State v. Robert E. Hammersley ( 2024 )


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  •        COURT OF APPEALS
    DECISION                                                NOTICE
    DATED AND FILED                            This opinion is subject to further editing. If
    published, the official version will appear in
    the bound volume of the Official Reports.
    January 4, 2024
    A party may file with the Supreme Court a
    Samuel A. Christensen               petition to review an adverse decision by the
    Clerk of Court of Appeals            Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
    and RULE 809.62.
    Appeal No.           2022AP263-CR                                              Cir. Ct. No. 1998CT1403
    STATE OF WISCONSIN                                             IN COURT OF APPEALS
    DISTRICT III
    STATE OF WISCONSIN,
    PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
    V.
    ROBERT E. HAMMERSLEY,
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Brown County:
    BEAU LIEGEOIS, Judge. Affirmed; sanctions imposed.
    ¶1         STARK, P.J.1 Robert E. Hammersley, pro se, appeals orders
    denying his motions for a John Doe hearing,2 denying his motion for
    1
    This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2021-22). All
    references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
    No. 2022AP263
    reconsideration of that denial, and the circuit court’s failure to act on his petition
    for a writ of coram nobis.             We conclude that Hammersley’s claims are
    procedurally barred. Accordingly, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2      In 1998, a vehicle that Hammersley was driving collided with
    another vehicle, and Hammersley drove away from the accident scene. The other
    vehicle’s occupants followed Hammersley and eventually “held him” at a gas
    station until the police arrived. Hammersley gave various versions of the events
    surrounding the collision to police and he ultimately told the investigating police
    officer that he knew he was drunk. A subsequent blood test yielded a result of
    0.17 blood alcohol content.
    ¶3      Hammersley was charged with three counts: hit and run of an
    attended vehicle; operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated as a third offense;
    and operating a motor vehicle with a prohibited alcohol concentration (PAC) as a
    third offense. He pled no contest to the first and third counts, and the second
    count was dismissed.3        Sentence was withheld on the hit-and-run count, and
    Hammersley was placed on probation for one year. On the third count, the circuit
    court sentenced Hammersley to forty-five days in jail, and revoked his driver’s
    license for twenty-six months.
    2
    “The Wisconsin John Doe proceeding is a criminal investigatory inquiry provided for
    by [WIS. STAT.] § 968.26. Its purpose is to ascertain whether a crime has been committed and by
    whom.” WIS JI—CRIMINAL SM-12 (2019).
    3
    Pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(c), the operating while intoxicated charge was
    dismissed after Hammersley’s no-contest plea.
    2
    No. 2022AP263
    ¶4       On April 21, 2020, Hammersley filed a pro se “Petition for
    Reconsideration of 2013 Decision and/or New Tendering of Request for a John
    Doe Hearing Pursuant to [WIS. STAT. ]§ 968.26 and/or Federal Investigations with
    Request for 13 Judicial Notices.”4               The petition alleged that following the
    accident, the occupants of the vehicle he hit had attempted to murder him that day
    by throwing a tire iron at him. The petition further alleged that the vehicle’s
    occupants kidnapped him when they held him until the police arrived, that these
    acts amounted to “terrorism,” and that the police were complicit in these actions.
    The circuit court denied the petition in a written order on July 24, 2020, due to the
    matter having “already been reviewed and conclusively decided by [the circuit
    court], [which] denied Mr. Hammersley’s previous petition.”                      On August 12,
    2020, Hammersley filed a motion for reconsideration of the July 2020 order, and
    that motion was denied on September 2, 2020.
    ¶5       On September 21, 2020, Hammersley filed a three-part petition for a
    John Doe hearing.          This petition was denied, and Hammersley’s subsequent
    motion for reconsideration was also denied. On December 10, 2020, Hammersley
    filed a “Petition for Coram Nobis[5] and Reassessment of 2020 John Doe Decisions
    4
    Hammersley has not provided this court with his original John Doe petition or the 2013
    order denying his petition, nor has he identified any facts that would demonstrate that the circuit
    court violated a plain legal duty by denying the 2013 petition. We note that “[i]t is the appellant’s
    responsibility to ensure completion of the appellate record and ‘when an appellate record is
    incomplete in connection with an issue raised by the appellant, we must assume that the missing
    material supports the … court’s ruling.’” State v. McAttee, 
    2001 WI App 262
    , ¶5 n.1, 
    248 Wis. 2d 865
    , 
    637 N.W.2d 774
     (citation omitted).
    5
    A writ of coram nobis
    (continued)
    3
    No. 2022AP263
    File No. 13JD24 and/or Continued Request for a John Doe Hearing Pursuant to
    WIS. STAT. § 968.26 and/or Coupled with Requests Under 
    28 U.S.C. § 535
    Federal Investigations with Re-Requested 13 Judicial Notices to Assist in Setting
    Aside the Wrongful Convictions in Case No. [19]98CT1403.” This document
    contained the same allegations as the April 2020 request for a John Doe hearing.
    The circuit court did not act on this petition.
    ¶6      On July 23, 2021, Hammersley filed a petition for a writ of
    mandamus in this court, which we denied, stating the following:
    Robert Hammersley has filed a petition for a supervisory
    writ of mandamus that appears to be challenging: (1) an
    order issued by Judge Beau G. Liegeois on July 24, 2020,
    denying Hammersley’s petition for a John Doe
    investigation; (2) an order issued by Judge Liegeois on
    September 2, 2020, denying Hammersley’s motion for
    reconsideration of the denial of the John Doe petition and
    directing Hammersley to apply to this court with any
    further requests for review of the John Doe proceeding; and
    (3) the circuit court’s failure to act upon Hammersley’s
    December 2, 2020, petition for a writ of coram nobis
    relating to a conviction in a 1998 Brown County case.
    These appear to be essentially the same issues Hammersley
    previously raised before this court in his “request for
    investigation” in No. 2021XX625.
    Aside from being procedurally barred from filing
    successive petitions seeking the same relief, Hammersley
    again fails to provide any grounds that would warrant the
    relief he seeks. Hammersley has not provided copies of his
    original John Doe petition or the July 24, 2020, order
    is of very limited scope. It is a discretionary writ which is
    addressed to the [circuit] court. The purpose of the writ is to
    give the … court an opportunity to correct its own record of an
    error of fact not appearing on the record and which error would
    not have been committed by the court if the matter had been
    brought to the attention of the … court.
    Jessen v. State, 
    95 Wis. 2d 207
    , 213-14, 
    290 N.W.2d 685
     (1980).
    4
    No. 2022AP263
    denying it, and he has not identified any facts that would
    demonstrate the judge violated a plain legal duty by
    denying the petition. In addition, Hammersley continues to
    operate under the mistaken belief that the circuit court
    judge could issue a supervisory writ to himself upon
    reconsideration. As we have previously explained, the
    proper mechanism for review of an order denying a
    John Doe petition is by a supervisory writ petition to this
    court, not by a writ petition to the circuit court. See State
    ex rel. Unnamed Person No. 1 v. State, 
    2003 WI 30
    , ¶38,
    
    260 Wis. 2d 653
    , 
    660 N.W.2d 260
    .
    Finally, assuming we construe the circuit court’s failure to
    act upon the coram nobis petition—in conjunction with its
    prior indication that it would not be addressing the matter
    further—as a constructive denial of the petition,
    Hammersley has not demonstrated that he was entitled to
    coram nobis relief.
    ….
    In order to constitute grounds for the issuance of a writ of
    error coram nobis there must be shown the existence of an
    error of fact which was unknown at the time of trial and
    which is of such a nature that knowledge of its existence at
    the time of trial would have prevented the entry of
    judgment. The writ does not lie to correct errors of law and
    of fact appearing on the record since such errors are
    traditionally corrected by appeals and writs of error.
    Likewise where the writ of habeas corpus affords a proper
    and complete remedy the writ of error coram nobis will not
    be granted. On an application for a writ of error coram
    nobis the merits of the original controversy are not in issue.
    Jessen v. State, 
    95 Wis. 2d 207
    , 213-14, 
    290 N.W.2d 685
    (1980) (citations omitted).
    In short, Hammersley’s complaints of “a whole slew of
    fundamental and/or structural errors in the 1998
    conviction” are the types of alleged errors of law and fact
    that could have been addressed by a timely appeal, and they
    are not the proper subject of a coram nobis petition.
    Hammersley v. Circuit Ct. for Brown Cnty., 2021AP1269-W (WI App. Dec. 22,
    2021).
    5
    No. 2022AP263
    ¶7      Hammersley now appeals the circuit court’s orders denying his April
    2020 and August 2020 motions, as well as the circuit court’s failure to act on his
    December 2020 petition for a writ of coram nobis.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶8      Hammersley argues that the circuit court should have heard his
    John Doe motions, should have granted his petition for a writ of coram nobis, and
    should have “voided the … wrongful criminal judgments and unlawful … arrests
    against him.” We conclude that Hammersley’s claims are procedurally barred.
    ¶9      “Whether a defendant’s appeal is procedurally barred is a question
    of law that we review de novo.” State ex rel. Washington v. State, 
    2012 WI App 74
    , ¶27, 
    343 Wis. 2d 434
    , 
    819 N.W.2d 305
    . “A matter once litigated may not be
    relitigated in a subsequent postconviction proceeding no matter how artfully the
    defendant may rephrase the issue.” State v. Witkowski, 
    163 Wis. 2d 985
    , 990, 
    473 N.W.2d 512
     (Ct. App. 1991).
    ¶10     Hammersley raises a number of issues regarding the circuit court’s
    denial of his motions and failure to act on his petition for a writ of coram nobis.6
    He appears to argue that the court erred by failing to consider the merits of his
    John Doe motions and his petition for a writ of coram nobis. It is clear, however,
    6
    To the extent we do not address issues or arguments that Hammersley intended to raise,
    we conclude that such issues or arguments are not sufficiently developed, are conclusory, and are
    too difficult to decipher. Accordingly, we reject them. See State v. Pettit, 
    171 Wis. 2d 627
    ,
    646-47, 
    492 N.W.2d 633
     (Ct. App. 1992).
    We also note that Hammersley appears to argue errors in other cases that are unrelated to
    this case. We will not discuss the merits of these claims and will not address them any further.
    6
    No. 2022AP263
    that the issues Hammersley raised in those filings were previously addressed by
    the circuit court and this court.
    ¶11   The circuit court denied Hammersley’s April 2020 petition for
    reconsideration of its 2013 order denying his motion for a John Doe hearing
    because the issues had “already been reviewed and conclusively decided.”
    Similarly, his August 2020 motion for reconsideration of the July 2020 order was
    denied because the issues raised in the petition had already been litigated.
    Hammersley’s September 2020 motion for a John Doe hearing was denied for a
    number of reasons, including that the facts Hammersley cited in support of his
    motion would not affect his underlying PAC conviction. Finally, this court denied
    Hammersley’s July 2021 petition for a writ of mandamus for the reasons quoted
    above. Thus, the issues raised in Hammersley’s John Doe motions, petition for a
    writ of coram nobis, and petition for a writ of mandamus have all been previously
    litigated and “may not be relitigated in a subsequent postconviction proceeding.”
    See 
    id.
    ¶12   In reply, Hammersley argues that his claims are not barred by
    Witkowski because they were not “properly” previously litigated. It is unclear
    what Hammersley means by “properly” litigated, insomuch as his claims and
    allegations have been extensively addressed by the circuit court and this court in
    prior decisions. We also note that Hammersley had the opportunity to appeal the
    2013 order denying his original petition for a John Doe hearing, but he failed to do
    so. Accordingly, we reject this undeveloped argument. See State v. Pettit, 
    171 Wis. 2d 627
    , 646-47, 
    492 N.W.2d 633
     (Ct. App. 1992).
    ¶13   Hammersley argues that his claims could not have been raised in
    previous appeals “without an actual real investigation and terrorism and
    7
    No. 2022AP263
    government misconduct.” Again, while difficult to understand his briefing, the
    crux of Hammersley’s argument appears to be that he should be granted
    postconviction relief in this case because he fled the scene of the 1998 collision
    due to the occupants of the other vehicle allegedly attempting to murder and
    kidnap him and these acts amounted to terrorism.
    ¶14     Regardless of any potential merit in these claims, the bases for
    Hammersley’s requested John Doe proceedings and writ of coram nobis have been
    previously addressed by the circuit court and this court. His assertion that he
    could not have raised these claims in previous appeals is without merit, and his
    claims are procedurally barred.7
    ¶15     The State argues that Hammersley is abusing the appellate process
    by repetitively relitigating the same matters, and it asks that this court impose
    sanctions against Hammersley. In light of Hammersley’s repetitious filings, we
    agree. This court has the inherent power to “ensure that it ‘functions efficiently
    and effectively to provide the fair administration of justice,’ and to control its
    docket with economy of time and effort.” State v. Casteel, 
    2001 WI App 188
    ,
    ¶23, 
    247 Wis. 2d 451
    , 
    634 N.W.2d 338
     (citation omitted). “Frivolous actions
    hinder a court’s ability to function efficiently and effectively and to fairly
    administer justice to litigants who have brought nonfrivolous actions.” 
    Id.
     This
    court can require that a litigant abusing the appellate process obtain prior approval
    7
    We further note that Hammersley’s allegations made in support of his John Doe motion
    would not provide a basis for any relief to Hammersley regarding his PAC conviction in this case.
    Even if the alleged crimes by the vehicle’s occupants took place, those crimes do not in any way
    suggest that Hammersley was innocent of the crime of operating a vehicle with a prohibited
    alcohol content.
    8
    No. 2022AP263
    for any future filings, on a case-by-case basis, so as to prevent additional frivolous
    findings. Id., ¶¶23-27.
    ¶16    Accordingly, we order that no further appellate filings will be
    accepted from Hammersley unless he submits by affidavit all of the
    following: (1) “[a] copy of the circuit court’s written decision and order he seeks
    to appeal,” (2) “[a] statement setting forth the specific grounds upon which this
    court can grant relief,” (3) “[a] statement showing how the issues sought to be
    raised differ from issues raised and previously adjudicated, and” (4) “[a] statement
    of why any new claims so raised are acceptable under [Witkowski, 163 Wis. 2d at
    990.]” See Casteel, 
    247 Wis. 2d 451
    , ¶25.
    By the Court.—Orders affirmed; sanctions imposed.
    This    opinion   will   not       be   published.   See   WIS. STAT.
    RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022AP000263-CR

Filed Date: 1/4/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/9/2024