State v. Donald R. Goldsworthy ( 2024 )

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
June 20, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.
Appeal No. 2022AP1963-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF606
STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV
STATE OF WISCONSIN,
PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
V.
DONALD R. GOLDSWORTHY,
DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Columbia County:
TODD J. HEPLER, Judge. Affirmed.
Before Blanchard, Graham, and Nashold, JJ.
Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent
or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
¶1 PER CURIAM. Donald Goldsworthy appeals a judgment of
conviction for operating a motor vehicle with a detectable amount of a restricted
No. 2022AP1963-CR
controlled substance, as a fifth offense. Goldsworthy contends that the circuit
court erred by denying his motion to suppress evidence obtained during a traffic
stop of his vehicle. We conclude that the court properly denied Goldsworthy’s
motion to suppress, and accordingly we affirm.
¶2 Goldsworthy was charged with multiple offenses based on evidence
obtained following a traffic stop of his vehicle. Goldsworthy moved to suppress
the evidence obtained during the traffic stop, arguing that the stop was not
supported by reasonable suspicion of any traffic violation.
¶3 At the suppression hearing, an officer testified that he stopped
Goldsworthy’s vehicle because it had six different lamps activated, in violation of
WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1) (2021-22).1 That statute provides:
Whenever a motor vehicle equipped with
headlamps also is equipped with any adverse weather
lamps, spotlamps or auxiliary lamps, or with any other
lamp on the front thereof projecting a beam of intensity
greater than 300 candlepower, not more than a total of 4 of
any such lamps or combinations thereof on the front of the
vehicle shall be lighted at any one time when such vehicle
is upon a highway.
Id. More specifically, the officer testified that the vehicle had three lamps
activated on each side of the front of the vehicle, and that it appeared to the officer
that all six lamps were approximately the same brightness. The officer testified
that his understanding was that § 347.07 provides that a maximum of four lamps
may be activated on the front of a vehicle at the same time. He testified that he
1
We use the term “lamp” for what might commonly be referred to as a “light,” because
that is the terminology used in WIS. STAT. § 347.07.
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.
2
No. 2022AP1963-CR
was not aware of any requirement that any of the unlawful “extra” lamps had to
have a luminous intensity above 300 candlepower to count toward the maximum.
¶4 The prosecution also offered into evidence the officer’s body camera
recording of the traffic stop and a transcript of the recording. On the recording,
the officer could be heard explaining to Goldsworthy that he was stopped because
he had all of the following activated on the front of his vehicle: “[Y]ou have the
two LEDs, the two fog lamps[,] and your two headlamps.” Using the terminology
of WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1), this would be two “auxiliary lamps,” two “adverse
weather lamps,” and two “headlamps.”
¶5 The circuit court denied the suppression motion. It determined that
WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1) is ambiguous as to whether a vehicle may have a total of
four or six front-mounted lamps illuminated simultaneously. The court
determined that the more reasonable interpretation of § 347.07(1) is that it allows
only four such lamps. The court also determined that, based on the officer’s
testimony that all six of the lamps were about equally bright, it was reasonable to
infer that all had a luminous intensity above 300 candlepower.
¶6 One lawful basis to stop a vehicle is reasonable suspicion that a
traffic law has been or is being violated. State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶30,
364 Wis. 2d 234, 868 N.W.2d 143. This depends on the ability of a reasonable
officer in the officer’s position “to point to specific and articulable facts which,
taken together with rational inferences from those facts, reasonably warrant that
intrusion.” Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968). Reviewing courts examine
whether the facts of the case would warrant a reasonable police officer, in light of
the officer’s training and experience, to suspect that an individual is committing, is
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No. 2022AP1963-CR
about to commit, or has committed an offense. State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d
77, 83-84 & n.1, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990).
¶7 Whether a suppression motion should have been granted is a
question of constitutional fact. State v. Knapp, 2005 WI 127, ¶19, 285 Wis. 2d 86,
700 N.W.2d 899. We uphold a circuit court’s findings of fact unless they are
clearly erroneous, but we independently review whether those facts meet
constitutional standards. State v. Johnson, 2007 WI 32, ¶13, 299 Wis. 2d 675,
729 N.W.2d 182. Statutory interpretation is also a question of law that we review
de novo. See State v. Neill, 2020 WI 15, ¶14, 390 Wis. 2d 248, 938 N.W.2d 521.
¶8 Goldsworthy argues that WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1) allows a total of six
front-mounted lamps to be illuminated simultaneously. He argues that the term
“any such lamps or combinations thereof” refers to the types of lamps listed in
addition to the two standard headlamps. He contends that, had the legislature
intended to include all lamps on the front of a vehicle in the phrase “any such
lamps or combinations thereof,” there would have been no need to list other types
of lamps in addition to the standard two headlamps. Thus, Goldsworthy contends,
a vehicle may have a total of six illuminated lamps: the two headlamps, plus up to
four of the other types of lamps.
¶9 The State argues that WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1) provides that a vehicle
may have only a total of four front-mounted lamps illuminated simultaneously. It
contends that the phrase “not more than a total of 4 of any such lamps or
combinations thereof” refers to all of the types of lamps identified in the preceding
clause, including “headlamps” and “any adverse weather lamps, spotlamps or
auxiliary lamps,” and “any other lamp … projecting a beam of intensity greater
4
No. 2022AP1963-CR
than 300 candlepower.” Thus, the State asserts, § 347.07(1) prohibits more than a
total of four simultaneously illuminated lamps on the front of a vehicle.
¶10 In the alternative, the State contends that, even if WIS. STAT.
§ 347.07(1) allows a total of six illuminated lamps, the officer in this case had
reasonable suspicion for the stop because he relied on a reasonable mistake of law,
namely, that the statute allows only four front-mounted lamps to be activated
simultaneously. See Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶52 (holding “that an
objectively reasonable mistake of law by a police officer can form the basis for
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop”).
¶11 We conclude that the officer had reasonable suspicion to stop
Goldsworthy to investigate a violation of WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1). In reaching this
conclusion, we need not decide whether the statute allows a vehicle to have four or
six simultaneously illuminated front-mounted lamps. We determine that, even if
the statute allows six, the officer relied on a reasonable mistake of law that the
statute allows only up to four. See Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶52 (“[A]n
objectively reasonable mistake of law by a police officer can form the basis for
reasonable suspicion to conduct a traffic stop.”).
¶12 We conclude that the officer’s interpretation of WIS. STAT.
§ 347.07(1) was objectively reasonable. The statute provides that a vehicle may
have “not more than a total of 4 of any such lamps or combinations thereof on the
front of the vehicle” illuminated at one time, which as the State argues reasonably
could apply to all of the types of lamps listed in the preceding part of the statute.
Sec. 347.07(1). Because the statute was subject to that reasonable interpretation,
the officer’s reliance on that interpretation, even if mistaken, established
reasonable suspicion for the stop. See Houghton, 364 Wis. 2d 234, ¶68 (“If the
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No. 2022AP1963-CR
statute is genuinely ambiguous, such that overturning the officer’s judgment
requires hard interpretive work, then the officer has made a reasonable mistake.”
(quoted source omitted)).
¶13 Our conclusion is also supported by the fact that Goldsworthy cites
no authority interpreting the statute as allowing up to six total front-mounted
lamps.2 See id., ¶70 (“That the statute has never been interpreted before weighs in
favor of” finding officer’s interpretation reasonable.). “Because ‘a reasonable
judge could agree with the officer’s view’ … in this case, we hold that [the
officer’s] mistake of law was objectively reasonable[.]”3 See id., ¶71 (quoted
source omitted).
2
The State cites State v. Brown, No. 2018AP2382, unpublished slip op. (WI App
May 23, 2019), as persuasive authority that WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1) allows a total of four lamps to
be lighted at the front of a vehicle. The issue in Brown was whether an officer made a reasonable
mistake of fact in stopping Brown based on the officer’s mistaken belief that Brown’s vehicle had
six simultaneously illuminated front lamps. Brown, No. 2018AP2382, ¶11. The issue of whether
the statute allows four or six lamps was not presented in Brown. Nevertheless, we framed the
issue as “whether the officer had reasonable suspicion to believe that Brown’s vehicle was
operating on a highway with more than four headlamps lit in violation of … § 347.07(1), which
provides that ‘not more than a total of 4 [lamps] on the front of [a] vehicle shall be lighted at any
one time when [the] vehicle is upon a highway.’” Brown, No. 2018AP2382, ¶1 (alterations in
original). Although Brown is not controlling authority, we note that our conclusion that the
officer’s belief that the statute allows a total of four lamps was objectively reasonable is
consistent with the result in Brown.
3
Indeed, in his reply brief, Goldsworthy does not dispute the State’s argument that it was
objectively reasonable for the officer to interpret the statute as prohibiting more than four front-
facing, illuminated lamps. Rather, he argues only that the officer did not rely on a reasonable
mistake of law because the officer was unaware of what Goldsworthy submits is the requirement
that a lamp must have a luminous intensity above 300 candlepower to count toward the total
number of permitted front-mounted lamps, an argument that we address below. We take
Goldsworthy’s lack of a reply on this argument as a concession that the officer’s belief that the
statute allows a total of four lighted lamps on the front of a vehicle was objectively reasonable.
See United Coop. v. Frontier FS Coop., 2007 WI App 197, ¶39, 304 Wis. 2d 750, 738 N.W.2d
578 (failure by appellant to respond in reply brief to an argument made in respondent’s brief may
be taken as a concession).
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No. 2022AP1963-CR
¶14 Goldsworthy contends, however, that the officer did not rely on a
reasonable mistake of law in stopping him because the officer did not correctly
take into account WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1)’s reference to “projecting a beam of
intensity greater than 300 candlepower.” As the basis for this argument,
Goldsworthy contends that § 347.07(1) requires that any lamp must have a
luminous intensity above 300 candlepower to count toward the total permitted
number of front-mounted illuminated lamps. In Goldsworthy’s view, this
candlepower requirement applies to all of the types of lamps specifically identified
in the statute, as well as “any other lamp.” Continuing from that premise,
Goldsworthy argues that the officer lacked reasonable suspicion to stop him
because the officer provided no testimony that he was able to determine the
candlepower of any lamp. See State v. Conaway, 2010 WI App 7, ¶13, 323
Wis. 2d 250, 779 N.W.2d 182 (officer lacked reasonable suspicion for vehicle
window tint violation where “nothing in the officer’s testimony provide[d] a basis
for a finding that the officer had the ability to judge whether a tinted rear window
came close to or failed to meet the 35%-light-pass-through requirement”).
¶15 In contrast, the State argues that the candlepower requirement
applies only to “any other lamp” within the phrase “any other lamp on the front
thereof projecting a beam of intensity greater than 300 candlepower.” For this
reason, the State contends, Goldsworthy’s candlepower argument is irrelevant
because there is no dispute that Goldsworthy simultaneously activated his
headlamps, adverse weather lamps, and auxiliary lamps, and these were not
subject to the candlepower requirement. Under this view, all that matters is that
7
No. 2022AP1963-CR
Goldsworthy had activated “the other specifically listed types of lamps from WIS.
STAT. § 347.07(1)—headlamps, adverse weather lamps, and auxiliary lamps.”4
¶16 As with the first issue, we need not resolve this dispute. We
conclude that it would have been objectively reasonable for an officer in the
position of the officer here to interpret WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1) as the State now
advocates, limiting the total number of headlamps plus adverse weather lamps and
auxiliary lamps on the front of a vehicle to four, without regard to their
candlepower.
¶17 WISCONSIN STAT. § 347.07(1) provides that when a vehicle that is
equipped with headlamps is also equipped with “any adverse weather lamps,
spotlamps, or auxiliary lamps, or with any other lamp on the front thereof
projecting a beam of intensity greater than 300 candlepower,” there may be “not
more than a total of 4 of any such lamps or combinations thereof on the front of
the vehicle” illuminated at the same time. It is objectively reasonable to interpret
the statute as providing that the lamps that count toward the total number of
allowed lamps are the types specifically identified plus “any other lamp on the
front thereof projecting a beam of intensity greater than 300 candlepower.” Again,
Goldsworthy cites no authority interpreting the statute to apply the candlepower
4
The State also contends that the officer’s testimony that all of the lights were the same
brightness was sufficient to establish reasonable suspicion that the lights exceeded 300
candlepower. And, the State asserts that even if the officer was mistaken and some or all of the
lamps on Goldsworthy’s vehicle were under 300 candlepower, the stop would be permissible
based on a reasonable mistake of fact. See State v. Houghton, 2015 WI 79, ¶75, 364 Wis. 2d
234, 868 N.W.2d 143 (explaining that “searches and seizures can be based on mistakes of fact”).
Because we conclude that it was objectively reasonable for the officer to interpret the statute as
prohibiting more than four headlamps, adverse weather lamps, and auxiliary lamps, regardless of
their candlepower, we do not reach those arguments.
8
No. 2022AP1963-CR
requirement to all of the lamps on the front of the vehicle.5 See Houghton, 364
Wis. 2d 234, ¶70. We conclude that a reasonable judge could agree with the
officer’s view that the candlepower requirement applies only to “any other lamp,”
not the enumerated lamps, and that such an interpretation is therefore objectively
reasonable. See id., ¶71.
¶18 Goldsworthy attempts to base an argument on the testimony of the
officer here to the effect that he was personally not aware of the 300 candlepower
requirement, regardless of how it might be interpreted. But this argument would
go nowhere. We generally do not base a reasonable suspicion analysis on the
subjective knowledge or views of the officers involved in incidents, but instead on
what actions reasonable officers in the positions of the officers could have
reasonably undertaken, consistent with the Fourth Amendment. State v. Pugh,
2013 WI App 12, ¶11, 345 Wis. 2d 832, 826 N.W.2d 418. As we have explained,
an objectively reasonable interpretation of WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1) is that it
prohibited Goldsworthy from having a total of six lamps—his headlamps, adverse
weather lamps, and auxiliary lamps—illuminated on the front of his vehicle,
regardless of candlepower. On that basis, we conclude that the officer had
reasonable suspicion for the stop.
¶19 For all of these reasons, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
5
The State again cites Brown, No. 2018AP2382, ¶¶2-4, 12-13, pointing out that, there,
we did not discuss candlepower at all as part of our reasonable suspicion analysis. Again, Brown
is not controlling and the candlepower issue was not presented in that case. But Brown supports
our conclusion that it is at least objectively reasonable to construe WIS. STAT. § 347.07(1) to
provide that the types of lamps specifically identified in the statute do not have a candlepower
requirement.
9
No. 2022AP1963-CR
By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.
10