John Klein v. City of Milwaukee ( 2024 )


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  •     COURT OF APPEALS
    DECISION                                             NOTICE
    DATED AND FILED                         This opinion is subject to further editing. If
    published, the official version will appear in
    the bound volume of the Official Reports.
    April 23, 2024
    A party may file with the Supreme Court a
    Samuel A. Christensen             petition to review an adverse decision by the
    Clerk of Court of Appeals          Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
    RULE 809.62.
    Appeal No.       2022AP1401                                              Cir. Ct. No. 2021CV4632
    STATE OF WISCONSIN                                       IN COURT OF APPEALS
    DISTRICT I
    JOHN KLEIN, PAUL LOUGH, ERIC PFEIFFER, BRIAN MATTE, DAVID KRITZECK,
    MICHAEL HAMANN, KENNETH MURRAY, JAMES CAMPBELL, JOSEPH BAUER,
    CRAIG NAWOTKA, ALEXANDER MANTAY, HERBERT SMITH, STEPHAN WHITE,
    DENISE RUEDA, ANGELA GONZALEZ, EDDIE ALBRITTON, GREGORY GARNER,
    PATRICK PAJOT, SHELONDIA TARVER, JOSEPH HALL, BRIAN BURCH, DIANA
    BARCHUS, DANIEL BOECK, SCOTT KEMPINSKI, DARREN LISS AND GREG
    DANES,
    PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS,
    V.
    CITY OF MILWAUKEE AND MILWAUKEE EMPLOYEES’ RETIREMENT
    SYSTEM/ANNUITY AND PENSION BOARD,
    DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.
    APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
    FREDERICK C. ROSA, Judge. Affirmed.
    Before White, C.J., Donald, P.J., and Geenen, J.
    No. 2022AP1401
    Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent
    or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
    ¶1      PER CURIAM. Plaintiffs, a group of police officers and firefighters
    for the City of Milwaukee, appeal an order of the circuit court denying their motion
    for declaratory judgment and dismissing their action. They claim that although they
    all began employment with the City on February 21, 2000, they are nonetheless
    entitled to certain retirement benefits eligible to retirement fund members who were
    “in active service” as of January 1, 2000. We agree with the circuit court that
    Plaintiffs are not eligible for these benefits, and accordingly, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2      The following facts are undisputed. Plaintiffs are police officers and
    firefighters for the City of Milwaukee, all of whom began their employment on
    February 21, 2000. Upon starting their employment, each plaintiff enrolled in a
    retirement fund known as the Firemen’s and Policemen’s Survivorship Fund
    (“Survivorship Fund”).          The Survivorship Fund was one of several City-
    administered pension and/or retirement benefit plans available to City employees
    through the City of Milwaukee Employes’ Retirement System (“ERS” or “the
    system”).1
    ¶3      Prior to Plaintiffs beginning employment, the City was involved in
    litigation regarding its ERS. To end the litigation, a resolution was proposed
    whereby the assets within the system’s various retirement funds would be merged
    1
    In Richland School District v. DILHR, 
    166 Wis. 2d 262
    , 271 n.1, 
    479 N.W.2d 579
     (Ct.
    App. 1991), we explained that “employe” is sometimes used in opinions instead of the significantly
    more common “employee” as the result of an express drafting decision of the original drafter of
    WIS. STAT. chapters 101 through 108. The decision was made in order to avoid typos on a
    typewriter.
    2
    No. 2022AP1401
    into one fund known as the “Combined Fund.” After the merger, members would
    participate in and receive certain pension or retirement benefits through the new
    Combined Fund, and the Survivorship Fund benefits would cease to exist.
    ¶4     On October 29, 1999, a Global Pension Settlement (“GPS”) was
    reached. Relevant here, the GPS provided that the Survivorship Fund would merge
    into the Combined Fund if 90% of all affected members, i.e., employees enrolled
    and participating in the Survivorship Fund, owning 90% of the retirement assets
    agreed to the GPS. Moreover, in order for the GPS to take effect without a court
    order, 100% of the members of the Survivorship Fund had to agree to the
    Survivorship Fund’s dissolution through a written consent.
    ¶5     Under the GPS, after 100% of the Survivorship Fund members agreed
    to its dissolution, the Survivorship Fund’s assets would be transferred to the
    Combined Fund, and the Survivorship Fund would cease to exist. Additionally,
    those members “in active service” as of January 1, 2000, would be awarded an
    additional two years of service: for covered police officers, after completing
    twenty-five years of creditable service or attaining age fifty-seven; and for covered
    firefighters, after twenty-two years of creditable service or attaining age forty-nine.
    They would also receive a one-time bonus paid out as a lump sum upon retirement
    in an amount equal to 5% of that member’s accrued benefit at retirement
    (“Additional Benefits”).
    ¶6     In April 2000, the City Common Council passed various ordinances
    to create the new Combined Fund and facilitate the GPS. It enacted Milwaukee City
    Charter Ordinance § 36-08-9 to provide a means by which ERS members enrolled
    in the system prior to June 28, 2000, could execute a written consent form agreeing
    to retroactively participate in the Combined Fund. Specifically, that ordinance
    3
    No. 2022AP1401
    stated that members “enrolled in the retirement system prior to June 28, 2000 may
    execute a consent form to participate in the [C]ombined [F]und in which case they
    shall participate in the [C]ombined [F]und effective January 1, 2000.” MILWAUKEE,
    WIS. MCC § 36-08-9. Other ordinances codified the Additional Benefits provided
    under the GPS, specifically stating that police officers and firefighters “in active
    service as of January 1, 2000, who participate[] in the [C]ombined [F]und” are
    eligible for the additional service credit and a 5% bonus. MILWAUKEE, WIS. MCC
    §§ 36-04-4-a & b, 36-05-11-a & b.
    ¶7      Subsequently, the City solicited consent from members via a “Global
    Settlement Consent Form,” directed to each member. The consent form allowed
    members to either “consent” or “object” to the GPS.                It explained that, by
    consenting, members agreed to participate in the new Combined Fund and obtain
    other benefit improvements, and authorized the City to proceed to implement the
    GPS on their behalf. It also provided an explanation of the new benefits structure
    and the implementation process.
    ¶8      Plaintiffs, because they were enrolled in ERS and the Survivorship
    Fund prior to June 28, 2000, were required to execute consent forms to participate
    in the Combined Fund.          Each Plaintiff consented to the GPS and to their
    participation in the Combined Fund.           A sufficient number of ERS members
    consented to the merger and to participate in the Combined Fund. The City
    implemented the GPS.2
    2
    From their hire date on February 21, 2000, through February 2001, Plaintiffs made
    contributions via payroll deduction to the Survivorship Fund. Upon the implementation of the
    GPS, those contributions were returned to Plaintiffs.
    4
    No. 2022AP1401
    ¶9     In 2021, two firefighter plaintiffs nearing twenty-two years of service
    made a request to collect the Additional Benefits from the Combined Fund. ERS
    denied the request. The City concluded that, although the two plaintiffs were
    members of the Combined Fund as of January 1, 2000 by having executed the
    written consent permitting retroactive participation, they were not “in active
    service” on that date as required by the GPS and relevant ordinances. Therefore,
    they were not eligible to receive the Additional Benefits.
    ¶10    On August 3, 2021, Plaintiffs filed the instant lawsuit seeking a
    declaratory judgment that they are entitled to the Additional Benefits. Plaintiffs
    filed a motion for declaratory judgment. The circuit court denied the motion and
    dismissed Plaintiffs’ action. In an oral ruling, the circuit court concluded that
    Plaintiffs were not “in active service” as of January 1, 2000, because they did not
    become employed by the City until February 21, 2000.
    ¶11    Plaintiffs appeal.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶12    Plaintiffs appeal the circuit court’s order denying their motion for
    declaratory judgment and dismissing their action. The circuit court’s ruling against
    Plaintiffs had the effect of a summary judgment; the parties agree that our review
    should be governed by the summary judgment standard that we apply de novo using
    the same methodology as the circuit court. See Young v. West Bend Mut. Ins. Co.,
    
    2008 WI App 147
    , ¶6, 
    314 Wis. 2d 246
    , 
    758 N.W.2d 196
    . Additionally, the issues
    involved require the interpretation of ordinances and thus present a question of law
    that we review de novo, applying the same principles used in statutory
    interpretation. Milwaukee Dist. Council 48 v. Milwaukee Cnty., 
    2019 WI 24
    , ¶11,
    
    385 Wis. 2d 748
    , 
    924 N.W.2d 153
    . As such, we begin with the language of the
    5
    No. 2022AP1401
    ordinance, giving the words their “‘common, ordinary, and accepted meaning,
    except that technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical
    or special definitional meaning.’” 
    Id.
     (citation omitted). If the meaning of the
    language is plain, the inquiry ordinarily ends. 
    Id.
    ¶13    Plaintiffs argue, and the City agrees, that by signing the consent form
    to convert the Survivorship Fund into the Combined Fund, they became members
    of the Combined Fund “effective January 1, 2000[,]” under MILWAUKEE, WIS.
    MCC § 36-08-9. However, the parties disagree about whether Plaintiffs were “in
    active service” as of January 1, 2000.
    ¶14    Plaintiffs argue that surrounding ordinances and certain language in
    the consent form make clear that they are considered to have been “in active service”
    as of January 1, 2000, and are therefore eligible for the Additional Benefits. In
    support, they cite MILWAUKEE, WIS. MCC § 36-13-2-c, which provides that rights
    to benefits vest on the date of the commencement of their membership in the system.
    They further point to the following language in the consent form:
    If I consent to the Global Settlement by checking the
    “Consent” box below, I understand that I am agreeing to
    participate in the newly created “Combined Fund” within the
    Milwaukee Employes’ Retirement System (“MERS”). I
    understand that this Combined Fund will provide improved
    benefits to its participants and fund structural changes that
    will benefit the City of Milwaukee (“City”) and City
    Agencies participating in the MERS. I understand that I will
    be authorizing the City to proceed to implement the Global
    Settlement on my behalf, thereby waiving my right to object
    to the terms and conditions of the Global Settlement and my
    right to object to my participation in the Combined Fund. I
    further understand that the City has reserved the right to
    refuse to proceed with implementation of the Global
    Settlement, even with my consent, if 90% of the members of
    the MERS representing 90% of the assets of the MERS do
    not consent to the Global Settlement.
    6
    No. 2022AP1401
    If I object to the Global Settlement, by checking the
    “Object” box below, I understand that I am refusing to
    participate in the Combined Fund and will not receive the
    additional pension benefits provided under the Global
    Settlement, unless the Court orders objecting members to
    participate in the Global Settlement.
    (Plaintiffs’ emphasis).
    ¶15    Plaintiffs recognize that the GPS requires them to have been “in active
    service” in order to be eligible for the Additional Benefits, but they argue that the
    meaning of “active service” should be controlled by MILWAUKEE, WIS. MCC § 350-
    40-1-a, which reads:
    350-40. Vacations. 1. DEFINITIONS.
    a. “Active service” means the time spent as an appointed
    employee on the city payroll in a position qualifying for
    fringe benefits ….
    Although Plaintiffs do not explicitly say so, it appears that their argument is that
    because they are deemed to be “participants” in the Combined Fund effective
    January 1, 2000, they were “on the city payroll in a position qualifying for fringe
    benefits” as of that date as well, therefore qualifying for the Additional Benefits.
    ¶16    We agree with the circuit court and the City that Plaintiffs are not
    entitled to the Additional Benefits because they were not “in active service.” As the
    City points out, Plaintiffs’ interpretation runs contrary to well-established principles
    of statutory interpretation. Plaintiffs’ interpretation treats “in active service” and
    “participation in the [C]ombined [F]und” as identical concepts even though they
    appear together in the same sentence. “Statutory language is read where possible to
    give reasonable effect to every word, in order to avoid surplusage.” State ex rel.
    Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 
    2004 WI 58
    , ¶46, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , 
    681 N.W.2d 7
    No. 2022AP1401
    110.   In order to avoid surplusage, we read these phrases as two distinct
    requirements to be eligible for the Additional Benefits.
    ¶17    There is no dispute that Plaintiffs “participat[ed] in the [C]ombined
    [F]und” effective January 1, 2000 by virtue of having executed the written consent
    allowing for retroactive participation, so they meet this requirement of eligibility.
    Further, the parties agree that we should use the definition of “active service” in
    MILWAUKEE, WIS. MCC § 350-40-1-a to determine if Plaintiffs were “in active
    service” for purposes of Additional Benefit eligibility.
    ¶18    Although it is “[t]his court, not the parties,” that decides questions of
    law, Cramer v. Eau Claire County, 
    2013 WI App 67
    , ¶11, 
    348 Wis. 2d 154
    , 
    833 N.W.2d 172
     (citations omitted), we agree with the parties that it is appropriate to
    apply Chapter 350’s definition of “active service” in this context. See Kalal, 
    271 Wis. 2d 633
    , ¶46 (explaining that “closely-related statutes” are proper
    considerations in interpreting statutory language). We conclude that Plaintiffs do
    not meet the definition. “Active service” in Chapter 350 requires that the employee
    be: (1) in an appointed city position; (2) on the city payroll; and (3) in a position
    qualifying for fringe benefits. MILWAUKEE, WIS. MCC § 350-40-1-a.
    ¶19    We agree with the City that under Chapter 350’s definition, it is likely
    not possible that “active service” could ever begin on a date earlier than the
    employee’s date of hire because that is the earliest date that an employee could fill
    a city position or be added to the city’s payroll. Because Plaintiffs were not
    “appointed employee[s] on the city payroll in a position qualifying for fringe
    benefits” as of January 1, 2000, they were not “in active service” as of that date.
    8
    No. 2022AP1401
    Therefore, the circuit court correctly concluded that Plaintiffs were ineligible for the
    Additional Benefits.3
    ¶20     For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court.
    By the Court.—Order affirmed.
    This    opinion     will    not       be   published.      See    WIS. STAT.
    RULE 809.23(1)(b)5. (2021-22).
    3
    Because we conclude that Plaintiffs were not “in active service” as of January 1, 2000,
    we do not address the issue of whether Plaintiffs waived their right to the Additional Benefits by
    signing the consent form to join the Combined Fund.
    9
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2022AP001401

Filed Date: 4/23/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/9/2024