of the
    municipal clerk or board of election commissioners as
    the location from which electors of the municipality
    may request and vote absentee ballots and to which
    voted absentee ballots shall be returned by electors
    for any election."
    (Emphasis added).
    ¶228 On    its   face,    
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
          sets     forth       that
    alternate voting sites "must be a location not only where voters
    may return absentee ballots, but also a location where voters
    'may request and vote absentee ballots.'"                Trump v. Biden, 
    2020 WI 91
    , ¶56, 
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    , 
    951 N.W.2d 568
     (Hagedorn, J.,
    concurring).       Thus, as the majority/lead opinion acknowledges,
    "[b]allot drop boxes are not alternate absentee ballot sites
    under 
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
     because a voter can only return the
    voter's absentee ballot to a drop box, while an alternate site
    must   also   allow     voters   to   request     and   vote    absentee       at   the
    site."    Majority/lead op., ¶57.
    ¶229 The    majority/lead        opinion    reads       into     
    Wis. Stat. § 6.855
     an implication beyond the statute's language.                         Although
    the majority/lead opinion correctly acknowledges that                          § 6.855
    does not describe drop boxes, it seeks support for its result in
    the    assertion      that   "[t]he     legislature      enacted        a     detailed
    statutory construct for alternate sites" while at the same time
    "the details of the drop box scheme are found nowhere in the
    statutes."       Id., ¶58.       This argument falls flat for the same
    reason the majority/lead opinion's statutory analysis of Wis.
    10
    No.       2022AP91.awb
    Stat. § 6.87(4)(b)1. fails:               the legislature did not include a
    detailed scheme for drop boxes in the statutes because it did
    not need to do so.              As analyzed above, § 6.87(4)(b)1. already
    authorizes them.
    ¶230 Election administration in Wisconsin is decentralized.
    State ex rel. Zignego v. Wis. Elections Comm'n, 
    2021 WI 32
    , ¶13,
    
    396 Wis. 2d 391
    ,        
    957 N.W.2d 208
    .         "Rather      than    a     top-down
    arrangement with a central state entity or official controlling
    local actors, Wisconsin gives some power to its state election
    agency (the Commission) and places significant responsibility on
    a   small   army     of   local    election        officials."       
    Id.
             Indeed,
    "Municipal clerks are the officials primarily responsible for
    election administration in Wisconsin."                Id., ¶15.
    ¶231 This      significant         responsibility      is   codified       in   the
    statutes.      Wisconsin         Stat.    §    7.15(1)     specifically        provides:
    "Each municipal clerk has charge and supervision of elections
    and registration in the municipality.                    The clerk shall perform
    the following duties and any others which may be necessary to
    properly conduct elections or registration . . . ."                            See also
    
    Wis. Stat. § 60.33
    (4)(a) ("The town clerk shall . . . [p]erform
    the duties required by chs. 5 to 12 relating to elections.").
    ¶232 Instead of an inexorable command that unstaffed drop
    boxes   are        banned,      
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1.         gives       some
    discretion to municipal clerks to determine how best to run
    elections     in    their    respective        jurisdictions.        By       using   the
    "municipal     clerk"       language      rather    than    the   "office        of   the
    municipal clerk" verbiage, the legislature necessarily entrusts
    11
    No.     2022AP91.awb
    some discretion to the municipal clerk in a manner consistent
    with    the     entirety      of    the    statutory         scheme.         See     DeWitt    v.
    Ferries,      
    2018 WI 117
    ,     ¶26,      
    385 Wis. 2d 1
    ,           
    921 N.W.2d 188
    (indicating that statutes are to be read in context, not in
    isolation       but    as    part    of    a    whole,       and     in    relation     to    the
    language of closely-related statutes).
    ¶233 The circuit court here allowed the use of staffed drop
    boxes in the office of a municipal clerk.                          But what good is this
    for a clerk in a rural area who may work only a few hours a
    week?      In    this       context,      it    certainly      makes       sense     for    those
    clerks to have at least the discretion to place a drop box
    outside the office or in another location so voters can drop off
    absentee ballots outside of the limited hours the clerk's office
    is actually open.
    ¶234 Instead          of     this       common        sense        reading     that     is
    consistent       with       the    decentralized        manner       in     which     Wisconsin
    elections are run, the majority/lead opinion severely limits the
    return of absentee ballots in all municipalities regardless of
    their circumstances.              Some voters will be unlucky enough to live
    in a jurisdiction without a full-time clerk, and others will be
    forced to go to only a single location to return their ballots
    where    they         previously       had       numerous       options.             Does     the
    majority/lead think everyone in this state lives in urban areas
    with full-time clerks and standard office hours?                                    If so, it
    ignores reality and puts rural voters at a disadvantage.
    ¶235 Our        statutes      and       case    law    indicate        that     election
    administration          in    Wisconsin         is    not    one-size-fits-all.               See
    12
    No.    2022AP91.awb
    Zignego, 
    396 Wis. 2d 391
    , ¶13.                 Yet the majority/lead opinion
    fails    to    recognize    this,     making    election      administration         more
    onerous for local clerks and the exercise of the franchise more
    difficult for voters.
    B
    ¶236 Contravening           the    plain    language      of   the     statute    to
    prohibit ballot drop boxes is bad enough.                  But the majority/lead
    opinion further erroneously determines that a voter cannot have
    a family member or friend return their ballot to the municipal
    clerk for them.      Majority/lead op., ¶83.
    ¶237 The brunt of this holding will fall on those who are
    homebound.       If a voter is disabled or sick, and someone the
    voter lives with is taking their own absentee ballot to the
    clerk's office, that roommate, spouse, or family member can't,
    under    the    majority/lead         opinion's   analysis,        simply     pick    up
    another validly voted ballot from the kitchen table and take it
    with them.
    ¶238 As        absurd       as     that    sounds      in      practice,13        the
    majority/lead opinion's statutory interpretation to reach that
    result    fares     no     better.         Although      at     first      blush     the
    majority/lead opinion's interpretation may seem reasonable, a
    closer    examination      of   the     text   reveals     otherwise.          Section
    13 Not    to   mention  that  the   majority/lead   opinion's
    conclusion arguably violates federal law related to voters with
    disabilities.    See 
    52 U.S.C. § 10508
     ("Any voter who requires
    assistance to vote by reason of blindness, disability, or
    inability to read or write may be given assistance by a person
    of the voter's choice, other than the voter's employer or agent
    of that employer or officer or agent of the voter's union.").
    13
    No.    2022AP91.awb
    6.87(4)(b)1. addresses only the manner for returning a ballot
    ("in person") and not who may return it.
    ¶239 Wisconsin          Stat.        § 6.87(4)(b)1.,         as       stated     above,
    provides:        "The envelope shall be mailed by the elector, or
    delivered in person, to the municipal clerk issuing the ballot
    or    ballots."        As     relevant       to    this    issue,       we    focus    on   the
    placement of the words within the statute.
    ¶240 Section 6.87(4)(b)1. does not say "delivered in person
    by    the   elector."          It    says         "delivered      in     person."14         The
    majority/lead opinion transposes the phrase "by the elector,"
    placing it not where the legislature placed it (after "mailed"),
    but instead writing it into the statute where the majority/lead
    opinion     prefers      it    to   be       placed       in    order    to     bolster     its
    erroneous conclusion.               Yet, the statute says nothing at all
    about who may return a ballot to the municipal clerk.                                  Rather,
    the    statute    is     written       in    the    passive       voice       and    does   not
    indicate    who    the      actor    is      who    must       deliver    the      ballot   "in
    person."     See Juneau Cnty. Star-Times v. Juneau County, 
    2011 WI App 150
    , ¶15, 
    337 Wis. 2d 710
    , 
    807 N.W.2d 655
    .
    ¶241 The majority/lead opinion violates a cardinal rule of
    statutory interpretation by writing words into the statute the
    legislature did not write.                  See Dawson v. Town of Jackson, 2011
    Further bolstering this interpretation of the statute is
    14
    the fact that the legislature used the plural in indicating that
    a completed ballot must be "delivered in person, to the
    municipal clerk issuing the ballot or ballots."      
    Wis. Stat. § 6.87
    (4)(b)1. (emphasis added). Why would the legislature use
    the plural if it did not contemplate that one person could
    return an additional ballot?
    14
    No.   2022AP91.awb
    WI 77, ¶42, 
    336 Wis. 2d 318
    , 
    801 N.W.2d 316
    .              A voter's spouse,
    child, or roommate can deliver a ballot "in person" just as the
    voter     can,   and   the   statute   draws   no   distinction.     Yet   the
    majority/lead opinion manufactures one, going outside the words
    the legislature wrote to place yet another obstacle in the way
    of voters simply seeking to exercise their cherished right to
    vote.15
    15As I end my discussion of this issue, I emphasize the
    limited nature of the court's determination.      It applies to
    absentee ballots delivered in person to the municipal clerk, not
    to a family member or a friend placing a ballot in the mail on
    behalf of a voter.        See majority/lead op., ¶5; Justice
    Hagedorn's concurrence, ¶185.
    However, despite its insistence that it is not addressing
    the issue, the majority/lead opinion proceeds to go on at length
    about Disability Rights Wisconsin's argument regarding federal
    law on ballot assistance and criticizes the argument as
    "undeveloped."     See majority/lead op., ¶¶84-86.       As the
    majority/lead opinion acknowledges, this argument is directed at
    the "impact of the circuit court's declarations on disabled
    voters who may be physically unable to vote if someone cannot
    place an absentee ballot in the mail on a voter's behalf." Id.,
    ¶86.    Accordingly, this sojourn is completely unnecessary to
    both the majority/lead opinion's holding and its analysis.     I
    highlight, however, the majority/lead opinion's own statement
    that we do not decide "whether the law permits a voter's agent
    to place an absentee ballot in the mail on the voter's behalf."
    Id.,   ¶5;   see  also  Justice   Hagedorn's  concurrence,  ¶185
    (explaining that "the court should not and does not make any
    declaration on [this] question").
    Undeterred by the majority/lead opinion's statement that
    the WEC memos at issue "do not address" the issue, Justice
    Roggensack's concurrence forges ahead with that analysis anyway.
    Rather than engage on an issue that is not properly before the
    court in the first place, I simply observe that Justice
    Roggensack's concurrence is not the law, and that the issue of
    whether a family member or other person may place an absentee
    ballot in a mailbox on behalf of a voter is not resolved by this
    opinion.
    15
    No.    2022AP91.awb
    III
    ¶242 As      a    final     point,        I    address       the     majority/lead
    opinion's     language       casting    doubt         on     the    results        of     past
    elections conducted with drop boxes.                    The majority/lead opinion
    claims that "[t]he illegality of these drop boxes weakens the
    people's faith that the election produced an outcome reflective
    of   their   will."        Majority/lead         op.,      ¶24;    see    also    id.,     ¶25
    ("[T]he failure to follow election laws is a fact which forces
    everyone . . . to          question         the       legitimacy           of      election
    results.").        It   suggests     that    the      use    of    drop     boxes       leaves
    electoral results "in question."                Id., ¶24.
    ¶243 Nonsense.              First,        accepting          the     majority/lead
    opinion's     assertion      requires      either       willful     ignorance        to    the
    origin of the WEC August 19, 2020 memo or a lack of trust in its
    source.      The August 19, 2020 memo was "adapted from a resource
    developed     as    part     of   the   Cybersecurity              and    Infrastructure
    Security     Agency     (CISA)      Elections           Infrastructure           Government
    Coordinating       Council    and   Sector          Coordinating         Council's       Joint
    COVID Working Group."             CISA is operated under the auspices of
    the Department of Homeland Security.                    Drop boxes were apparently
    secure enough for the federal Department of Homeland Security,
    yet the majority/lead opinion still contends that they cause
    people to lose faith in our elections.
    ¶244 There is no evidence at all in this record that the
    use of drop boxes fosters voter fraud of any kind.                              None.      And
    there certainly is no evidence that voters who used drop boxes
    16
    No.      2022AP91.awb
    voted for one candidate or party or another, tilting elections
    either direction.
    ¶245 It    is   true    that     the     legislature    has     referred      to
    absentee voting as a "privilege exercised wholly outside the
    traditional    safeguards        of   the    polling   place"      that     must   be
    "carefully    regulated     to    prevent      the   potential      for    fraud   or
    abuse."     
    Wis. Stat. § 6.84
    (1).             But despite the majority/lead
    opinion's bald assertion that voter fraud is actually a "serious
    problem,"    majority/lead       op.,       ¶71,   studies   have    demonstrated
    extremely low rates of voter fraud in United States elections.16
    ¶246 The    majority/lead        opinion's      sky-is-falling         rhetoric
    not only defies the facts, but also is downright dangerous to
    our democracy.       Absent evidence that supports its statements,
    the majority/lead opinion still lends its imprimatur to efforts
    to destabilize and delegitimize recent elections.
    ¶247 But concerns about drop boxes alone don't fuel the
    fires questioning election integrity.                Rather, the kindling is
    primarily provided by voter suppression efforts and the constant
    16See, e.g., Andrew C. Eggers, Haritz Garro, and Justin
    Grimmer, No evidence for systematic voter fraud:      A guide to
    statistical claims about the 2020 election, Proc. of the Nat'l
    Acad. of Sci., https://www.pnas.org/doi/10.1073/pnas.2103619118
    (Nov. 2, 2021); Justin Levitt, The Truth About Voter Fraud,
    Brennan Center for Justice, https://www.brennancenter.org/our-
    work/research-reports/truth-about-voter-fraud (Nov. 9, 2007);
    see also Trump v. Biden, 
    2020 WI 91
    , ¶59, 
    394 Wis. 2d 629
    , 
    951 N.W.2d 568
     (Hagedorn, J., concurring) ("At the end of the day,
    nothing in this case casts any legitimate doubt that the people
    of Wisconsin lawfully chose Vice President Biden and Senator
    Harris to be the next leaders of our great country.").
    17
    No.   2022AP91.awb
    drumbeat of unsubstantiated rhetoric in opinions like this one,
    not actual voter fraud.17
    ¶248 For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent.
    ¶249 I am authorized to state that Justices REBECCA FRANK
    DALLET and JILL J. KAROFSKY join this dissent.
    17As should be clear by now, this dissent's analysis is
    neither an "ad hominem attack" nor "political talking points" as
    the majority/lead opinion claims.    See majority/lead op., ¶86
    n.29. This court's poor track record on voting rights is well-
    established and the flaws in the majority/lead opinion's
    analysis that lead to an additional "barrier" to voting are set
    forth in this opinion.
    Nevertheless, footnote 29 of the majority/lead opinion
    takes this dissent to task and ridicules Justice Jill Karofsky
    for joining it, while at the same time partaking in the very
    conduct about which it is complaining.
    What comes to mind is the adage of psychological
    projection——"the pot calling the kettle black."     Rather than
    detailing   in  response   the   several  and  recent   examples
    illustrating the adage (and risking the undesirable escalation
    of hyperbole), I observe only that there is an obvious
    difference between attacking a public servant as a "tyrant" for
    merely doing her job, which elicited Justice Karofsky's
    objection in Becker, and simply pointing out this court's poor
    recent track record when it comes to protecting voting rights,
    as does this dissent.    See Becker v. Dane County, 2022 WI __,
    ¶44, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __.
    18
    No.   2022AP91.awb
    1
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022AP000091

Filed Date: 7/8/2022

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 7/8/2022

Authorities (45)

State Ex Rel. Wisconsin Senate v. Thompson , 144 Wis. 2d 429 ( 1988 )

McDonald v. Board of Election Comm'rs of Chicago , 89 S. Ct. 1404 ( 1969 )

Federal Election Commission v. Akins , 118 S. Ct. 1777 ( 1998 )

Whitman v. American Trucking Assns., Inc. , 121 S. Ct. 903 ( 2001 )

Sommerfeld v. Board of Canvassers , 269 Wis. 299 ( 1955 )

Barry Laboratories, Inc. v. State Board of Pharmacy , 26 Wis. 2d 505 ( 1965 )

Moedern v. McGinnis , 70 Wis. 2d 1056 ( 1975 )

Lister v. Board of Regents of the University of Wisconsin ... , 72 Wis. 2d 282 ( 1976 )

S. D. Realty Co. v. Sewerage Commission of Milwaukee , 15 Wis. 2d 15 ( 1961 )

Responsible Use of Rural & Agricultural Land v. Public ... , 239 Wis. 2d 660 ( 2000 )

Putnam v. Time Warner Cable of Southeastern Wisconsin, Ltd. ... , 255 Wis. 2d 447 ( 2002 )

Miller Brands-Milwaukee, Inc. v. Case , 162 Wis. 2d 684 ( 1991 )

Bartus v. Wisconsin Department of Health & Social Services , 176 Wis. 2d 1063 ( 1993 )

State Ex Rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane County , 271 Wis. 2d 633 ( 2004 )

Village of Trempealeau v. Mikrut , 273 Wis. 2d 76 ( 2004 )

Rubin v. Islamic Republic of Iran , 200 L. Ed. 2d 58 ( 2018 )

United States v. Cotton , 122 S. Ct. 1781 ( 2002 )

Dean v. United States , 129 S. Ct. 1849 ( 2009 )

State v. Smith , 283 Wis. 2d 57 ( 2005 )

Cords v. State , 62 Wis. 2d 42 ( 1974 )

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