Vilas County v. Timothy Bowler , 2019 WI App 43 ( 2019 )

2019 WI App 43COURT OF APPEALS OF WISCONSIN
PUBLISHED OPINION
Case No.: 2018AP837
†Petition for Review Filed
Complete Title of Case:
VILAS COUNTY, A WISCONSIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
TIMOTHY BOWLER, KIM BOWLER AND ALPINE RESORT OF PRESQUE
ISLE, INC.,
†DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
Opinion Filed: July 30, 2019
Submitted on Briefs: January 8, 2019
Oral Argument:
JUDGES: Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.
Concurred:
Dissented:
Appellant
ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the defendants-appellants, the cause was submitted on the
briefs of Bryce A. Schoenborn of Slaby, Deda, Marshall, Reinhard &
Writz LLP, Phillips.
Respondent
ATTORNEYS: On behalf of the plaintiff-respondent, the cause was submitted on the
brief of Meg C. O’Marro, Vilas County Assistant Corporation Counsel,
Eagle River.
2019 WI App 43COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
July 30, 2019
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2018AP837 Cir. Ct. No. 2017CV132
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
VILAS COUNTY, A WISCONSIN MUNICIPAL CORPORATION,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
TIMOTHY BOWLER, KIM BOWLER AND ALPINE RESORT OF PRESQUE
ISLE, INC.,
DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Vilas County:
NEAL A. NIELSEN III, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.
¶1 HRUZ, J. Timothy Bowler, Kim Bowler and Alpine Resort of
Presque Isle, Inc. (collectively, the Bowlers) appeal a summary judgment granted
in favor of Vilas County to enforce an ordinance establishing a uniform addressing
system within the County. The structures on the Bowlers’ property consist of a
No. 2018AP837
residence from which the Bowlers operate their resort business and several cabins
the Bowlers rent out on a short-term, seasonal basis.
¶2 The Bowlers assert the County lacked authority under the relevant
ordinance to name the road serving their residence and rental structures. Their
argument in this respect is twofold. First, they contend the road does not satisfy
the ordinance’s definition of a “private road.” Second, they argue the road does
not satisfy the ordinance’s requirement that the road serve three or more
“residences or lots.” We conclude the road is a “private road” within the
ordinance definition because it is a road located on private property that leads to
the ten structures on the Bowlers’ property, each of which is a “primary” or
“principal” structure under the ordinance because it is used for human habitation.
We also conclude the buildings satisfy the ordinance’s requirement that the road
serve three or more “residences,” which include all of the Bowlers’ cabins.
¶3 The Bowlers also challenge the County’s authority under the
ordinance to assign addresses to their rental cabins. They argue these buildings
are not “principal” or “primary” structures and, therefore, are not subject to the
County’s addressing requirement. Consistent with our conclusion regarding the
County’s authority to name the Bowlers’ private road, we reject this argument and
hold that each of the ten structures at issue (the Bowlers’ residence and their nine
rental cabins) is a “primary” or “principal” structure to which the County may
assign an address.
¶4 Finally, the Bowlers argue the ordinance is invalid because the
County is applying it beyond the scope of the Wisconsin statute authorizing the
County to adopt a rural naming or numbering system. We disagree and conclude
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the ordinance may be properly applied to each home or business structure on the
Bowlers’ property. Accordingly, we affirm.
BACKGROUND1
¶5 The relevant facts are largely undisputed. The Bowlers own a parcel
of real property in Vilas County that is located in the Town of Presque Isle.
Located on the parcel is the Bowlers’ permanent residence, out of which they run
their business, Alpine Resort of Presque Isle, Inc. The remaining nine buildings
on the parcel are cabins that are rented on a short-term, seasonal basis in
connection with the Bowlers’ resort business.
¶6 In 2008, the Vilas County Board of Supervisors adopted a Uniform
Addressing System Ordinance (the Ordinance) as chapter 28 of the General Code
of Vilas County. The Ordinance, adopted pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 59.54(4),
1
WISCONSIN STAT. RULE 809.19(3)(a)2. (2017-18) requires a respondent’s brief to
include a statement of the case “with appropriate references to the record.” See also RULE
809.19(1)(d). The County’s brief includes some citations that refer generally to whole documents
within the record without specifying the page of the document on which the relevant information
may be found. Additionally, it cites to exhibits without identifying the record document to which
the exhibit is attached. Further, the copy of the relevant ordinance the County includes in its
supplemental appendix appears not to have been made part of the record below. We typically
will not consider materials in an appendix that are not in the appellate record. Roy v. St. Lukes
Med. Ctr., 2007 WI App 218, ¶10 n.1, 305 Wis. 2d 658, 741 N.W.2d 256. Nonetheless, the
relevant portions of the ordinance are recited in the briefs and in the complaint, the content of the
ordinance is undisputed, and a copy of the ordinance is available on the Vilas County website.
See VILAS COUNTY, WIS., GENERAL CODE OF VILAS COUNTY ch. 28 (2008),
https://vilascountywi.gov/documents/Corporation%20Counsel/chap28.pdf (last accessed July 24,
2019). Under these circumstances, we elect to reach the merits of the Bowlers’ challenges.
However, this court is a “fast-paced, high-volume court,” State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 647,
492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992), and we admonish the County that future violations of the Rules
of Appellate Procedure may result in sanctions. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2) (2017-18).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise
noted. All references to chapter 28 of the General Code of Vilas County are to the 2008 version.
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No. 2018AP837
made explicit its purpose as being to “facilitate the naming of roads, signing of
roads, assigning of addresses, location of address signs and house numbers in
order to aid emergency personnel in providing fire protection, emergency medical
services, law enforcement services, delivery of mail and meet other general
location needs of the public.” VILAS COUNTY, WIS., GENERAL CODE OF VILAS
COUNTY § 28.01 (hereinafter, VILAS COUNTY CODE).
¶7 To that end, the Ordinance gives the County the authority to name
“[e]xisting public or private roads serving three (3) or more residences or lots.”
VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.06(3). The Ordinance also dictates that “[a]ll homes,
businesses, farms, multifamily dwellings, structures for human habitation, and
other establishments, within the unincorporated areas of Vilas County shall have
an assigned uniform addressing number.” VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.09(1). In
describing the addressing number system, the Ordinance states: “Each principal
structure shall be assigned an address based on where the driveway to the structure
intersects the named road”; and, “Where more than one principal structure exists,
each structure shall be assigned an address.” VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.10(2), (3).
¶8 In early 2015, the County began an address assessment of the
Bowlers’ Presque Isle property.2 During the assessment, the Vilas County
2
According to information the County provided to the Bowlers, the address assessment
was part of an effort to “identify[] discrepancies in the addressing database that is utilized by the
Vilas County Dispatch Center for 911 calls.” The County stated that addresses that were not
compliant with the address grid “can cause confusion and may create difficulty or delays in
locating a structure, especially during an emergency situation.” In conducting the assessment, the
County was acting pursuant to VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.11(10), which states: “Existing
addresses that are discovered to have been incorrectly assigned shall be evaluated by the County
and a determination shall be made if the situation needs to be corrected. The landowner(s)
affected may be required to change their address to correct the situation.”
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Addressing Coordinator determined that, in addition to the Bowlers’ residence, the
nine rental units comprising Alpine Resort required address numbers, and the road
serving those units and the residence had to be named. The County notified the
Bowlers of its conclusion by letter, and it requested that the Bowlers submit a road
name request form so the County could proceed with naming the private road.
The County stated it would assign address numbers to the structures along the
private access road after the road had been named.
¶9 The County received a telephone call from the Bowlers objecting to
the County naming their road. Then, on August 31, 2015, the Bowlers attended a
meeting of Vilas County’s Land Records Committee and objected to the
application of the Ordinance in its entirety to the Bowlers’ property, including the
County’s decision to assign address numbers to their rental cabins. The Land
Records Committee concluded it was without authority to exempt any property
from the Ordinance, and the Addressing Coordinator sent the Bowlers another
letter advising them of the County’s intent to name their road and assign addresses
to the structures on their property.
¶10 As of October 5, 2015, the County had not received a response from
the Bowlers regarding their preferred road name, and the County designated the
existing road “Alpine Resort Dr.” The Bowlers then notified the County that they
wished for the road to be named “Private Resort Dr.,” which the Town of Presque
Isle subsequently approved. The County notified the Bowlers that signs would be
installed on their property reflecting the new road name and assigned addresses for
the buildings.
¶11 On December 1, 2015, the Town of Presque Isle installed a new road
name sign at Private Resort Drive’s intersection with Crab Lake Road, a public
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No. 2018AP837
right-of-way. The Bowlers confronted the town official who was installing the
sign and refused him entry onto their property to install address numbers, claiming
his presence was unlawful and he was trespassing. Thereafter, the Bowlers
continued to refuse access to their property for installation of address numbers
assigned to Private Resort Drive.
¶12 The County filed this action in September 2017, asserting the
Bowlers’ conduct constituted a “flagrant and continuing violation” of the
Ordinance. The County sought an injunction prohibiting the Bowlers from
interfering with the installation of any necessary signage, as well as forfeitures for
their alleged violations of the Ordinance. In response, the Bowlers asserted that
the Ordinance, by its plain terms, could not be applied to their property, such that
the County was prohibited from naming their road or assigning an address to any
building except their residence. The Bowlers argued that even if the Ordinance
could be construed to permit those activities, it exceeded the scope of the
authorizing legislation codified in WIS. STAT. § 59.54(4), and therefore was
unenforceable by the County.3
¶13 The parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment regarding the
enforceability of the Ordinance. At the summary judgment hearing, the County
asserted that the Ordinance permitted it to assign addresses to any building used
for human habitation, and further that such an interpretation was permissible under
WIS. STAT. § 59.54(4) because each of the Bowlers’ rental structures was a
3
The Bowlers filed a counterclaim with their answer. The circuit court concluded the
counterclaim was indistinct from the Bowlers’ answer and affirmative defenses and did not
require a responsive pleading from the County. The Bowlers do not challenge that determination
on appeal.
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No. 2018AP837
“business” or “establishment” within that statute’s meaning. The circuit court
stated it understood the County’s position. But the court also remarked it could
“certainly understand that the [Bowlers] have an interest in the name of their
business, and they have an interest in an address that has been established and
used for marketing … for a long time.”
¶14 The circuit court adjourned the hearing without granting either
summary judgment motion and encouraged the parties to explore the possibility of
reaching a “cooperative resolution” involving the Land Records Committee. The
Land Records Committee met in February 2018 to again consider the application
of the Ordinance to the Bowlers’ property, but the Bowlers did not attend the
meeting. The committee again concluded the Bowlers were required to comply
with the Ordinance.
¶15 The County then filed a motion for default judgment based upon the
Bowlers’ failure to appear before the Land Records Committee. At the continued
hearing on the various motions, the circuit court declined to hold the Bowlers in
default, but it granted the County’s summary judgment motion. The court
concluded that Liberty Grove Town Board v. Door County Board of Supervisors,
2005 WI App 166, 284 Wis. 2d 814, 702 N.W.2d 33, was “conclusive” of the
County’s authority to adopt the Ordinance. It also concluded the rental structures
on the Bowlers’ property could properly be considered “residences” so as to
require naming of the Bowlers’ road and addressing of those structures. The
Bowlers now appeal.
DISCUSSION
¶16 We review a grant of summary judgment de novo. Chapman v.
B.C. Ziegler & Co., 2013 WI App 127, ¶2, 351 Wis. 2d 123, 839 N.W.2d 425.
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No. 2018AP837
Summary judgment is appropriate if the record demonstrates that there is no
genuine issue as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law. WIS. STAT. § 802.08(2). Reviewing a grant of summary
judgment involves following a well-established methodology under which we first
examine the pleadings to determine whether a claim has been stated, and, if so, we
then analyze whether any factual issues exist. Kieninger v. Crown Equip. Corp.,
2019 WI 27, ¶11, 386 Wis. 2d 1, 924 N.W.2d 172.
¶17 Additionally, this case requires that we interpret and apply the
Ordinance and WIS. STAT. § 59.54(4), the statute under which the Ordinance was
adopted. The same rules of interpretation apply to ordinances and to statutes.
Schwegel v. Milwaukee Cty., 2015 WI 12, ¶22, 360 Wis. 2d 654, 859 N.W.2d 78.
In both instances, we begin with the plain language; if the meaning of the
ordinance or statute is clear, we ordinarily stop the inquiry. Id. Statutory and
ordinance language is given its common, ordinary and accepted meaning, except
that technical or specifically defined words or phrases are given those respective
meanings. Id. Additionally, statutory and ordinance language is interpreted in the
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the
language of surrounding or closely related statutes, and reasonably, to avoid
absurd or unreasonable results. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty.,
2004 WI 58, ¶46, 271 Wis. 2d 633, 681 N.W.2d 110.
¶18 The Bowlers challenge various aspects of the Ordinance as part of
two overarching arguments. First, the Bowlers assert the County lacks authority
under the Ordinance to name their road, both because the road does not qualify as
a “private road” and because the road does not serve “three (3) or more
residences.” See VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.06(3). Second, the Bowlers contend
the rental buildings on their property cannot be assigned addresses because only
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No. 2018AP837
“principal structures” may be assigned an address and their residence is the only
“principal structure” on the property. See VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.10(2). We
reject these arguments for the reasons that follow.
¶19 The Bowlers also argue that even if the Ordinance is properly
interpreted as the County suggests, it exceeds the scope of WIS. STAT. § 59.54(4).
The Bowlers therefore assert the Ordinance is invalid and the County cannot
enforce it. To the contrary, we conclude the addressing system adopted by the
County does not exceed the authority conferred by § 59.54(4).
I. The County properly concluded the Ordinance can be applied to name the
Bowlers’ road.
¶20 VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.06 concerns the assignment of road
names within the County. Private roads in existence at the time the Ordinance was
enacted must be named if they serve three or more residences or lots. VILAS
COUNTY CODE § 28.06(3). A “private road” is defined by the Ordinance as “any
road on private property leading to two or more driveways and/or principal
structures that may not be visible from a named road.” VILAS COUNTY CODE
§ 28.05(6).
¶21 The Bowlers argue their road is not a “private road” within the
meaning of VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.06(3) because it does not lead to two or
more driveways or principal structures.4 It appears undisputed that the Bowlers’
road does not lead to two or more driveways and that the Bowlers’ residence and
4
Consistent with this argument, the Bowlers’ brief refers to the road as a “driveway,”
which the Ordinance defines as a “private road serving not more than two primary structures.”
VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.05(4).
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No. 2018AP837
their rental units may not be visible from a named road. Thus, the question is
whether the Bowlers’ road leads to two or more “principal structures.” As we
explain in the following section, we conclude that the Bowlers’ residence and each
of their rental units is a “principal structure” under the Ordinance. Accordingly,
we conclude that the road is a “private road” within the meaning of § 28.06(3)
because it leads to the Bowlers’ residence and their nine rental cabins.
¶22 We next consider whether the private road serves three or more
residences or lots, as required by VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.06(3).5 Unlike the
phrase “private road,” the Ordinance does not provide a definition of the term
“residence.” The Bowlers urge us to adopt what they consider a “common and
ordinary” definition of “residence” that requires occupancy with some degree of
permanency. The Bowlers argue their rental cabins do not qualify under their
preferred definition because they are “temporary dwellings which are intended for
temporary habitation for occupants for only part of the year.” As support for their
definition, the Bowlers cite several cases involving the term “residence” as applied
in other legal contexts.
¶23 It is true that some cases speak of a “residence” in a fashion that
requires a degree of permanency in the occupation of the premises. This
understanding of the term is particularly true in cases requiring a certain period of
“residence” (or absence thereof) before the happening of a particular thing. For
example, the Bowlers rely on Miller v. Sovereign Camp Woodmen of the World,
5
Because we conclude the Bowlers’ private road serves three or more residences, it is
not necessary for us to consider the County’s alternative argument that the road serves three or
more “lots.”
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No. 2018AP837
140 Wis. 505, 122 N.W. 1126 (1909), in which our supreme court—in dealing
with an attempt to collect life insurance on an absent relative—stated: “Residence
signifies a person’s permanent home and principal establishment, to which
whenever he is absent he has the intention of returning.” Id. at 509.
¶24 The Bowlers also rely on Town of Carlton v. State Department of
Public Welfare, 271 Wis. 465, 74 N.W.2d 340 (1956), in which our supreme court
was required to determine the “legal settlement” of certain individuals for
purposes of ascertaining which of the county or the municipality was responsible
for furnishing them with statutory public assistance. Id. at 466-67. For purposes
of that statute, the court concluded that the verb “resides” was a reference to a
person’s domicile. Id. at 468. “Residence, in this connection,” stated the court,
“is residence with the present intent of making the place one’s home, in contrast to
mere presence there without such intent. … No mere pretense of residence, no
passing visit, no temporary presence … nothing short of actual abode here, with
intention of permanent residence, will fill the letter or the spirit of the statute.” Id.
at 467-68.
¶25 Yet this conception of “residence” as encompassing a degree of
permanency is not the only meaning that can be assigned to the term. We often
consult dictionary definitions to assist us in determining the ordinary meaning of
statutory language. County of Dane v. LIRC, 2009 WI 9, ¶23, 315 Wis. 2d 293,
759 N.W.2d 571. “Residence,” to be sure, encompasses “a temporary or
permanent dwelling place, abode, or habitation to which one intends to return as
distinguished from a place of temporary sojourn or transient visit.” Residence,
WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993). But the term may
also have a meaning that focuses on the building’s use as opposed to the subjective
intent of a particular individual. To be precise, a “residence” means “a building
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No. 2018AP837
used as a home; DWELLING.” Id. Use of “residence” in this sense would appear
to encompass use for temporary lodging, as the types of activities being
undertaken within the Bowlers’ rental units (e.g., eating, sleeping, bathing) are
indistinguishable from the types of activities that take place in a home.
¶26 The mere existence of multiple dictionary definitions does not
necessarily mean a word is ambiguous. Ho-Chunk Nation v. DOR, 2009 WI 48,
¶23, 317 Wis. 2d 553, 766 N.W.2d 738. “Many words have multiple dictionary
definitions; the applicable definition depends upon the context in which the word
is used.” Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶49. Explicit statements of legislative purpose
are helpful in arriving at the correct interpretation; “a plain-meaning interpretation
cannot contravene a textually or contextually manifest statutory purpose.” Id.¶27 Here, the legislative body clearly had the latter meaning of
“residence” in mind when it adopted the Ordinance. The Vilas County Board of
Supervisors stated the intent of the Ordinance was “to facilitate the naming of
roads, signing of roads, assigning of addresses, location of address signs and house
numbers in order to aid emergency personnel in providing fire protection,
emergency medical services, law enforcement services, delivery of mail and meet
other general location needs of the public.” VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.01. This
purpose could hardly be met if the road-naming provision did not apply to roads
leading to structures intended or used for temporary lodging. Temporary
inhabitants of a structure in Vilas County, much like the County’s permanent
residents, may occasionally require emergency services at their location. The
Ordinance’s objective is to ensure that emergency personnel can easily locate
persons in need to deliver such services. Adopting the restrictive meaning of
“residences” urged by the Bowlers would eviscerate this explicit purpose.
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No. 2018AP837
¶28 Interpreting the term “residence” to include structures intended for
short-term rental is not a novel approach. In Heef Realty & Investments, LLP v.
City of Cedarburg Board of Appeals, 2015 WI App 23, 361 Wis. 2d 185, 861
N.W.2d 797, this court considered “whether short-term rental is a permitted use
for property in a single-family residential district under the City of Cedarburg’s
zoning code.” Id., ¶1. The ordinance there stated that use as a single-family
dwelling was permitted, but it did not impose any time requirement on the
duration of that use. Id., ¶10. We concluded that under State ex rel. Harding v.
Door County Board of Adjustment, 125 Wis. 2d 269, 371 N.W.2d 403 (Ct. App.
1985), we were required to “look at the language of the ordinance, which is about
the use of the property, not the duration of that use.” Heef Realty, 361 Wis. 2d
185, ¶11.
¶29 As a result, we rejected the city’s argument that the term “residence”
included an inherent temporal element. See id., ¶13 (“There is nothing inherent in
the concept of residence or dwelling that includes time.”). Focusing on the nature
of the property’s use, we observed that the home in Harding “was designed with a
kitchen, dining room, living room, and four bedrooms”—precisely the type of
arrangement one would expect in a place intended for human habitation. Heef
Realty, 361 Wis. 2d 185, ¶12. We concluded:
This focus on the daily living connotation of “residential”
gibes with the circuit court’s explanation that what makes a
home a residence is its use “to sleep, eat, shower, relax,
things of that nature.” What matters is residential use, not
the duration of the use. The words “single-family,”
“residential” and “dwelling” do not operate to create time
restrictions that the legislative body did not choose to
include in the ordinance.
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No. 2018AP837
Id. In this case, the Bowlers argue the term “residence” implies precisely the type
of durational element we rejected in Heef Realty. We see no reason to exclude
certain residential structures from the scope of the Ordinance merely because the
occupants are purchasing a short-term lease to reside in those structures.
¶30 Accordingly, we conclude the term “residences” in VILAS COUNTY
CODE § 28.06(3) is not limited to structures intended for a degree of permanent
occupancy by the same individuals. Rather, the term refers generally to structures
that are intended or used for human habitation—regardless of the duration of any
such habitation by any particular human. Because it is undisputed that the
Bowlers’ rental cabins are used for this purpose, they are “residences” under the
Ordinance. The County therefore could properly name the Bowlers’ private road
because it serves “three or more residences.”6
II. The County properly applied the Ordinance to assign address numbers to
the Bowlers’ rental structures.
¶31 As mentioned above, both the road-naming section and the address
provisions of the Ordinance refer to a “principal structure.” Specifically, the
6
The Bowlers contend the circuit court lacked sufficient evidence to grant the County’s
summary judgment motion, focusing on the court’s partial reasoning that the cabins were
“residences” because they could be converted to condominiums at some point in the future. They
contend there was no evidence before the court “to suggest or allow it to conclude that the rental
units on the Bowlers’ property were going to become condominiums.”
As a general rule, if a circuit court reached the correct result, we may affirm its decision
even if the court used a rationale that we do not adopt. See Correa v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2010
WI App 171, ¶4, 330 Wis. 2d 682, 794 N.W.2d 259. Additionally, we apply a de novo standard
of review to all issues presented in this case. See supra ¶¶16-17. Because we conclude the
Bowlers’ rental cabins qualify as “residences” under the Ordinance without regard to any
potential future use as condominiums, we need not address the Bowlers’ argument regarding the
sufficiency of the record to support the circuit court’s “condominium conversion” reasoning.
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No. 2018AP837
Bowlers challenge the County’s authority to assign address numbers to their rental
cabins under VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.10(2) and (3). Section 28.10(2) states,
“Each principal structure shall be assigned an address based on where the
driveway to the structure intersects the named road.” Section 28.10(3) states,
“Where more than one principal structure exists, each structure shall be assigned
an address.”
¶32 The Ordinance does not define the phrase “principal structure.” It
does, however, contain an enumerated definition for “primary structure.” A
“primary structure” is “a building in which is conducted the principal use of the lot
or parcel in which it is located. A primary structure may be used for residential,
commercial, industrial, public-semipublic, recreation, or other.” VILAS COUNTY
CODE § 28.05(5). The Bowlers appear to concede the definition of “primary
structure” applies where the phrase “principal structure” is used elsewhere in the
Ordinance.
¶33 Even absent such a concession, we agree with the County that the
phrases “primary structure” and “principal structure” are synonymous under the
Ordinance. The phrase “primary structure” is found only three times in the
Ordinance, with each use located in the definitions section. See VILAS COUNTY
CODE § 28.05(1), (4), (5). “Primary,” as used in these instances, means “first in
rank or importance : CHIEF, PRINCIPAL.” Primary, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW
INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993). The definitions section of the Ordinance
uses “principal structures” once, in defining a “private road,” see § 28.05(6), and
“principal structure” appears elsewhere only in the section discussing
implementation of the addressing system, see VILAS COUNTY CODE
§ 28.10(2), (3). “Principal,” in this context, means “most important, consequential,
or influential : relegating comparable matters, items, or individuals to secondary
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No. 2018AP837
rank.” Principal, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993).
Considering the context of the statute as a whole—and the nearly identical
meanings commonly ascribed to the adjectives “primary” and “principal”—we
conclude the Ordinance’s definition of “primary structure” also applies in
instances where the Ordinance uses the phrase “principal structure.”
¶34 The Bowlers—in a conclusory fashion—contend there is only one
“principal structure” on their property, which is the residence out of which they
conduct their business. They reach this conclusion by reasoning that there can be
only one “primary” or “principal” structure on any given lot. The Bowlers argue
that if their residence and rental cabins all qualify as “primary” structures, none of
them are, in fact, “primary.” Implicitly, the Bowlers appear to be asserting that the
primary use of their lot is for residential purposes, and therefore only their
residence qualifies as a “principal structure.”
¶35 The main problem with the Bowlers’ argument is that their
reasoning tracks neither the Ordinance’s language nor its purpose. The Ordinance,
in adopting the uniform addressing system, states: “All homes, businesses, farms,
multifamily dwellings, structures for human habitation, and other establishments,
within the unincorporated areas of Vilas County shall have an assigned uniform
addressing number.” VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.09(1). The Bowlers’
interpretation of the provisions implementing this general requirement—in
particular VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.10(2) and (3)—would lead to an absurd
result. Namely, under the Bowlers’ approach, structures like their rental cabins—
which, again, plainly are structures for “human habitation” and therefore are
structures requiring address numbers under § 28.09(1)—would not receive
addresses. We avoid unreasonable interpretations of statutes. Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d
633, ¶46.
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¶36 Reading the Ordinance as a whole, it is evident VILAS COUNTY
CODE § 28.10(2) was meant to limit the grant of addressing authority contained in
§ 28.09(1), which, if broadly construed, could apply to nearly every building on a
property. The circuit court questioned the County about the scope of its authority
under the Ordinance, asking whether a lumber company with a mill, a drying shed,
a retail store, and some storage buildings—all business structures—would each be
required to have a separate address. The County agreed that not all of the
buildings described by the circuit court would need to be addressed. Section
28.10(2) limits the assignment of addresses to each “principal structure,” ensuring
that the most important or frequently occupied buildings on the property receive
addresses, while buildings only tangentially involved in the principal use or uses
of the property need not be separately addressed.
¶37 Moreover, the plain language of the Ordinance appears to allow for
multiple uses of the same property. Although the Ordinance’s definition of a
“primary structure” uses the definite article “the” in referring to the “principal use”
of a lot or parcel, it goes on to state that a primary structure may be used for a
variety of purposes, including residential or business purposes. See VILAS
COUNTY CODE § 28.05(5). On this record, it seems apparent the Bowlers’
“principal use of the lot or parcel” involves both residential and business uses, the
latter of which itself is to provide short-term residences for rent. Because the
structures at issue are all used for human habitation, it makes no sense to draw a
distinction between residential and business uses as the Bowlers do.
¶38 Furthermore, even if such a distinction was warranted by the
Ordinance language, the Bowlers’ arguments are insufficient to explain why that
distinction should matter for our purposes here. First, they never explain why
their “residential” use of a single building should dictate that the predominant use
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of their whole parcel is residential and not business-related. Specifically, the
Bowlers do not address the undisputed fact that they operate nine other buildings
in connection with their resort business and even operate their business out of their
home. Indeed, in their reply brief, the Bowlers assert that their home doubles as a
resort lodge. Second, even if the primary use of their parcel is “residential,” the
Bowlers fail to explain why the nine habitable cabins they own are not also
“primary structures” that are part of such use.7 The Bowlers give virtually no
consideration to the Ordinance’s statement that “[w]here more than one principal
structure exists, each structure shall be assigned an address.” VILAS COUNTY
CODE § 28.10(3).
¶39 In sum, we conclude the Bowlers’ residence and each of their resort
cabins are “principal structures” within the meaning of VILAS COUNTY CODE
§ 28.10(2). Additionally, the road on their property qualifies as a “private road”
because it leads to “two or more … principal structures” under VILAS COUNTY
CODE § 28.05(6). The County could therefore properly name the Bowlers’ road
and assign addresses to their residence and the rental units.
III. The County did not exceed the authority granted by the enabling statute.
¶40 The Bowlers alternatively contend that if the Ordinance is
interpreted to include their rental cabins as structures to which separate addresses
will be assigned, its reach extends “beyond that of the enabling statute.” “A
7
Under the Bowlers’ logic, the status of the cabins as “primary structures”—and
therefore the County’s ability to address those cabins—would change merely if the Bowlers’
residence was located on a different parcel. This incongruence in the application of the
Ordinance produces an absurd outcome, and we strive to avoid absurd results.
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No. 2018AP837
county’s statutory authority is limited to that provided in the enabling statute.”
Liberty Grove Town Bd., 284 Wis. 2d 814, ¶16. When an ordinance does not
comply with the enabling statute, it is invalid and may not be enforced. Id.¶41 The enabling statute is WIS. STAT. § 59.54(4), which permits a
county board to “establish a rural naming or numbering system in towns for the
purpose of aiding in fire protection, emergency services, and civil defense.”
Under the statute, “[e]ach rural road, home, business, farm or other establishment,
may be assigned a name or number,” and “[t]he names or numbers may be
displayed on uniform signs posted on rural roads and intersections, and at each
home, business, farm or other establishment.” Id.
¶42 The terms “home,” “business,” and “farm” are, in the Bowlers’
view, “more or less … self-explanatory terms.” They propose that the term
“establishment” should have its common dictionary meaning, which is “a more or
less fixed and [usually] sizable place of business or residence together with all the
things that are an essential part of it (as grounds, furniture, fixtures, retinue,
employees).” Establishment, WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL
DICTIONARY (1993). The Bowlers assert their rental cabins do not fit any of these
definitions, and they summarily argue “[t]here is only one home, business or
establishment on the parcel, which is the Bowlers’ permanent residence out of
which they conduct their business.”
¶43 The Bowlers do not explain how, under their preferred dictionary
definition of that term, their rental cabins are not “establishments,” as those
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No. 2018AP837
structures are used for both business and residential purposes. 8 See State v. Pettit,
171 Wis. 2d 627, 646, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App. 1992) (“We may decline to
review issues inadequately briefed.”). Rather, they appear to believe that WIS.
STAT. § 59.54(4) allows the County to assign only one address per home or
business, regardless of how many structures are present on the property. The
Bowlers posit that extending § 59.54(4) to include “every structure used for
business purpose[s] would greatly expand the reach of the enabling statute.” They
suggest a hypothetical scenario in which “a car dealership with an office, a
detached shop, and a shed” on a single parcel would each be assigned a different
address by the County. This result, they argue, would be generally supported by
the public safety objectives of the Ordinance, but it would not be permitted under
the enabling statute.
¶44 We disagree with the Bowlers’ interpretation of WIS. STAT.
§ 59.54(4) and how it applies in this context. The Ordinance here does not purport
to allow the County to assign an address to every building merely because it is
used for a business purpose. Rather, under the Ordinance, the County is allowed
to assign an address to each “primary” or “principal” structure involved in a
particular use of the property. This allowance is compatible with the enabling
8
As noted earlier in the opinion, it is undisputed (and indisputable) that the rental cabins
are “structures for human habitation,” as that phrase is used in VILAS COUNTY CODE § 28.09(1).
See supra ¶35. While WIS. STAT. § 59.54(4) itself does not include that particular phrase in its
enumerated list of places that may be assigned a name or number, “structures for human
habitation” are certainly a type of “other establishment” under § 59.54(4). The Ordinance in
§ 28.09(1) merely enumerates two additional types of “other establishments”—namely,
multifamily dwellings and structures for human inhabitation. The Bowlers do not argue, and
likely could not argue, that by including “structures for human habitation” among those “other
establishments” that could be assigned addresses, the County was acting outside the scope of the
enabling statute. And, if “structures for human habitation” fall within the purview of § 59.54(4),
then the County was clearly within its authority to assign addresses to the structures at issue here.
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No. 2018AP837
statute, which allows for the County to assign an address to each “establishment.”
The rental cabins on the Bowlers’ property appear to satisfy the Bowlers’
preferred definition of an “establishment,” as each is a primary or principal
structure used for residential and business purposes together with all the things
that are an essential part of those uses. Given the Bowlers’ lack of a developed
argument on the point, we conclude the cabins are “establishments” and, therefore,
are valid subjects for addressing under § 59.54(4).
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
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