State v. Antonio L. Simmons ( 2020 )


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  •       COURT OF APPEALS
    DECISION                                             NOTICE
    DATED AND FILED                         This opinion is subject to further editing. If
    published, the official version will appear in
    the bound volume of the Official Reports.
    July 21, 2020
    A party may file with the Supreme Court a
    Sheila T. Reiff               petition to review an adverse decision by the
    Clerk of Court of Appeals          Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
    RULE 809.62.
    Appeal No.         2018AP591-CR                                            Cir. Ct. No. 2000CF3635
    STATE OF WISCONSIN                                         IN COURT OF APPEALS
    DISTRICT I
    STATE OF WISCONSIN,
    PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
    V.
    ANTONIO L. SIMMONS,
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
    WILLIAM S. POCAN and DAVID A. HANSHER, Judges. Affirmed.
    Before Brash, P.J., Donald and White, JJ.
    ¶1       BRASH, P.J. Antonio L. Simmons appeals an order from the circuit
    court denying his motion for postconviction deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) testing
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    on several items of evidence, pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 974.07 (2017-18).1 He also
    appeals orders denying his motion for reconsideration and his motion requesting
    supplemental briefing on his related due process argument regarding the items that
    were destroyed. We affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2       This matter dates back to a shooting that occurred in July 2000.
    Simmons got into an argument with J.S.G. at a tavern located at 42nd Street and
    Capitol Drive in the City of Milwaukee. During the altercation, J.S.G. hit Simmons
    over the head with a glass bottle. J.S.G. then left the tavern with his sister, P.S.G.,
    and her friend, A.C., in P.S.G.’s car. They had just driven away from the tavern
    when a white car pulled up next to them at the intersection and started firing a gun
    into P.S.G.’s car. J.S.G. suffered multiple gunshot wounds to his chest, shoulder,
    and cheek, and P.S.G. had one gunshot wound to her upper right shoulder. A.C.
    was not hit.
    ¶3       After the shooting, the white car fled from the scene and was
    discovered shortly thereafter by responding officers eleven blocks from where the
    shooting had occurred.            The only person officers saw near the vehicle—
    approximately twenty feet away from it—was Zakea Jones, who subsequently
    informed officers that she was dating Simmons. Jones initially told an officer that
    a man she knew as “C-Note” had fled from the vehicle. However, in a statement to
    police an hour and a half later, she told the investigating detective that it was
    Simmons who had fled from the car.
    1
    All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2017-18 version unless otherwise
    noted.
    2
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    ¶4      In a search of the white car, officers recovered a .380 bullet casing
    inside the vehicle, along with several nine-millimeter casings that were found in the
    street. Officers also found a small bottle of champagne, a larger bottle of brandy,
    and a baseball cap inside the vehicle, and a silk head wrap and two black shoes
    outside of the vehicle.
    ¶5      J.S.G., P.S.G., and A.C. all identified Simmons as the shooter and as
    the man with whom J.S.G. had the earlier altercation inside the tavern, from a photo
    array. Two other witnesses–employees of the tavern who had broken up the fight
    between Simmons and J.S.G.—also identified Simmons as the shooter.
    ¶6      Simmons was subsequently arrested and charged with two counts of
    first-degree recklessly endangering safety while armed and one count of second-
    degree recklessly endangering safety while armed.
    ¶7      A jury trial was held in February 2001.2 Among the witnesses for the
    State, J.S.G. testified about the events that night. He stated that the fight in the
    tavern started after J.S.G. was talking to a girl and Simmons—whom he did not
    know—pushed J.S.G. and then grabbed his head, ramming it into a wall; J.S.G. then
    hit Simmons with the bottle. After J.S.G. left the bar with P.S.G. and A.C. in
    P.S.G.’s car, J.S.G. testified that the white car—driven by Simmons—pulled up next
    to them, and Simmons started shooting. J.S.G. further stated that Simmons got out
    of his car and continued shooting into P.S.G.’s car, yelling for J.S.G. to “die” as he
    was shooting. Additionally, P.S.G. and A.C. testified about the events of that night,
    and identified Simmons as the shooter.
    2
    The Honorable Robert Crawford presided over the trial and sentenced Simmons. We
    refer to him as the trial court.
    3
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    ¶8     Also testifying on behalf of the State was Tyrone Ramsey, one of the
    tavern employees who had previously identified Simmons. He worked security at
    the tavern, and testified that he witnessed the fight between Simmons and J.S.G.,
    both of whom he knew as regular patrons of the tavern. Ramsey stated that after he
    separated the two, he told J.S.G. to leave the bar, but kept Simmons inside until he
    felt J.S.G. had enough time to leave—approximately ten to fifteen minutes.
    ¶9     Ramsey testified that he saw Simmons get into the white vehicle.
    After Simmons had pulled away from the bar, he saw Simmons get out of his car at
    the intersection—approximately half a block away—and start shooting into the
    vehicle in which J.S.G. was a passenger. Ramsey stated that the intersection was
    well-lit, that there was nothing obstructing his view of the intersection, and that he
    had no doubt that it was Simmons who had shot into P.S.G.’s car.
    ¶10    One of the officers who investigated the shooting scene also testified.
    He stated that he recovered six .380 shell casings and one bullet from the scene.
    That evidence along with the other shell casings that were found in and around the
    white car were analyzed by the Wisconsin State Crime Lab; the findings were
    conclusive that the shell casings at the shooting scene were from the same gun as
    the casing found inside the white car.
    ¶11    Additionally, a detective who had interviewed Jones testified as well.
    On cross-examination, Simmons’ trial counsel attempted to elicit testimony from
    the detective about Jones’ statement that C-Note had fled from the white car.
    However, based on the evidentiary rule of completeness, the trial court ruled that if
    it permitted that statement, it would also allow testimony regarding her second
    statement to police that it was Simmons who had fled from the vehicle. Counsel
    opted not to pursue that line of questioning.
    4
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    ¶12      Simmons called as a witness his close friend John Lindsey, who was
    present at the tavern during the fight with J.S.G. Lindsey testified that Simmons
    left the tavern with him in his red Cutlass to go to the hospital to have the wound on
    Simmons’ head treated. Lindsey testified that he saw gunfire coming from a white
    car, shooting at another vehicle, as they drove away from the tavern. Lindsey further
    stated that Simmons decided not to seek treatment at the hospital since he had an
    outstanding warrant.
    ¶13      The jury convicted Simmons of all three counts with which he was
    charged.
    ¶14      During the preparation of the presentence investigation report,
    Simmons told the presentence writer that Jones was actually the shooter. He
    submitted an affidavit from Jones confessing to the shooting, in which she explained
    that she had shot at the car out of fear because she had seen J.S.G. with a gun. She
    also averred that C-Note was in the vehicle with her at the time, not Simmons. As
    a result, Simmons moved for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence. The
    trial court denied the motion, noting that Simmons would have to address that issue
    in an appeal.
    ¶15      Simmons was sentenced in June 2001 to a total of twenty-six years of
    initial confinement and thirteen years of extended supervision. In discussing the
    factors it was considering for sentencing, the trial court noted that it found it
    “especially reprehensible” that Simmons was attempting to shift the blame to Jones,
    whom the court deemed to be “vulnerable and easy to manipulate[.]”
    ¶16      In February 2003, Simmons filed a postconviction motion seeking
    sentence modification on the grounds that his sentence was excessive, and that the
    trial court had relied on the assumption that Simmons had manipulated Jones into
    5
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    claiming responsibility for the shooting, which was without basis. Simmons also
    filed a supplemental motion seeking a new trial in the interests of justice based on
    affidavits from two new witnesses who averred that Simmons got into Lindsey’s
    red Cutlass on the night of the shooting, rather than the white vehicle which was
    involved in the shooting. Simmons’ motions were denied without a hearing. 3
    ¶17     This court affirmed. See State v. Simmons, Nos. 2003AP1455-CR
    and 2003AP1456-CR, unpublished slip op. ¶1 (WI App July 30, 2004). In that
    opinion, we reasoned that the proffered testimony of the two new witnesses did not
    “undermine the evidence that Simmons went on a rampage of revenge following a
    bar fight.” Id., ¶17. We stated that this was “Simmons’ obvious motive for
    retaliation,” and that the evidence in this case—particularly the testimony from “the
    three occupants of [P.S.G.]’s car and from Ramsey”—was “substantial and
    compelling.” Id. Thus, we concluded that Simmons had not met his burden of
    demonstrating a “substantial degree of probability” that this new evidence would
    produce a different result if he was granted a new trial. Id.4
    ¶18     Simmons filed the underlying motion for postconviction DNA testing
    in March 2017. He seeks testing on “items with which Jones and C-Note likely
    3
    The Honorable David A. Hansher entered the order denying the motions, as the successor
    to Judge Crawford’s calendar.
    4
    Simmons has since filed numerous other postconviction motions, including a pro se WIS.
    STAT. § 974.06 motion filed in December 2005 claiming, among other things, newly discovered
    evidence—an affidavit from a fellow prison inmate which stated that he had seen Simmons get into
    the red Cutlass on the night of the shooting. That motion was also denied by Judge Hansher, and
    we affirmed, again concluding that this alleged new evidence “did not establish a substantial degree
    of probability that a new trial would produce a different result.” See State v. Simmons,
    No. 2006AP731, unpublished slip op. ¶¶1, 15 (WI App March 13, 2007). Simmons subsequently
    filed a petition for federal habeas corpus, which was also denied.
    6
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    came in contact” that were recovered in and around the white vehicle: the bullet
    casings, the baseball cap, the bottles of alcohol, the head wrap, and the shoes.
    ¶19     The circuit court denied Simmons’ motion. It concluded that there
    was really no useful exculpatory evidence that could be derived from DNA testing
    on those items. In particular, the court observed that the presence of someone else’s
    DNA on the bullet casings would only suggest that another person had loaded the
    gun; it would not “exonerate [Simmons] as the shooter.” Furthermore, the court
    noted that even if Simmons has satisfied the statutory conditions for bringing the
    motion, he had not persuaded the court that there was “a reasonable probability that
    DNA testing of the bullet casings would have had any material impact on the
    prosecution of this case or the outcome of the trial, particularly given the eyewitness
    testimony.”
    ¶20     Simmons filed a motion for reconsideration of that decision. The
    circuit court ordered supplemental briefing regarding the issues raised by Simmons
    in that motion, but ultimately concurred with the conclusions of the initial decision
    denying Simmons’ motion for postconviction DNA testing, and thus denied his
    motion for reconsideration.5 This appeal follows.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶21     Although the parties disagree as to how the issues here should be
    framed, Simmons’ argument on appeal is, essentially, that the circuit court erred in
    its determination that Simmons did not meet the requirements of WIS. STAT.
    5
    The Honorable William S. Pocan issued the initial decision on Simmons’ motion for
    postconviction DNA testing. Judge Hansher, as the successor to Judge Pocan’s calendar, ordered
    the supplemental briefing and issued the order denying his motion for reconsideration. We refer to
    both of them as the circuit court.
    7
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    § 974.07 that would mandate court-ordered postconviction DNA testing of the items
    recovered in and around the white vehicle on the night of the shooting.
    ¶22    Under WIS. STAT. § 974.07(2), a defendant may, at any time after
    being convicted, file a motion requesting an order for DNA testing of evidence if
    all of the following factors are met:
    (a) The evidence is relevant to the investigation or
    prosecution that resulted in the conviction[.]
    (b) The evidence is in the actual or constructive possession
    of a government agency.
    (c) The evidence has not previously been subjected to
    forensic [DNA] testing or, if the evidence has previously
    been tested, it may now be subjected to another test using
    a scientific technique that was not available or was not
    utilized at the time of the previous testing and that
    provides a reasonable likelihood of more accurate and
    probative results.
    Id.
    ¶23    In reviewing such a motion, the circuit court must order the DNA
    testing requested if all of the following apply:
    1. The movant claims that he or she is innocent of the
    offense at issue in the motion under sub. (2).
    2. It is reasonably probable that the movant would not have
    been prosecuted [or] convicted … for the offense at issue
    in the motion under sub. (2), if exculpatory [DNA]
    testing results had been available before the prosecution
    [or] conviction[.]
    3. The evidence to be tested meets the conditions under sub.
    (2)(a) to (c).
    4. The chain of custody of the evidence to be tested
    establishes that the evidence has not been tampered with,
    replaced, or altered in any material respect or, if the chain
    of custody does not establish the integrity of the
    8
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    evidence, the testing itself can establish the integrity of
    the evidence.
    WIS. STAT. § 974.07(7)(a).
    ¶24    In this case, the circuit court based its denial of Simmons’ motion
    primarily on Simmons’ failure to meet the reasonable probability condition set forth
    in WIS. STAT. § 974.07(7)(a)2. This court addressed this issue in State v. Hudson,
    
    2004 WI App 99
    , 
    273 Wis. 2d 707
    , 
    681 N.W.2d 316
    , where the circuit court had
    denied the defendant’s motion for court-ordered postconviction DNA testing based
    on his failure to meet the reasonable probability condition. Id., ¶¶1, 13.
    ¶25    In Hudson, we first discussed the standard of review for this issue.
    See id., ¶14. The defendant asserted that de novo review was appropriate for the
    question of “reasonable probability,” similar to the analysis for ineffective
    assistance of counsel claims. Id. Under that analysis, prejudice to a defendant is
    demonstrated if, due to an error by trial counsel, there is a reasonable probability
    that the outcome of the proceeding would have been different. State v. Love, 
    2005 WI 116
    , ¶30, 
    284 Wis. 2d 111
    , 
    700 N.W.2d 62
    . A “reasonable probability” is a
    probability “sufficient to undermine confidence in the outcome.” 
    Id.
     (citations and
    some quotation marks omitted).
    ¶26    On the other hand, the State in Hudson contended that the conditions
    of WIS. STAT. § 974.07(7)(a) are comparable to the review of claims of newly
    discovered evidence. Hudson, 
    273 Wis. 2d 707
    , ¶15. Under that test, a defendant
    must also prove that there is a reasonable probability of a different outcome, which
    exists if “there is a reasonable probability that a jury, looking at both the [old
    evidence] and the [new evidence], would have a reasonable doubt as to the
    defendant’s guilt.” Love, 
    284 Wis. 2d 111
    , ¶44 (quoting State v. McCallum, 208
    9
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    Wis. 2d 463, 474, 
    561 N.W.2d 707
     (1997); brackets in Love). However, for the
    newly discovered evidence analysis, this is a deferential determination made by the
    circuit court. See McCallum, 
    208 Wis. 2d at 480
    .
    ¶27     We concluded in Hudson that the deferential approach “fits best” for
    determinations regarding the conditions of WIS. STAT. § 974.07(7)(a). Hudson, 
    273 Wis. 2d 707
    , ¶16. We observed that the circuit court, “‘[h]aving heard both the
    evidence at the original trial or hearing, or even just the evidence on the motion
    hearing … is in a better position than an appellate court to determine whether
    confidence in the correctness of the outcome at the original trial or hearing has been
    undermined.’” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). We therefore applied the erroneous exercise
    of discretion standard to the circuit court’s determination that the defendant had not
    met the reasonable probability condition. Id., ¶¶1, 16.
    ¶28     We are bound by the Hudson decision.6 We therefore apply the
    erroneous exercise of discretion standard to this case.                  We will uphold a
    discretionary decision of the circuit court if it “‘has examined the relevant facts,
    applied a proper standard of law, and, using a demonstrated rational process,
    reached a conclusion that a reasonable judge could reach.’” Hefty v. Strickhouser,
    
    2008 WI 96
    , ¶28, 
    312 Wis. 2d 530
    , 
    752 N.W.2d 820
     (citation omitted).
    ¶29     In its initial denial of Simmons’ motion, the circuit court questioned
    the relevance of any potential exculpatory evidence that could be procured from the
    items as requested, because it would not result in an exoneration of Simmons as the
    6
    In State v. Denny, 
    2017 WI 17
    , ¶81 n.21, 
    373 Wis. 2d 390
    , 
    891 N.W.2d 144
    , our supreme
    court noted, but declined to address, those parties’ arguments regarding the proper standard of
    review for determinations of motions made pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 974.07. Therefore, in the
    absence of a different directive, we are bound by our decision in State v. Hudson, 
    2004 WI App 99
    , ¶16, 
    273 Wis. 2d 707
    , 
    681 N.W.2d 316
    , to apply the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.
    See Cook v. Cook, 
    208 Wis. 2d 166
    , 189-90, 
    560 N.W.2d 246
     (1997).
    10
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    shooter. In other words, the court did not believe that the third requirement of WIS.
    STAT. § 974.07(7)(a)—that all of the conditions of WIS. STAT. § 974.07(2) are met,
    including demonstrating the relevance of the evidence—had been established by
    Simmons.
    ¶30    Furthermore, the circuit court stated that even if the relevancy
    condition had been satisfied, the court was “not persuaded that there is a reasonable
    probability that DNA testing of the bullet casings would have had any material
    impact on the prosecution of this case or the outcome of the trial”—the second
    condition of WIS. STAT. § 974.07(7)(a). In particular, the court noted the eyewitness
    testimony of J.S.G., P.S.G., A.C., and Ramsey, who all identified Simmons as the
    shooter. The circuit court stated that even without any DNA evidence linking
    Simmons to the shooting, the jury was “obviously satisfied about [Simmons’] guilt
    beyond a reasonable doubt,” based on that testimony as well as other evidence
    presented by the State.
    ¶31    The subsequent decision by the circuit court on Simmons’ motion for
    reconsideration concurred with these findings.          The circuit court noted that
    Simmons’ argument is “predicated on the shaky assumption” that Jones’ version of
    the events that night, as stated in her affidavit, is accurate. The circuit court further
    observed that Jones “did not appear at trial or testify in accordance with her
    affidavit” and that the trial court had “rejected [her affidavit] outright based on the
    eyewitness testimony at trial.”
    ¶32    Simmons extensively argues that this eyewitness testimony was not
    credible. However, “[i]t is the function of the trier of fact, and not of an appellate
    court, to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw
    11
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.” State v. Poellinger, 
    153 Wis. 2d 493
    , 506, 
    451 N.W.2d 752
     (1990). Moreover,
    [t]he rule in Wisconsin is that the jury, as ultimate arbiter of
    credibility, has the power to accept one portion of a witness’
    testimony, reject another portion and assign historical facts
    based upon both portions. In short, a jury can find that a
    witness is partially truthful, partially untruthful and have
    both of these determinations mean something quite
    independent of one another.
    O’Connell v. Schrader, 
    145 Wis. 2d 554
    , 557, 
    427 N.W.2d 152
     (Ct. App. 1988).
    Thus, Simmons’ arguments relating to the eyewitnesses’ credibility are not
    compelling.7
    ¶33     In fact, Simmons’ case has been reviewed by this court and others
    numerous times since his conviction, and his arguments have consistently been
    rejected due to the “substantial and compelling” evidence against Simmons that is
    contained in the record. See Simmons, Nos. 2003AP1455-CR and 2003AP1456-
    CR, ¶17. This evidence was reviewed again by the circuit court here in making its
    discretionary decisions regarding Simmons’ motions. “Discretion contemplates a
    process of reasoning, which depends on the facts of record or that are reasonably
    derived by inference from the record, and a conclusion based on a logical rationale
    founded upon proper legal standards.” State v. Ziegler, 
    2006 WI App 49
    , ¶21, 289
    7
    Simmons also calls into question the veracity of the testimony of the investigating
    detective, Kevin Armbruster. This allegation is based on an unrelated case in which Armbruster
    was one of several detectives against which a lawsuit was filed by an individual whose conviction
    had been overturned; he claimed that Armbruster and another officer had failed to disclose
    exculpatory impeachment evidence during the investigation that led to his wrongful conviction.
    See Avery v. City of Milwaukee, 
    847 F.3d 433
    , 435 (7th Cir. 2017).
    Simmons specifically calls into question A.C.’s statement to Detective Armbruster
    identifying Simmons as the shooter, pointing out inconsistencies in A.C.’s statement to police and
    her trial testimony. However, A.C.’s testimony was subject to cross-examination by Simmons’
    trial counsel. Furthermore, as we have already stated, a witness’s credibility is to be determined
    by the jury, not this court. See State v. Poellinger, 
    153 Wis. 2d 493
    , 506, 
    451 N.W.2d 752
     (1990).
    12
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    Wis. 2d 594, 
    712 N.W.2d 76
    . We conclude that the circuit court did just that when
    it determined that Simmons had not met the requirement of demonstrating that there
    was a reasonable probability that he would not have been prosecuted or convicted
    if the items had been previously tested for DNA. Therefore, the court did not
    erroneously exercise its discretion in denying Simmons’ WIS. STAT. § 974.07
    motion and his motion for reconsideration.
    ¶34    After his motion for reconsideration was denied, Simmons moved the
    circuit court for supplemental briefing. His request was based on the briefing for
    the motion for reconsideration, wherein the State had informed the court and
    Simmons that of the evidence for which Simmons was seeking DNA testing, only
    the bullet casings remained; the other evidence had been destroyed. Simmons had
    then asserted in his reply brief that the destroyed evidence was potentially
    exculpatory, and his due process rights had therefore been violated with its
    destruction. Thus, Simmons sought supplemental briefing to allow for the State to
    respond to that allegation.
    ¶35    The circuit court denied this motion as well. It based its decision on
    the two-pronged analysis set forth in State v. Greenwold, 
    189 Wis. 2d 59
    , 67-68,
    
    525 N.W.2d 294
     (Ct. App. 1994): “[a] defendant’s due process rights are violated
    if the police: (1) failed to preserve the evidence that is apparently exculpatory; or
    (2) acted in bad faith by failing to preserve evidence which is potentially
    exculpatory.” We review de novo the circuit court’s “application of a constitutional
    standard to the conduct of the police officers in preserving evidence.” Id. at 66.
    ¶36    The circuit court stated that its denial of Simmons’ previous motions
    explained why it “does not agree with [Simmons’] assessment of the exculpatory
    value of any of [the] items” he sought to have tested. Based on our review of the
    13
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    record as discussed above, we agree with the circuit court’s findings relating to the
    lack of exculpatory value of the evidence Simmons sought to have tested.
    ¶37   Consequently, as the circuit court observed, Simmons is “obligated to
    establish bad faith on the part of the police.” The bad faith prong “can only be
    shown if: (1) the officers were aware of the potentially exculpatory value or
    usefulness of the evidence they failed to preserve; and (2) the officers acted with
    official animus or made a conscious effort to suppress exculpatory evidence.” Id.
    at 69.
    ¶38   Simmons does not allege—either in his motion or on appeal—bad
    faith on the part of the police in the destruction of the evidence. Instead, he argues
    that he should have been granted a hearing for fact-finding on the issue.
    ¶39   However, “[n]ot all [postconviction] motions require evidentiary
    hearings.” See State v. Balliette, 
    2011 WI 79
    , ¶53, 
    336 Wis. 2d 358
    , 
    805 N.W.2d 334
     (citation omitted). In contrast to pretrial motions, a postconviction motion
    “entails more demanding standards” because “once the criminal process has been
    completed and the defendant convicted and sentenced, the reasons that support a
    lesser sufficiency standard for pretrial motions are no longer compelling, and
    instead, we must consider the strong policy that favors finality.” 
    Id.
     (citations
    omitted). Therefore, a postconviction motion should allege “facts that would
    support [the defendant’s] ultimate objective,” as well as set forth what that
    defendant “intend[s] to prove at an evidentiary hearing, if one were granted.” Id.,
    ¶69.
    ¶40   Simmons’ motion fails to do this. Furthermore, as the circuit court
    pointed out, there is not “the thinnest of shreds” of evidence of any such bad faith
    14
    No. 2018AP591-CR
    here. Therefore, we conclude that the circuit court properly denied his motion for
    supplemental briefing.
    ¶41    Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s orders denying Simmons’
    motion for postconviction DNA testing, his motion for reconsideration, and his
    motion for supplemental briefing on the due process issue.
    By the Court.—Orders affirmed.
    Not recommended for publication in the official reports.
    15
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2018AP000591-CR

Filed Date: 7/21/2020

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/9/2024