State v. Travonta Emanuel Richmond ( 2024 )


Menu:
  •      COURT OF APPEALS
    DECISION                                                  NOTICE
    DATED AND FILED                              This opinion is subject to further editing. If
    published, the official version will appear in
    the bound volume of the Official Reports.
    July 2, 2024
    A party may file with the Supreme Court a
    Samuel A. Christensen                  petition to review an adverse decision by the
    Clerk of Court of Appeals               Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
    and RULE 809.62.
    Appeal No.        2023AP1129-CR                                                Cir. Ct. No. 2020CF3049
    STATE OF WISCONSIN                                             IN COURT OF APPEALS
    DISTRICT I
    STATE OF WISCONSIN,
    PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,
    V.
    TRAVONTA EMANUEL RICHMOND,
    DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
    APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
    County: STEPHANIE ROTHSTEIN, Judge. Affirmed.
    Before White, C.J., Geenen and Colón, JJ.
    Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent
    or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
    No. 2023AP1129-CR
    ¶1      PER CURIAM. Travonta Emanuel Richmond appeals from a
    judgment of conviction entered following a jury trial for repeated sexual assault of
    a child. On appeal, Richmond argues that the State failed to corroborate his
    confession. For the reasons set forth below, we reject his argument and affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    ¶2      On September 1, 2020, the State charged Richmond with one count
    each of repeated sexual assault of a child, strangulation and suffocation, physical
    abuse of a child, and two counts of bail jumping. The State moved to dismiss
    several of the counts, and Richmond proceeded to a jury trial on one count of
    repeated sexual assault of a child.           The jury found Richmond guilty, and
    Richmond was subsequently sentenced to four years of initial confinement and six
    years of extended supervision.
    ¶3      At the trial, the jury heard Richmond’s confession to having a sexual
    relationship with Amber, who Richmond knew was thirteen years old.1 In his
    confession, Richmond stated that Amber originally presented herself as sixteen
    years old, but even though Richmond eventually learned that Amber was only
    thirteen years old, he continued his relationship with Amber. Richmond indicated
    that he was in love with Amber, and he estimated that he had sexual intercourse
    with Amber at least forty times over the course of the previous year.2
    1
    We use a pseudonym to refer to the child victim in this case. See WIS. STAT.
    RULE 809.86 (2021-22). All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version
    unless otherwise noted.
    2
    As alleged in the criminal complaint, Amber estimated that she had sexual intercourse
    with Richmond over 100 times.
    2
    No. 2023AP1129-CR
    ¶4     Amber did not testify at trial. Instead, the State presented Amber’s
    birth certificate to prove her age.     The State also presented evidence from
    investigating and arresting officers who spoke with Amber and Richmond around
    the time of Richmond’s arrest, and the State presented two photographs taken
    from surveillance video of a gas station near the scene of Richmond’s arrest. The
    first photo was a picture of Amber, and the second photo depicted Richmond
    standing next to Amber and holding Amber’s arm in a manner that the trial court
    later described made it clear that the two were familiar with one another.
    ¶5     Following the State’s presentation of the evidence, trial counsel
    moved to dismiss for lack of corroboration of Richmond’s confession. The trial
    court denied the motion. After receipt of the jury’s verdict, the trial court also
    denied another motion by trial counsel for judgment notwithstanding the verdict
    on the same grounds that the State failed to corroborate Richmond’s confession.
    Richmond now appeals.
    DISCUSSION
    ¶6     On appeal, Richmond argues that the State failed to produce
    evidence to corroborate his confession. In particular, he argues that the State
    needed to introduce independent evidence of a crime in order to corroborate his
    confession. In this case, with the crime being repeated sexual assault of a child,
    Richmond contends that the State was required to present independent evidence
    that Richmond and Amber had a sexual relationship by, for example, providing
    DNA evidence or testimony from friends or family members establishing the
    nature of the relationship between Richmond and Amber. We disagree.
    ¶7     “A conviction will not stand on the basis of a defendant’s confession
    alone.” State v. Bannister, 
    2007 WI 86
    , ¶23, 
    302 Wis. 2d 158
    , 
    734 N.W.2d 892
    .
    3
    No. 2023AP1129-CR
    Rather, the State must “present some evidence that the crime charged actually
    occurred, independent of the defendant’s confession” and the State must
    corroborate “any significant fact.” Id., ¶¶25-26 (citation omitted).
    ¶8     A significant fact “is one that gives confidence that the crime the
    defendant confessed to actually occur[red],” and it “need not either independently
    establish the specific elements of the crime or independently link the defendant to
    the crime.” Id., ¶31.
    ¶9     “When a court addresses a defendant’s claim that his or her
    confession was insufficiently corroborated, it examines the sufficiency of evidence
    presented at trial.” Id., ¶32. Whether the State produced sufficient evidence to
    corroborate a confession is a question of law that we review independently. Id.,
    ¶22. However, we review “the facts in evidence in a light most favorable to the
    jury’s verdict.” Id.
    ¶10    We conclude that the State sufficiently corroborated Richmond’s
    confession.   In addition to Richmond’s confession, the State introduced the
    testimony of officers, two photographs of Amber, and Amber’s birth certificate.
    As the trial court recognized when it denied trial counsel’s motion at trial, the
    officer testimony, the photographs of Amber, and Amber’s birth certificate
    establish both Amber’s identity and age, which are two significant facts in and of
    themselves to corroborate Richmond’s confession.
    ¶11    Moreover, the State also introduced a photograph of Richmond and
    Amber together at the gas station just prior to Richmond’s arrest. Significantly,
    the moment captured in the photo indicates that Richmond and Amber have a
    certain familiarity with one another given how Richmond is positioned next to
    Amber and holding her arm. While the photograph does not itself depict a sexual
    4
    No. 2023AP1129-CR
    act, a depiction of a sexual act between Richmond and Amber is not required. The
    simple fact that Richmond and Amber have a certain familiarity with one another
    as shown in the photo where Richmond is positioned next to Amber and holding
    Amber’s arm is sufficient because that photo establishes a connection between
    them, where one reasonable interpretation is that the two were also romantically
    involved.   Thus, the photograph of Richmond and Amber at the gas station
    established another significant fact to corroborate Richmond’s confession.
    ¶12    Contrary to Richmond’s contention, the evidence used to corroborate
    his confession need not independently establish an element of the crime, and it is
    sufficient corroboration of his confession to establish Amber’s identity and age
    and a certain familiarity between Richmond and Amber. “All the elements of the
    crime do not have to be proved independent of an accused’s confession,” and
    corroboration “can be far less than is necessary to establish the crime independent
    of the confession.” Holt v. State, 
    17 Wis. 2d 468
    , 480, 
    117 N.W.2d 626
     (1962).
    ¶13    Indeed, in State v. Thomas, 
    2021 WI App 55
    , ¶¶4, 13-14, 
    399 Wis. 2d 277
    , 
    963 N.W.2d 887
    , we rejected a similar argument that corroboration
    of a defendant’s confession to first-degree sexual assault required “some
    corroboration that sexual contact occurred.” In rejecting the argument, we stated,
    “The corroboration rule is not so narrowly drawn,” and we accepted corroboration
    in the form of recovery of a pornographic video referenced in the defendant’s
    confession and an account from a neighbor in which the neighbor described noises
    consistent with those the defendant described in his confession. Id., ¶¶12-14.
    ¶14    Returning to Richmond’s case, the State produced evidence
    establishing Amber’s identity and age, as well as some sort of connection between
    Amber and Richmond. While this evidence produced by the State to corroborate
    5
    No. 2023AP1129-CR
    Richmond’s confession would not independently establish each element of the
    crime of repeated sexual assault of a child, we conclude that the evidence
    nonetheless gives us confidence that the crime to which Richmond confessed and
    was convicted—repeated sexual assault of Amber—actually did occur, and that is
    all that is required to corroborate Richmond’s confession. See Bannister, 
    302 Wis. 2d 158
    , ¶26.
    ¶15    Consequently, we reject Richmond’s argument and affirm.3
    By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.
    This    opinion   will   not       be   published.   See     WIS. STAT.
    RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.
    3
    We do not address the State’s argument that we should modify or abrogate the
    corroboration rule. See Cook v. Cook, 
    208 Wis. 2d 166
    , 189-90, 
    560 N.W.2d 246
     (1997)
    (explaining that the court of appeals may not “overrule, modify, or withdraw” a previous
    decision).
    6
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2023AP001129-CR

Filed Date: 7/2/2024

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 9/9/2024