Jonathan Todd Morris v. Labor Industry and Review Commission ( 2024 )

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 9, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2022AP1865 Cir. Ct. No. 2022CV972
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I
JONATHAN TODD MORRIS,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,
V.
LABOR INDUSTRY AND REVIEW COMMISSION, WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF
WORKFORCE DEVELOPMENT AND BREDAN MECHANICAL SYSTEMS, INC.,
DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
PEDRO A. COLÓN, Judge. Affirmed.
Before White, C.J., Donald, P.J., and Geenen, J.
Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent
or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2022AP1865
¶1 PER CURIAM. Jonathan Todd Morris appeals the decision of the
circuit court affirming the decision of the Labor and Industrial Review
Commission (LIRC), which found him ineligible for unemployment insurance
benefits due to “misconduct” connected with his employment. The Department of
Workforce Development (DWD) issued an initial decision that found Morris
ineligible for benefits because he was discharged for “substantial fault” connected
with his work. Morris appealed to an administrative law judge (ALJ), sitting as an
appeal tribunal, who affirmed DWD’s decision but modified the basis for
ineligibility from “substantial fault” to “misconduct.” Morris petitioned for
review of the ALJ’s decision to LIRC, and LIRC affirmed.
¶2 Morris contends that LIRC erred when it affirmed the ALJ’s
determination that Morris was ineligible for benefits because he was discharged
for “misconduct.” He argues that several of LIRC’s material factual findings were
not supported by substantial and credible evidence and that LIRC erred in
concluding that his actions constituted “misconduct.” Morris further argues that
the modification from “substantial fault” in the DWD decision to “misconduct” in
the ALJ’s decision denied him due process, and he was prejudiced by the ALJ’s
decision to exclude certain evidence at the appeal hearing. We disagree and affirm
LIRC’s decision.
BACKGROUND
¶3 For fourteen years, Jonathan Todd Morris was the vice president of
finance and operations for his employer, Bredan Mechanical Systems, Inc.
(Bredan). Morris’s primary responsibility was to assure the financial health of the
company. Bredan terminated Morris’s employment on October 26, 2020, the day
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No. 2022AP1865
after he reported to Bredan that he lost at least $394,000 of the company’s money
over the course of the previous month in an internet-based wire transfer scam.
¶4 On September 17, 2020, Morris received an email that appeared to
be from NTS IT Care (NTS), an internet technology service provider with which
Bredan had previously done business. The email said that NTS was going to
charge Bredan $399.99 for services unless Morris called to get the charge credited.
Morris called the phone number listed in the email and spoke with Peter Tweed,
who Morris believed worked for the provider, about the refund. Tweed told
Morris that Morris needed to give him remote access to Morris’s work computer
and then log into Bredan’s bank account so that he could walk Morris through the
credit process. Morris complied, giving Tweed remote access and then logging
into Bredan’s Chase bank account with Tweed watching. When a dialogue box
appeared on the screen, Tweed told Morris to type “$499.00” into the box—the
$399 amount plus a $100 cancellation fee Tweed said NTS would “probably”
charge—so that the credit request could be processed.
¶5 According to Morris, as he entered the credit amount, his computer
screen went blank. When the screen turned back on moments later, Tweed asked
Morris what he had done. Tweed claimed that Morris had not requested a credit
but instead had transferred $49,999.99 of NTS’s money into Bredan’s account.
Because Morris was still logged into Bredan’s bank account, he could see that it
showed a $49,999.99 deposit into Bredan’s savings account.
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¶6 Tweed was very upset but explained that Morris could correct the
error by going to the bank to request a wire transfer of $49,400.1 Tweed gave
Morris instructions for the wire transfer, which included the name of Tweed’s
bank—the Bank of Bangkok. Tweed also told Morris that when he transferred the
money to make sure that the reason for the transfer was listed as “personal family
reasons.”
¶7 Morris recognized while he was still on the phone and computer
with Tweed that the transfer request was suspicious and likely illegal. Morris
testified that he became “concerned” that a foreign bank account was involved and
suspected a possible money laundering scheme. He further testified that he “just
want[ed] to get [him]self the hell out of the loop[.]” He added that by giving
Tweed remote access to his computer, he placed Bredan’s computers at risk of a
ransomware attack. Morris said that he complied with Tweed’s requests in order
to get Tweed off of his computer.
¶8 Even though Morris “knew it was a scam” or money laundering
scheme, suspected that Tweed was not who he said he was, and feared Tweed
could launch a ransomware attack against Bredan’s computers and digital assets,
Morris physically went to a Chase bank location and, after transferring $49,000
from Bredan’s savings account to its checking account, wired $49,000 to Tweed’s
account. While he recognized that Tweed was engaged in suspicious or illegal
activity, Morris hoped that complying with Tweed’s demands would resolve the
situation. It did not.
1
The amount of the first wire transfer varies in the record, but the inconsistencies are
minor and immaterial.
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No. 2022AP1865
¶9 The next day, Tweed called Morris and said that the wire transfer
never went through, and instead, more of NTS’s money was deposited into
Bredan’s savings account. Tweed insisted that Morris reverse the deposit by
sending two additional $49,000 transfers to two new bank accounts. Morris made
those transfers on September 23, 2020. The pattern continued. Tweed would call
with various excuses about wire transfer failures or inadvertent deposits, telling
Morris to send new wire transfers of $49,000 each. Tweed’s claims corresponded
with entries in Bredan’s Chase bank account showing credits to the savings
account. Tweed also showed Morris bank statements that appeared to show these
NTS deposits into Bredan’s savings account. In reality and unbeknownst to
Morris, the bank statements were falsified: the deposits had come from Bredan’s
own checking account, not NTS.
¶10 On Monday, September 28, 2020, after Morris had made six
transfers totaling $294,000 from Bredan’s checking account to Tweed’s various
bank accounts in Bangkok and Hong Kong, Tweed told Morris that they had been
scammed, and the money had been stolen. Morris realized that all of the money
he transferred was Bredan’s money and that it had been stolen via the wire
transfers. Tweed told Morris that the bulk of the funds were permanently lost and,
after speculating that Morris would likely be fired for losing Bredan’s money,
Tweed suggested a way Morris could possibly obtain a partial refund.
¶11 Morris transferred yet more money to various overseas bank
accounts over the next three weeks. Morris, with Tweed’s help, recovered some
funds—apparently a technique in furtherance of the scam—but proceeded to wire,
and then lose, even more money than he recovered. Finally, and only after he lost
his personal funds to the scam, Morris reported the scam to the FBI on or around
October 17, 2020.
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¶12 Morris did not notify Bredan of the scam or stolen money until
October 20, 2020, at the earliest. In total, Morris made nine wire transfers from
Bredan’s bank account, causing a financial loss to Bredan of at least $394,000.
Tweed had access to Morris’s work computer and bank account information for at
least four weeks.
¶13 Bredan subsequently terminated Morris’s employment. Morris
applied for unemployment insurance benefits from the DWD. After completing its
investigation, DWD issued its initial determination concluding that although
Morris was not discharged for “misconduct,” he was nonetheless ineligible for
benefits because he had been discharged for “substantial fault” connected with his
employment.
¶14 Morris appealed the determination, arguing that DWD’s decision
was internally inconsistent and in conflict with controlling law. DWD issued
notice of a hearing on the appeal. The notice described the issue for hearing as:
[Whether] the circumstances surrounding the employee’s
separation from employment … disqualify the employee
from receiving unemployment benefits. WIS. STAT.
§§ 108.04(1)(b), (5), (5g), (7) & (7m) and WIS. ADMIN
CODE § DWD 132 & 133[.]
¶15 An ALJ held a hearing on Morris’s appeal. Morris testified at the
hearing, as did Bredan’s CEO, Dan Rogers, and its president, Michael Gaggioli.
The ALJ concluded that Morris was ineligible for benefits. Specifically, the ALJ
noted that Morris continued making large wire transfers after he knew that the
employer’s money had been stolen, did not notify his supervisors despite
mounting losses, and that there was, therefore, no reasonable justification for
Morris’s conduct. The ALJ determined that these actions constituted an
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No. 2022AP1865
intentional and substantial disregard of Morris’s duties and obligations to Bredan
and satisfied the “general misconduct” standard.
¶16 Morris appealed the ALJ’s decision to LIRC. He contended that his
conduct could not be reconciled with the definition of “misconduct” under WIS.
STAT. § 108.04(5) (2021-22).2 LIRC disagreed and affirmed the appeal tribunal
decision, finding that:
The employee testified at the hearing that he was
the victim of a scam and that he did not intentionally take
money from the employer’s accounts.… However, the
employee felt, from the very first day, that the situation was
a scam. He had allowed a third party access to the
employer’s computer and logged into the employer’s bank
account while the third party had remote access to the
employee’s work computer. The employee did not
immediately inform the employer of his actions or his
suspicions but continued to allow this stranger access to his
work computer and the employee continued to wire large
sums of money to foreign bank accounts. His actions in
this regard were intentional and the decision not to
immediately inform the employer of the problem was
detrimental to the employer’s interests. Further, the
employee’s actions in continuing to wire money to foreign
banks in the hopes that an unknown individual would
return the money was so negligent as to evince a willful
and substantial disregard of the employer’s interest as to
amount to misconduct connected with his work.
¶17 Morris appealed LIRC’s decision to the circuit court, which affirmed
LIRC’s decision. Morris now appeals LIRC’s determination that he was ineligible
for unemployment benefits due to “misconduct” connected with his employment.
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.
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No. 2022AP1865
DISCUSSION
¶18 Morris argues that several of LIRC’s factual findings are not
supported by substantial and credible evidence. He further contends that LIRC
erred when it concluded that the actions resulting in his termination constituted
“misconduct” under WIS. STAT. § 108.04(5). Finally, Morris raises two issues that
he could have, but did not, raise on appeal to LIRC, including an alleged due
process violation and several alleged evidentiary errors.3
A. Standard of review
¶19 On appeal, we review LIRC’s decision, not the decision of the
circuit court. Friendly Vill. Nursing & Rehab, LLC v. DWD, 2022 WI 4, ¶13,
400 Wis. 2d 277, 969 N.W.2d 245. Because we review LIRC’s decision directly,
we do not address Morris’s claims regarding alleged circuit court errors.
¶20 Administrative decisions concerning unemployment insurance
benefits are governed by Chapter 108 of the Wisconsin statutes. A reviewing
court may set aside LIRC’s order if it depends on a material and controverted
finding of fact not supported by credible and substantial evidence, or if it is
otherwise issued in excess of LIRC’s authority. WIS. STAT. §§ 108.09(7)(f),
108.09(7)(c)6.a.; Xcel Energy Servs., Inc. v. LIRC, 2013 WI 64, ¶55, 349 Wis. 2d
234, 833 N.W.2d 665. “LIRC’s findings of fact are upheld if they are supported
by substantial and credible evidence.” Operton v. LIRC, 2017 WI 46, ¶18, 375
Wis. 2d 1, 894 N.W.2d 426 (citations omitted). Credible and substantial evidence
3
Morris asks that this court “reverse and order that Mr. Morris be paid all state and
federal supplemental unemployment benefits due him.” As a matter of law, however, this court’s
role is confined to affirming or setting aside LIRC’s decision. WIS. STAT. § 108.09(7)(c)6.
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No. 2022AP1865
is that which is “sufficient to exclude speculation or conjecture” and is less
demanding than proof by a preponderance of the evidence. Bumpas v. DILHR,
95 Wis. 2d 334, 343, 290 N.W.2d 504 (1980). The burden of showing that
LIRC’s decision was not supported by credible and substantial evidence is on the
party seeking to set aside LIRC’s findings and order. Bretl v. LIRC, 204 Wis. 2d
93, 99, 553 N.W.2d 550 (Ct. App. 1996).
¶21 LIRC’s legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Mueller v. LIRC,
2019 WI App 50, ¶17, 388 Wis. 2d 602, 933 N.W.2d 645. We afford no deference
to the agency’s interpretation of law. WIS. STAT. § 227.57(11). However, in
evaluating the persuasiveness of the agency’s arguments, we will give “due
weight” to LIRC’s experience, technical competence, and specialized knowledge,
as well as to the discretionary authority conferred upon it, while still exercising
independent judgment in deciding the legal question.4 Sec. 227.57(10); Tetra
Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶78, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914 N.W.2d 21.
B. LIRC’s findings of fact are supported by substantial and credible
evidence.
¶22 LIRC’s conclusion that Morris engaged in general misconduct
within the definition of WIS. STAT. § 108.04(5) rested on a handful of key findings
of fact that Morris argues are unsupported by credible and substantial evidence.
We disagree.
4
As required by Tetra Tech EC, Inc. v. DOR, 2018 WI 75, ¶79, 382 Wis. 2d 496, 914
N.W.2d 21, LIRC “explain[ed] how its experience, technical competence, and specialized
knowledge give its view of the law a significance or perspective unique amongst the parties, and
why that background should make the agency’s view of the law more persuasive than others.”
We agree, but we note that our decision would be the same whether or not “due weight” is given
to LIRC.
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No. 2022AP1865
¶23 First, Morris contends that LIRC concluded that Morris “suspected
the scam itself” on day one. It did not. Morris testified that he suspected a scam,
was suspicious of Tweed, and was “concerned” by the foreign bank account even
before he made the first transfer. He “knew it was a scam” or a money laundering
scheme, even if he did not know it was the scam. There is credible and substantial
evidence that Morris suspected a scam on the first day.
¶24 Morris next argues that LIRC erred when it found that Morris knew
he had repeatedly successfully wired money overseas. Again, LIRC never made
such a finding. Morris changes LIRC’s actual conclusion by adding “successful,”
but regardless, there is no dispute that by September 28, 2020, Morris knew that
the transfers of Bredan’s money were successful and that the money was stolen,
yet he continued to make wire transfers after that date.
¶25 Morris also takes issue with LIRC’s finding that he “repeatedly”
gave Tweed access to his computer. To the extent Morris did not actively give
Tweed repeated access to his computer, he is correct. However, Tweed did not
have to repeatedly be granted access. LIRC also found that Morris “continued to
allow this stranger access to his work computer,” and Morris admitted that Tweed
did have access to his work computer on and after September 17, 2020,
maintaining access throughout the duration of the scam despite Morris’s claimed
concern of preventing a ransomware attack.
¶26 Morris also argues that there is no evidence that he was required to
immediately report any suspicious activity to management. While this statement
is correct, LIRC did not find otherwise. Instead, it concluded that Morris’s failure
to immediately notify Bredan of the scam or Tweed’s access to his work computer
was detrimental to Bredan. Morris also argues that this finding is not supported by
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No. 2022AP1865
credible and substantial evidence, but we reject his assertion out of hand. Bredan
lost $394,000 because of Morris’s conduct, including $98,000 after Morris was
told that the first $296,000 in wire transfers was stolen.
¶27 In sum, we conclude that the challenged LIRC findings are
supported by substantial and credible evidence.
C. LIRC correctly concluded that Morris’s actions constituted
“misconduct” under WIS. STAT. § 108.04(5).
¶28 Morris argues that LIRC erred when it found his actions constituted
“misconduct” under WIS. STAT. § 108.04(5) because the record establishes that he
did not act with “wrongful intent or evil design,” but instead, acted in “good
faith.” Morris’s understanding of “misconduct” is incomplete and specifically
ignores the operative language of the statute relied upon by LIRC. We agree with
LIRC that Morris’s actions constituted “misconduct” disqualifying Morris from
receiving unemployment benefits.
¶29 Although Wisconsin’s unemployment compensation statutes
embody a strong public policy in favor of compensating the unemployed,
employees may be disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits under WIS.
STAT. § 108.04. Operton, 375 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶32-33. An employee may be
disqualified from receiving unemployment benefits if their employment is
terminated due to misconduct connected with their employment. Sec. 108.04(5).
While misconduct usually involves intentional acts, the statute makes clear that
unintentional conduct can also amount to misconduct. It defines “misconduct” as:
[O]ne or more actions or conduct evincing such willful or
wanton disregard of an employer’s interests as is found in
deliberate violations or disregard of standards of behavior
which an employer has a right to expect of his or her
employees, or in carelessness or negligence of such degree
or recurrence as to manifest culpability, wrongful intent, or
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No. 2022AP1865
evil design of equal severity to such disregard, or to show
an intentional and substantial disregard of an employer’s
interests, or of an employee’s duties and obligations to his
or her employer.
Id. “[A] recurrent pattern of negligent acts, so serious as to amount to gross
negligence” can constitute “misconduct.” McGraw-Edison Co. v. DILHR, 64
Wis. 2d 703, 712, 221 N.W.2d 677 (1974). It is the repeated nature of the
negligent acts in disregard of the employer’s interest that distinguishes gross
negligence from “mere inefficiency, unsatisfactory conduct, failure in good
performance as the result of inability or incapacity, inadvertencies or ordinary
negligence in isolated instances, or good faith errors in judgment or discretion,”
which is not “misconduct” sufficient to disqualify a terminated employee from
receiving unemployment benefits. Boynton Cab Co. v. Neubeck, 237 Wis. 249,
260, 296 N.W. 636 (1941); see also Operton, 375 Wis. 2d 1, ¶¶43-46.
¶30 Morris argues that because he did not intend to become a victim of a
scam when he made the first transfer on September 17, 2020, the “intent”
requirement cannot be met to find “misconduct,” but this framing of the issue
misses the point and mischaracterizes the basis for LIRC’s legal conclusion. To
the contrary, the record demonstrates that Morris recognized from the very first
day that something was off with the transaction; he testified that he suspected a
scam (not the scam) or money laundering scheme. He also testified that he made
the first wire transfer at least in part because he feared a ransomware attack after
he gave Tweed access to his work computer, yet he made no effort to restrict
Tweed’s access. Morris continued to make wire transfers to foreign banks at
Tweed’s direction, citing “personal family reasons” for the transfers. Even after
Tweed confirmed that nearly $300,000 was stolen less than two weeks into the
scam, Morris transferred more money at Tweed’s direction without telling
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No. 2022AP1865
Bredan’s ownership until several weeks later, after Bredan had suffered additional
losses. This conduct is objectively unreasonable and actively disregards the
employer’s interests.
¶31 LIRC’s findings of fact are supported by substantial and credible
evidence. We agree with LIRC’s conclusion that by “continuing to wire money to
foreign banks in the hopes that an unknown individual would return the money,”
Morris’s actions were “so negligent as to evince a willful and substantial disregard
of [Bredan’s] interest as to amount to misconduct connected with his work.”
D. Morris’s remaining claims fail due to lack of prejudice.
1. Due process
¶32 Morris argues that he was denied due process because the ALJ
denied benefits on a different basis than the DWD, and for a different reason than
the one Bredan cited when it terminated his employment. Specifically, Morris
complains that “at no time before the ALJ’s June 26, 2021 Decision had [he] ever
been notified that he did not qualify for benefits because he was expected to
promptly report any suspicious activity to management and had failed to report the
scam to management quickly enough.”5
¶33 “The fundamental requirements of procedural due process are notice
and an opportunity to be heard.” Zimbrick v. LIRC, 2000 WI App 106, ¶10, 235
Wis. 2d 132, 613 N.W.2d 198 (citation omitted). The notice must be reasonably
calculated to inform the person of the pending proceeding and to afford them an
Although Morris’s due process claim could be deemed forfeited by his failure to raise
5
the issue before LIRC, we nonetheless reject his claim on the merits. See State v. Ndina, 2009
WI 21, ¶¶28-30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612.
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No. 2022AP1865
opportunity to object and defend their rights. Id. Here, because the notice issued
by DWD included whether Morris was terminated for “misconduct” under WIS.
STAT. § 108.04(5) as an issue for hearing before the ALJ, we are not persuaded
that notice was inadequate or violated due process.
¶34 However, even if a notice is insufficient, reversal of the commission
decision based on a due process violation for insufficient notice requires a
showing of prejudicial error. Zimbrick, 235 Wis. 2d 132, ¶18. Thus, a reversal of
LIRC’s decision based on a due process violation for insufficient notice “at least
requires a showing that the ALJ did not have all of the relevant evidence before
him in the record (which would include relevant testimony from claimant), or that
the ALJ did not consider all of the evidence in the record in reaching his decision.”
Id. (citation omitted).
¶35 Morris has not identified any relevant evidence or argument he could
have offered or that the ALJ did not consider due to lack of notice. The evidence
Morris does identify—a copy of a statement that Bredan made to DWD during the
initial investigation—is not part of the hearing record,6 and in any event, the
statement contradicts Morris’s argument because it identifies as among the reasons
for Morris’s termination was that “he failed to inform the owner of the wire
transfers for over 30 days.” Accordingly, we reject Morris’s due process claim.
6
“A party is precluded from offering evidence he failed to offer before the commission.”
Weibel v. Clark, 87 Wis. 2d 696, 708, 275 N.W.2d 686 (1979); Kenwood Merch. Corp. v. LIRC,
114 Wis. 2d 226, 236, 338 N.W.2d 312 (Ct. App. 1983).
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No. 2022AP1865
2. Evidentiary issues
¶36 Morris’s final argument is that the ALJ made a series of evidentiary
errors, including: (1) refusing to allow him to testify about his post-termination
offers to help Bredan with their investigation into the scam; (2) refusing to allow
him to testify about certain details of an earlier ransomware attack Bredan
experienced to shed light on Morris’s concern about a new ransomware attack by
Tweed; and (3) refusing to admit and view a YouTube video about how the
purported scam worked. Morris argues that because the refused evidence was
relevant to his “intent” and “good faith” in dealing with Tweed, it is therefore
relevant to the misconduct standard. However, aside from Morris’s conclusory
statement that the ALJ’s refusal to allow the evidence was plain and reversible
error and highlighting that there was no objection to the rejected evidence, Morris
provides no legal support for his claims and fails to sufficiently allege that the
ALJ’s evidentiary rulings harmed him.7
¶37 The lack of a party’s objection to evidence does not make evidence
admissible. Appeal tribunals have a duty to secure the facts in as direct and simple
a manner as possible. WIS. ADMIN. CODE §§ DWD 140.15(2) and 140.16(1).
Evidence having reasonable probative value is admissible, but irrelevant,
immaterial, and repetitive evidence is not. WIS. ADMIN. CODE § DWD 140.16(1).
¶38 Our review of the record does not support Morris’s conclusion that
the ALJ committed any error, let alone plain or reversible error. The ALJ
disallowed details of the prior ransomware attack, which were not relevant to
7
Like his due process argument, Morris could have but did not raise these evidentiary
issues before LIRC, and therefore, the issues could be deemed forfeited. See Ndina, 315 Wis. 2d
653, ¶¶28-30. Nonetheless, we reject Morris’s evidentiary issues on the merits.
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No. 2022AP1865
Morris’s termination, but allowed his testimony about the fact that such an attack
occurred. That Morris offered his services to Bredan after he was terminated is
also not relevant to or probative of the circumstances surrounding the termination.
¶39 Morris argues that the details about a past ransomware attack and his
post-termination cooperation with the employer are relevant to his intent and the
“good faith” nature of his actions, and that the YouTube video provided an
explanation of the scam. However, the record reflects that Morris offered other
testimony that covered these bases, rendering any error in the ALJ’s evidentiary
rulings harmless.
¶40 By statute, we disregard any irregularity or error of the commission
unless Morris was damaged by it. WIS. STAT. § 108.09(7)(dm). Morris offered
other evidence about his intent and justifications for his conduct, and the ALJ
heard about the existence of a previous ransomware attack. The exclusion of the
YouTube video is equally harmless because Morris explained how the scam
worked in great detail based on his personal experience having fallen victim to it.
Thus, even if we accept that the challenged evidentiary rulings were all erroneous,
we conclude that Morris suffered no harm as a result. LIRC’s conclusions that
Morris committed misconduct when he did not notify his employer about the scam
until all of the money was lost and that he had allowed a third party access to the
employer’s computer, creating the risk of a ransomware attack, are not
undermined by the ALJ’s alleged errors.
CONCLUSION
¶41 For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that: (1) LIRC’s factual
findings are supported by substantial and credible evidence; (2) LIRC correctly
applied the law to the facts in concluding that Morris was terminated for
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No. 2022AP1865
“misconduct”; and (3) Morris was not harmed by any alleged due process
violation or evidentiary errors.
By the Court.—Order affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.
17