State v. Lawrence Griffin, Jr. ( 2021 )


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  •       COURT OF APPEALS
    DECISION                                                 NOTICE
    DATED AND FILED                             This opinion is subject to further editing. If
    published, the official version will appear in
    the bound volume of the Official Reports.
    June 29, 2021
    A party may file with the Supreme Court a
    Sheila T. Reiff                   petition to review an adverse decision by the
    Clerk of Court of Appeals              Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
    RULE 809.62.
    Appeal No.         2020AP1043-CR                                                Cir. Ct. No. 2017CF104
    STATE OF WISCONSIN                                             IN COURT OF APPEALS
    DISTRICT I
    STATE OF WISCONSIN,
    PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
    V.
    LAWRENCE GRIFFIN, JR.,
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee County:
    DAVID A. HANSHER, Judge. Affirmed.
    Before Brash, P.J., Dugan and Donald, JJ.
    Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent
    or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
    ¶1       PER CURIAM. Lawrence Griffin, Jr. appeals his judgment of
    conviction for possession of a firearm by a felon. Griffin pled guilty to that charge
    No. 2020AP1043-CR
    after the trial court denied his motion to suppress. Griffin asserts that that the trial
    court erred in denying his suppression motion, arguing that at the time the arresting
    police officers seized him— resulting in the discovery of the gun—they did not have
    reasonable suspicion for the seizure, and it was therefore illegal. We disagree and
    affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2   The charge against Griffin stemmed from an incident that occurred in
    the early morning hours of August 9, 2016. According to the complaint, officers
    from the Milwaukee Police Department were on patrol in the area of North 11th
    Street in Milwaukee at approximately 2:47 a.m. when they saw Griffin standing in
    the road, leaning into the driver’s side window of a parked car. When Griffin saw
    the marked squad car approaching, he walked around the vehicle to the passenger
    side, “blading his body in the process” away from the squad. One of the officers
    stated that he saw Griffin perform a “security check” of his right side—holding the
    waistband of his pants—as Griffin walked around the vehicle. That officer later
    explained at the suppression motion hearing that blading and security checks can be
    indicative of a person having a concealed firearm.
    ¶3   The officers stopped the squad behind the vehicle, but did not activate
    its lights or siren. One of the officers exited the squad car “quickly,” and then heard
    the sound of metal hitting concrete. The officer believed that the sound was a
    firearm that had been dropped in the road. The officer stated that Griffin backed
    away from the item he had dropped, looking at the ground, but did not attempt to
    retrieve it; instead, he simply put his hands up. As the officer proceeded toward
    Griffin, he saw a 9mm handgun on the ground next to the vehicle. The officer then
    grabbed Griffin’s arm and inquired as to whether Griffin had a valid permit to carry
    2
    No. 2020AP1043-CR
    a concealed weapon. When Griffin replied that he did not, the officer took him into
    custody. Officers subsequently discovered that Griffin had a previous felony
    conviction.
    ¶4     Griffin was charged with possession of a firearm by a felon. He filed
    a motion to suppress the evidence of the firearm that was recovered on the ground,
    arguing that at the point in time he was seized—which, he asserted, was when the
    officer got out of the squad—the officer did not have reasonable suspicion of a
    crime, and the seizure was therefore illegal.
    ¶5     A hearing on the motion was held in February 2018, with one of the
    arresting officers testifying as to the events relating to Griffin’s arrest. The officer
    stated that the entire incident—from when the officers turned onto 11th Street to
    when Griffin was taken into custody—was less than a minute, and that there was
    only “a few seconds maybe” between the time that the officer exited the squad,
    heard the gun fall on the ground, and reached Griffin.
    ¶6     Griffin also testified, stating that he was simply giving cigarettes to
    his friend who was sitting in the vehicle that night; that he had moved around the
    vehicle when he saw the squad for purposes of “avoidance,” because he did not want
    to be “talked to” by the officers; and that he had not been holding the waistband of
    his pants. Griffin testified that it took “[m]aybe 15 seconds” for the officer to exit
    the squad and reach him.
    ¶7     The trial court denied the motion, finding that Griffin was not seized
    until after the officer heard the gun fall to the ground. The court found that at that
    point, the officer had established reasonable suspicion that Griffin was carrying a
    gun, and then determined that Griffin did not have a valid permit to carry a
    concealed firearm.
    3
    No. 2020AP1043-CR
    ¶8      Griffin subsequently entered a guilty plea to the charge against him.1
    He was sentenced in August 2019 to five years of initial confinement followed by
    five years of extended supervision. This appeal follows.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶9      On appeal, Griffin argues that the trial court erred in denying his
    motion to suppress. The review of a trial court’s decision on a motion to suppress
    presents a mixed question of fact and law. State v. Eason, 
    2001 WI 98
    , ¶9, 
    245 Wis. 2d 206
    , 
    629 N.W.2d 625
    . We will not reverse the trial court’s findings of fact
    unless they are clearly erroneous; however, we review de novo the application of
    constitutional principles to those facts. 
    Id.
    ¶10     Griffin argues that his motion to suppress should have been granted
    because the police officers did not have reasonable suspicion of a crime when
    Griffin was seized. “The Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
    [a]rticle I, [s]ection 11 of the Wisconsin Constitution protect people from
    unreasonable searches and seizures.” State v. Young, 
    2006 WI 98
    , ¶18, 
    294 Wis. 2d 1
    , 
    717 N.W.2d 729
     (footnotes omitted). An investigative stop is “technically a
    ‘seizure’ under the Fourth Amendment[.]” State v. Waldner, 
    206 Wis. 2d 51
    , 55-
    56, 
    556 N.W.2d 681
     (1996). However, an investigative stop passes constitutional
    muster “if the police have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is
    being committed, or is about to be committed.” Young, 
    294 Wis. 2d 1
    , ¶20.
    ¶11     The specific issue in this case requires a determination of when Griffin
    was actually seized. “[A] person is ‘seized’ only when, by means of physical force
    1
    Under the plea agreement, charges against Griffin in a different case were dismissed but
    read in for sentencing in this case.
    4
    No. 2020AP1043-CR
    or a show of authority, his freedom of movement is restrained.” United States v.
    Mendenhall, 
    446 U.S. 544
    , 553 (1980). Put another way, as long as an individual
    with whom the police have made contact “remains free to disregard the questions
    and walk away,” there has not been a seizure, and the constitutional protections of
    the Fourth Amendment have not been invoked. 
    Id. at 553-54
    .
    ¶12    Griffin asserts that the seizure occurred when the officer exited the
    squad car and began moving quickly toward him. The State, on the other hand,
    argues that the seizure of Griffin did not occur until the officer had grabbed Griffin’s
    arm and inquired about a permit for the gun that had dropped.
    ¶13    To determine whether a seizure has occurred, the Mendenhall Court
    provided several “[e]xamples of circumstances that might indicate a seizure, even
    where the person did not attempt to leave,” such as “the threatening presence of
    several officers, the display of a weapon by an officer, some physical touching …
    of the citizen, or the use of language or tone of voice indicating that compliance
    with the officer’s request might be compelled.” 
    Id. at 554
    . It is also considered to
    be a seizure “when a police officer makes a show of authority to a citizen, [and] the
    citizen yields to that show of authority.” State v. Kelsey C.R., 
    2001 WI 54
    , ¶30, 
    243 Wis. 2d 422
    , 
    626 N.W.2d 777
    ; see also California v. Hodari D., 
    499 U.S. 621
    , 626
    (1991) (“An arrest requires either physical force … or, where that is absent,
    submission to the assertion of authority.”).
    ¶14    Here, the officer’s testimony at the suppression hearing—which the
    trial court found to be credible—indicates that he exited the squad quickly and began
    moving toward Griffin. However, the lights and siren of the squad had not been
    activated, and only one officer exited the squad when it stopped. Furthermore, there
    is no evidence that the officer who exited the squad drew his weapon or spoke to
    5
    No. 2020AP1043-CR
    Griffin before he heard the gun drop. Additionally, that officer testified that when
    the gun dropped, Griffin backed away from it and raised his hands in the air,
    indicating consciousness of guilt. Moreover, the officer did not restrain Griffin by
    grabbing his arm until after he heard the gun hit the ground.
    ¶15    Even if Griffin inferred that the officer was approaching him to speak
    with him, “police questioning, by itself, is unlikely to result in a Fourth Amendment
    violation” unless “the circumstances of the encounter are so intimidating as to
    demonstrate that a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave
    if he had not responded[.]” I.N.S. v. Delgado, 
    466 U.S. 210
    , 216 (1984). We again
    note that the squad’s lights and siren had not been activated; in fact, Griffin testified
    that he “felt free” to move around the vehicle when he saw the squad approaching.
    After that, only a few seconds elapsed between the time the officers pulled up in
    their squad and when the arresting officer heard the gun drop, and there is no
    evidence that Griffin submitted to police authority during that time frame. See
    Kelsey C.R., 
    243 Wis. 2d 422
    , ¶30.
    ¶16    Based on these circumstances, we conclude that the seizure of Griffin
    occurred after the officer heard the gun drop. See 
    id.
     At that point, the officer had
    reasonable suspicion that a crime “has been committed, is being committed, or is
    about to be committed,” and thus had proper grounds for the seizure. See Young,
    
    294 Wis. 2d 1
    , ¶20. Therefore, the trial court did not err in denying Griffin’s motion
    to suppress. Accordingly, we affirm his judgment of conviction.
    By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
    This    opinion    will   not       be   published.   See     WIS. STAT.
    RULE 809.23(1)(b)5. (2019-20).
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2020AP001043-CR

Filed Date: 6/29/2021

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/9/2024