State of West Virginia ex rel. James Harris v. Scott Smith, Ohio County Prosecuting Attorney and James Harris v. Scott Smith, Ohio County Prosecuting Attorney ( 2022 )


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  •                                                                                         FILED
    February 25, 2022
    STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS                                     OF WEST VIRGINIA
    State of West Virginia ex rel. James Harris,
    Petitioner
    vs.) No. 21-0213 (Ohio County 21-P-16)
    Scott Smith, Ohio County Prosecuting
    Attorney,
    Respondent
    and
    James Harris,
    Petitioner Below, Petitioner
    vs.) No. 21-0295 (Ohio County 21-P-16)
    Scott Smith, Ohio County Prosecuting Attorney,
    Respondent Below, Respondent
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner James Harris, a self-represented litigant, appeals the Circuit Court of Ohio
    County’s March 30, 2021, order denying his renewed motion to disqualify the Ohio County
    Prosecuting Attorney’s Office from acting on his application to present complaints to the grand
    jury. In addition, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of prohibition seeking a rule to show cause
    against respondent “prohibiting him and his staff from participating in [petitioner’s] application to
    present complaints to the grand jury . . . so as to remove all potential appearances of impropriety
    in the proceedings . . . .” Respondent Scott Smith, Ohio County Prosecuting Attorney, by counsel
    Shawn R. Turak, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order in both Nos. 21-0213 and
    21-0295. Petitioner submitted a reply in No. 21-0295. 1
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    1
    Upon consideration, the Court is of the opinion that a rule should not be issued, and the
    writ prayed for by petitioner in Case No. 21-0213 is hereby refused.
    1
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these reasons,
    a memorandum decision is appropriate under Rule 21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    In 2008, petitioner was convicted of one count of the felony offense of conspiracy; one
    count of the felony offense of abduction with the intent to defile; two counts of the felony offense
    of aiding/abetting sexual assault, second degree; and one count of the felony offense of sexual
    assault, second degree. Petitioner appealed those convictions to this Court, and this Court affirmed
    in State v. Harris, 
    226 W. Va. 471
    , 
    702 S.E.2d 603
     (2010). 2 In 2021, petitioner asked the circuit
    court to present an indictment to the Ohio County Grand Jury seeking to indict former State
    Trooper Matthew Adams, who handled the investigation that led to petitioner’s convictions, for
    perjury and to indict former Ohio County Assistant Prosecuting Attorney Joseph Barki, the lead
    prosecuting attorney on petitioner’s underlying case, for subornation of perjury. In addition,
    petitioner sought to disqualify the Ohio County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office from acting upon
    his “application.” The circuit court denied petitioner’s motion to disqualify respondent by order
    entered on March 1, 2021. It also denied petitioner’s renewed motion for disqualification by order
    entered on March 30, 2021.
    Petitioner originally filed his petition for a writ of prohibition with this Court on March 15,
    2021, apparently addressing the original order denying the motion for disqualification. During the
    pendency of the petition for a writ of prohibition, petitioner also filed his direct appeal, appealing
    the March 30 order denying his renewed motion for disqualification. Neither of these orders deny
    petitioner’s application to present charges to the grand jury.
    “The Court has . . . indicated that whether a trial court should disqualify a prosecutor, or
    his office, from prosecuting a criminal defendant is reviewed under an abuse of discretion
    standard. See, e.g., State v. Britton, 
    157 W.Va. 711
    , 
    203 S.E.2d 462
     (1974).” State v. Keenan, 
    213 W. Va. 557
    , 561, 
    584 S.E.2d 191
    , 195 (2003). While petitioner sets forth nine assignments of error,
    without addressing the vast majority of them in his brief, his arguments essentially fit into two
    categories: (1) the circuit court erred in denying his initial and renewed motion to disqualify
    respondent and (2) the circuit court erred by failing to conduct a hearing pursuant to this Court’s
    findings in Dreyfuse, In re Application to Present Complaint to the Grand Jury, 
    243 W. Va. 190
    ,
    
    842 S.E.2d 743
     (2020).
    With regard to his contention that the circuit court erred in refusing to disqualify
    respondent, petitioner argues that if a prosecutor has a conflict or a personal interest in a criminal
    case he/she is handling, this can erode the public confidence as to the impartiality of the system.
    2
    According to that opinion, while petitioner was under investigation for rape, he and his
    codefendants raped another individual. Petitioner was tried for charges stemming from the rapes
    of both women. This Court noted therein that
    because Mr. Harris was found to have committed two prior felonies, the abduction
    with intent to defile conviction was used to enhance the sentence for that crime to
    that of life imprisonment under the recidivist statutes. The trial court also ruled that
    Mr. Harris had to serve the life sentence before serving the other sentences.
    2
    See Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Knight, 
    168 W. Va. 615
    , 
    285 S.E.2d 401
     (1981). He also asserts that circuit
    courts unquestionably have the authority to disqualify a prosecuting attorney from a criminal case,
    pursuant to West Virginia Code § 7-7-8, and appoint a competent practicing attorney to act as a
    special prosecutor. State ex rel. Matko v. Ziegler, 
    154 W. Va. 872
    , 
    179 S.E.2d 735
     (1971).
    Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify the Ohio County Prosecuting Attorney from considering the
    application to present complaints to the grand jury “[e]mphatically[] detailing that the Ohio County
    [P]rosecutor Scott Smith was present and a participant during the grand jury proceedings where
    Matthew Adams and Joseph E. Barki are detailed within the Application to present Complaints to
    a Grand Jury as violators of West Virginia Penal laws . . . .” He contends that Mr. Smith’s
    “impartiality and objectivity as well as prosecutor Scott Smith’s usurping the authority of the
    Grand Jury by refusing to present petitioner[]’s Complaints to the Grand Jury for probable cause
    determination.”
    Petitioner asserts that the circuit court improperly rejected his argument that Mr. Smith had
    abdicated his duty by refusing to disqualify himself from the application to present complaints to
    the grand jury. According to petitioner, the circuit court failed to provide findings of fact to justify
    its conclusion that good cause exists to deny petitioner’s motion for disqualification. Petitioner
    also claims that it failed to set forth legal analysis as to why its denial of the motion was proper so
    it is necessary to reverse the circuit court’s order and remand for the entry of a new order that is
    sufficient for appellate review.
    In Nicholas v. Sammons, 
    178 W.Va. 631
    , 
    363 S.E.2d 516
     (1987), at syllabus
    point 1, we recognized two major categories of prosecutorial disqualification:
    The first is where the prosecutor has had some attorney-client
    relationship with the parties involved whereby he obtained
    privileged information that may be adverse to the defendant’s
    interest in regard to the pending criminal charges. A second category
    is where the prosecutor has some direct personal interest arising
    from animosity, a financial interest, kinship, or close friendship such
    that his objectivity and impartiality are called into question.
    State v. James R., II, 
    188 W. Va. 44
    , 46, 
    422 S.E.2d 521
    , 523 (1994). As the circuit court found in
    the instant case, in its order denying petitioner’s motion to disqualify respondent,
    Petitioner claims that the perpetrator who suborned the perjured testimony that is
    the subject of his Application is Joseph Barki, III, who was an [a]ssistant
    [p]rosecuting [a]ttorney at the Ohio County Prosecutor’s Office at the time of the
    allegedly suborned testimony. However, Mr. Barki was not employed by the Ohio
    County Prosecutor when [p]etitioner initiated this action. Furthermore,
    [p]etitioner’s claim that the Ohio County Prosecutor, Scott Smith and/or any other
    [a]ssistant Ohio County [p]rosecutors, aided Mr. Barki in the allegedly suborned
    testimony at [p]etitioner’s original trial is unsubstantiated. Moreover, [p]etitioner
    asserted no independent grounds as to a conflict with Matthew Adams. Thus, there
    is no conflict of interest requiring that the Ohio County Prosecutor be disqualified
    from the litigation . . . .
    3
    In its order denying petitioner’s renewed motion, the circuit court set forth the following:
    [A]s established in the last [o]rder entered by [that court], Mr. Barki is no longer
    employed by the [Ohio County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office]. Moreover, outside
    of bald assertions, [p]etitioner has presented no independent evidence
    substantiating the claim that a conflict with [that office] exists. Finally, as
    established in the first [o]rder, independent grounds as to a conflict with Matthew
    Adams has not been established. Thus, there is no conflict of interest requiring that
    [respondent] be disqualified from this litigation . . . .
    Based on petitioner’s skeletal arguments 3 and the circuit court’s findings, this Court cannot find
    that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying petitioner’s original or renewed motion to
    disqualify respondent. Further, we disagree with petitioner’s assertion that the circuit court’s
    orders are insufficient to allow this Court to properly consider this matter.
    To the extent petitioner claims error in the circuit court’s failure to conduct a Dreyfuse
    hearing, we find no merit to that assertion. As the circuit court set forth in its March 1, 2021, order,
    at this stage of the litigation, it cannot be conclusively determined that [p]etitioner
    is “engaging in conduct which demonstrates a clear intention to obstruct the
    administration of justice.” Consequently, in accordance with the opinion in
    Dreyfuse, the [c]ourt will provide a copy of the Application to the Ohio County
    Prosecutor’s Office to begin the process detailed within the Supreme Court opinion
    in Dreyfuse.
    Thus, it is clear that the circuit court has not denied petitioner a Dreyfuse hearing. As set forth in
    Dreyfuse,
    [w]hen a private citizen seeks to present a complaint to the grand jury, he
    must first apply to the circuit court. The circuit court shall then provide a copy of
    the application to the prosecuting attorney. Upon receipt of the private citizen's
    application, the prosecuting attorney may then initiate grand jury proceedings based
    on the allegations in the private citizen's application or he may decline to do so. If
    a prosecuting attorney declines to initiate grand jury proceedings, or does not act
    upon the application within a reasonable period of time, the private citizen may
    seek review of their application in the circuit court. In reviewing the private citizen's
    application after a prosecuting attorney declines to initiate grand jury proceedings
    or does not act upon the application within a reasonable period of time, the circuit
    court shall conduct an in camera hearing to provide the private citizen and the
    3
    As we previously have stated “[a] skeletal ‘argument,’ really nothing more than an
    assertion, does not preserve a claim. . . . Judges are not like pigs, hunting for truffles buried in
    briefs.” State, Dep’t of Health and Human Res., Child Advocate Office on Behalf of Robert
    Michael B. v. Robert Morris N., 
    195 W. Va. 759
    , 765, 
    466 S.E.2d 827
    , 833 (1995) (quoting United
    States v. Dunkel, 
    927 F.2d 955
    , 956 (7th Cir. 1991)).
    4
    prosecuting attorney an opportunity to address the court regarding the private
    citizen's application.
    243 W. Va. at 192, 842 S.E.2d at 745, Syl. Pt. 11. Therefore, it appears that the circuit court
    properly provided a copy of petitioner’s application to respondent in accordance with Dreyfuse.
    We hereby direct the circuit court to continue its compliance with the procedure this Court set
    forth in Dreyfuse going forward in the underlying matter.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: February 25, 2022
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice John A. Hutchison
    Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
    Justice Tim Armstead
    Justice William R. Wooton
    Justice Alan D. Moats sitting by temporary assignment
    5