State v. Corey T. Rector ( 2023 )


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    2023 WI 41
    SUPREME COURT                 OF   WISCONSIN
    CASE NO.:                 2020AP1213-CR
    COMPLETE TITLE:           State of Wisconsin,
    Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant,
    v.
    Corey T. Rector,
    Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent.
    ON CERTIFICATION FROM THE COURT OF APPEALS
    OPINION FILED:            May 23, 2023
    SUBMITTED ON BRIEFS:
    ORAL ARGUMENT:            October 12, 2022
    SOURCE OF APPEAL:
    COURT:                 Circuit
    COUNTY:                Kenosha
    JUDGE:                 Jason A. Rossell
    JUSTICES:
    KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
    which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.
    REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part
    and dissenting in part, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK,
    J., joined.
    NOT PARTICIPATING:
    ATTORNEYS:
    For     the       plaintiff-respondent-cross-appellant,         there   were
    briefs filed by Winn S. Collins, assistant attorney general,
    with whom on the briefs was Joshua L. Kaul, attorney general.
    There        was    an   oral   argument    by    Winn    S.   Collins,   assistant
    attorney general.
    For     the       defendant-appellant-cross-respondent,         there   were
    briefs        filed      by   Andrew   R.   Hinkel,      assistant   state   public
    defender.    There   was   an    oral   argument   by    Andrew      R.    Hinkel,
    assistant state public defender.
    An      amicus   curiae     brief   was   filed     by   Katie    R.     York,
    appellate division director, with whom on the brief was Kelli S.
    Thompson, state public defender, for the Wisconsin State Public
    Defender.
    2
    
    2023 WI 41
    NOTICE
    This opinion is subject to further
    editing and modification.   The final
    version will appear in the bound
    volume of the official reports.
    No.         2020AP1213-CR
    (L.C. No.      2018CF840)
    STATE OF WISCONSIN                                   :            IN SUPREME COURT
    State of Wisconsin,
    Plaintiff-Respondent-Cross-Appellant,                        FILED
    v.                                                             MAY 23, 2023
    Corey T. Rector,                                                          Sheila T. Reiff
    Clerk of Supreme Court
    Defendant-Appellant-Cross-Respondent.
    KAROFSKY, J., delivered the majority opinion of the Court, in
    which ANN WALSH BRADLEY, DALLET and HAGEDORN, JJ., joined.
    REBECCA GRASSL BRADLEY, J., filed an opinion concurring in part
    and dissenting in part, in which ZIEGLER, C.J., and ROGGENSACK,
    J., joined.
    APPEAL    from      an   order    of   the   Circuit      Court     for    Kenosha
    County, Jason A. Rossell, Judge.                Affirmed.
    ¶1     JILL J. KAROFSKY, J.               This case determines whether
    Corey        Rector   must       comply    with      sex    offender        registration
    requirements for life under 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1. (2021-
    22).1        Wisconsin's sex offender registration statute requires
    All subsequent references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to
    1
    the 2021-22 version unless otherwise indicated.
    No.        2020AP1213-CR
    lifetime registration when a "person has, on 2 or more separate
    occasions, been convicted . . . for a sex offense."                                     
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.                We are tasked with interpreting the phrase
    "separate occasions," and we determine that, in the context of
    this       statute,       the    plain       and    ordinary      meaning          of     "separate
    occasions" does not refer solely to the number of convictions.
    Consequently, the circuit court did not err by ordering Rector
    to register as a sex offender for fifteen years rather than
    until his death because his five convictions for possession of
    child      pornography          were    filed      in     a   single    case       and     occurred
    during the same hearing.                     We also hold that the circuit court
    did not err in finding Rector ineligible to participate in the
    Earned Release Program (ERP).
    I.    BACKGROUND
    ¶2        The State filed a criminal complaint charging Rector
    with ten counts of possession of child pornography in violation
    of 
    Wis. Stat. § 948.12
    (1m) after seizing over 1,000 offending
    images      and    videos        in    Rector's         possession.          During       a   single
    hearing,         Rector    pled        guilty      to    five   out    of     ten        counts   of
    possession of child pornography.2                         The circuit court3 sentenced
    Rector      to    eight     years       initial         confinement     and     ten       years   of
    extended supervision on each of the five counts to be served
    Pursuant to the plea agreement, the other five counts of
    2
    possession of child pornography were dismissed and the State
    agreed not to issue any additional charges based on the other
    discovered images.
    The Honorable Jason
    3                                      A.    Rossell     of     the    Kenosha         County
    Circuit Court presided.
    2
    No.     2020AP1213-CR
    concurrently       and   ordered     Rector       to    comply   with      sex   offender
    registration requirements for fifteen years.                         The court found
    Rector ineligible to participate in the ERP, in relevant part
    because the offense was not a "substance abuse crime."
    ¶3     The    Department       of    Corrections       (DOC)        requested     the
    circuit court amend the Judgment of Conviction (JOC) because it
    believed 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1. required Rector to register
    as a sex offender for life.               The circuit court denied the motion
    to   amend   the     JOC,     determining        that    § 301.45(5)(b)1.         did   not
    require lifetime registration because the convictions did not
    occur on "separate occasions."                    The State cross-appealed the
    denial of the motion to amend.
    ¶4     Rector also filed a postconviction motion to amend the
    JOC on the basis that the court improperly determined he was not
    eligible to participate in the ERP.                      The circuit court denied
    Rector's motion for two reasons: (1) the circuit court explained
    that it only authorizes eligibility to participate in the ERP
    when substance abuse "directly goes to the criminogenic factor
    that caused the crime" and that was not the case here; and (2)
    the circuit court was concerned that participation in the ERP
    could   lead   to     release       before       the    defendant    had     served     the
    statutory minimum sentence.               Rector filed an appeal challenging
    the denial of his motion to amend the JOC.
    ¶5     The     court     of    appeals       certified        the    cross-appeal
    pursuant to Wis. Stat. § (Rule) 809.61 because, in its view, the
    plain      meaning       of     "separate         occasions"        in     
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1. appears to conflict with this court's decisions
    3
    No.    2020AP1213-CR
    in State v. Wittrock, 
    119 Wis. 2d 664
    , 
    350 N.W.2d 647
     (1984),
    and State v. Hopkins, 
    168 Wis. 2d 802
    , 
    484 N.W.2d 549
     (1992).
    We      accepted       certification                and         consequently           also        took
    jurisdiction over Rector's appeal.
    II.       ANALYSIS
    ¶6       We    begin     by        addressing          the      State's         cross-appeal
    regarding       
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.                and     determine          that
    convictions         based    on        charges          filed    in     a     single        case    and
    occurring during the same hearing have not occurred on "2 or
    more separate occasions."                    Therefore, the circuit court did not
    err in requiring Rector to comply with registration requirements
    for   only     15    years.             We    then       address        Rector's       appeal       and
    determine that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise
    its discretion in finding Rector ineligible to participate in
    the ERP.
    A.     Sex Offender Registration Requirements
    ¶7       When a person is ordered to comply with sex offender
    registration         requirements,              Wisconsin's           statutes             offer    two
    options    for      how     long       those       requirements         extend——15          years    or
    until    the    offender's             death.           Wisconsin       Stat.      § 301.45(5)(a)
    governs when a person must comply with registration requirements
    for 15 years, and             § 301.45(5)(b) governs when a person must
    comply for life.             Sections 301.45(5)(b)1., 1m., and 2. require
    lifetime registration when applicable criteria are met.                                       Section
    301.45(5)(b)3.         gives       a    circuit         court    discretion           to    otherwise
    order lifetime registration.                    We note that this opinion does not
    address    § 301.45(5)(b)3.,                 and    as    such     it       does   not      affect    a
    4
    No.       2020AP1213-CR
    circuit      court's         discretion        to    otherwise       order        lifetime
    registration.
    ¶8     We    must      interpret     
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.           to
    determine whether a person who has been convicted on multiple
    counts of possession of child pornography filed within a single
    case and whose convictions occurred during the same hearing must
    comply with the sex offender registration requirements for life.
    This is a question of statutory interpretation that we review de
    novo.      State v. Forrett, 
    2022 WI 37
    , ¶5, 
    401 Wis. 2d 678
    , 
    974 N.W.2d 422
    .
    ¶9     In addressing 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1., we first
    discern its plain meaning based on the language and context of
    the statute.           We next address this court's prior decisions in
    Wittrock and Hopkins, which interpreted similar language in 
    Wis. Stat. § 939.62
    , and explain why those decisions do not dictate
    our interpretation of § 301.45(5)(b)1. in this case.
    1.   The Plain Meaning of 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.
    ¶10    "Statutory interpretation begins with the language of
    the   statute.          If   the     meaning    of    the    statute      is    plain,   we
    ordinarily stop the inquiry."                  State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct.
    for Dane Cnty., 
    2004 WI 58
    , ¶45, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , 
    681 N.W.2d 110
    (quotations omitted).               In discerning plain meaning, we use the
    "common,     ordinary,        and    accepted       meaning"   of    words       and   give
    "technical        or     specially-defined           words     or    phrases"          their
    "technical or special definitional meaning."                        
    Id.
        Both context
    and   structure        of    a   statute   are       important      to     meaning,      and
    5
    No.    2020AP1213-CR
    "[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give reasonable
    effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."                         Id., ¶46.
    ¶11   Wisconsin Stat. § 301.45(5)(b)1. reads:
    (b) A person who is covered under sub. (1g)(a), (b),
    (bm), (c), (d), (dd), (dp) or (e) shall continue to
    comply   with    the   [sex   offender   registration]
    requirements of this section until his or her death if
    any of the following applies:
    1. The person has, on 2 or more separate occasions,
    been convicted or found not guilty or not responsible
    by reason of mental disease or defect for a sex
    offense, or for a violation or the solicitation,
    conspiracy or attempt to commit a violation, of a
    federal law, a military law, a tribal law or a law of
    any state that is comparable to a sex offense.
    We are asked to determine what it means to be convicted "on 2 or
    more separate occasions."4             The State argues that a person meets
    the     criteria       of   being     convicted    "on   2       or    more      separate
    occasions" when that person has been convicted of two or more
    offenses.        Rector      argues    that    a   person    fails          to   meet   the
    criteria of being convicted "on 2 or more separate occasions"
    when that person is convicted based on charges filed in a single
    case,     and    the    convictions      occur     during    the        same     hearing.
    According to Rector, the State's interpretation of the statute
    reads out the phrase "separate occasions" altogether.                            We agree
    with Rector that the plain and unambiguous meaning of the phrase
    "separate       occasions,"     given    the   context      of    § 301.45(5)(b)1.,
    means that convictions based on charges filed in a single case
    4The parties do not dispute that Rector was convicted of a
    sex offense, which is defined to include "a violation . . . of
    s. . . . 948.12." 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (1d)(b).
    6
    No.       2020AP1213-CR
    and    occurring         during   the     same      hearing       do        not    constitute
    convictions on "separate occasions."
    ¶12    We begin by defining the phrase "separate occasions."
    "Separate" means "set or kept apart: disunited."                               Separate, The
    American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1645 (3d
    ed.    1992).       An    "occasion"     is       "an    event    or    a    happening;      an
    incident"; or a "time at which an event occurs."                               Occasion, The
    American Heritage Dictionary of the English Language 1250 (3d
    ed. 1992).        Taken together, a separate occasion is an incident
    or time at which an event occurred, which is set apart from
    another incident or time at which a different event occurred.
    ¶13    The relevant portion of 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.
    says that a person must comply with registration requirements
    until his or her death               if "[t]he person has, on 2 or more
    separate          occasions,       been           convicted . . . for                 a     sex
    offense . . . ."           It is clear from the sentence structure that
    the    "2    or   more    separate      occasions"        phrase       is    modifying      the
    conviction for a sex offense rather than the commission of a sex
    offense.      The statute refers to one who has "been convicted" for
    a sex offense on separate occasions rather than one who "has
    committed" a sex offense on separate occasions.                                   Furthermore,
    the     statute      is      generally        focused        on        various        possible
    dispositions of a case——referencing conviction, a finding of not
    guilty or not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect,
    a reversed conviction, or a reversed finding of not guilty or
    not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect——rather
    than    making      any    reference      to       the    details       surrounding         the
    7
    No.    2020AP1213-CR
    commission of an offense.            As such, a person must comply with
    registration requirements for life if the event of conviction
    occurred at two or more separate (set apart) times.
    ¶14     Given the above framework, we must determine whether
    the convictions in this case——which were filed in a single case
    and occurred during the same hearing——constitute convictions on
    "separate occasions."        The common understanding and use of the
    phrase     "separate     occasions"           makes    clear     that       Rector's
    convictions fall outside the scope of § 301.45(5)(b)1.
    ¶15     Rector offers an illustrative example of the common
    usage of separate occasions in his briefing: if a person goes to
    the store and buys two apples, one right after the other, have
    they purchased apples on two separate occasions?                    No.     Clearly,
    the transactions happened on one occasion.                      Conversely, if a
    person said they purchased apples on two separate occasions, it
    is evident that the apple-purchaser took two trips to the store.
    ¶16     The     United       States   Supreme       Court     also      recently
    considered the ordinary meaning of the word "occasion" in Wooden
    v. United States, determining that "occasion" commonly refers to
    an "event, occurrence, happening, or episode" which "may itself
    encompass multiple, temporally distinct activities."                      
    142 S. Ct. 1063
    , 1069 (2022).      The Court offered the occasion of a wedding,
    which    often    includes   a    ceremony,     cocktail    hour,      dinner,   and
    dancing, as an example of one occasion with various activities
    that take place at different times.                   
    Id.
       In the context of
    criminal behavior, the Court held that an "occasion" "may, in
    common usage, include temporally discrete offenses."                         
    Id.
     at
    8
    No.        2020AP1213-CR
    1070.       More specifically the court determined that, "[Wooden's]
    one-after-another-after-another                           burglary       of        ten     units        in     a
    single storage facility occurred on one 'occasion.'"                                                 Id. at
    1069.       The United States Supreme Court's analysis is, of course,
    not       binding      on    this     court       in          matters         of    state         statutory
    interpretation, but the analysis is a persuasive example of the
    common understanding of the term "occasion."
    ¶17    Wisconsin         Stat.    § 301.45(5)(b)1.'s                     use     of     the    term
    "separate"            to     modify         "occasions"               further              assists           us.
    Convictions           that   are     filed       in       a    single     case        and       pronounced
    within the same hearing are not significantly "set apart" or
    "disunited,"           and    so    are     not       "separate          occasions."                On       the
    contrary, when a court pronounces convictions from the same case
    in    a    single      hearing,       those       convictions             are        united        by    both
    temporal proximity and by the same case filing.
    ¶18    Given      the    common    and          ordinary       understanding              of       the
    phrase          "separate     occasions"          as          shown      through           examples          and
    dictionary definitions, we hold that Rector's convictions did
    not take place on "separate occasions."                                  Like different apples
    purchased         during      the    same     trip            to   the    store,           or     different
    activities         occurring        at     the    same         wedding,            Rector's        multiple
    convictions occurred during the same "occasion."
    ¶19    In   contrast,       the    State            fails      to    offer        any     textual
    reading which gives effect to the phrase "separate occasions."
    The State reads the statute as if it required a person to comply
    with      lifetime         registration          if       that     "person          has      twice       been
    convicted."           But the statute actually reads if a "person has, on
    9
    No.   2020AP1213-CR
    2   or       more   separate    occasions,          been   convicted . . . ."          By
    ignoring "separate occasions" the State renders it surplusage.
    However, "[s]tatutory language is read where possible to give
    reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage."
    Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶46.                      The legislature used the phrase
    "separate occasions."            We must attempt to give effect to every
    word, and as such, we hold that when a person is convicted based
    on charges filed in a single case during the same hearing, then
    those convictions have not occurred on "separate occasions."5
    2.    Wittrock, Hopkins, and 
    Wis. Stat. § 939.62
    (2)
    ¶20    Although the meaning of the statute is clear from its
    text,        the    State    argues        that     our    reading     of    
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.            should    be     informed      by   this    court's     prior
    interpretation of the term "separate occasions" in the context
    of the criminal repeater statute, § 939.62(2), which reads as
    follows:
    The actor is a repeater if the actor was convicted of
    a   felony  during   the  5-year   period  immediately
    preceding the commission of the crime for which the
    actor presently is being sentenced, or if the actor
    was convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate occasions
    during that same period, which convictions remain of
    record and unreversed.
    The facts of this case——where Rector's convictions were
    5
    filed in a single case and occurred during the same hearing——
    provide a sufficient basis to determine that the convictions did
    not occur on separate occasions.      We leave for another day
    whether or not convictions that only meet one of those two
    conditions have occurred on separate occasions.
    10
    No.     2020AP1213-CR
    We addressed the term "occasions" within this criminal repeater
    statute in two cases: State v. Wittrock, 
    119 Wis. 2d 664
     and
    State v. Hopkins, 
    168 Wis. 2d 802
    .
    ¶21     In    the       first      case,       Wittrock      was     sentenced        as     a
    repeater after pleading guilty to misdemeanor charges and having
    previously       been         convicted       of     three       misdemeanors       within        the
    preceding five years.                  Wittrock, 
    119 Wis. 2d at 665
    .                   Wittrock
    had been convicted of two of his prior misdemeanors on the same
    day during the same hearing, although the conduct that gave rise
    to     each     conviction            occurred          on      separate     days     and         was
    indisputably not part of the same course of conduct.                                     
    Id. at 666
    .          Wittrock         argued     that          the     phrase     "convicted        of     a
    misdemeanor         on    3    separate       occasions"         required    three     separate
    court appearances in order to qualify as a repeater.                                   
    Id.
            The
    court    ultimately           disagreed        and      affirmed     Wittrock's       sentence.
    
    Id.
    ¶22     The       court       in   Wittrock            determined     that    the      word
    "occasion,"          as       used     within        § 939.62,       was     ambiguous,           and
    defined       the        plain       meaning       of         "occasion"     as     "happening,
    incident."           Id.      at     670-71    (quoting         Webster's    New     Collegiate
    Dictionary       794       (1977)).           Then,      with    little     analysis    of        the
    surrounding words of the statute, the court held that the term
    is ambiguous in the context of the repeater statute because the
    "incident" referred to could be either the "incident" of the
    commission of the crime or the "incident" of conviction.                                          Id.
    Determining the language to be ambiguous, the court then looked
    to legislative intent——and particularly the legislative history
    11
    No.    2020AP1213-CR
    and purpose of the repeater statute——as was an accepted approach
    to statutory interpretation at the time.6                   Id. at 671.             The court
    turned    to    a    law     review   article      which    recapped          the    author's
    involvement on the advisory committee which worked on the 1949
    revisions to the criminal code, including relevant revisions to
    the   criminal       repeater      statute.         Id.    at    671-73       (referencing
    William A. Platz, The 1949 Revision of the Wisconsin Code of
    Criminal    Procedure,         
    1950 Wis. L. Rev. 28
    ).        The     court      also
    reviewed the 1949 committee comment on the repeater statute.
    Id. at 673.         The court concluded that both sources reflected the
    committee's         intent    to   shift   focus     from       prior    sentences         onto
    prior crimes and to focus on the quantity of crimes rather than
    the time of conviction.            Id. at 673-74.
    ¶23      Finally,      the   court     determined         that    the    purpose      of
    repeater statutes, "[r]egardless of the particular phraseology,"
    "is to serve as a warning to first offenders.                          Id. at 675.          The
    infliction of more severe punishment for a repeater is based
    upon his persistent violation of the law after conviction for
    previous infractions."             Id. (quoting State v. Midell, 
    40 Wis. 2d 516
    , 527, 
    162 N.W.2d 54
     (1968)).                   The court determined that the
    legislative         history     and   purpose       of     the     statute          were   not
    consistent with a reading of the term "occasion" which referred
    to the timing of the conviction.                   Id. at 673-74.             As a result,
    6We have since clarified that, "[j]udicial deference to the
    policy choices enacted into law by the legislature requires that
    statutory interpretation focus primarily on the language of the
    statute." See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty.,
    
    2004 WI 58
    , ¶44, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , 
    681 N.W.2d 110
    .
    12
    No.        2020AP1213-CR
    the court concluded that convictions for misdemeanors within the
    same       hearing,       but   based      on    criminal      activity     that        occurred
    independent of each other and on separate days, were convictions
    on "separate occasions."                   
    Id.
         The court explicitly left open
    the question of whether convictions based on criminal activity
    committed      as     part      of   the    same      course    of    conduct        constitute
    convictions on "separate occasions."                        Id. at 668.
    ¶24     In Hopkins, the court addressed the question left open
    in Wittrock: whether multiple misdemeanors committed within the
    same       course    of    conduct      constituted          convictions        on     "separate
    occasions" under the repeater statute.                         Hopkins, 
    168 Wis. 2d at 805-08
    .        The    court      held      that       the   ambiguous     term       "occasion"
    referred to the number of the defendant's convictions and not to
    the criminal acts giving rise to such convictions.                               
    Id. at 805, 807-10
    .        The    court      in     Hopkins        again   relied     heavily        on   the
    underlying purpose of the repeater statute.                          
    Id. at 811-13
    .
    ¶25     While the operation of the criminal repeater statute
    appears to be settled,7 it does not follow that such operation is
    The legislature made changes to 
    Wis. Stat. § 939.62
     at
    7
    various times since this court's decisions in Wittrock and
    Hopkins and did not make any changes to the "separate occasions"
    language, indicating possible legislative acquiescence in the
    court's interpretation within the context of that statute. See
    Estate of Miller v. Storey, 
    2017 WI 99
    , ¶51, 
    378 Wis. 2d 358
    ,
    
    903 N.W.2d 759
     ("legislative inaction in the wake of judicial
    construction of a statute indicates legislative acquiescence").
    The concurrence/dissent misfires when it attacks the
    majority for pointing out inconsistencies in the Wittrock and
    Hopkins    decisions    without    overruling   those   cases.
    Concurrence/dissent, ¶85.   We reiterate that this case is not
    about whether to overrule Wittrock and Hopkins but whether we
    13
    No.    2020AP1213-CR
    necessarily     transposed       onto   the   sex   offender      registration
    statute.   Prior interpretation by this court may be helpful in a
    plain meaning analysis when the court has defined a legal term
    of art or addressed the context of a closely related statute.8
    See Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶¶45-46.            This is sometimes referred
    to   as       the        "prior-construction"       canon    of      statutory
    interpretation.          See Lightfoot v. Cendant Mortg. Corp., 
    580 U.S. 82
    , 95-96 (2017).           However, the court's decisions in Wittrock
    and Hopkins do not dictate our decision in this case for three
    reasons: (1) Wittrock and Hopkins were not merely defining the
    term "occasion" but analyzing what the term referred to in the
    unique context of the criminal repeater statute; (2) neither
    "occasions" nor "separate occasions" are terms of art; and (3)
    Wisconsin's     sex       offender   registration    statute,     
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    , and criminal repeater statute, § 939.62, are not so
    closely related as to dictate a singular usage of the term.                  We
    more fully explain each of these reasons in turn.
    a.    Context and Legislative History
    ¶26   The court in Wittrock was not grappling with the plain
    meaning of the term "occasion" in isolation.                Rather the court
    should extend those cases' interpretation of 
    Wis. Stat. § 939.62
    to a different statute.
    8 The concurrence/dissent confusingly claims that the
    majority opinion "holds, at least implicitly, that prior
    construction     is     irrelevant   to     plain    meaning."
    Concurrence/dissent, ¶56.     On the contrary, we explicitly
    recognize that prior-construction is relevant to plain meaning
    in certain circumstances.
    14
    No.     2020AP1213-CR
    was    determining         what     the    term     "occasion"            meant    within      the
    context       of     the    criminal        repeater          statute.            The     court's
    dictionary          definition       of     the     term        "occasion"——"happening,
    incident"——is consistent with the definition we present above.
    Wittrock, 
    119 Wis. 2d at 670
     (quoting Webster's New Collegiate
    Dictionary         794     (1977)).         The     bulk       of     Wittrock's         analysis
    attempts to discern whether "occasion" refers to the incident of
    the commission of the crime or the incident of conviction.                                      Of
    import, any analysis in Wittrock where we tried to resolve the
    ambiguity of "occasion" is irrelevant here since we recognize
    that    "occasion"         in    
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.               unambiguously
    refers to the incident of conviction.
    ¶27    Additionally,         the     Wittrock          analysis      focuses       on   the
    legislative         history       and     purpose        of    the     criminal          repeater
    statute,      which        is    entirely     different           than     the     legislative
    history and purpose of the sex offender registration statute.
    As     to    the    sex     offender       registration             statute's      legislative
    history,      the        State    argues     that    there          are    three        documents
    relevant to our analysis: (1) a DOC report in the statute's
    drafting file, (2) a DOC fiscal estimate for the statute, and
    (3) a Legislative Council memorandum discussing a related, but
    different statute.               We decline to give much weight to these
    sources.           These    three    sources       are     less      persuasive         than   the
    Wittrock sources——a law review article penned by a drafter of
    the    statute      and     a    committee    comment——because              they     differ     in
    15
    No.    2020AP1213-CR
    form,       authorship,        and      clarity    with    which     they    demonstrate
    legislative intent.9            We consider each source in turn.
    ¶28     First, the DOC report is not a reliable indicator of
    legislative intent.               Legislators are not bound to follow, or
    even       consider,    a   DOC      report       when    drafting    and    enacting    a
    statute.       Additionally, the DOC report does not comment on the
    meaning of "separate occasions."
    ¶29     The     other      two     pieces    of    legislative       history     are
    equally unenlightening.                 A DOC fiscal estimate references "two
    or more separate sexual assault convictions" and a Legislative
    Council memorandum references a situation where a person "has
    committed crimes . . . on two or more occasions."                           DOC, Fiscal
    Estimate – 1995 Session for 1995 Wis. S.B. 182 (May 25, 1995);
    Wis. Legis. Council Staff, Information Memorandum 96-18 3 (July
    12, 1996).          Not only do these two sources appear to work against
    each       other,    with   one      source   referencing      convictions      and     the
    other the commission of crimes, but more importantly, neither
    source reflects or addresses the language actually implemented
    in 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.                     At bottom, these three sources
    fail to illuminate our reading of the statute.
    Perhaps recognizing the significant differences between
    9
    the three sources in this case and the sources in Wittrock, the
    concurrence/dissent contends that one might draw reasonable
    inferences from the three proffered sources that are "analogous"
    to   the   inferences  drawn   by   this   court  in   Wittrock.
    Concurrence/dissent, ¶101.    The concurrence/dissent argues we
    should be bound to the history-based interpretation in Wittrock
    because of those analogous inferences.    This proposition runs
    contrary to this court's customary approach to statutory
    interpretation.
    16
    No.   2020AP1213-CR
    ¶30      In    summary,     the     portions      of        Wittrock——and     by
    extension, Hopkins——that are inconsistent with our analysis are
    all based on considerations that are irrelevant or inapplicable
    in the current context.                 Although the legislative history in
    Wittrock        may   have    clarified    the    intent      of    the   legislature
    regarding the criminal repeater statute, the legislative history
    of   
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.         offers   no   analogous     level   of
    clarity.
    b.     Terms Of Art
    ¶31      Neither      Wittrock     nor     Hopkins     treated      the     term
    "occasion" or the phrase "separate occasions" as a legal term of
    art.        A phrase can at times take on a specialized meaning that
    differs from its common, ordinary meaning, becoming a term of
    art.10       If a phrase has taken on a specialized legal meaning,
    then     this    court    should   attempt       to   discern      that   specialized
    meaning, and prior judicial interpretations of the same phrase
    can be a helpful tool in discerning that specialized meaning.11
    A term of art is "[a] word or phrase having a specific,
    10
    precise meaning in a given specialty, apart from its general
    meaning in ordinary contexts."     Term of Art, Black's Law
    Dictionary (11th ed. 2019).
    See 
    Wis. Stat. § 990.01
    (1) ("All words and phrases shall
    11
    be construed according to common and approved usage; but
    technical words and phrases and others that have a peculiar
    meaning in the law shall be construed according to such
    meaning."); see also Mueller v. TL90108, LLC, 
    2020 WI 7
    , ¶19,
    
    390 Wis. 2d 34
    , 
    938 N.W.2d 566
     ("The statutes themselves do not
    define the relevant terms.    However, the [relevant] statutory
    terms . . . are technical phrases with specific and distinct
    meaning in our common law, and we therefore give them their
    accepted legal meaning.").
    17
    No.      2020AP1213-CR
    The Wittrock and Hopkins courts considered the word "occasion"
    ambiguous in the context of the repeater statute and sought to
    define the ordinary meaning within that context, primarily by
    looking to the legislative history and purpose of the statute.
    We likewise believe the phrase "separate occasions" is not a
    legal      term    of       art,      but   should    be   given    its    plain,      ordinary
    meaning.      Because the phrase is not a legal term of art, it is
    of limited value for us to look to a case that defines the same
    phrase but does so under a different statute and pays particular
    attention         to    the        legislative       history     and      purpose      of    that
    statute.12
    c.   Closely Related Statutes
    ¶32     Finally, 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1. is not so closely
    related to § 939.62(2) that the court must interpret all words
    and   phrases          in    a    singular     way    to   avoid    confusion        or     absurd
    results.          This       represents        the    primary      point       of   contention
    between           our            reading       of      the         statute          and       the
    concurrence/dissent's.                         Both        the         State        and       the
    concurrence/dissent rely on the prior-construction canon to say
    The concurrence/dissent appears to claim that any word or
    12
    phrase that has been authoritatively construed in a particular
    context becomes a legal term of art that must forevermore be
    given that construction. Concurrence/dissent, ¶67. This court
    has never defined the concept of a legal term of art that
    broadly and doing so would severely limit the legislature's
    ability to use common language in its common and ordinary sense.
    Putting that aside, we emphasize that the definition of
    "occasion" that we employ is consistent with the definition used
    in Wittrock and Hopkins.       Neither case offers a separate
    technical definition for the phrase "separate occasions" that we
    could apply in this case.
    18
    No.     2020AP1213-CR
    that    the    interpretations                of     Wittrock      and    Hopkins     should    be
    incorporated        into       
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.          The      prior-
    construction canon is an articulation of the principle that when
    a particular phrase has been given authoritative construction by
    the    courts,          it    is        to     be     understood         according     to      that
    construction.           Although this principle is at its strongest when
    the court is interpreting a reenactment of the same statute, it
    has also been applied to interpretations of related statutes——
    although,      as       the     concurrence/dissent                 concedes,       "with     less
    force."       See concurrence/dissent, ¶66 (quoting Antonin Scalia &
    Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts
    322).13
    ¶33    We    begin          by        acknowledging         that    members      of    this
    majority have previously voiced their position that canons of
    construction are tools in a toolbox of statutory interpretation
    and should not be seen as inflexible rules of construction that
    override the plain meaning of otherwise unambiguous statutes.14
    This    position        hardly       "degrades"            or    "demeans"   the     canons,    as
    supporters         of        their       use        have        spoken    similarly.           See
    concurrence/dissent, ¶¶80, 82; See also, e.g., Neil M. Gorsuch,
    Lecture, Of Lions and Bears, Judges and Legislators, and the
    Despite this concession, the concurrence/dissent charges
    13
    ahead, applying the canon with full force in this case.      In
    fact, that opinion relies so heavily on this single canon that
    it fails to engage in a plain meaning analysis of the words of
    the text beyond application of the canon.
    See James v. Heinrich, 
    2021 WI 58
    , ¶76, 
    397 Wis. 2d 517
    ,
    14
    
    960 N.W.2d 350
     (Dallet, J., dissenting).
    19
    No.   2020AP1213-CR
    Legacy of Justice Scalia, 
    66 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 905
    , 917
    (2016) (referring to the use of canons as "judges pull[ing] from
    the same toolbox").
    ¶34   In this case, however, we need not debate the general
    usefulness of canons of construction because even viewed as the
    concurrence/dissent presents, the prior-construction canon does
    not aid in our analysis here for two reasons.              First, no single
    canon of construction will always take precedence over all other
    principles of construction.15         And second, the canon does not
    govern in this case.       Absent the use of a "term of art," the
    prior-construction canon only governs if the different statutes
    at issue are "closely related."           On this point everyone appears
    to agree.    See concurrence/dissent, ¶¶94, 107.
    ¶35   "Statutes are closely related when they are in the
    same    chapter,   reference   one   another,   or   use   similar   terms."
    State v. Reyes Fuerte, 
    2017 WI 104
    , ¶27, 
    378 Wis. 2d 504
    , 
    904 N.W.2d 773
    .     Here the two statutes do not fit the definition of
    closely related.      It is undeniable that the two statutes reside
    in different chapters governing different subject matter.              There
    are no cross references between § 301.45 and § 939.62, and the
    statutes do not rely on each other or otherwise interact.
    In fact, there is a canon for that——the "Principle of
    15
    Interrelating Canons," which suggests that "[n]o canon of
    interpretation is absolute.      Each may be overcome by the
    strength   of   differing   principles that  point   in   other
    directions." See Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading Law:
    The Interpretation of Legal Texts 59.
    20
    No.    2020AP1213-CR
    ¶36    The State insists that since both statutes reference
    convictions on "separate occasions," they use "similar terms"
    and    are    thus   closely      related.16     We        disagree    because   the
    legislature's limited use of general terms is hardly enough on
    its own to make the statutes closely related.
    ¶37    As an illustrative example, contrast this case with
    the related statutes in Bragdon v. Abbott, in which The United
    States Supreme Court applied the prior-construction canon.                       
    524 U.S. 624
        (1998).      Bragdon      interpreted   the     provision    of   the
    Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) which defines disability
    as "a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits
    one or more of the major life activities of such individual."
    See 
    id. at 630
    .            In interpreting that definition, the Court
    looked to how courts and agencies had applied the definition of
    "handicapped individual" in the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.                      
    Id. at 631
    .       The court noted that the entire definition in the ADA
    "is drawn almost verbatim" from the Rehabilitation Act of 1973.
    
    Id.
             Furthermore,    the    ADA    included     a    statutory     provision
    directing that "nothing in this chapter shall be construed to
    apply a lesser standard than the standards applied under Title V
    The concurrence/dissent also says that "the justification
    16
    for applying the canon seems particularly strong when the phrase
    at   issue   seldom   appears   in   the   Wisconsin  statutes."
    Concurrence/dissent, ¶94.     This statement appears entirely
    unsupported by any authority on the prior-construction canon and
    the opinion fails to explain why this would be so.
    21
    No.   2020AP1213-CR
    of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973" which created a direct link
    between those Acts.17          
    Id. at 631-32
    .
    ¶38    There is no such direct link between the sex offender
    registration statute and the criminal repeater statute.                          Each
    uses    the     phrase    "separate     occasions,"       but     the   surrounding
    structure and language of each statute is far from identical.
    For example, 
    Wis. Stat. § 939.62
    (2) looks to "the 5-year period
    immediately preceding the commission of the crime for which the
    actor presently is being sentenced," while § 301.45(5)(b)1. does
    not include a time period and does not refer separately to the
    current conviction, but simply looks to whether a person "has,
    on two or more separate occasions, been convicted."18                      Unlike the
    ADA    in    Bragdon,    which    not   only   included    a    nearly      identical
    definition      from     the     Rehabilitation   Act,      but     also     directly
    referenced that same act, nothing about the language used in
    
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.       indicates    that        the   legislature
    looked to or copied 
    Wis. Stat. § 939.62
    (2).
    See also United States v. Davis, 
    588 U.S. __
    , 
    139 S. Ct. 17
    2319, 2329 (2019) where the Court applied a consistent meaning
    to terms used in two statute's definitions of "crime of
    violence." Both statutes were within the criminal code and the
    definitions had "almost identical" language.         
    Id.
        The
    referenced definitions shared over 25 identical consecutive
    words.
    Wisconsin Stat. § 939.62(2) also uses the language "which
    18
    convictions   remain    of   record   and    unreversed,"  while
    § 301.45(5)(b)1. uses different language to accomplish a similar
    end, and provides that "[a] conviction or finding of not guilty
    or not responsible by reason of mental disease or defect that
    has been reversed, set aside or vacated is not a conviction or
    finding for purposes of determining . . . whether a person has
    been convicted on 2 or more separate occasions."
    22
    No.    2020AP1213-CR
    ¶39       The primary link between the two statutes is their
    practical application, namely that both statutes may be relied
    upon    during         the    sentencing      of   a   criminal       defendant.        And
    although         the     phrase     "separate      occasions"         will    be    applied
    differently            depending     on     whether     the    defendant       is     being
    sentenced as a criminal repeater under § 939.62(2) or is being
    required         to     comply      with     registration           requirements      under
    § 301.45(5)(b)1., any inconsistency or confusion is outweighed
    by the clear and plain meaning of § 301.45(5)(b)1.
    ¶40       Even    in   its    strongest     form,      the    prior-construction
    canon merely creates a presumption that the legislature intended
    to incorporate the court's prior interpretation of a word or
    phrase in closely related statutes.                    But that presumption is not
    meant       to   counteract       our     oft-quoted   principle       that    "statutory
    language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning"
    and "if the meaning of the statute is plain, we ordinarily stop
    the inquiry."             See State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane
    Cnty., 
    2004 WI 58
    , ¶45, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , 
    681 N.W.2d 110
    .19                              The
    presumption is meant to add clarity, not sow confusion.                                  In
    other words, fundamentally, we must presume that the legislature
    means what it says.                 See Heritage Farms, Inc. v. Markel Ins.
    Co., 
    2009 WI 27
    . ¶14 n.9, 
    316 Wis. 2d 47
    , 
    767 N.W.2d 652
    .
    One might also find an articulation of this principle in
    19
    the   "ordinary-meaning  canon,"   which   Scalia   and    Garner
    characterize   as  "the  most  fundamental   semantic   rule   of
    interpretation." See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law at 69.
    23
    No.     2020AP1213-CR
    ¶41      Given        that        
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.             does    not
    require Rector to comply with registration requirements for life
    because he was convicted of five offenses all within a single
    case and during the same hearing, and thus was not convicted on
    "2 or more separate occasions," the circuit court did not err
    when it required registration for only 15 years.
    B.     Rector's Crimes
    ¶42      Having explained our reasoning and dispensed with the
    counter      arguments,          we     should          be     done     with    our        analysis.
    However, before concluding, we are compelled to respond to the
    concurrence/dissent's             accusations                charging    that        this    opinion
    omits the details of the images found in Rector's possession and
    in doing so both "trivializes heinous crimes against children"
    and ignores the statutory purpose of public protection.                                            See
    concurrence/dissent, ¶¶57, 107.                         Neither accusation holds water.
    This opinion omits the details of the images not to trivialize
    Rector's crimes but rather because the seriousness of Rector's
    crimes is irrelevant to the question of statutory interpretation
    before us.       As to the statutory purpose, we attempt to honor
    that purpose by deferring to the legislature's policy decisions
    as expressed in the words of the statute.
    ¶43      In cases such as this, which involve serious criminal
    conduct   perpetrated            against       innocent          and    vulnerable          victims,
    attorneys and judges must balance the need for addressing the
    facts   of    the    case        with        the    victim's          interest        in    privacy,
    sensitivity,        and    respect.                Achieving          this     balance       can   be
    challenging.        Undoubtedly, there are cases where a description
    24
    No.   2020AP1213-CR
    of an assault is relevant and significant to the question at
    issue.      Clearly, this is not that case.              Here we are faced with
    a   straight-forward        question    of    statutory    interpretation.         As
    such, the details of the content of the images discovered in
    Rector's possession are irrelevant.               Instead, the only relevant
    facts are the circumstances surrounding Rector's convictions, as
    sufficiently detailed in this opinion.20
    ¶44    There is no disagreement in this case that Rector's
    crimes     were   serious.        The   statutory    language      of   
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1., however, does not hinge on whether this court
    concludes that Rector's crimes were serious.                 It is undisputable
    that all sex offenses covered by the sex offender registration
    statutory scheme are heinous in nature, thus necessitating the
    use of the registry for the protection of the public.                      However,
    within that scheme, the legislature, not this court, made policy
    decisions regarding which offenders are categorically required
    to comply with registration requirements for life and which are
    required to comply for 15 years.21                  Our job is to faithfully
    interpret     the   words    of   the   statute     in    order   to    discern   the
    Conversely, an example of a legal question that may
    20
    necessitate some description of the assaults is if we were asked
    to determine if the content of the images constituted child
    pornography.   It is undisputed in this case that the images
    constitute child pornography.
    21In addition to requiring lifetime registration for those
    convicted of a sex offense on two or more separate occasions,
    
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1m. also lists specific crimes for
    which a single violation requires the offender to comply with
    registration requirements for life.        Possession of child
    pornography could have been, but was not, included on that list.
    25
    No.     2020AP1213-CR
    legislature's        policy     choice,     not   to   impose     our   own     policy
    choices.
    ¶45     Nonetheless, our colleagues accuse this opinion of
    endangering "some of the most vulnerable members of the public."
    Concurrence/dissent,          ¶99.        That    is     simply   not     the    case.
    Importantly, nothing in this opinion undermines the ability of a
    circuit court to order an offender to comply with registration
    requirements for life, even if the offender is not otherwise
    required by the statutes to register for longer than fifteen
    years under 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)3.                   Said differently, this
    opinion does not give any sex offender blanket protection from
    lifetime registration.
    ¶46    In Rector's case, the State did not ask the circuit
    court to order that Rector comply with registration requirements
    for    life    under    § 301.45(5)(b)3.           The    State    only     requested
    lifetime registration under § 301.45(5)(b)1., and that is the
    only legal question we address today.                    It is irresponsible to
    suggest that we are endangering vulnerable members of the public
    by narrowly addressing the legal issue before us.
    C.    Eligibility For The Earned Release Program
    ¶47    We now turn to Rector's appeal challenging the circuit
    court's finding that Rector was ineligible to participate in the
    ERP.    We review the circuit court's sentencing decision to deny
    a defendant participation in the ERP for an erroneous exercise
    of discretion.         
    Wis. Stat. § 973.01
    (3g) ("the court shall, as
    part    of    the    exercise    of   its      sentencing    discretion,        decide
    whether the person being sentenced is eligible or ineligible to
    26
    No.       2020AP1213-CR
    participate       in    the     earned      release        program.").         A    court   has
    erroneously       exercised          its    discretion       if   it    imposes       sentence
    "without the underpinnings of an explained judicial reasoning
    process," State v. Loomis, 
    2016 WI 68
    , ¶30, 
    371 Wis. 2d 235
    , 
    881 N.W.2d 749
     (quoting McCleary v. State, 
    49 Wis. 2d 263
    , 278, 
    182 N.W.2d 512
     (1971)), or if it holds a "predisposition . . . so
    specific or rigid so as to ignore the particular circumstances
    of the individual offender."                   State v. Ogden, 
    199 Wis. 2d 566
    ,
    573, 
    544 N.W.2d 574
     (1996).
    ¶48    Rector           argues    that     the    circuit         court       erroneously
    exercised    its       discretion          because    it    employed     a     "preconceived
    policy of sentencing that is 'closed to individual mitigating
    factors.'"             
    Id. at 571
         (quoting       State      v.     Martin,      
    100 Wis. 2d 326
    , 327, 
    302 N.W.2d 58
     (Ct. App. 1981)).
    ¶49    In     Ogden,       we    remanded       for    resentencing        because     the
    circuit court denied the defendant Huber release22 for child care
    purposes     based       on     an    impermissible          preconceived           sentencing
    policy.     Id. at 572.             The circuit court stated that it did not
    allow     Huber    privileges          for     child       care   except       in     "extreme
    circumstances" because "number one, it is all too often abused.
    Somebody becomes real interested in a child only after they have
    been sentenced to jail . . . ."                  Id.       Thus, the circuit court in
    Ogden not only espoused a preconceived sentencing policy, but
    used generalized references to the likelihood of abuse and other
    22Huber release grants leave privileges to county jail
    prisoners for purposes such as employment, healthcare, attending
    to family needs, and more. See 
    Wis. Stat. § 303.08
    .
    27
    No.     2020AP1213-CR
    defendants' past involvement with their children to justify its
    decision      rather     than        assessing        the    defendant's           specific
    relationship and involvement with her child and her likelihood
    of abusing Huber privileges.
    ¶50     The record before us is distinguishable from Ogden.
    In this case, the circuit court set forth a sentencing policy
    that    inherently       relied        on     individualized          factors——namely,
    whether substance abuse goes "to the criminogenic factor that
    caused the crime."           The circuit court went on to explain: "So if
    there's an operating while intoxicated case or maybe a domestic
    violence case in which alcohol was used or in some way, shape[,]
    or form the substance abuse was the reason for the crime."                               The
    circuit court explicitly explained that it approves eligibility
    for the ERP if substance abuse "was a reason for the crime" but
    "[i]n this case it's a possession of child pornography."                                 This
    is sufficient to show that the circuit court was not "closed to
    individual mitigating factors."                     Id. at 571.       The court simply
    found     that     Rector's        individual       mitigating       factors       did   not
    warrant      eligibility      in    the    ERP.       The   circuit        court   did    not
    erroneously         exercise        its      discretion        by     denying        Rector
    eligibility for participation in the ERP.                      Because we affirm the
    circuit court's decision on these grounds, we do not address the
    circuit court's other grounds for denying eligibility.
    III.    CONCLUSION
    ¶51    We    affirm     the     circuit       court's     order       denying      the
    State's request to amend the JOC as 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.
    does    not        require     that        Rector     comply        with     registration
    28
    No.   2020AP1213-CR
    requirements until his death.        Rector's five convictions for
    possession of child pornography were filed in a single case and
    occurred during the same hearing.     Consequently, the convictions
    did not occur on separate occasions.     We also affirm the circuit
    court's order denying Rector's request to amend the JOC as the
    circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion.
    By the Court.—The order of the circuit court is affirmed.
    29
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    ¶52    REBECCA     GRASSL    BRADLEY,      J.      (concurring       in     part,
    dissenting in part).
    Where once certain words in an Act of Parliament have
    received a judicial construction in one of the
    Superior Courts, and the Legislature has repeated them
    without any alteration in a subsequent statute, I
    conceive that the Legislature must be taken to have
    used them according to the meaning which a Court of
    competent jurisdiction has given to them.
    Ex Parte Campbell, (1870) L.R. 5 Ch. App. 703, 706 (Eng.).
    ¶53    The primary issue in this case turns on the meaning of
    the phrase "2 or more separate occasions."                      Under 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1. (2019–20)1 ("the repeat sex offender statute"),
    a person who has "been convicted" of "a sex offense" on "2 or
    more separate occasions" must register as a sex offender for
    life.        Corey   T.   Rector   was    convicted      of   five   sex    offenses,
    stemming from the same case.               The State argues each conviction
    constitutes a "separate occasion," requiring Rector to register
    as a sex offender for life.              Rector contends convictions entered
    in   close     temporal     proximity      or   in     the    same   case    are    not
    "separate      occasions."         The   majority       erroneously    rejects      the
    State's construction in favor of Rector's.
    ¶54    The    prior-construction         canon    readily     resolves      this
    issue.       See generally Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner, Reading
    Law:       The Interpretation of Legal Texts 322 (2012).                   Under this
    canon, when judicial constructions "have settled the meaning of
    an existing statutory provision, repetition of the same language
    Unless otherwise noted, all subsequent references to the
    1
    Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2019–20 version.
    1
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    in   a     new        statute"                addressing      similar           subject         matter
    presumptively incorporates these constructions.                                    See Bragdon v.
    Abbott, 
    524 U.S. 624
    , 645 (1998) (citing Lorillard v. Pons, 
    434 U.S. 575
    , 580–81 (1978)).                       Shortly before the enactment of the
    repeat sex offender statute, and in an analogous context, this
    court    held       multiple         convictions           each       constitute         a    "separate
    occasion," even if the convictions occur in the same case or
    stem from the same course of conduct.                                  State v. Hopkins, 
    168 Wis. 2d 802
    ,         805,          
    484 N.W.2d 549
            (1992);       see      also       State    v.
    Wittrock, 
    119 Wis. 2d 664
    , 666, 
    350 N.W.2d 647
     (1984).                                               This
    background informs a reasonable person's understanding of the
    language       in    the       repeat      sex     offender       statute.           See      State    v.
    Yakich,       
    2022 WI 8
    ,             ¶35,      
    400 Wis. 2d 549
    ,            
    970 N.W.2d 12
    .
    Applying the canon, this court should hold Rector was convicted
    of "a sex offense" on "2 or more separate occasions"; therefore,
    he is required to register as a sex offender for life.                                        See 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1.
    ¶55       Application               of     the       prior-construction                 canon     is
    supported by other indicators of meaning.                                    Its application is
    consistent          with       a    statutorily           defined      purpose       of       the    sex-
    offender registry.                  See 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.001
     (explaining one
    purpose of the registry is to protect the public); see also
    Scalia     &        Garner,          Reading        Law,     at        217    ("A . . . purpose
    clause . . . is            a       permissible        indicator         of    meaning.").             Its
    application is also consistent with this court's decision in
    State    ex     rel.       Kaminski           v.    Schwarz       a    few    years          after    the
    enactment of the repeat sex offender statute.                                      See 
    2001 WI 94
    ,
    2
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    ¶33     n.8,        
    245 Wis. 2d 310
    ,        
    630 N.W.2d 164
    .            Additionally,
    extrinsic       sources        confirm      this     plain-meaning            analysis.          See
    James      v.       Heinrich,      
    2021 WI 58
    ,       ¶26,    
    397 Wis. 2d 517
    ,            
    960 N.W.2d 350
                (explaining          extrinsic        sources           are       sometimes
    considered to confirm a plain-meaning analysis (citing State ex
    rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
    2004 WI 58
    , ¶51, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , 
    681 N.W.2d 110
    )).
    ¶56      The majority commits at least three errors that cause
    it    to   incorrectly            conclude    the       prior-construction              canon     is
    inapplicable.             First, the majority holds, at least implicitly,
    that prior construction is irrelevant to plain meaning.                                   Second,
    the majority insinuates the canon's application is inapposite
    because, in its view, the prior decisions on which the canon's
    application          is    predicated       were     wrongly     decided——although               the
    majority does not overrule them.                        Lastly, the majority suggests
    the     presence          of     trivial     differences         between        two      statutes
    presents        a    compelling      reason        to    disregard      the     canon.           The
    majority is wrong on each count.                        I respectfully concur in part
    and dissent in part.2
    I.     BACKGROUND
    ¶57      The       majority    omits        from    its        opinion       a    thorough
    description          of    the    facts,     dismissing         the    heinous          nature   of
    Rector's crimes as "irrelevant" and scrapping statutory purpose
    from its purportedly plain meaning analysis.                             See majority op.,
    The majority correctly concludes the circuit court did not
    2
    err in denying Rector's request to participate in the Earned
    Release Program.   Accordingly, I join paragraphs 47 through 50
    of the majority opinion.
    3
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    ¶¶42–43   (holding       the   seriousness        of   Rector's       crimes    is
    "irrelevant").         Contrary    to   the    majority's    position,       "[i]t
    is . . . customary for any judicial opinion to relay the facts
    of the case"——sometimes even when the relevance of particular
    facts is debatable.3      Becker v. Dane County, 
    2022 WI 63
    , ¶89, 
    403 Wis. 2d 424
    ,     
    977 N.W.2d 390
         (Rebecca       Grassl     Bradley,     J.,
    dissenting).       Rector's       crimes      illustrate    why     the   State's
    3 Relevancy is often in the eye of the beholder. In Doubek
    v. Kaul, we considered whether Daniel Doubek's misdemeanor
    conviction for disorderly conduct constituted a crime of
    domestic violence, thereby prohibiting him from owning a
    firearm.   
    2022 WI 31
    , 
    401 Wis. 2d 575
    , 
    973 N.W.2d 756
    .    In a
    unanimous opinion, this court concluded the crime did not, as a
    matter of law, constitute domestic violence. Id., ¶1. Justice
    Jill J. Karofsky opened her concurring opinion with the
    following description of the crime:
    Late in the evening on August 21, 1993, Doubek's
    estranged wife was in her home alone with their four-
    year-old daughter.   While talking with her sister on
    the phone, the line suddenly went dead.         Minutes
    later, Doubek broke through the front door, punching a
    hole in the glass so he could unlock it from the
    inside. Without his wife's permission, Doubek entered
    her home armed with a 2x4 slab of lumber. Raising the
    2x4 above his head, he told his wife she "was dead."
    She asked her husband to leave and then went to the
    door, yelling out to her neighbors for help.     Doubek
    threatened that if she did not move away from the
    door, he would "let her have it." The two eventually
    went outside to avoid waking their young daughter.
    Once outside, Doubek told his wife he did not care
    what would happen to him if he killed her, even if it
    meant he lost custody of their daughter.      About 30
    minutes later, Doubek left.
    Id., ¶23 (Karofsky, J., concurring). Notably, Justice Karofsky
    relayed this detailed description of Doubek's crime despite the
    impossibility of preserving the victims' anonymity.     Doubek's
    estranged wife and daughter were identified publicly.    Justice
    Karofsky   acknowledged  the   majority   opinion  was  "legally
    correct," rendering her entire opinion unnecessary. Id., ¶25.
    4
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    proffered       interpretation     is   consistent      with     the   statutory
    purpose of protecting the public——particularly children.                       See
    infra Section III.A.
    ¶58     In 2018, the National Center for Missing and Exploited
    Children reported to the Wisconsin Department of Justice that
    Rector,     a   middle-aged      man,   may   possess      child   pornography.
    Police executed a search warrant at Rector's home, and, as the
    majority notes, "[t]he State . . . seiz[ed] over 1,000 offending
    images and videos in Rector's possession."4                 Majority op., ¶2.
    The State contextualizes Rector's crimes in its opening brief:
    [T]en   videos   contained   graphic   and   disturbing
    recordings of child pornography with multiple sexual
    assaults of children, including:     (1) an adult male
    having anal intercourse with a prepubescent female;
    (2) an adult male having sexual intercourse with a
    prepubescent female; (3) an adult male appearing to
    perform oral sex on a female toddler; (4) an adult
    male performing oral sex on a prepubescent female's
    anus and the child performing oral sex on the adult;
    (5) a bondage recording of a naked prepubescent female
    performing oral sex on an adult male with the child
    bound in rope and wearing a leather collar; (6) a
    prepubescent female performing oral sex on an adult
    male with the child spitting out ejaculation fluid;
    (7) a prepubescent female performing oral sex on an
    adult male with the adult ejaculating onto the child's
    mouth and chin; (8) a nude prepubescent female rubbing
    her vagina with a toothbrush before inserting it in
    her anus; (9) a prepubescent female child masturbating
    her vaginal and anus area; and (10) a pubescent female
    exposing her breast, vagina, and anus to the camera.
    Rector    himself——not    his     attorney——told     the    circuit    court   he
    "wasn't the one who was violating" the dignity of the children
    4  Given its definition of relevancy, it is unclear why the
    majority notes the State "seiz[ed] over 1,000 offending images
    and videos." Rector was charged with ten offenses and convicted
    of five. See majority op., ¶2 & n.2.
    5
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    in these videos because he was not the one performing the sexual
    assaults.5                    Rector      acknowledged           merely       that      he
    "possibly . . . re-victimized"                  them     "even    though     they    don't
    know" that he possessed the videos.
    ¶59       The State charged Rector with ten counts of possession
    of   child        pornography       contrary       to   
    Wis. Stat. §§ 948.12
    (1m),
    (3)(a), and 939.50(3)(d) (2017–18).                     As the majority notes, the
    parties agree that possession of child pornography is a "sex
    offense" for the purpose of sex-offender registration.                           Majority
    op.,       ¶11    n.4    (quoting      
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (1d)(b)      (2021–22)).
    Pursuant to a plea agreement, Rector pled guilty to five counts,
    and the other five counts were dismissed.                        The State agreed not
    to   issue        additional      charges      related    to     materials    discovered
    during the same search and to dismiss a separate, unrelated
    matter.          During the plea colloquy, Rector was asked for his plea
    to each count individually.                   After Rector said "guilty" for the
    fifth time, the circuit court accepted his pleas, found Rector
    "guilty . . . in Counts 1 through 5," and entered the judgment
    of conviction.
    ¶60       At     the   sentencing      hearing,    the    circuit     court   asked
    whether sex-offender registration was required.                           The prosecutor
    was unsure, so the court relied on a pre-sentence investigation
    report, which recommended registration for 15 years.                           The court
    accepted this recommendation.                   The court also sentenced Rector
    The Honorable Jason A. Rossell, Kenosha County Circuit
    5
    Court, presided.
    6
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    to eight years of initial confinement and ten years of extended
    supervision on each count to be served concurrently.
    ¶61     The Department of Corrections (DOC) later moved the
    circuit court to amend the judgment of conviction to require
    Rector    to    register    as     a   sex       offender   for    life.         The   DOC
    explained lifetime registration was required under the repeat
    sex offender statute because Rector was convicted of multiple
    sex     offenses     and    each       conviction      constituted         a     separate
    occasion.       The DOC referenced a 2017 Attorney General opinion,
    in which the Attorney General construed the phrase "on 2 or more
    separate occasions" in 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.46
    (2m)(am) (2017–18), a
    closely related statute enacted at the same time as the repeat
    sex offender statute.         See Opinion of Wis. Att'y Gen. to Jon E.
    Litscher, Sec'y of the Wis. DOC, OAG-02-17 (Sept. 1, 2017).
    Section      301.46(2m)(am)      addresses         circumstances        under    which    a
    government agency is required to notify local law enforcement
    upon the release of a sex offender into the community.                                 The
    Attorney General concluded the number of "separate occasions" is
    "the     number    of   convictions,         including       multiple      convictions
    imposed at the same time and based on the same complaint."                             Id.,
    ¶2.
    ¶62     Rector objected, and the circuit court denied DOC's
    motion, reasoning Rector's sex offense convictions did not occur
    on     different     occasions.          The      court     concluded      the     phrase
    "separate      occasions"    in    the    repeat      sex    offender      statute       is
    ambiguous.        It then performed a "fresh analysis" to resolve the
    7
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    ambiguity, rather than examining how this court has construed
    that phrase in an analogous statute.
    ¶63    Rector appealed the circuit court's decision denying
    him eligibility for an Earned Release Program, and the State
    cross-appealed       on       the    sex-offender        registration       issue.       The
    court of appeals certified the appeals to this court.                            The court
    of appeals noted this court held, in a similar context, "the
    phrase 'separate occasions' . . . meant each separate conviction
    even when multiple convictions occurred in the same proceeding,
    at    the    same    time[.]"          State       v.    Rector,     No. 2020AP1213-CR,
    unpublished certification, at 2 (Wis. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 2021).
    It emphasized that if this court were to deny certification, the
    court of appeals would be "tasked with defining the same phrase"
    that this court "already defined" in two of its decisions.                               Id.
    This court accepted certification.
    II.    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    ¶64    The    State's         cross-appeal         requires        this   court    to
    construe      the        repeat       sex   offender         statute.            Statutory
    construction        is    a   question      of     law    subject     to    this   court's
    independent review.             See State v. McKellips, 
    2016 WI 51
    , ¶29,
    
    369 Wis. 2d 437
    , 
    881 N.W.2d 258
     (citing Shannon E. T. v. Alicia
    M. V.M., 
    2007 WI 29
    , ¶31, 
    299 Wis. 2d 601
    , 
    728 N.W.2d 636
    ).
    III.   ANALYSIS
    A.    Application of the Prior-Construction Canon Requires Rector
    to Register as a Sex Offender for Life.
    ¶65    The repeat sex offender statute provides:
    (b) A person who is covered under sub. (1g) (a), (b),
    (bm), (c), (d), (dd), (dp) or (e) shall continue to
    8
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    comply with the requirements of this section until
    his or her death if any of the following applies:
    1.   The person has, on       2 or more separate
    occasions, been convicted or found not guilty
    or not responsible by reason of mental disease
    or defect for a sex offense, or for a
    violation, or the solicitation, conspiracy or
    attempt to commit a violation, of a federal
    law, a military law, a tribal law or a law of
    any state that is comparable to a sex offense.
    A conviction or finding of not guilty or not
    responsible by reason of mental disease or
    defect that has been reversed, set aside or
    vacated is not a conviction or finding for
    purposes of determining under this subdivision
    whether a person has been convicted on 2 or
    more separate occasions.
    
    Wis. Stat. § 301.45
    (5)(b)1. (emphasis added).
    ¶66    The     State's    argument         is     grounded        in   the     prior-
    construction canon, which holds that "[i]f a . . . phrase has
    been   authoritatively          interpreted        by    the     highest      court    in   a
    jurisdiction, . . . a later version of that act perpetuating the
    wording      is   presumed      to   carry       forward       that   interpretation."
    Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 322.                      Even more broadly, "the
    canon . . . applies (though with less force) to interpretations
    of the same wording in related statutes."                      Id.; see also Shambie
    Singer, 3A Sutherland Statutes & Statutory Construction § 67:3
    n.52 (8th ed. last updated Nov. 2022) ("The prior construction
    canon of statutory interpretation teaches that if courts have
    settled the meaning of an existing provision, the enactment of a
    new    provision        that    mirrors          the    existing         statutory      text
    indicates, as a general matter, the new provision has that same
    meaning."           (citing    Lightfoot     v.        Cendant    Mortg.      Corp.,     
    137 S. Ct. 553 (2017)
    )); Bryan A. Garner et al., The Law of Judicial
    9
    No.       2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    Precedent         346     (2016)        (explaining        "when         a      legislature
    incorporates provisions of an older law into a new law" after
    the older law has been construed, the new law presumptively
    receives the same construction).                    As the United State Supreme
    Court stated:           "In adopting the language used in the earlier
    act,    Congress        'must   be     considered    to    have     adopted        also    the
    construction given by this Court to such language, and made it a
    part of the enactment.'"               Shapiro v. United States, 
    335 U.S. 1
    ,
    16 (1948) (quoting Hecht v. Malley, 
    265 U.S. 144
    , 153 (1924)).
    ¶67    The       prior-construction           canon        stems          from      the
    precedential nature of common law jurisprudence:                             once a phrase
    has been authoritatively construed in a particular context, it
    acquires a particular meaning in a "technical legal sense"——even
    if    the    phrase      has    a    different     meaning    in    common         parlance.
    Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 324.                        For example, the word
    "person" in common parlance means a "human being," but in a
    legal document, it likely also "denotes a corporation" or "other
    entity[.]"          Id. at 73.           Contrary to the majority's view, a
    phrase does not have to be a "legal term of art" prior to its
    initial construction——it becomes one through its construction.
    See, e.g., majority op., ¶25 (citing Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    ,
    ¶¶45–46);      see      also    id.,     ¶31.      "The     bar    is        unquestionably
    justified in relying on a decision (even a single decision) of
    the    jurisdiction's          highest     court   regarding       the       meaning      of   a
    certain word or phrase that is repeated in a later statute."
    Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 325.                      Unfortunately, "[c]ourts
    as    well   as     advocates       have   been    known     to    overlook        technical
    10
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    senses of ordinary words——senses that might bear directly on
    their decisions."     Id. at 74.    The majority opinion presents a
    prime example.
    ¶68   The State discusses a different basis for the prior-
    construction     canon:   reasonable    people   "presume    that    the
    legislature acts with full knowledge of existing statutes and
    how the courts have interpreted them."       Mallow v. Angove, 
    148 Wis. 2d 324
    , 330, 
    434 N.W.2d 839
     (Ct. App. 1988) (citing C.L. v.
    Edson, 
    140 Wis. 2d 168
    , 181, 
    409 N.W.2d 417
     (Ct. App. 1987)).
    Although this "fanciful presumption of legislative knowledge,"6
    is not the soundest basis for the canon, this court has long
    invoked it:
    All statutes are presumed to be enacted by the
    legislature with full knowledge of the existing
    condition   of  the   law   and  with   reference  to
    it, . . . they are therefore to be construed in
    connection with and in harmony with the existing law,
    and as a part of a general and uniform system of
    jurisprudence, that is, they are to be construed with
    a reference to the whole system of law of which they
    form a part.
    Wis. Carry, Inc. v. City of Madison, 
    2017 WI 19
    , ¶62 n.44, 
    373 Wis. 2d 543
    , 
    892 N.W.2d 233
     (quoting Town of Madison v. City of
    Madison, 
    269 Wis. 609
    , 614, 
    70 N.W.2d 249
     (1955)) (ellipsis in
    the original).
    ¶69   The practical implications of the prior-construction
    canon are the same, at least in this case, regardless of the
    rationale for the canon:     "the meaning and effect of statutes
    are to be determined in connection, not only with the common
    6  Antonin Scalia & Bryan A. Garner,         Reading    Law:     The
    Interpretation of Legal Texts 324 (2012).
    11
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    law, . . . and      the    constitution,            but       also    with     reference           to
    other statutes . . . and the decisions of the courts."                                      Town of
    Madison,    
    269 Wis. at 614
        (quoting          82    C.J.S.        Statutes         § 362)
    (ellipses in the original).
    ¶70     The    State     notes         the    phrase       at    issue,        "2       or   more
    separate     occasions,"        is     materially             identical        to       a    phrase
    appearing    in    another      statute,          
    Wis. Stat. § 939.62
              (1991–92)
    ("the   repeat     offender     statute").               That       statute    enhanced           the
    penalty    for    "repeaters."              In    relevant          part,     it    defined         a
    repeater as a person "convicted of a misdemeanor on 3 separate
    occasions" during the 5-year period immediately preceding the
    commission of the crime for which the person was presently being
    sentenced.       § 939.62(2) (1991–92) (emphasis added).
    ¶71     In 1984 and again in 1992, this court construed the
    phrase "3 separate occasions" in the repeat offender statute.
    In State v. Wittrock, the defendant was convicted of disorderly
    conduct in 1977.         
    119 Wis. 2d at 666
    .               In 1980, he was convicted
    of two counts of disorderly conduct in one case, stemming from
    separate events.          
    Id.
            In 1981, he was charged with various
    crimes.     
    Id. at 665
    .         The issue was whether the two disorderly
    conduct    convictions       from      the       1980    case       constituted             separate
    occasions, even though the convictions arose from one case.                                       
    Id.
    at 666–67.
    ¶72     The     arguments         in    Wittrock          mirrored        the       arguments
    advanced    in    this     case.           The    State       argued        each    conviction
    constituted a separate occasion.                   
    Id. at 667
    .           In contrast, the
    12
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    defendant    argued      "3   separate     occasions"       meant    three    separate
    court appearances.        
    Id.
    ¶73     This    court       deemed     "separate      occasions"       ambiguous,
    consulted      legislative      history,      and    considered      public       policy
    implications.       
    Id.
     at 671–75.            The majority in this case does
    not reconcile its holding that the phrase "separate occasions"
    is plain with this court's previous holding in Wittrock that the
    phrase is ambiguous.          At a minimum, the phrase is also ambiguous
    in the repeat sex offender statute.
    ¶74     After declaring "separate occasions" ambiguous, this
    court   held     each    disorderly      conduct     conviction      constituted        a
    separate    occasion.         
    Id. at 674
    .       It   explained     the    statute
    focuses     on   the     "quantity       of    crimes,"      not     the     "time     of
    conviction."            
    Id.
          Accordingly,         the    disorderly        conduct
    convictions      were     separate       occasions    even     though      they      were
    adjudicated in the same case.7                 Notably, this court held open
    7  The majority suggests this court's consideration of
    "legislative intent" in Wittrock is indicative of the "accepted
    approach to statutory interpretation at the time."      Majority
    op., ¶22.   It cites no authority for this proposition, but it
    does state in a footnote, "[w]e have since clarified that,
    '[j]udicial deference to the policy choices enacted into law by
    the legislature requires that statutory interpretation focus
    primarily on the language of the statute.'"        
    Id.,
     ¶22 n.6
    (quoting State ex rel. Kalal v. Cir. Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
    2004 WI 58
    ,   ¶44,   
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    ,   
    681 N.W.2d 110
    )   (second
    modification in the original).
    Reality is more nuanced. At the time Wittrock was decided,
    "ascertainment of legislative intent" was "the frequently-stated
    goal of statutory interpretation," but "our cases generally
    adhere[d] to a methodology that relie[d] primarily on intrinsic
    sources of statutory meaning and confine[d] resort to extrinsic
    sources of legislative intent to cases in which the statutory
    language [wa]s ambiguous."        Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶43
    13
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    whether convictions for crimes constituting a single course of
    conduct qualify as separate occasions.         Id. at 668.
    ¶75   In State v. Hopkins, the defendant argued he was not a
    repeater because the conduct underlying two of his three prior
    convictions stemmed from events occurring on the same day.                  
    168 Wis. 2d at 807
    .       Specifically, the defendant was arrested for
    possession of cocaine and then gave officers a false name.                  
    Id.
    He was convicted of both possession of cocaine and obstructing
    an officer.     
    Id.
          Following reasoning similar to Wittrock's,
    this court held the defendant was a repeater because "[t]he
    'occasion'    referred    to   in   the   statute   is    the    occasion    of
    conviction for each of the three crimes.                 Thus, all that is
    required by the statute is that a defendant be convicted of
    three misdemeanors within the five-year period."                 
    Id. at 805
    .
    (citations omitted).      Additionally, the test for ambiguity
    employed in Wittrock is effectively the same test this court
    currently employs.    Compare id., ¶47 ("The test for ambiguity
    generally keeps the focus on the statutory language: a statute
    is ambiguous if it is capable of being understood by reasonably
    well-informed persons in two or more senses."          (citations
    omitted)), with State v. Wittrock, 
    119 Wis. 2d 664
    , 669–70, 
    350 N.W.2d 647
     (1984) ("This court has often stated that the
    threshold question to be addressed by this court when construing
    a statute is whether the statutory term is ambiguous.           A
    statutory term is deemed ambiguous if reasonable persons could
    disagree as to its meaning.     However, whenever a case such as
    this reaches the court, it naturally follows that the parties
    will obviously disagree as to the term's meaning.     The court,
    then, will look to the language of the statute itself to
    determine whether well-informed persons should become confused
    as to a term's meaning.        Primary recourse is to statutory
    language itself. When this court looks at the language utilized
    in . . . [the repeat offender statute] the statute must be
    interpreted on the basis of the plain meaning of its terms."
    (citations omitted)).
    14
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    Accordingly, "each conviction for a misdemeanor constitutes a
    separate occasion[.]"       
    Id.
          This court emphasized that "it is
    the number of convictions that is important rather than when the
    crimes were committed."8      
    Id.
    ¶76    The    State   argues     Wittrock      and    Hopkins       construed
    "separate    occasions"     to      have    a     particular      meaning,      and
    reasonable people understand the repetition of that phrase in
    related    and    subsequently    enacted       statutes   to    bear    the   same
    8 In Hopkins, this court rejected a surplusage argument
    nearly identical to the surplusage rationale the majority
    adopts. See majority op., ¶¶11, 19. As this court explained:
    [The defendant] next contends that this court is bound
    by his interpretation of the statute by [the rule
    that] . . . [s]tatutes should be construed so that
    effect   is   given   to   each   word . . . .     [The
    defendant's] argument . . . is that a finding that a
    person can be a repeater based on two or more
    misdemeanors arising out of a single course of conduct
    renders   surplusage   the   phrase   "on   3  separate
    occasions."    [The defendant] . . . maintains that if
    the legislature had intended that the number of prior
    convictions would define a repeater, its use of the
    phrase "on 3 separate occasions" was unnecessary. The
    legislature could have merely said "convicted of 3
    misdemeanors."
    . . . .
    [W]e disagree that our interpretation fails to give
    effect to every word in the statute. In this opinion,
    we have concluded that each entry of conviction
    against a defendant constitutes a separate occasion
    for purposes of the repeat offender statute.    Thus,
    contrary to . . . [the defendant's] assertions, our
    interpretation of the statute gives meaning to the
    phrase "on 3 separate occasions."
    State v. Hopkins, 
    168 Wis. 2d 802
    , 813–14,            
    484 N.W.2d 549
    (1992).    The majority          does not reconcile              its    surplusage
    rationale with Hopkins.
    15
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    meaning.      Wittrock and Hopkins therefore collectively inform how
    a reasonable person interprets the repeat sex offender statute,
    considering        these        cases   were       decided     shortly        before       the
    enactment of that statute.                 Specifically, Wittrock was decided
    in 1984 and Hopkins in 1992.                    In 1995, the court of appeals
    applied     the    rule    articulated        in   these     cases.        See     State    v.
    Koeppen,     
    195 Wis. 2d 117
    ,        126    n.4,    
    536 N.W.2d 386
              (Ct.   App.
    1995)     ("A     conviction       of    a    misdemeanor          on     three    separate
    occasions only requires convictions of three prior misdemeanors,
    not three separate court appearances."                        (citing Wittrock, 
    119 Wis. 2d at 674
    )).          In mid-1996, the repeat sex offender statute
    and its companion, 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.46
    (2m)(am), were created by
    the   same      act,   and       both   statutes       use    the       phrase    "separate
    occasions."        1995 Wis. Act 440, §§ 72, 75.                    Given this timing,
    the     State     emphasizes       "[u]nder . . . [the              prior-construction]
    canon[,] . . . 'separate occasions' receives its accepted legal
    meaning      under        the     Wittrock-Hopkins           interpretation."                A
    discussion of this series of events is conspicuously absent from
    the   majority      opinion,       which      treats    the    repeat       sex    offender
    statute as if it were enacted before Wittrock and Hopkins.
    ¶77    In    contrast,        Rector     rejects       the    prior-construction
    canon.      Rector seems to take issue with the very idea that prior
    construction is relevant to plain meaning.                           He also seems to
    argue Wittrock and Hopkins were wrongly decided, theorizing this
    court    over-relied        on    legislative       history.            Additionally,      he
    argues the canon is inapplicable because the cases construed, in
    his view, a materially different statute.
    16
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    ¶78    Instead      of    applying             the     prior-construction            canon,
    Rector primarily argues that multiple convictions occur on the
    same occasion unless they are separated by a temporal lapse.                                   He
    quotes       an    abrogated     Seventh             Circuit     decision:          "the     term
    'occasion'         incorporates           a     temporal       distinction,         i.e.,      one
    occasion cannot be simultaneous with another."                                   United States
    v. Hudspeth, 
    42 F.3d 1015
    , 1023 n.16 (7th Cir. 1994) (en banc),
    abrogated on other grounds by                         Shepard v. United States, 
    544 U.S. 13
     (2005).           At points, Rector suggests the issue is not so
    much timing as whether the convictions result from the same
    underlying case.
    ¶79    The prior-construction canon resolves this case.                                  In
    Wittrock and Hopkins, this court authoritatively construed the
    phrase "separate occasions."                     In Wittrock, this court held that
    two convictions adjudicated in the same case constitute separate
    occasions.          
    119 Wis. 2d at 666
    .                    Similarly, in Hopkins, this
    court    held       convictions           for    two        crimes   committed        in    close
    temporal          proximity     constitute             separate        occasions:             "The
    'occasion'         referred     to     in       the    statute       is    the    occasion      of
    conviction for each of the three crimes.                                  Thus, all that is
    required by the statute is that a defendant be convicted of
    three misdemeanors within the five-year period."                                
    168 Wis. 2d at 805
    .     Shortly after Hopkins, the legislature used the phrase
    "separate         occasions"         in       another        statute       governing        repeat
    offenders:          the   repeat          sex    offender       statute.         Applying      the
    prior-construction            canon,          each    of    Rector's      five    sex      offense
    17
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    convictions          constitutes     a     separate     occasion,      even        though
    Rector's pleas were accepted during the same court proceeding.
    ¶80    Contrary to Rector's argument, the prior-construction
    canon is relevant to plain meaning but the majority degrades its
    utility.       See Majority op., ¶20 (declaring "the meaning of the
    statute is clear from its text" and only after that declaration
    considering the State's prior-construction argument); see also
    id.,    ¶9    ("[W]e     first    discern . . . [the         repeat    sex     offender
    statute's] plain meaning based on the language and context of
    the      statute.            We     next     address     this        court's       prior
    decisions . . . and explain why those decisions do not dictate
    our interpretation . . . in this case.").
    ¶81    Although the majority admits "[p]rior interpretation
    by this court may be helpful in a plain meaning analysis," its
    analysis eschews the canon altogether.                      See id., ¶25 (citing
    Kalal,       
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    ,    ¶¶45–46).         For    example,       it    holds
    Wittrock is "irrelevant" because, in the majority's view, the
    repeat       sex     offender     statute     is   "unambiguous[],"          but    that
    reasoning          incorrectly    presumes       the   prior-construction           canon
    applies only to resolve an ambiguity.                   Id., ¶26.       The majority
    says the canon is at odds with "our oft-quoted principle that
    'statutory language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted
    meaning[.]'"          Id., ¶40 (quoting Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶45).
    By    truncating       the   principle      espoused   in    Kalal,    the     majority
    misrepresents         that   case,    which      actually    reads:       "Statutory
    language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning,
    except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are
    18
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    given their technical or special definitional meaning."                                      Kalal,
    
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶45 (citations omitted).
    ¶82     In    other       cases,     some      members       of    the    majority       have
    demeaned      the     canons          of   construction          as      mere     tools      in    a
    "toolbox"——"extrinsic                 source[s],"         the    utility        of    which        is
    limited to "clearing up confusing or ambiguous text."                                        James,
    
    397 Wis. 2d 517
    , ¶23 n.12 (quoting the dissent).                                     Previously,
    this court unequivocally rejected this view.                               
    Id.
     (noting some
    justices'          disparagement             of        the         canons         exposes           a
    "[f]undemental[] . . . misunderstand[ing                         of]     how     to    interpret
    legal    texts").           The       denigration         of    traditional          canons       for
    interpreting legal texts infects the majority opinion.
    ¶83     Like many other canons, prior construction is a source
    of   plain     meaning,         having      been      applied       by    "the       best      legal
    thinkers . . . for centuries."                    Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at
    xxix.       Common        law    jurisdictions            throughout       the       world     have
    applied the prior-construction canon for a long time.                                           See,
    e.g.,    Campbell,          5     Ch.      App.      at     706.          Its     conventional
    application, over a long period, makes it an intrinsic source.
    "Neither written words nor the sounds that the written words
    represent have any inherent meaning.                       Nothing but convention and
    contexts cause a symbol or sound to convey a particular idea."
    Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at xxvii.                            The prior-construction
    canon    is    part       of    "a      generally         agreed-on       approach        to      the
    interpretation of legal texts."                      
    Id.
            It and other canons are
    "helpful, neutral guides," "grounded in experience developed by
    reason   and       tend    to     a    better     administration           of    justice        than
    19
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    leaving interpretation in each case to feelings of policy on the
    part of the tribunal[.]"          
    Id. at 61
     (quoting 3 Roscoe Pound,
    Jurisprudence 506 (1959)).          The majority's "marginalization" of
    this well-established canon "flies in the face of centuries of
    jurisprudence" and is "far outside of the judicial mainstream."
    See James, 
    397 Wis. 2d 517
    , ¶23 n.12.
    ¶84    The majority also demonstrates a misunderstanding of
    the prior-construction canon by adopting Rector's attack on the
    reasoning of Wittrock and Hopkins.             See, e.g., majority op., ¶22
    ("[W]ith     little   analysis    of    the    surrounding      words   of   the
    statute, the court held that the term is ambiguous[.]"); 
    id.,
    ¶25   n.7    (explaining    the   majority      intends    to    "point[]    out
    inconsistencies in the Wittrock and Hopkins decisions").                     Even
    assuming    the   cases    were   wrongly      decided,   they    changed     the
    background against which the repeat sex offender statute was
    enacted.     The legislature presumptively relied on these cases, a
    point reasonable people expect to inform legal meaning.                      The
    legislature is not required to predict which of this court's
    cases may someday be overturned.
    ¶85    The majority stops short of overturning Wittrock and
    Hopkins despite insinuating they were wrongly decided, creating
    inconsistency in the law——a prime reason to discard a decision.
    See State v. Roberson, 
    2019 WI 102
    , ¶50, 
    389 Wis. 2d 190
    , 
    935 N.W.2d 813
        (explaining    this      court   can   overturn    precedent    if
    "there is a showing that the precedent has become detrimental to
    coherence and consistency in the law" (quoting Bartholomew v.
    Wis. Patients Comp. Fund & Compcare Health Servs. Ins., 
    2006 WI 20
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    91, ¶33, 
    293 Wis. 2d 38
    , 
    717 N.W.2d 216
    )).                               The majority offers
    no     principled        reason——none——to             justify       why         the    number       of
    occasions is calculated differently in two statutes using the
    same phrase in analogous contexts.                            The majority claims the
    repeat offender statute is "unique," but the majority's mere
    declaration        does     not     make    it    so.         See    Majority          op.,     ¶25.
    Limiting cases to their facts without justification is not legal
    reasoning.
    ¶86       The majority claims "any inconsistency or confusion"
    stemming from its holding "is outweighed by the clear and plain
    meaning" of the repeat sex offender statute.                              Id., ¶39; see also
    id.,    ¶30       ("In     summary,        the    portions          of     Wittrock——and            by
    extension, Hopkins——that are inconsistent with our analysis are
    all based on considerations that are irrelevant or inapplicable
    in     the       current     context.").               This        reasoning          erroneously
    presupposes        that     prior       construction          is    irrelevant          to    plain
    meaning.         Applying the canon would preserve plain meaning and
    prevent      a    wholly     unnecessary          inconsistency.                 See    Scalia       &
    Garner,      Reading       Law,    at     324.        The    canon       recognizes          that    a
    precedential construction imbues a phrase with meaning it might
    otherwise not have.                By disregarding the canon, the majority
    fosters      incoherence          and   complexity          while    spawning          confusion.
    See Barrass v. Aberdeen Steam Trawling & Fishing Co., [1933]
    A.C. 402, 412 (Eng.) (explaining the prior-construction canon is
    "a   salutary       rule    and     one    necessary         to     confer       upon    Acts       of
    Parliament that certainty which, though it is often lacking, is
    always to be desired").
    21
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    ¶87    Notwithstanding the conflict created by its decision
    in this case, the majority declines to overturn Wittrock and
    Hopkins because the meaning of the phrase "separate occasions"
    in   the    repeat    offender          statute      "appears       to     be     settled[.]"
    Majority op., ¶25.               The majority presumes the legislature has
    "possibl[y]" "acquiesce[d]" to the Wittrock-Hopkins construction
    because the legislature has made changes to the repeat offender
    statute since those cases were decided "and did not make any
    changes to the 'separate occasions' language[.]"                                 Id., ¶25 n.7
    (citing     Estate        of    Miller    v.    Storey,       
    2017 WI 99
    ,        ¶51,   
    378 Wis. 2d 358
    , 
    903 N.W.2d 759
    ).                  The majority then holds that just
    because     the    meaning        "appears      to    be   settled         [in    the     repeat
    offender statute], it does not follow that such operation is
    necessarily        transposed          onto    the . . . [repeat            sex        offender]
    statute."        Id., ¶25.        Whatever illegitimate theory the majority
    invokes to support its creation of legal inconsistency cannot
    justify     its    decision        to    mutate      fixed    meaning        in    a     closely
    related statute.
    ¶88    The irony of upholding Wittrock and Hopkins based on
    legislative        acquiescence          is    totally       lost    on     the        majority.
    According to the majority, the fixed meaning of a statute can
    change      if     this        court    misconstrues         the     statute           and    the
    legislature, over some undefined period, does not amend the text
    to correct the error.              Although the conventional application of
    the misguided doctrine would conclude legislative acquiescence
    confirms     the    holdings       of    Wittrock      and    Hopkins,           the    majority
    disagrees with the analysis in each case.                       The majority does not
    22
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    explain how the fixed meaning of a statute can change based on
    its    text   remaining       unchanged.           See   Estate     of    Miller,    
    378 Wis. 2d 358
    ,         ¶99   (Kelly,         J.,    concurring/dissenting).            The
    Wisconsin Constitution sets forth procedures for changing the
    law.    Absent from them is any manner by which a law can be, in
    effect,       amended        through       legislative      inaction.             Unlike
    legislative acquiescence, prior construction is premised on an
    event prior to a law's enactment imbuing a phrase used in the
    law with meaning.             Legislative acquiescence is premised on a
    non-event——the        mere    passage       of    time——changing     a    law's    fixed
    meaning.
    ¶89    The     majority       professes         inaction     can     imbue     a
    misconstrued statute with a new meaning.                     If the majority is
    correct, surely this court's construction of a phrase could also
    imbue meaning into that phrase when it is later used in a new
    statute.      In fact, to conclude that when the legislature does
    not    act,    it     is   making      a    reasoned     decision    to    endorse     a
    particular construction is much more suspect than to suppose the
    legislature considers the definitive construction of a phrase by
    the state's highest court when it uses that phrase in a new
    statute.            See    id.,   ¶97       ("[A]ttributing       significance        to
    legislative inaction depends on an overweening, court-centric
    view of our relationship to the other branches of government.
    If this interpretive device is to function, it requires a belief
    that the legislature carefully attends to everything we say,
    rigorously compares our pronouncements to its own understanding
    of the statutory corpus, compiles a list of disagreements, and
    23
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    privileges     corrective      measures          over       everything      else     on    its
    crowded    legislative       calendar.").               A    legislative         drafter    is
    obviously     interested      in   the      legislation            being    construed       in
    accordance with the drafter's expectations, and for that reason,
    drafters     often    consider     how    phrases           have    been    construed       by
    courts.      See Wisconsin Bill Drafting Manual § 2.03(2)(a) (2023–
    24) (advising drafters at the Legislative Reference Bureau to
    consider whether a word or phrase is defined "in case law").
    ¶90     Rector's      argument      that     the       statutes       are    materially
    different, which the majority adopts, is patently wrong.                              As the
    majority notes, both the repeat sex offender statute and the
    repeat     offender     statute       "may       be     relied       upon        during    the
    sentencing of a criminal defendant"——and specifically, a repeat
    offender.      See Majority op., ¶39.                   Contradicting itself, the
    majority declares the only similarity between the statutes lies
    in   their     use    of    the    same      language.              Id.,     ¶36     ("[T]he
    legislature's limited use of general terms is hardly enough on
    its own to make the statutes closely related.").                                  While the
    majority insists these statutes are sufficiently dissimilar to
    reject the prior-construction canon, its description of these
    alleged differences is particularly opaque.
    ¶91     "[W]hen a statute uses the very same terminology as an
    earlier    statute——especially         in    the        very   same       field,    such    as
    securities law or civil—rights law——it is reasonable to believe
    that the terminology bears a consistent meaning."                                  Scalia &
    Garner, Reading Law, at 323.              "One might even say that the body
    of law of which a statute forms a part——especially if that body
    24
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    has been codified——is part of the statute's context."                                   Id.; see
    also Strenke v. Hogner, 
    2005 WI 25
    , ¶28, 
    279 Wis. 2d 52
    , 
    694 N.W.2d 296
          ("A    statute       must     be    interpreted        in       light    of   the
    common law and the scheme of jurisprudence existing at the time
    of its enactment."             (citing State v. Hansen, 
    2001 WI 53
    , ¶19,
    
    243 Wis. 2d 328
    , 
    627 N.W.2d 195
    )).                     Notably, the United States
    Supreme   Court       rejected        the     trivial-differences               approach       the
    majority employs.           See United States v. Davis, 
    588 U.S. __
    , 
    139 S. Ct. 2319
    ,      2329        (2019)     (citing        Sullivan       v.        Stroop,      
    496 U.S. 478
    , 484 (1990)).
    ¶92    The repeat sex offender statute uses the "very same
    terminology"——"separate               occasions"——as           the     repeat           offender
    statute   and    both       statutes        deal    with     similar       subject       matter.
    Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 323.                         That one states "2 or
    more separate occasions" and the other "3 separate occasions" is
    irrelevant.           See    State     v.     Anderson,       
    2014 WI 93
    ,          ¶41,    
    375 Wis. 2d 337
    , 
    851 N.W.2d 760
     (Abrahamson, C.J., dissenting) ("I
    start with the statutes, the one governing . . . [not guilty by
    reason    of     insanity]        and       the      other     governing          involuntary
    intoxication.           The     two     are        closely    related.             They       have
    distinctive features but also share certain legal similarities;
    violation of each might be proven by similar facts.").                                   In one
    treatise on statutory construction, examples of similar subject
    matters    are        discussed        at     a      high     level        of     generality:
    "securities      law    or     civil—rights          law[.]"          Scalia       &     Garner,
    Reading Law, at 323.            The two statutes in this case are part of
    the same body of law.            The purpose of both is self-evidently to
    25
    No.     2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    protect     the       public      from      repeat       offenders     and       both    impact
    sentencing.
    ¶93      The majority contradicts its own reasoning that the
    statutes are different by holding the similarity in language
    between the statutes is immaterial because "separate occasions"
    was not a legal term of art at the time it was construed in
    Wittrock.       See Majority op., ¶31.                   The question, though, is not
    whether "separate occasions" had or has an accepted meaning in
    common parlance but whether this court's precedent changes that
    otherwise       accepted        meaning       in     a    particular        context.         It
    obviously does.
    ¶94      The    phrase       "separate        occasions"       is    not     especially
    common    in    the     Wisconsin        statutes.          Statutes       can     be    closely
    related based on "similar" phraseology and subject matter, and
    the   justification          for      applying      the    canon     seems       particularly
    strong when the phrase at issue seldom appears in the Wisconsin
    statutes.       Compare State v. Reyes Fuerte, 
    2017 WI 104
    , ¶27, 
    378 Wis. 2d 504
    , 
    904 N.W.2d 773
     ("Statutes are closely related when
    they are in the same chapter, reference one another, or use
    similar terms.          Being within the same statutory scheme may also
    make two statutes closely related."                        (citation omitted)), with
    majority       op.,    ¶35     ("It    is    undeniable       that    the     two       statutes
    reside in different chapters governing different subject matter.
    There are no cross references between . . . [the two statutes],
    and   the      statutes      do    not      rely     on    each    other      or    otherwise
    interact.").
    26
    No.     2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    ¶95     Aside     from   the   repeat   sex     offender       statute,      its
    companion, 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.46
    (2m)(am), and the repeat offender
    statute, the phrase appears in only three other statutes, one of
    which imposes a penalty enhancer for certain repeat domestic
    abusers.      See     
    Wis. Stat. § 939.621
    (1)(b)        (defining      as    a
    "domestic abuse repeater" any "person who, during the 10-year
    period immediately prior to the commission of the crime for
    which the person is presently being sentenced if the convictions
    remain of record and unreversed, was convicted on 2 or more
    separate occasions of a felony or a misdemeanor for which a
    court imposed a domestic abuse surcharge under s. 973.055 (1), a
    felony or a misdemeanor for which a court waived a domestic
    abuse surcharge pursuant to s. 973.055 (4), or a felony or a
    misdemeanor that was committed in another state but that, had it
    been committed in this state, would have subjected the person to
    a domestic abuse surcharge under s. 973.055 (1) or that is a
    crime of domestic abuse under the laws of that state" (emphasis
    added));    
    Wis. Stat. § 939.22
    (21)   (defining        a    "[p]attern      of
    criminal gang activity" in the Wisconsin Criminal Code); 
    Wis. Stat. § 174.02
    (3)(a)1. (defining the circumstances under which a
    court may order a dog killed).         In the six statutes in which the
    phrase    "separate    occasions"    appears,     four   protect      the   public
    from repeat offenders.          The majority, therefore, is wrong to
    suggest    "separate     occasions"    is   a     "general       term[.]"        See
    Majority op., ¶36 ("[T]he legislature's limited use of general
    terms is hardly enough on its own to make the statutes closely
    related.").
    27
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    ¶96    Application of the prior-construction canon is also
    consistent      with    a     textually-expressed            purpose     of    the     sex-
    offender registry, which the majority disregards:                              Protecting
    the public, and particularly children.                   See 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.001
    ("The    purposes      of    this    chapter     and    chs.   302     to    304    are    to
    prevent delinquency and crime by an attack on their causes; to
    provide a just, humane and efficient program of rehabilitation
    of   offenders;        and    to     coordinate        and   integrate        corrections
    programs with other social services.                   In creating the department
    of corrections, chs. 301 to 304, the legislature intends that
    the state continue to avoid sole reliance on incarceration of
    offenders       and    continue       to   develop,          support     and       maintain
    professional community programs and placements.").                             Textually-
    expressed purpose is a legitimate indication of plain meaning.
    See Scalia & Garner, Reading Law, at 217.
    ¶97    The 2017 Attorney General opinion examined the purpose
    of the sex-offender registry, and specifically, of 
    Wis. Stat. § 301.46
    .       The Attorney General noted § 301.46 "reflects the
    Legislature's concern with offenders' potential danger to the
    public.     The number of convictions, not court proceedings, best
    measures that risk."                OAG-02-17, ¶14; see also Kaminski, 
    245 Wis. 2d 310
    , ¶41 (explaining the purpose of the act creating the
    repeat    sex    offender      statute     was    "to    protect       the    public      and
    assist law enforcement" and "related to community protection"
    (quoting State v. Bollig, 
    2000 WI 6
    , ¶¶21–22, 
    232 Wis. 2d 561
    ,
    
    605 N.W.2d 199
    )).            A person convicted of multiple sex offenses
    is no less dangerous than he would otherwise be solely because
    28
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    the convictions occurred in the same case.                    See OAG-02-17, ¶15.
    Perhaps a person who is convicted of a sex offense and later
    commits a second sex offense is more dangerous than someone
    convicted of two sex offenses in one case because the person
    clearly did not use the first conviction as an opportunity for
    rehabilitation.           The majority does not, however, require the
    commission     of     an    offense   to     take     place     after    the    first
    conviction.         The    majority   does   not    hold      that   a   person      who
    commits      crimes    after    already      having    been      convicted      is     a
    repeater.      Instead, the majority holds that a person convicted
    at two different times and in two different proceedings is a
    repeater, while a person convicted of multiple offenses close in
    time during one proceeding is not.             That holding is not required
    by the text of the statute and is divorced from the statutory
    purpose.
    ¶98   The majority does not reconcile its dangerous holding
    with   the    dangerous     problem   the    legislature       addressed       in    the
    repeat sex offender statute.          As the State notes:
    [S]uppose . . . [a   person    other    than   Rector]
    downloaded child pornography to his home computer in
    County X and later that same day to his cellphone
    while in County Y. Under this scenario, the State may
    charge this other person in two counties that may
    result in convictions in different courts on different
    days.
    According to the State, "[i]t is absurd that the two defendants
    face such differing periods of sex offender registration and
    reporting."      Although the State misunderstands the extraordinary
    29
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    facts necessary to deem a result legally absurd,9 the logical
    implications of Rector's interpretation should give the majority
    pause in light of the sex-offender registry's purpose.                              Rector
    is no less dangerous than the hypothetical sex offender in the
    State's scenario, yet the majority's holding places him on the
    registry for a much             shorter period.            The majority's holding
    invites strategic pleading by the State; the majority would have
    required Rector to register as a sex offender for life had the
    prosecutor      simply      brought      one    count      in     one    case    and    the
    remaining counts in another, with the cases being adjudicated on
    different    days.          The       majority's       holding      creates      peculiar
    distinctions between similarly situated defendants.
    ¶99     Rector possessed vile, evil imagery of children being
    sexually abused; having his crimes adjudicated in a single case
    does not mitigate the danger he poses.                    Even assuming Rector and
    others   like    him     have     a    "low"    risk      of    reoffending——a         point
    emphasized in an amicus brief by the State Public Defender——
    three    justices      of     this      court      have        previously       explained:
    "[P]arents of young children should ask themselves whether they
    should worry that there are people in their community who have
    'only' a 16 percent or an 8 percent probability of molesting
    young children——bearing in mind the lifelong psychological scars
    that such molestation frequently inflicts."10                            State v. C.G.,
    9  See generally Secura Supreme Ins. v. Estate of Huck, 
    2023 WI 21
    , 
    406 Wis. 2d 297
    , 
    986 N.W.2d 810
     (Rebecca Grassl Bradley,
    J., dissenting) (discussing the legal principle of absurdity).
    10 The study cited in the amicus brief found six percent of
    sex offenders reoffended by committing another sex offense over
    a 15-year period.   Joseph R. Tatar II & Anthony Streveler, Sex
    30
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    
    2022 WI 60
    , ¶42, 
    403 Wis. 2d 229
    , 
    976 N.W.2d 318
     (lead op.)
    (quoting Belleau v. Wall, 
    811 F.3d 929
    , 933–34 (7th Cir. 2016)).
    The majority impermissibly erases the statutory purpose of the
    sex-offender     registry    by    constructing        a    rule       removing   Rector
    from   the   registry   earlier     than    the    law       requires,      apparently
    because the prosecutor used an efficient method to prosecute the
    multiple     crimes   Rector      committed.       The       majority's        decision
    thereby endangers some of the most vulnerable members of the
    public.
    ¶100 In   contrast,     application        of       the   prior-construction
    canon would give effect to the statutory purpose of the sex-
    offender registry while remaining consistent with this court's
    post-enactment precedent.          In 2001, this court unanimously cited
    
    Wis. Stat. § 301.46
    (2m) as requiring "DOC . . . to provide the
    police chief or sheriff with bulletins regarding any registrant
    who is about to be released from confinement if the registrant
    has been convicted of two or more sex offenses, or has been
    committed under Wis. Stat. Ch. 980."              Kaminski, 
    245 Wis. 2d 310
    ,
    ¶33 n.8.     This court equated convictions on "2 or more separate
    Offender Recidivism After Release from Prison 5 (2015),
    https://doc.wi.gov/DataResearch/RecidivismReincarceration/Sexual
    OffenderRecidivismReport.pdf.   The study utilized DOC's rather
    narrow definition of "sexual recidivism": "Following an episode
    of incarceration with the WI DOC, to commit a sex offense that
    results in a new conviction and sentence to WI DOC custody or
    supervision." Id. at 4. This definition is problematic because
    many sex offenses do not result in a conviction.     See State v.
    Johnson, 
    2023 WI 39
    , ¶79, __ Wis. 2d __, __ N.W.2d __ (Karofsky,
    J., concurring) ("[A]ccording to data from the U.S. Department
    of Justice, as much as 86 percent of child sexual abuse may go
    unreported altogether."    (citing Dean G. Kilpatrick et al.,
    Youth Victimization: Prevalence and Implications 6 (2003))).
    31
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    occasions" with convictions for "two or more sex offenses[.]"
    
    Id.
            The     majority     silently       withdraws         this        language     from
    Kaminski, destabilizing yet another precedent.                               See Friends of
    Frame      Park,    U.A.   v.   City    of    Waukesha,      
    2022 WI 57
    ,    ¶68,    
    403 Wis. 2d 1
    ,         
    976 N.W.2d 263
            (Rebecca        Grassl          Bradley,      J.,
    concurring) ("After the plain text of a statute, precedent is
    the most significant, the most ubiquitous, and the most powerful
    of the traditional tools of statutory construction."                                (quoting
    Michael Sinclair, Traditional Tools of Statutory Interpretation
    13 (1942))).         The majority's holding cannot be reconciled with
    Kaminski.
    ¶101 Extrinsic sources, referenced by the State, confirm
    the propriety of applying the prior-construction canon.11                                  The
    majority      degrades        them,     even        though   it         rationalizes      its
    rejection of the canon because the repeat sex offender statute
    ostensibly         carries      an    "entirely        different . . . legislative
    history[.]"          Majority        op.,    ¶27.      In    a    literal       sense,     all
    statutes have a different history, but the reasonable inferences
    that can be drawn from the legislative history of the repeat sex
    offender statute are analogous to those drawn by this court in
    Wittrock      and     Hopkins        with    regard     to       the     repeat     offender
    statute's history.
    The majority insinuates this opinion elevates extrinsic
    11
    sources above the letter of the law, but extrinsic sources
    simply confirm the plain-meaning analysis and their use for this
    purpose is well established in our jurisprudence.         Contra
    majority op., ¶27 n.9.
    32
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    ¶102 Three sources of legislative history are relevant.                                A
    DOC report in the drafting file for the repeat sex offender
    statute recommended "lifetime registration requirements for any
    person convicted, or found not guilty [by reason] of mental
    disease or defect, of two (2) or more sexual offenses——repeat
    sex   offenders."12        DOC,       Sex    Offender       Community      Notification:
    Proposed   Program      Components           6    (1994);    see     also      
    id.
         at    ii
    (recommending     extending       "registration            requirements         for    repeat
    sex   offenders    (2    or     more    separate          convictions)         for    life").
    Notably,   the    report       uses    the       phrase    "repeat       sex   offenders,"
    while the word "repeater" is used throughout the repeat offender
    statute.    E.g.,       
    Wis. Stat. § 939.62
    (1)       ("If   the       actor    is   a
    repeater . . . .").           The report, which was created before the
    The majority declares this report "is not a reliable
    12
    indicator of legislative intent.    Legislators are not bound to
    follow, or even consider, a DOC report when drafting or enacting
    a statute."    Id., ¶28.    We do not attempt to discern the
    mythical legislative "intent" underlying a statute but instead
    declare its meaning, which legislative history may be used to
    confirm. The majority deems the law review article discussed in
    Wittrock a reliable historical source but it was published after
    the enactment of the relevant language in the repeat offender
    statute.   Obviously, it was not read by any legislators who
    voted on the matter. See id., ¶27 (proclaiming this law review
    article a better source of legislative history).
    The majority displays a lack of familiarity with this
    court's binding precedent referencing this DOC report.     E.g.,
    State ex rel. Kaminski v. Schwarz, 
    2001 WI 94
    , ¶¶53–55, 
    245 Wis. 2d 310
    , 
    630 N.W.2d 164
     (citing and quoting DOC, Sex
    Offender Community Notification:     Proposed Program Components
    (1994)); State v. C.G., 
    2022 WI 60
    , ¶29, 
    403 Wis. 2d 229
    , 
    976 N.W.2d 318
     (quoting State v. Bollig, 
    2000 WI 6
    , ¶¶22, 25, 
    232 Wis. 2d 561
    , 
    605 N.W.2d 199
     (citing DOC, Sex Offender Community
    Notification, i, 1–2)).      The majority creates yet another
    inconsistency in the law, calling into question multiple
    decisions regarding the sex-offender registry.
    33
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    text   of    the    bill     was    drafted,      is    not   the        only    source      of
    legislative history to confirm the State's construction.                                A DOC
    fiscal estimate (prepared after the bill's drafting) similarly
    noted the legislation would "expand[] registration time frames"
    for    "individuals        with    two     or    more   separate         sexual        assault
    convictions[.]"        DOC, Fiscal Estimate – 1995 Session for 1995
    Wis. S.B. 182 (May 25, 1995).                   After enactment, an information
    memorandum prepared by the Legislative Council, in discussing
    the companion statute, noted:
    Act 440 requires DOC . . . to send a bulletin to local
    law enforcement officials if the agency is going to
    place or release into the community a person who:
    (a) is   subject    to    sex   offender   registration
    requirements;   and   (b)   has  committed  crimes   or
    violations covered by the registration statute on two
    or more occasions.
    Wis. Legis. Council Staff, Information Memorandum 96-18 3 (July
    12, 1996).         The focus of the report, the estimate, and the
    memorandum is on the number of convictions, without regard to
    when   the    judgment       of    conviction       was    entered.             This    focus
    supports     the    application       of    the    canon,     and        nothing       in   the
    legislative        history        indicates      members      of     the        legislature
    understood the phrase "separate occasions" to have a different
    meaning than it was construed to have in Wittrock and Hopkins.
    See Wis. Legislature v. Palm, 
    2020 WI 42
    , ¶26, 
    391 Wis. 2d 497
    ,
    
    942 N.W.2d 900
          ("[T]he        Legislative         Reference        Bureau       never
    described the added language as changing . . . [the agency's]
    authority.").
    34
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    B.     The Majority Establishes a Rudderless Rule of "I Know It
    When I See It."
    ¶103 The majority holds that "when a person is convicted
    based on charges filed in a single case during the same hearing,
    then     those    convictions         have            not     occurred        on       'separate
    occasions.'"       Majority op., ¶19.                  It explicitly "leave[s] for
    another    day    whether . . . convictions                   that     only       meet    one    of
    those two conditions," i.e., convictions occurring in either "a
    single    case"    or   at    "the    same           hearing"    but     not      both,        "have
    occurred on separate occasions."                      
    Id.,
     ¶19 n.5.           The majority's
    holding    resolves     the    issue       in        this    case,     but    its      reasoning
    leaves future cases in flux and subject to the court's whim
    rather than its judgment.
    ¶104 The majority first focuses on temporal proximity in
    determining      whether     occasions          are        separate:         "a   person        must
    comply with registration requirements for life if the event of
    conviction occurred at two or more separate (set apart) times."
    Id., ¶13.      Leaving "set apart" without any definition, however,
    the majority proclaims "[c]onvictions that are filed in a single
    case     and     pronounced      within              the     same      hearing         are       not
    significantly      'set      apart'        or    'disunited,'           and       so     are    not
    'separate occasions.'"          Id., ¶17.             The majority then pivots to a
    different test for whether occasions are separate, which is not
    so much grounded in timing as whether the convictions stem from
    "the same case filing."              Id.        The majority never resolves this
    contradiction.
    ¶105 What if a case involves two sex offenses and the first
    plea is accepted before a lunch break and the second after?                                     Are
    35
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    those convictions "united by . . . temporal proximity"?                                 See id.
    Could a prosecutor bring separate cases but have the guilty
    pleas     entered    within       a    few     minutes           of   one      another?        The
    majority's reasoning lacks clarity, leaving the impression of a
    "rule" grounded in nothing more than "I know it when I see it."
    See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 
    378 U.S. 184
    , 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
    concurring) ("I have reached the conclusion . . . that under the
    First and Fourteenth Amendments criminal laws in this area are
    constitutionally limited to hard-core pornography.                                  I shall not
    today     attempt    further          to    define        the     kinds        of   material    I
    understand to be embraced within that shorthand description; and
    perhaps I could never succeed in intelligibly doing so.                                   But I
    know it when I see it, and the motion picture involved in this
    case is not that.").13
    ¶106 The       vagueness         in    the     majority's        reasoning        could    be
    easily    avoided    with     a    clear       holding       grounded          in    traditional
    legal reasoning.       Instead, the majority says, in effect, "I know
    these weren't separate occasions.                         Maybe in some future case
    I'll tell you what a separate occasion actually is."
    IV.    CONCLUSION
    ¶107 The majority errs in rejecting the prior-construction
    canon's     application       in       favor        of    muddling        the       well-settled
    meaning    of   "separate     occasions,"                which    this      court     decisively
    13Similarly unclear is the majority's wedding analogy. See
    majority op., ¶16.    Of course a wedding could be an occasion,
    and obviously a wedding may have discrete events, e.g., a
    marriage ceremony and a reception.     That various things can
    happen during a      single occasion does not dictate what
    constitutes a particular occasion.
    36
    No.    2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    construed nearly 40 years ago to mean "separate convictions" not
    "separate proceedings."          The legislature relied on this meaning
    when it later used the phrase in a closely related statute.                     The
    majority     repudiates    the   fixed    meaning     of   the    phrase   at   the
    expense of the textually-expressed purpose of the statute, and
    in derogation of this court's precedent.               Effectively rewriting
    the    repeat   sex     offender    statute,    the    majority      trivializes
    heinous crimes against children, and its decision endangers some
    of    the   community's   most     vulnerable   members.         I   respectfully
    concur in part and dissent in part.
    ¶108 I am authorized to state that Chief Justice ANNETTE
    KINGSLAND     ZIEGLER    and   Justice    PATIENCE    DRAKE      ROGGENSACK     join
    this opinion.
    37
    No.   2020AP1213-CR.rgb
    1