State v. Frederick A. Ziesmer ( 2020 )

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
August 11, 2020
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2019AP1437-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2014CF1106
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
FREDERICK A. ZIESMER,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Eau Claire County: JOHN F. MANYDEEDS, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Seidl, JJ.
Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent
or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
¶1 PER CURIAM. Following a jury trial, Frederick Ziesmer was
convicted of repeated sexual assault of the same child. The victim of that offense
No. 2019AP1437-CR
was Ziesmer’s stepdaughter Claire.1 As a condition of Ziesmer’s extended
supervision, the circuit court ordered that he have no contact with any minor
children, including his biological daughter, Iris. The court subsequently denied
Ziesmer’s postconviction motion, which sought to modify that condition to allow
him to have contact with Iris.
¶2 On appeal, Ziesmer argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by prohibiting him from having contact with Iris as a condition of his
extended supervision, and that the court erred by denying his postconviction motion
to modify the no-contact condition without a hearing. Ziesmer also argues that the
no-contact provision impermissibly infringes on his constitutional right to parent his
child. We reject these arguments and affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶3 In November 2014, Ziesmer was arrested and charged with repeated
sexual assault of Claire, who was then fifteen years old. Claire told police that the
assaults occurred from 2012 until June 2014, while Claire was in sixth, seventh, and
eighth grades. At the time of the assaults, Claire would have been twelve to fourteen
years old.
¶4 Following his arrest, Ziesmer was released on signature bond with a
condition stating he could have no contact with Claire or any other children at her
residence, and no unsupervised contact with any other minors. In February 2015,
Ziesmer’s bond was modified to specifically permit contact with Iris if it was
1
For ease of reading, we use pseudonyms when referring to the victim and to Ziesmer’s
biological daughter.
2
No. 2019AP1437-CR
supervised by Iris’s mother, who was also Claire’s mother and Ziesmer’s then-wife.
Iris was four years old at the time of that modification.
¶5 In May 2015, Ziesmer pled no contest to a single count of
second-degree sexual assault of a child. He was sentenced to nine years’ initial
confinement and eleven years’ extended supervision. As a condition of his extended
supervision, he was ordered to have no contact with Claire and “[n]o unsupervised
contact with any minor children, to include his own children and grandchildren.”
¶6 Ziesmer was subsequently allowed to withdraw his no-contest plea,
and the original charge against him was reinstated. While awaiting trial on that
charge, Ziesmer was again released on bond and permitted to have contact with Iris,
if it was supervised by Iris’s mother.
¶7 Ziesmer’s case was tried to a jury in March 2018. At trial, Claire
testified that Ziesmer sexually assaulted her twice when she was in sixth grade, two
or three times when she was in seventh grade, and about two times while she was in
eighth grade. Other evidence at trial showed that when police interviewed Ziesmer
about Claire’s allegations, he admitted that he had touched Claire’s breasts and
vagina on one occasion and her breast on another occasion.
¶8 In his trial testimony, Ziesmer denied sexually assaulting Claire and
asserted that when he told police he had done so, he was merely recounting events
that happened in a dream. Ziesmer also testified at trial that Claire was seven or
eight years old when he began dating her mother. When asked about his relationship
with his stepchildren, Ziesmer responded, “I loved them like they were my own.”
He further testified that his stepchildren typically called him “Dad,” and he referred
to Claire as “my daughter” during his testimony.
3
No. 2019AP1437-CR
¶9 The jury found Ziesmer guilty of repeated sexual assault of the same
child. On June 1, 2018, the circuit court imposed the same sentence Ziesmer had
received before withdrawing his no-contest plea—nine years’ initial confinement
and eleven years’ extended supervision.
¶10 When setting forth the conditions of Ziesmer’s extended supervision
during its sentencing remarks, the circuit court initially stated that Ziesmer was “not
to have contact with [Claire] or any minors.” However, the court subsequently
stated, “[N]o unsupervised contact with minor children.” Defense counsel later
asked the court to clarify whether Ziesmer was allowed to have supervised contact
with minor children, and the court responded, “I don’t want any contact with minors.
I’m sorry. That’s—thank you for correcting that.” The court also clarified that the
prohibition on contact with minor children barred Ziesmer from having contact with
Iris. Defense counsel then asked whether Ziesmer would be allowed to send letters
to Iris, and the following exchange occurred:
THE COURT: [Assistant district attorney] Larson, what’s
your feeling about that?
MS. LARSON: I guess I’d like to ask her mother.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER: I would prefer not.
MS. LARSON: She would prefer not.
THE COURT: Okay. So no.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: In that case if I could ask if it
would be up to the agent or have the agent make this
decision. As he’s progressing through time, I think the agent
or the social worker in the prison system may be in a better
position than us at this point in time to assess that.
THE COURT: I’m going to say no at this point. If he is
doing better, he can always address the Court and ask for a
modification at some point in time, and if he’s doing well
and if the mother of the child changes her mind, that can
4
No. 2019AP1437-CR
happen, but it seems pretty firm that she does not want that
contact to occur, okay?
¶11 The circuit court subsequently entered a judgment of conviction,
which stated that as a condition of his extended supervision, Ziesmer was to have
“[n]o contact with any minor children, to include his daughter.” On June 27, 2019,
Ziesmer filed a postconviction motion asking the court to modify that condition to
allow him to have contact with Iris. The State submitted a letter to the court in
opposition to Ziesmer’s motion. The State noted the victim witness coordinator had
contacted Iris’s mother, “who indicated she did not want the condition modified.”
The State also asserted there had been “no other change in circumstances since the
sentencing hearing on June 1, 2018, to justify modifying the extended supervision
conditions.”
¶12 The circuit court denied Ziesmer’s postconviction motion without a
hearing. Rather than issuing a written decision, the court simply stamped
“DENIED” on the first page of the motion and added the handwritten notation “See
DA [district attorney] Letter.” Ziesmer now appeals.
DISCUSSION
I. The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion by barring
Ziesmer from having contact with minors, including Iris, as a condition
of his extended supervision.
¶13 WISCONSIN STAT. § 973.01(5) (2017-18) provides that a circuit court
“may impose conditions upon [a] term of extended supervision.” The statute grants
circuit courts “broad discretion” to impose conditions of extended supervision, as
long as the conditions are “reasonable and appropriate.” State v. Koenig, 2003 WI
App 12, ¶7, 259 Wis. 2d 833, 656 N.W.2d 499 (2002). “Whether a condition of
extended supervision is reasonable and appropriate is determined by how well it
5
No. 2019AP1437-CR
serves the dual goals of supervision: rehabilitation of the defendant and the
protection of a state or community interest.” State v. Miller, 2005 WI App 114,
¶11, 283 Wis. 2d 465, 701 N.W.2d 47.
¶14 We review conditions of extended supervision “under the erroneous
exercise of discretion standard.” State v. Stewart, 2006 WI App 67, ¶11, 291
Wis. 2d 480, 713 N.W.2d 165. Under that standard, we will uphold a circuit court’s
discretionary determination as long as the court reached a reasonable conclusion
based on a consideration of the appropriate law and the facts of record. State v.
Salas Gayton, 2016 WI 58, ¶20, 370 Wis. 2d 264, 882 N.W.2d 459. If a circuit
court fails to adequately explain the reasons for its discretionary decision, we will
independently review the record to determine whether it provides a reasonable basis
for the court’s ruling. State v. Clark, 179 Wis. 2d 484, 490, 507 N.W.2d 172(Ct. App. 1993).
¶15 In this case, Ziesmer argues the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by imposing the no-contact condition “[b]ecause the court failed to
consider how the no-contact order was reasonably related to … Ziesmer’s
rehabilitation or protection of the public, and because both factors favor contact …
with [Iris].” We are not persuaded. Instead, we conclude the record supports the
court’s discretionary decision to order Ziesmer to have no contact with any minor
children, including Iris, during his extended supervision.
¶16 Specifically, the record supports a determination that barring contact
with Iris would advance a state or community interest—namely, protecting Iris from
being sexually abused by Ziesmer. Our supreme court has previously held that in
cases involving the sexual abuse of children, the government has “a responsibility
to protect the public from further criminal activity by the offender.” Ramaker v.
6
No. 2019AP1437-CR
State, 73 Wis. 2d 563, 568, 243 N.W.2d 534 (1976). Thus, “[a] probation condition
that a person convicted of taking indecent liberties with a child not associate with
minor children is a reasonable condition.” Id. at 566. The same is true when a court
imposes such a provision as a condition of extended supervision. See Koenig, 259
Wis. 2d 833, ¶7 n.3 (noting that “authority relating to the propriety of conditions of
probation is applicable to conditions of extended supervision”).
¶17 Ziesmer nevertheless asserts that it was unreasonable for the circuit
court to prevent him from having contact with Iris as a condition of his extended
supervision because the record does not demonstrate that he “ever was or would be
a threat to [Iris].” He cites four factors in support of that assertion, each of which
we reject.
¶18 First, Ziesmer observes that he was never “charged with or convicted
of any type of sexual assault before [Claire’s] allegations arose.” Be that as it may,
Ziesmer was convicted of repeatedly sexually assaulting Claire, who was both a
minor and a relative. That conviction, standing alone, provided a basis for the circuit
court to conclude that Ziesmer posed a threat to Iris, regardless of whether Ziesmer
had been charged with or convicted of sexual assault on any prior occasions.
¶19 Second, Ziesmer asserts there is no evidence that he poses a threat to
Iris because his conviction for sexually assaulting Claire, to whom he was not
biologically related, “does not necessarily make it more likely that he would assault
his own biological child.” Based on the evidence presented at Ziesmer’s trial,
however, the circuit court could reasonably conclude otherwise. Ziesmer testified
at trial that his stepchildren called him “Dad” and that he “loved them like they were
[his] own.” He also referred to Claire as “my daughter” during his trial testimony.
Despite Ziesmer’s close, parent-like relationship with Claire, he repeatedly sexually
7
No. 2019AP1437-CR
assaulted her. The record therefore supports a conclusion that Ziesmer’s sexual
assaults of Claire make it more likely that he will sexually assault Iris, even though
Iris is his biological daughter and Claire is not.
¶20 Third, Ziesmer contends that his “positive record of complying with
bond … proves” he is not a threat to Iris. Ziesmer observes that in February 2015,
his bond was modified to allow him to have supervised contact with Iris. After he
withdrew his no-contest plea, he was again released on bond with a condition
allowing supervised contact with Iris. Ziesmer asserts that he was never charged
with violating the conditions of his bond and there were “no issues reported with
him seeing [Iris].” He therefore argues his “record of compliance” shows that he
“is not a threat to his biological daughter.”
¶21 Ziesmer’s compliance with his bond conditions does not compel a
conclusion that he will not pose a threat to Iris when he is released to extended
supervision. Iris was between two and four years old when Ziesmer repeatedly
sexually assaulted Claire. She was four years old when Ziesmer was arrested and
when his bond was modified to allow supervised contact with her in February 2015.
She was seven years old when Ziesmer was released on bond following the
withdrawal of his no-contest plea.
¶22 In contrast, when Ziesmer is first eligible for release to extended
supervision in August 2025, Iris will be fifteen years old. Ziesmer was convicted
of repeatedly sexually assaulting Claire when she was between twelve and fourteen
years old. That Ziesmer did not violate his bond by sexually assaulting Iris when
she was between two and seven years old does not establish that he will not be a
threat to her when she is fifteen years old—only slightly older than Claire was when
Ziesmer repeatedly sexually assaulted her.
8
No. 2019AP1437-CR
¶23 Fourth, Ziesmer asserts that “the Department of Correction[s’]
(“DOC”) policy provides another layer of protection” because “the DOC will still
do its own assessment to determine whether it believes contact is appropriate.” In
support of this assertion, Ziesmer cites several administrative code provisions
allowing the DOC to regulate prison inmates’ mail and visits. See WIS. ADMIN.
CODE §§ DOC 309.04, 309.09, 309.11 (Feb. 2019).
¶24 This argument fails because the no-contact condition pertains only to
Ziesmer’s extended supervision. Ziesmer does not cite any legal authority
supporting the proposition that, even in the absence of the no-contact condition, the
DOC would “do its own assessment” of whether contact with Iris was appropriate
during his extended supervision. Moreover, even assuming the DOC would perform
such an assessment, the circuit court could still reasonably conclude that because of
the threat Ziesmer posed to Iris, it was appropriate for the court to bar contact with
Iris as a condition of his extended supervision, rather than leaving that decision to
the DOC.
¶25 Ziesmer next argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by imposing the no-contact condition because the condition “does
nothing to advance [his] rehabilitation and is in fact harmful to rehabilitation.” He
then cites a DOC rule regarding inmate telephone calls, which provides that the
DOC “shall encourage communication between an inmate and an inmate’s family”
because such communication “fosters reintegration into the community and the
maintenance of family ties” and “helps to motivate the inmate and thus contributes
to morale and to the security of the inmate and staff.” WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DOC
309.39(1) (Feb. 2019). As the State correctly notes, the DOC rule that Ziesmer cites
applies to inmate phone calls, not extended supervision. We agree with the State
that “[i]t is not inconsistent for [the] DOC to encourage communication between an
9
No. 2019AP1437-CR
inmate and the inmate’s family by telephone, and for the court to prohibit contact
between a person on extended supervision and a minor female whose sister the
person repeatedly sexually assaulted when the sister was a minor.”
¶26 Regardless, even assuming that permitting Ziesmer to have contact
with Iris during his extended supervision would advance his rehabilitation, the
circuit court could reasonably conclude that the need to protect Iris from Ziesmer
outweighed that interest. Again, Ziesmer was convicted of repeatedly sexually
assaulting Claire—who called him “Dad” and whom he claimed to love like his own
daughter—when she was only slightly younger than Iris will be when Ziesmer is
first eligible for release to extended supervision. On these facts, the no-contact
condition is reasonable and appropriate because it serves the State’s interest in
protecting Iris from sexual assault.
¶27 Ziesmer also argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by “delegat[ing] its discretion in determining the proper no-contact
conditions to [Iris’s] mother.” However, the record does not support Ziesmer’s
assertion that the court delegated its discretion to Iris’s mother. Instead, the record
merely reflects that the court considered Iris’s mother’s preference when making its
decision regarding the no-contact condition. Ziesmer cites no legal authority
supporting the proposition that the court could not consider Iris’s mother’s
preference. Moreover, if contact were allowed, it likely would have been only with
supervision, which would most naturally be done by Iris’s mother as it was when
Ziesmer was released on bond. Thus, it was natural for the court to consider the
mother’s preferences in this matter.
¶28 Finally, Ziesmer argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by failing to adequately set forth its reasoning when it imposed the
10
No. 2019AP1437-CR
no-contact condition. As noted above, however, when a circuit court fails to explain
its reasons for a discretionary decision, we independently review the record to
determine whether it provides a reasonable basis for the court’s ruling. Clark, 179
Wis. 2d at 490. Here, for all of the reasons explained above, the record supports the
court’s discretionary decision to impose the no-contact condition.
II. The circuit court did not err by denying Ziesmer’s postconviction
motion without a hearing.
¶29 Ziesmer also faults the circuit court for failing to hold an evidentiary
hearing on his postconviction motion to modify the no-contact condition. If a
postconviction motion alleges sufficient facts that, if true, would entitle the
defendant to relief, a circuit court must hold an evidentiary hearing on the motion.
State v. Allen, 2004 WI 106, ¶9, 274 Wis. 2d 568, 682 N.W.2d 433. Whether the
motion alleges sufficient facts to entitle the defendant to relief is a question of law
that we review independently. Id. In so doing, we may consider only the allegations
within the four corners of the defendant’s motion. State v. Romero-Georgana, 2014
WI 83, ¶64, 360 Wis. 2d 522, 849 N.W.2d 668. “[I]f the motion does not raise facts
sufficient to entitle the movant to relief, or presents only conclusory allegations, or
if the record conclusively demonstrates that the defendant is not entitled to relief,
the circuit court has the discretion to grant or deny a hearing.” Allen, 274 Wis. 2d
568, ¶9.
¶30 Here, the circuit court properly denied Ziesmer’s postconviction
motion without a hearing because the allegations in the motion, even if true, would
not have entitled Ziesmer to relief. During Ziesmer’s sentencing hearing, the court
considered and rejected Ziesmer’s request that it allow him to have contact with Iris
during his extended supervision. Nevertheless, the court acknowledged that
11
No. 2019AP1437-CR
Ziesmer could ask the court to modify the no-contact condition at a later date “if
he’s doing well and if the mother of the child changes her mind.”
¶31 Approximately one year later, Ziesmer filed his postconviction
motion to modify the no-contact condition, but the motion did not allege any new
facts that were not known to the circuit court at the time of sentencing that would
have entitled Ziesmer to relief. As the State correctly noted in its letter opposing
Ziesmer’s motion, the allegations in the motion did not show that there had been a
“change in circumstances since the sentencing hearing on June 1, 2018, to justify
modifying the extended supervision conditions.” The court relied on the reasoning
in the State’s letter when denying Ziesmer’s motion. Because the motion did not
allege any new facts that would have entitled Ziesmer to relief, Ziesmer was not
entitled to an evidentiary hearing on the motion, and the court did not erroneously
exercise its discretion by declining to hold a hearing.2
¶32 On appeal, Ziesmer contends the circuit court’s failure to hold an
evidentiary hearing “depriv[ed] him of the ability to fully present how well he was
doing and what treatment he had already accomplished.” Critically, however,
Ziesmer’s postconviction motion contained no allegations regarding those topics.
We agree with the State that Ziesmer “is not entitled to a hearing in order to show
2
The only new allegation in Ziesmer’s postconviction motion was his assertion, in a
single-sentence footnote, that even though the no-contact condition is a condition of his extended
supervision, it “may prevent the Department of Corrections (DOC) from even considering whether
to allow … Ziesmer to write to or have supervised and approved contact with his daughter, [Iris],
while in prison.” (Emphasis added.) That allegation was insufficient to entitle Ziesmer to relief.
Notably, Ziesmer did not allege that the DOC had actually refused to allow him to write to or have
contact with Iris while in prison based on the no-contact provision. He simply alleged that the
DOC might do so at some unspecified point in the future. That speculative assertion was
insufficient to entitle Ziesmer to relief, and it therefore did not require the circuit court to hold an
evidentiary hearing on his postconviction motion.
12
No. 2019AP1437-CR
how well he is doing and what treatment he [h]as accomplished when he did not
even allege those things in his postconviction motion.”
III. The no-contact condition does not impermissibly infringe on Ziesmer’s
constitutional right to parent Iris.
¶33 Ziesmer also argues that the no-contact condition impermissibly
infringes on his constitutional right to parent Iris. A condition of extended
supervision may infringe on a defendant’s constitutional rights as long as the
condition is not overly broad and is reasonably related to the defendant’s
rehabilitation. See State v. Oakley, 2001 WI 103, ¶19, 245 Wis. 2d 447, 629
N.W.2d 200, opinion clarified on denial of reconsideration, 2001 WI 123, 248
Wis. 2d 654, 635 N.W.2d 760.
¶34 Ziesmer argues the no-contact condition is overly broad for three
reasons. First, he argues the condition is overly broad because it will effectively
terminate his parental rights to Iris, without affording him the due process
protections that are normally provided to a parent in termination of parental rights
proceedings. He contends the condition will bar all contact with Iris “for the 11
years of his extended supervision.”
¶35 Ziesmer misstates the no-contact condition’s impact. Although the
condition applies during the entire eleven-year term of Ziesmer’s extended
supervision, it only prevents him from having contact with Iris while she is a minor.
When Ziesmer is first eligible for release to extended supervision in August 2025,
Iris will be about fifteen and one-half years old. Thus, Iris will be a minor—and
Ziesmer will be barred from having contact with her—for only about two and
one-half years of his eleven-year extended supervision term. In addition, if Ziesmer
is able to show in the future that he has made enough progress in treatment that he
13
No. 2019AP1437-CR
no longer poses a threat to Iris, he may be able to successfully petition the circuit
court to modify the no-contact condition.
¶36 Furthermore, while Ziesmer asserts on appeal that the no-contact
condition has affected his ability to have contact with Iris while he is in prison, he
cites no factual support for that assertion. Ziesmer merely references the
unsubstantiated allegation in his postconviction motion that the no-contact
condition “may” prevent the DOC from considering whether to allow him to have
contact with Iris while he is in prison. There is nothing in the record to support
Ziesmer’s assertion that the no-contact condition has actually affected his ability to
have contact with Iris during his term of initial confinement. On these facts, we
reject Ziesmer’s contention that the no-contact condition will effectively terminate
his parental rights to Iris.
¶37 Second, Ziesmer argues the no-contact condition is overly broad
because the circuit court could have instead imposed less restrictive conditions, such
as permitting supervised, written, or telephone contact with Iris, or permitting
contact as allowed by his probation agent. During Ziesmer’s sentencing hearing,
however, the court considered whether to permit supervised or written contact with
Iris, and it also considered Ziesmer’s request that it allow his probation agent to
determine whether he could have contact with her. The court rejected those options,
and as explained above, the record supports the court’s exercise of discretion in that
regard.
¶38 In particular, the circuit court could reasonably conclude that given
Ziesmer’s sexual abuse of Claire, any contact with Iris during his extended
supervision—regardless of whether it was supervised—could pose a threat to her.
The court could also consider the fact that Iris’s mother—who had previously
14
No. 2019AP1437-CR
supervised Ziesmer’s contact with Iris while he was released on bond—was
apparently unwilling to do so during Ziesmer’s extended supervision. In addition,
the court could reasonably determine that the State’s interest in protecting Iris
warranted imposing a no-contact condition, rather than delegating the decision
about contact to Ziesmer’s probation agent. Furthermore, the court noted that if
Ziesmer made progress in treatment, he could petition the court to amend the
no-contact condition at a later date. Under these circumstances, the fact that the
court could have chosen to impose less restrictive conditions does not convince us
that the no-contact condition is overly broad.
¶39 Third, Ziesmer argues the no-contact condition is overly broad
because in addition to prohibiting contact with Iris, it also “bars him from having
any contact with any other relatives that are minors, including his many
grandchildren.” He further notes that the condition would “prevent him from raising
any additional children, should he decide to father more children.” These arguments
fail because Ziesmer did not ask the circuit court to modify the no-contact condition
to permit contact with his grandchildren or other minor relatives, or to allow him to
raise additional children. Instead, Ziesmer’s postconviction motion merely asked
the court to “modify his condition of extended supervision to allow contact with his
biological child, [Iris].” Similarly, Ziesmer argues on appeal that the no-contact
condition should be modified to state: “no contact with any minor children, except
contact is allowed with his biological daughter, [Iris].” Ziesmer’s argument that the
no-contact condition is overly broad because it prohibits him from having contact
with minor relatives other than Iris therefore has no relevance to his requested relief.
¶40 In arguing that the no-contact condition is overly broad, Ziesmer
likens his case to United States v. Baker, 755 F.3d 515 (7th Cir. 2014). Baker was
convicted of criminal sexual assault in January 1982 and July 1983 and was
15
No. 2019AP1437-CR
sentenced to concurrent prison terms. Id. at 519. He was released on parole in
1986, and within three months of his release, he kidnapped, threatened, and sexually
assaulted two women. Id. After Baker was released on parole again in 2003, he
was fired from his job at a restaurant after he attempted to solicit sex from two
fourteen-year-old girls. Id.¶41 In 2012, Baker pled guilty to violating requirements of the sex
offender registry, and as a condition of his supervised release, he was ordered not
to have contact with any person under the age of eighteen, including his own
children, except in the presence of a responsible adult. Id. at 520-22. Baker
challenged that condition on appeal, and the government conceded “that the ban on
supervised contact with Baker’s own children should be vacated” because “there
[was] no evidence that Baker ha[d] abused or attempted to abuse his own children,
or that he [was] a danger to his own family.” Id. at 526. Based on the State’s
concession, the Seventh Circuit vacated the condition prohibiting Baker from
having unsupervised contact with his children. Id. at 526-27.
¶42 Ziesmer argues that just as the no-contact condition in Baker was
overly broad because there was no evidence that Baker was a danger to his own
children, the no-contact condition in this case is overly broad because there is no
evidence that Ziesmer poses a threat to Iris. We disagree. As explained above, the
circuit court could reasonably conclude that Ziesmer was a danger to Iris based on
his repeated sexual assaults of Claire. While Ziesmer again asserts that his
“conviction of sexual assault for his stepdaughter does not mean his biological
daughter is at risk,” we have already rejected that contention.
¶43 Finally, Ziesmer argues the no-contact condition is unconstitutional
because it is not reasonably related to his rehabilitation. See Oakley, 245 Wis. 2d
16No. 2019AP1437-CR
447, ¶19. We are not persuaded. “A condition is reasonably related to the goal of
rehabilitation if it assists the convicted individual in conforming his or her conduct
to the law.” Id., ¶21. Here, the no-contact condition will assist Ziesmer in
conforming his conduct to the law by removing any opportunity he might have to
sexually assault Iris. The condition is therefore reasonably related to Ziesmer’s
rehabilitation. In addition, as noted above, Ziesmer’s rehabilitation is not the only
factor the circuit court considered in establishing the no-contact condition. The
no-contact condition not only is reasonably related to the goal of Ziesmer’s
rehabilitation, it also assures Iris’s protection.
By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT. RULE
809.23(1)(b)5. (2017-18).
17