Judith Collett, Assessor v. Eastern Royalty, LLC , 232 W. Va. 126 ( 2013 )


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  •       IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
    September 2013 Term                      FILED
    _______________                     October 21, 2013
    released at 3:00 p.m.
    RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    No. 12-0764                  SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    _______________
    JUDITH COLLETT, ASSESSOR OF TAYLOR COUNTY, AND THE COUNTY
    COMMISSION OF TAYLOR COUNTY,
    Respondents Below, Petitioners
    v.
    EASTERN ROYALTY, LLC, AS SUCCESSOR PETITIONER TO WEST VIRGINIA
    COAL MINE, LLC,
    Petitioner Below, Respondent
    ____________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Taylor County
    The Honorable Alan D. Moats, Judge
    Civil Action No. 10-P-11
    AFFIRMED
    ____________________________________________________________
    AND
    _______________
    No. 12-0765
    _______________
    JUDITH COLLETT, ASSESSOR OF TAYLOR COUNTY, AND THE COUNTY
    COMMISSION OF TAYLOR COUNTY,
    Respondents Below, Petitioners
    v.
    COALQUEST DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
    Petitioner Below, Respondent
    ____________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Taylor County
    The Honorable Alan D. Moats, Judge
    Civil Action No. 10-P-12
    AFFIRMED
    ____________________________________________________________
    AND
    _______________
    No. 12-0766
    _______________
    JUDITH COLLETT, ASSESSOR OF TAYLOR COUNTY, AND THE COUNTY
    COMMISSION OF TAYLOR COUNTY,
    Respondents Below, Petitioners
    v.
    PATRIOT MINING COMPANY, INC.,
    Petitioner Below, Respondent
    ____________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Taylor County
    The Honorable Alan D. Moats, Judge
    Civil Action No. 10-P-13
    AFFIRMED
    ____________________________________________________________
    AND
    _______________
    No. 12-0767
    _______________
    JUDITH COLLETT, ASSESSOR OF TAYLOR COUNTY, AND THE COUNTY
    COMMISSION OF TAYLOR COUNTY,
    Respondents Below, Petitioners
    v.
    TRIO PETROLEUM CORPORATION, WACO OIL & GAS, INC., MIKE ROSS, AND
    I.L. MORRIS & MIKE ROSS, INC.,
    Petitioners Below, Respondents
    ____________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Taylor County
    The Honorable Alan D. Moats, Judge
    Civil Action No. 10-P-14
    AFFIRMED
    ____________________________________________________________
    AND
    _______________
    No. 12-0768
    _______________
    JUDITH COLLETT, ASSESSOR OF TAYLOR COUNTY, AND THE COUNTY
    COMMISSION OF TAYLOR COUNTY,
    Respondents Below, Petitioners
    v.
    COALQUEST DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
    Petitioner Below, Respondent
    ____________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Taylor County
    The Honorable Alan D. Moats, Judge
    Civil Action No. 11-P-17
    AFFIRMED
    ____________________________________________________________
    Submitted: September 25, 2013
    Filed: October 21, 2013
    G. Nicholas Casey, Jr., Esq.              Herschel H. Rose III, Esq.
    Webster J. Arceneaux, III, Esq.           Steven R. Broadwater, Esq.
    Sang Ah Koh, Esq.                         Rose Law Office
    Lewis, Glasser, Casey & Rollins, PLLC     Charleston, West Virginia
    Charleston, West Virginia                 Counsel for Respondent Eastern
    Counsel for the Petitioners               Royalty LLC
    Floyd M. Sayre, III, Esq.                 David E. Goddard, Esq.
    Bowles Rice LLP                           Goddard & Wagoner
    Martinsburg, West Virginia                Clarksburg, West Virginia
    Counsel for Respondents Trio Petroleum    Counsel for Respondents Coalquest
    Corporation, Waco Oil & Gas, Inc., Mike   Development, LLC and Patriot Mining
    Ross, and I.L. Morris & Mike Ross, Inc.   Company, Inc.
    CHIEF JUSTICE BENJAMIN delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
    1.     “This Court reviews the circuit court’s final order and ultimate
    disposition under an abuse of discretion standard. We review challenges to findings of
    fact under a clearly erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de novo.”
    Syllabus point 4, Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W.Va. 178, 
    469 S.E.2d 114
    (1996).” Syl. pt.
    1, In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 
    223 W. Va. 14
    , 
    672 S.E.2d 150
    (2008).
    2.     “‘“A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly
    expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full
    force and effect.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 
    65 S.E.2d 488
    (1951).’ Syl.
    Pt. 1, State v. Jarvis, 199 W.Va. 635, 
    487 S.E.2d 293
    (1997).” Syl. pt. 2, Mace v. Mylan
    Pharm., Inc., 
    227 W. Va. 666
    , 
    714 S.E.2d 223
    (2011).
    3.     “‘“The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give
    effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syllabus point 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s
    Compensation Commissioner, 159 W.Va. 108, 
    219 S.E.2d 361
    (1975).’ Syl Pt. 3, Davis
    Mem’l Hosp. v. W. Va. State Tax Comm’r, 222 W.Va. 677, 
    671 S.E.2d 682
    (2008).” Syl.
    pt. 4, Mace v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 
    227 W. Va. 666
    , 
    714 S.E.2d 223
    (2011).
    i
    4.     “‘“In ascertaining legislative intent, effect must be given to each part
    of the statute and to the statute as a whole so as to accomplish the general purpose of the
    legislation.” Syl. Pt. 2, Smith v. State Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, 159
    W.Va. 108, 
    219 S.E.2d 361
    (1975).’ Syl. Pt. 2, White v. Wyeth, 227 W.Va. 131, 
    705 S.E.2d 828
    (2010).” Syl. pt. 5, Mace v. Mylan Pharm., Inc., 
    227 W. Va. 666
    , 
    714 S.E.2d 223
    (2011).
    5.     “In all cases, it is incumbent upon the circuit court, as it is upon the
    county commission and the assessor, to set the assessed value of all parcels of land at the
    amount established by the State Tax Commissioner[.] W. Va. Code § 18-9A-11.” Syl. pt.
    5, Tug Valley Recovery Ctr., Inc. v. Mingo Cnty. Comm’n, 
    164 W. Va. 94
    , 
    261 S.E.2d 165
    (1979).
    6.     “An appellate court should not overrule a previous decision recently
    rendered without evidence of changing conditions or serious judicial error in
    interpretation sufficient to compel deviation from the basic policy of the doctrine of stare
    decisis, which is to promote certainty, stability, and uniformity in the law.” Syl. pt. 2,
    Dailey v. Bechtel Corp., 
    157 W. Va. 1023
    , 
    207 S.E.2d 169
    (1974).
    7.     Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g) (2010), upon receiving the
    appraisal of natural resources property from the State Tax Commissioner, a county
    assessor may either accept or reject that appraisal. If the assessor rejects the appraisal, the
    ii
    assessor must show just cause for doing so to the Property Valuation Training and
    Procedures Commission, including a plan by which a different appraisal should be
    conducted. If the assessor accepts the appraisal, the assessor is then foreclosed from later
    challenging the appraisal before either the Property Valuation Training and Procedures
    Commission under W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g) or the Board of Equalization and Review
    under W. Va. Code § 11-3-24 (2010). To the extent that In re 1994 Assessments of
    Property of Righini, 
    197 W. Va. 166
    , 
    475 S.E.2d 166
    (1999), holds otherwise, it is
    expressly overruled.
    iii
    Benjamin, Chief Justice:
    The petitioners, Judith Collet, Assessor of Taylor County (“Assessor”), and
    the Taylor County Commission (“County Commission”), appeal the May 10, 2012, Final
    Order of the Circuit Court of Taylor County as to each of the respondents herein: Eastern
    Royalty, LLC, as successor petitioner to West Virginia Coal Mine, LLC (“Eastern”)
    (Case Number 12-0764); Coalquest Development, LLC (“Coalquest”) (Case Numbers
    12-0765 and 12-0768); Patriot Mining Company, Inc. (“Patriot”) (Case Number 12-
    0766); and Trio Petroleum Corporation, Waco Oil & Gas, Inc., Mike Ross, and I.L.
    Morris & Mike Ross, Inc. (“Trio”) (Case Number 12-0767). In the circuit court’s May
    10, 2012 order, the court reversed the Board of Equalization and Review (“Board”). The
    court found that the Assessor had violated W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g) (2010) by
    challenging the Commissioner’s appraisals of the respondents’ property in hearings
    before the Board after she had previously accepted those appraisals. Accordingly, the
    court found the Board’s decision to increase the natural resources property tax owed by
    the respondents following the hearings was in error. On appeal, the petitioners argue that
    the proceedings before the Board were conducted in accordance with the applicable
    statutory provisions and that the Board-ordered increase in taxes was legitimate and
    warranted.
    Because the factual background and procedural history giving rise to the
    cases at bar are largely the same, the cases have been consolidated for this Court’s
    1
    consideration and resolution. After thoroughly reviewing the record presented, the briefs,
    the relevant legal authorities, and the arguments of the petitioners and the respondents,
    we find that the circuit court did not commit error below with regard to its May 10, 2012,
    order. We therefore affirm the order.
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    Respondents Eastern, Coalquest, Patriot, and Trio own coal-bearing
    properties in Taylor County, West Virginia. The dispute giving rise to this case involves
    tax assessments made on properties owned by each respondent during the 2010 tax year.
    Tax assessments made on Coalquest’s properties during the 2011 tax year are also at
    issue.
    Sometime prior to February 1, 2010, the State Tax Commissioner
    (“Commissioner”) appraised the respondents’ properties.         The Commissioner then
    provided those values to the Assessor. The Assessor accepted those values and placed
    them in the Taylor County land books. Thereafter, the Assessor hired Jerry Knight of
    Knight Consulting to review the values for accuracy. Mr. Knight consulted with Scott
    Burgess, then Assistant Director of the State’s Property Tax Division. The two men
    found what they believed to be errors in the appraisals provided by the Commissioner.
    Specifically, they believed the Commissioner had under-appraised the property.
    2
    The Assessor presented the new values calculated by Mr. Knight and Mr.
    Burgess to the Board, requesting that the Board approve changing the values she had
    already entered in the land books. The Board held a number of hearings to address the
    issue. During a hearing on February 12, 2010, the Assessor challenged the original
    values assigned to property owned by Coalquest and Patriot. The Assessor and the
    property owners disagreed over whether the Assessor was using the correct procedure to
    change the value assigned to properties. At the hearing, Mr. Knight testified:
    What Ms. Collett did was, she received the values. She
    placed them on the property books. One of the reasons she
    did so was because she received them in January; 10%
    notices had to go out in the beginning of January. She had
    little, if any, time to even review these values to present the
    issue to the Property Valuation Training and Procedures
    Commission. I’ll call it the PVC for short; because that’s
    what everybody does. To present it to the PVC about mid-
    January. So Ms. Collett put the value on the books. She
    accepted the appraised value and put them on the books.
    Now the issue here is the appeal of those values under
    a different statute, totally different statute. The statute is 11-3-
    24,[1] the Board of Equalization and Review statute. This
    particular statute, bear with me a moment till I get there,
    indicates that generally that any person can apply to the board
    of review and equalization for the correction of the
    assessment. There’s supreme court case law on that that
    suggests that any individual can appeal any entry on those
    books. It’s the Tug Valley Recovery case.[2] And the assessor,
    in exercising her right just like any other person in the state of
    West Virginia who has the right, is presenting these issues
    before this board so that the board can carry out it’s [sic] duty
    1
    W. Va. Code § 11-3-24 (2010) is quoted infra Part III.
    2
    Tug Valley Recovery Ctr., Inc. v. Mingo Cnty. Comm’n, 
    164 W. Va. 94
    , 
    261 S.E.2d 165
    (1979).
    3
    of examining the information and correcting any and all
    errors that are found in the property books.
    (Footnotes added).
    The Board held a second hearing on February 22, 2010, addressing the
    property owned by Coalquest, Patriot, Eastern, and Trio. Mr. Knight attempted to clarify
    the position he took in the first hearing:
    [I]n this instance the assessor accepted the tax
    department’s appraisals and placed them on the books at 60%
    of market value. The assessor isn’t---isn’t rejecting the
    appraisals. The assessor is suggesting that---that one factor, at
    the recommendation of the state tax department, should be
    changed.
    ....
    [T]he assessor has a statutory duty under West
    Virginia Code 11-3-24 to assist this body in their
    deliberations concerning the compliance with state statutes---
    state regulations concerning the valuation of the property
    that’s on the property books that were presented to this
    commission for its---it’s [sic] review and consideration.
    I did indicate that the Tug Valley Recovery case that’s
    annotated in 11-3-24 does indicate that any person or any
    taxpayer has the---has the right to appear here. I certainly
    didn’t intend to indicate, and I don’t believe I did indicate,
    that the assessor was appearing here as a person. The assessor
    certainly is appearing here in her capacity as an assessor to
    assist the board under the provisions of 11-3-24, as that
    statute requires in its deliberation concerning these issues.
    Mr. Knight and Mr. Burgess again testified to what they believed were mistakes in the
    initial values provided by the Commissioner.
    4
    Through letters dated March 2, 2010, the Board notified the respondents
    that it had accepted the Assessor’s proposed changes to the valuation of the property.
    These changes radically increased the value assigned to each owner: The Commissioner
    appraised Eastern’s property at $119,634, and the Board changed the valuation to
    $1,449,447, increasing the original valuation by $1,329,813 (1112%); the Commissioner
    appraised Coalquest’s property at $3,219,616, and the Board changed the valuation to
    $7,147,056, increasing the original valuation by $3,927,440 (122%); the Commissioner
    appraised Patriot’s property at $13,791, and the Board changed the valuation to $153,586,
    increasing the original valuation by $139,795 (1014%); and the Commissioner appraised
    Trio’s property at $278,958, and the Board changed the valuation to $3,404,849,
    increasing the valuation by $3,125,891 (1121%).
    All of the owners appealed the Board’s decision to the circuit court. By
    order dated September 21, 2010, the circuit court ordered that the parties mediate the
    dispute. Following mediation on December 14, 2010, the mediator submitted a report to
    the court on December 16, 2010, stating that mediation had failed.
    A few months thereafter, on February 18, 2011, Coalquest received notice
    of the Assessor’s intent to ask the Board to increase the 2011 assessment of its property.
    Following a hearing on February 28, 2011, the Board notified Coalquest via letter dated
    March 1, 2011, that it had accepted the Assessor’s proposed changes to the valuation of
    its property. The Commissioner appraised Coalquest’s property at $1,648,997, and the
    5
    Board changed the valuation to $18,730,989, increasing the valuation by $17,081,992
    (1036%). Coalquest appealed the Board’s decision to the circuit court.
    On January 12, 2012, the circuit court heard argument on the respondent
    owners’ petitions for appeal. The circuit court granted the respondents’ requests for
    appeal on January 23, 2012. By order dated May 10, 2012, the circuit court reversed the
    Board’s valuation changes, finding that the proceedings before the Board were unlawful
    because the Assessor did not comply with procedure set by statute. The court further
    found that the procedures were also in violation of constitutional provisions resulting in
    “unequal taxation that is not uniform across the State.” The court ordered that the values
    all be returned to the initial values set by the Commissioner and that all of the
    respondents be exonerated from the payment of the difference. The petitioners now
    appeal the May 10, 2012, order to this Court.
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    When evaluating a circuit court’s order reviewing a decision of a Board of
    Equalization and Review, this Court applies a multifaceted standard of review:
    This Court reviews the circuit court’s final order and
    ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion standard.
    We review challenges to findings of fact under a clearly
    erroneous standard; conclusions of law are reviewed de
    novo.” Syllabus point 4, Burgess v. Porterfield, 196 W.Va.
    178, 
    469 S.E.2d 114
    (1996).
    6
    Syl. pt. 1, In re Tax Assessment of Foster Found. Woodlands Ret. Cmty., 
    223 W. Va. 14
    ,
    
    672 S.E.2d 150
    (2008).
    III.
    ANALYSIS
    On appeal, the petitioners submit five assignments of error to the Court.3
    We note, however, that the petitioners did not organize the argument in their brief under
    3
    The petitioners’ five separate assignments of error are as follows:
    1.     The Circuit Court erred in its Final Order
    entered on May 10, 2012, (hereinafter ‘Final Order’),
    reversing the five decisions of the County Commission of
    Taylor County sitting as the Board of Equalization and
    Review (hereinafter ‘Board’) and ordering that the
    assessments of [Respondents’] properties be returned to the
    initial values provided by the State Tax Commissioner and
    recorded upon the land books in Taylor County, West
    Virginia.
    2.      The Circuit Court erred in its Final Order in
    ruling that, as a matter of law, under W. Va. Code §11-1C-7a,
    the State Tax Commissioner has the exclusive jurisdiction to
    assess natural resources property and that the Assessor had no
    legal authority to hire a separate consultant to review
    appraisals conducted by the State Tax Commissioner and to
    question the methods of the State Tax Commissioner.
    3.      The Circuit Court erred in its Final Order in
    ruling that, as a matter of law, under W. Va. Code §11-1C-
    10(g), the only way for the Assessor to change the assessed
    value of [Respondents’] property was for the Assessor to
    apply to the West Virginia Property Valuation Training and
    Procedures Commission.
    (continued . . .)
    7
    each of these assignments of error as is required by Rule 10(c)(7) of the Revised Rules of
    Appellate Procedure.4     Instead, the petitioners’ argument is organized under two
    headings, the first of which describes what the petitioners see to be the duties of the
    Assessor and the County Commission, and the second of which pronounces the
    petitioners’ actual argument: “The circuit court erred in ruling as a matter of law, under
    W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g), that the only way for the assessor to change the assessed
    value of [respondents’] natural resource properties was for the assessor to apply to the
    West Virginia Property Valuation Training and Procedures Commission.” Upon our
    review of the petitioners’ brief, we find that the five assignments of error, which are
    largely repetitive, are thoroughly encapsulated by the second heading in the brief.
    Therefore, we will continue by addressing all five assignments of error as one. See W. Va.
    Dep’t of Health & Human Res. v. Payne, ___ W. Va. ___, 
    746 S.E.2d 554
    , 560 n.11
    (2013).
    4.    The Circuit Court erred in its Final Order in
    ruling that applicable Legislative Rules and methodologies
    were disregarded at the Board hearings.
    5.     The Circuit Court erred in its Final Order in
    reversing the five decisions by the Board because the Board
    hearings were not in violation of statutory provisions or
    founded upon unlawful procedures.
    4
    Rule 10(c)(7) of the Revised Rules of Appellate Procedure requires that a
    petitioner’s brief “must contain an argument exhibiting clearly the points of fact and law
    presented, the standard of review applicable, and citing the authorities relied on, under
    headings that correspond with the assignments of error.”
    8
    At the outset, we recognize that although the parties dispute a number of
    the facts involved in this case, particularly those used in valuing the respondents’
    property, the issue before the Court is purely legal and involves only the interpretation of
    the applicable statutory sections. More specifically, we are tasked with determining the
    duties and limitations of the Assessor and the Board. Therefore, our review is de novo.
    Because a large number of statutory sections within West Virginia’s Tax Code are
    relevant, we will begin our analysis by examining those statutes and how they interact
    before proceeding to our examination of the issue presented by the petitioners.
    There are three articles in Chapter 11 of the West Virginia Code that are
    applicable to this case: Article 1C, which was enacted in 1990; Article 3, which was
    enacted in 1904; and Article 6K, which was enacted in 2010. The property at issue in
    this case is classified “natural resources property” under W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(a)(2)
    (1994). Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(d), “the state Tax Commissioner shall
    determine the fair market value of all natural resources property in the State.” See also
    W. Va. Code § 11-6K-4(d) (2010) (“[T]he Tax Commissioner shall annually value and
    make tentative appraisals of all . . . natural resources property as provided in section ten
    [§ 11-1C-10], article one-c of this chapter.”).5 The Commissioner performs its appraisals
    using a valuation plan set pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(e).
    5
    W. Va. Code Chapter 11 Article 6K was enacted after the respondents’ property
    was appraised for the 2010 tax year. While Article 6K is not applicable to the 2010 tax
    assessments, it is applicable to the 2011 tax year assessment challenged by Coalquest.
    9
    The Tax Commissioner shall develop a plan for the
    valuation of . . . natural resources property. The plan[] shall
    include expected costs and reimbursements, and shall be
    submitted to the Property Valuation Training and Procedures
    Commission on or before the first day of January, one
    thousand nine hundred ninety-one, for its approval on or
    before the first day of July of such year. Such plan shall be
    revised, resubmitted to the commission and approved every
    three years thereafter.
    W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(e).          The Property Valuation Training and Procedures
    Commission (“PVC” or “Valuation Commission”) is established through W. Va. Code §
    11-1C-3 (1990), which states, in part:
    There is hereby created, under the Department of Tax
    and Revenue, a Property Valuation Training and Procedures
    Commission which consists of the state Tax Commissioner,
    or a designee, who shall serve as chairperson of the
    commission, three county assessors, five citizens of the State,
    one of which shall be a certified appraiser, and two county
    commissioners.
    Upon producing tentative appraisals, the Commissioner forwards the
    appraisals to both the property owner and the applicable county assessor pursuant to W.
    Va. Code § 11-6K-4(e).      At that time, the owner and/or the county assessor may
    challenge the appraisal via petition to the Commissioner pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-
    6K-5 (2010). Final appraisals are also provided to the county assessor. W. Va. Code §
    11-1C-10(d)(2); see also W. Va. Code § 11-6K-6(b) (2010) (“[T]he Tax Commissioner
    shall forward each [final] . . . natural resources property appraisal to the county
    assessor.”). Along with the appraisal itself, the Commissioner must
    10
    supply support data that the assessor might need to explain or
    defend the appraisal. The commissioner shall directly defend
    any challenged appraisal when the assessed value of the
    property in question exceeds two million dollars or an owner
    challenging an appraisal holds or controls property situated in
    the same county with an assessed value exceeding two
    million dollars.
    W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(d)(2).
    Prior to the enactment of Chapter 11, Article 6K, upon receiving the
    appraisals from the Commissioner, county assessors were required to notify property
    owners of any increase in the valuation of the property if that increase was ten percent
    greater or $1,000 more than the previous year’s valuation at least fifteen days before the
    board of equalization and review’s first meeting in February. W. Va. Code § 11-3-2a
    (2008).
    If the assessor determines the assessed valuation of
    any item of real property is more than ten percent greater than
    the valuation assessed for that item in the last tax year, the
    increase is one thousand dollars or more and the increase is
    entered in the property books as provided in section nineteen
    of this article, the assessor shall give notice of the increase to
    the person assessed or the person controlling the property as
    provided in section two of this article. The notice shall be
    given at least fifteen days prior to the first meeting in
    February at which the county commission meets as the board
    of equalization and review for that tax year and advise the
    person assessed or the person controlling the property of his
    or her right to appear and seek an adjustment in the
    assessment.
    
    Id. After Chapter
    11, Article 6K was enacted in 2010, W. Va. Code § 11-3-2a was
    amended to include the following language: “[T]his notification requirement does not
    11
    apply to industrial or natural resources property appraised by the Tax Commissioner
    under article six-k [§§ 11-6K-1 et seq.] of this chapter . . . .” W. Va. Code § 11-3-2a
    (2010).6 Now, under W. Va. Code § 11-6K-4(e), the Commissioner must complete
    tentative appraisals of natural resources property by October 15 of the tax year and
    thereafter provide that tentative appraisal to the property owner and to the assessor. The
    Commissioner must finalize tentative appraisals by December 15 of the tax year and
    provide the final appraisals to the county assessors. W. Va. Code § 11-6K-6.
    W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g) provides two courses of action an assessor may
    take upon receiving the Commissioner’s appraisal:
    The county assessor may accept the appraisal
    provided, pursuant to this section, by the state tax
    commissioner: Provided, That if the county assessor fails to
    accept the appraisal provided by the state Tax Commissioner,
    the county assessor shall show just cause to the valuation
    commission for the failure to accept such appraisal and shall
    further provide to the valuation commission a plan by which a
    different appraisal will be conducted.
    Pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g), an assessor may either (1) accept the appraisal,
    or (2) reject the appraisal. If the assessor accepts the appraisal, the assessor “shall
    multiply each such appraisal by sixty percent and include the resulting assessed value in
    the land book . . . for each tax year.” W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(d)(2). If the assessor
    6
    W. Va. Code § 11-3-2a (2008) was also amended in 2010 to specify that notice
    must be provided to landowners of increased valuations by January 15 of the tax year.
    12
    rejects the Commissioner’s appraisal, the assessor shall cooperate with the PVC as
    required by W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g).7
    The County Commission, meeting as the Board, convenes to review and
    equalize the assessments made by the assessor. W. Va. Code § 11-3-24(a) (2010).
    At the first meeting of the board, the assessor shall
    submit the property books for the current year, which shall be
    complete in every particular, except that the levies shall not
    be extended. The assessor and the assessor’s assistants shall
    attend and render every assistance possible in connection with
    the value of property assessed by them.
    W. Va. Code § 11-3-24(b). The Board is tasked with correcting “all errors in the names
    of persons, in the description and valuation of property, and shall cause to be done
    whatever else is necessary to make the assessed valuations comply with the provisions of
    7
    W. Va. Code § 11-6K-6(c) describes the process by which a taxpayer may
    challenge an assessment of natural resources property. That statute states:
    Any taxpayer claiming to be aggrieved by any
    assessment made pursuant to this article may appeal the
    assessment as provided under the provisions of article three
    [§§ 11-3-1 et seq.] of this chapter: Provided, That if the
    assessment exceeds sixty percent of the final appraisal by the
    Tax Commissioner, the taxpayer may notify the Tax
    Commissioner in writing of this error, whereupon he or she
    shall, if the error is confirmed, instruct the assessor in writing
    to lower the assessment to sixty percent of the final appraisal.
    The assessor shall, upon receipt of instruction from the Tax
    Commissioner, lower the assessment as required.
    A taxpayer who wishes to appeal an assessment of natural resources property must
    proceed pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-3-23a(d) (2010) and W. Va. Code § 11-3-24.
    13
    this chapter.” W. Va. Code § 11-3-24(c). The Board may not consider or review any
    question of classification or taxability. 
    Id. If the
    Board determines that an assessment
    must be increased, it must provide “the taxpayer with at least five days’ notice, in writing,
    of the intention to make the increase.” W. Va. Code § 11-3-24(d).8 Taxpayers receiving a
    notice of increase from the Board “may appear before the board at the time and place
    specified in the notice to object to the proposed increase in the valuation of taxpayer’s
    property.” W. Va. Code § 11-3-24(f).
    In the case sub judice, the Assessor accepted the Commissioner’s appraisals
    of the respondents’ property and entered the assessed value in the land books pursuant to
    W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g) and § 11-1C-10(d)(2). Thereafter, she advised the Board
    that the values were incorrect, and she sought to have the land books changed. The
    Board approved the changes requested by the Assessor, ordering that the land books be
    changed to reflect the valuations calculated by the Assessor.
    The respondent property owners maintain that the circuit court correctly
    found that the Board may not change the Commissioner’s appraisal at the request of the
    8
    In this case, the circuit court recognized that the Assessor waited until “the
    eleventh hour” to challenge the appraisals before the Board during the 2010 tax year,
    providing the first notice of the intent to increase the valuation of the respondents’
    property in February pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-3-24(d). The Assessor argued that
    she had such authority, despite the notice requirement set forth in W. Va. Code § 11-3-2a
    (2008), requiring that she provide the notice no later than fifteen days prior to the first
    meeting of the Board.
    14
    Assessor under W. Va. Code § 11-3-24. Instead, the respondents contend that the
    Assessor must submit her requested changes to the PVC pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-
    1C-10(g).   The question the Court now faces is a question of legislative intent: In
    enacting W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10, did the Legislature intend to limit the powers granted
    by W. Va. Code § 11-3-24 to county assessors in pursuing challenges to the
    Commissioner’s appraisals of natural resources property, by requiring the county
    assessors take those challenges to the PVC?
    When interpreting statutes, this Court looks first to the plain language of
    the statute. “‘“A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly
    expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full
    force and effect.” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Epperly, 135 W.Va. 877, 
    65 S.E.2d 488
    (1951).’ Syl.
    Pt. 1, State v. Jarvis, 199 W.Va. 635, 
    487 S.E.2d 293
    (1997).” Syl. pt. 2, Mace v. Mylan
    Pharm., Inc., 
    227 W. Va. 666
    , 
    714 S.E.2d 223
    (2011). “A statute is open to construction
    only where the language used requires interpretation because of ambiguity which renders
    it susceptible of two or more constructions or of such doubtful or obscure meaning that
    reasonable minds might be uncertain or disagree as to its meaning.” Hereford v. Meek,
    
    132 W. Va. 373
    , 386, 
    52 S.E.2d 740
    , 747 (1949). Upon our examination of the statutes,
    we believe the authority of county assessors is unclear; while W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g)
    appears to limit how an assessor treats an appraisal to two options, to accept or reject, it
    does not explicitly state that the limitation excludes the assessor’s authority under W. Va.
    Code § 11-3-24 to correct errors in assessments.
    15
    When there is uncertainty as to the meaning of statutes, the statutes must be
    evaluated to give effect to the intent of the Legislature. Syl. pt. 4, Mace, 
    227 W. Va. 666
    ,
    
    714 S.E.2d 223
    (“‘“The primary object in construing a statute is to ascertain and give
    effect to the intent of the Legislature.” Syllabus point 1, Smith v. State Workmen’s
    Compensation Commissioner, 159 W.Va. 108, 
    219 S.E.2d 361
    (1975).’ Syl Pt. 3, Davis
    Mem’l Hosp. v. W. Va. State Tax Comm’r, 222 W.Va. 677, 
    671 S.E.2d 682
    (2008).”).
    “‘“In ascertaining legislative intent, effect must be given to each part of the statute and to
    the statute as a whole so as to accomplish the general purpose of the legislation.” Syl. Pt.
    2, Smith v. State Workmen’s Compensation Commissioner, 159 W.Va. 108, 
    219 S.E.2d 361
    (1975).’ Syl. Pt. 2, White v. Wyeth, 227 W.Va. 131, 
    705 S.E.2d 828
    (2010).” Syl. pt.
    5, Mace, 
    227 W. Va. 666
    , 
    714 S.E.2d 223
    . When the interplay of multiple statutory
    sections is also at issue, we have said:
    Consistency in statutes is of prime importance, and, in
    the absence of a showing to the contrary, all laws are
    presumed to be consistent with each other. Where it is
    possible to do so, it is the duty of the courts, in the
    construction of statutes, to harmonize and reconcile laws, and
    to adopt that construction of a statutory provision which
    harmonizes and reconciles it with other statutory provisions *
    **.
    State ex rel. Pinson v. Varney, 142 W.Va. 105, 109–10, 
    96 S.E.2d 72
    , 75 (1956) (internal
    quotations and citations omitted). Following our careful examination of the applicable
    statutory sections, we conclude that the Legislature intended for county assessors to
    16
    challenge the Commissioner’s appraisals before the PVC and not before their respective
    boards of equalization and review.
    Although W. Va. Code §§ 11-3-1 to -33 charge county assessors with the
    task of appraising property within their counties, the Legislature has specifically provided
    exceptions. The valuation of natural resources property constitutes one such exception.
    W. Va. Code § 11-1C-7 (2003) explicitly excludes from the responsibilities of county
    assessors the task of appraising natural resources property. W. Va. Code § 11-1C-7
    (“Except for property appraised by the state Tax Commissioner under section ten [§ 11-
    1C-10] of this article . . . all assessors shall . . . appraise all real and personal property in
    their jurisdiction at fair market value . . . .”). Instead, under W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10, the
    Legislature has placed the responsibility of appraising natural resources property within
    the province of the Commissioner.          The Commissioner accomplishes this task by
    implementing valuation plans in cooperation with the PVC, a group made up of officials
    from all over the state, including the Commissioner.               Certainly, if the primary
    responsibility of appraising natural resources property throughout West Virginia is
    delegated to the Commissioner and the PVC, then the Commissioner and the PVC are in
    the best position to review challenges to those valuations.
    Furthermore, it is this Court’s belief that the Legislature has placed the
    responsibility of appraising natural resources property in the hands of the Commissioner
    to ensure compliance with the West Virginia Constitution. Article 10, § 1 of the West
    17
    Virginia Constitution requires that taxation “be equal and uniform throughout the state.”
    The goal of providing uniform taxation throughout the state is echoed in W. Va. Code §
    11-1C-1(a) (1990):
    The Legislature hereby finds and declares that all
    property in this State should be fairly and equitably valued
    wherever it is situated so that all citizens will be treated fairly
    and no individual species or class of property will be
    overvalued or undervalued in relation to all other similar
    property within each county and throughout the State.
    If county assessors are permitted to alter accepting the Commissioner’s appraisals to then
    turn around and challenge those appraisals before their local boards of equalization and
    review, there will be no check on whether the tax is equal and uniform throughout the
    state.9 When challenges are made to the PVC, the PVC and the Commissioner are able to
    review each county assessor’s challenge in the context of natural resources valuations on
    a state-wide level, thereby ensuring equal and uniform taxation state wide.
    9
    We also note that at oral argument, the fairness of proceedings before boards of
    equalization and review was discussed. County assessors and county commissioners are
    elected by the citizens of the county in which they reside. It has been previously
    suggested by Eastern’s counsel that because “a county commission has the ultimate
    responsibility for the fiscal affairs of each county . . . a commission has an inherent
    interest in maximizing the revenue available to the county . . . .” Steven R. Broadwater,
    The Illusion of Due Process in West Virginia’s Property Tax Appeals System: What
    Illusion?, 
    113 W. Va. L
    . Rev. 791, 801 (2011) (quoting Brief of Appellant at 16, Bayer
    MaterialScience, LLC v. State Tax Commissioner, 
    672 S.E.2d 174
    (W. Va. 2008)).
    However, because the petitioners did not raise as error the due process implications
    involved in challenges of valuations made to county commissions sitting as boards of
    equalization and review, we will not address the issue at this time.
    18
    We find that W. Va. Code § 18-9A-11 (2008) is also instructive. That
    section, which relates to the appraisal and assessment of real property for the support of
    the public school system, includes a subsection describing the responsibilities of county
    assessors, county commissions, and the Commissioner:
    Whenever in any year a county assessor or a county
    commission fails or refuses to comply with the provisions of
    this section in setting the valuations of property for
    assessment purposes in any class or classes of property in the
    county, the State Tax Commissioner shall review the
    valuations for assessment purposes made by the county
    assessor and the county commission and shall direct the
    county assessor and the county commission to make
    corrections in the valuations as necessary so that they comply
    with the requirements of chapter eleven [§§ 11-1-1 et seq.] of
    this code and this section and the Tax Commissioner shall
    enter the county and fix the assessments at the required ratios.
    Refusal of the assessor or the county commission to make the
    corrections constitutes grounds for removal from office.
    W. Va. Code § 18-9A-11(c). In Tug Valley Recovery Center, Inc. v. Mingo County
    Commission, 
    164 W. Va. 94
    , 108, 
    261 S.E.2d 165
    , 173 (1979), this Court discussed the
    operation of W. Va. Code § 18-9A-11 as follows:
    This Court recognizes the problems inherent in setting
    the proper amount of tax to be paid on any given parcel of
    land. The assessment of real estate values is a very technical
    and complex area, particularly insofar as we are dealing with
    the assessment of mineral estates, those estates being invisible
    to the eye and being difficult to properly and scientifically
    assess. . . .
    The task is lightened to a great extent by the provisions
    of W. Va. Code § 18-9A-11. As mentioned previously, that
    section of the Code specifically provides that the State Tax
    Commissioner is to make an appraisal of all mineral and
    surface estates in West Virginia, and that appraisal is to serve
    as the basis for determining the true and actual value for all
    assessment      purposes.    Therefore,     once     the    Tax
    19
    Commissioner’s appraisal has been made, the duty of the
    circuit court is clear and the taking of further evidence would
    not be necessary. It is incumbent upon the circuit court, as it
    would be upon the county commission and the assessor, to set
    the assessed value of all parcels of land at the amount
    established by the State Tax Commissioner.
    (Emphasis removed). In recognizing the importance of deferring to the Commissioner’s
    appraisals, the Court held, “In all cases, it is incumbent upon the circuit court, as it is
    upon the county commission and the assessor, to set the assessed value of all parcels of
    land at the amount established by the State Tax Commissioner[.] W. Va. Code § 18-9A-
    11.” Syl. pt. 5, Tug Valley Recovery Ctr., 
    164 W. Va. 94
    , 
    261 S.E.2d 165
    .
    Additionally, we note that the language of W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g)
    provides assessors with two very explicit courses of action: accept the Commissioner’s
    appraisal or reject it. The Legislature has not provided a mechanism by which an
    assessor may challenge an appraisal after having accepted it. It is our belief that by
    refusing to include that third course of action, the Legislature did not intend to permit an
    assessor to challenge an appraisal after having accepted the same.
    In spite of our interpretation of the Legislature’s intent with regard to § 11-
    1C-10(g), the Assessor makes a compelling argument that she is not bound by the
    appraisals provided to her by the Commissioner, and that instead she is obligated, under
    W. Va. Code § 11-3-24, to request that the Board make changes such as those at issue in
    this case. She relies primarily on In re 1994 Assessments of Property of Righini, 197 W.
    
    20 Va. 166
    , 
    475 S.E.2d 166
    (1996), which also dealt with the valuation of natural resources
    property, in support of her position that she is not bound by the valuations provided to her
    by the Commissioner.
    In Righini, the type of natural resources property at issue was “managed
    timberland”.10 The property was certified as managed timberland by the Division of
    Forestry pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-1C-11(b)(1), which states, “[T]imberland certified
    by the Division of Forestry as managed timberland shall be valued as managed
    timberland . . . .” The Commissioner valued the property as managed timberland and
    provided its appraisals to the county assessor of Morgan County. The county assessor
    then appraised the property based on actual market value instead of using the
    Commissioner’s value.         The county assessor’s value was much higher than the
    Commissioner’s value.
    The property owners protested the value assigned by the county assessor
    and sought review by the Morgan County Board of Equalization and Review (“Morgan
    10
    Managed timberland, as defined by W. Va. Code § 11-1C-2(b) (2000), is
    surface real property, except farm woodlots, of not less than
    ten contiguous acres which is devoted primarily to forest use
    and which, in consideration of their size, has sufficient
    numbers of commercially valuable species of trees to
    constitute at least forty percent normal stocking of forest trees
    which are well distributed over the growing site, and that is
    managed pursuant to a plan provided for in section ten [§ 11-
    1C-10] of this article.
    21
    Board”). The owners argued that because the Division of Forestry had certified the
    property as managed timberland, neither the county assessor nor the Morgan Board had
    the power to reclassify the property and change the valuations of property accordingly.
    The Morgan Board upheld the county assessor’s appraisal, but on appeal, the circuit court
    reversed.
    This Court reversed the decision of the circuit court and reinstated the
    valuations determined by the county assessor and the Board. In doing so, the Righini
    Court said:
    We can reach no other conclusion other than the
    Division of Forestry is the agency designated to inspect
    property that a taxpayer contends to be managed timberland
    to determine if that property qualifies for managed timberland
    certification. We do not agree that W. Va.Code 11-1C-11
    (1990) represents the legislative expression that vests
    managed timberland assessment authority in the Division of
    Forestry. This statutory provision authorizes the Division of
    Forestry to assist other taxing authorities in the managed
    timberland certification process, but does not preempt the
    assessor and county commission from their ultimate authority
    and responsibility of determining the true and actual value of
    real and personal property.
    
    Righini, 197 W. Va. at 171
    , 475 S.E.2d at 171 (footnote omitted). In reaching this
    conclusion, the Court did not apply W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g), stating:
    W. Va.Code 11-1C-10(g) prescribes the evaluation of
    natural resources property, including managed timberland,
    that provides the protocols for an assessor to question the
    appraisal of the natural resources property. However, that
    statutory provision has not been cited or relied upon by the
    parties as being relevant to the resolution of the issues in this
    case.
    22
    
    Righini, 197 W. Va. at 171
    n.17, 475 S.E.2d at 171 
    n.17. The Righini Court then
    proceeded to create the following two new syllabus points:
    1.    The county commission’s power to “fix
    property” at its true and actual value, pursuant to W.Va.Code
    11-3-24 (1979), includes the power to increase or decrease
    the value, which in turn, includes the power to rescind the
    certification made by the Division of Forestry of managed
    timberland, because that certification affects the value of
    property.
    2.    W.Va.Code 11-1C-11 (1990) authorizes the
    Division of Forestry to assist other taxing authorities in the
    managed timberland certification process, but does not
    preempt the assessor and county commission from their
    ultimate authority and responsibility of determining the true
    and actual value of real and personal property.
    
    Id. Upon our
    reading of Righini, we agree with the Assessor that the case does
    support her position. Righini implicitly allows a county assessor and her county’s board
    of equalization and review to change, pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-3-24, the valuation
    of natural resources property provided to the assessor by the Commissioner. However,
    upon our examination of Righini in light of the current case before the Court, we are
    convinced that Righini was decided in error and that the power conferred by that case to
    county assessors and county commissions is inconsistent with the Legislature’s intent in
    promulgating W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g), a statutory provision not therein considered by
    the Righini Court.
    23
    The Court’s error in Righini is two-fold. First, the parties and the Court
    incorrectly framed the issue, questioning the county assessor’s relation to the Division of
    Forestry instead of the county assessor’s relation to the Commissioner. The real dispute
    in the case involved what tax the property owners owed. The tax owed is determined
    using an appraisal. Appraisals of managed timberland are made by the Commissioner.
    The Righini Court mistakenly focused on the Division of Forestry, which only has the
    authority to classify property as managed timberland. The classification is not what
    actually mattered to the disposition of this case, but the appraisal produced by the
    Commissioner using that classification. It is not relevant whether county assessors have
    the power to change the classification of property if they do not then also have the power
    to change the valuations provided by the Commissioner.
    Second, because the Commissioner’s valuation of property was at the root
    of the issue, not the classification by the Department of Forestry, application of W. Va.
    Code § 11-1C-10(g) was essential to the result in the case, and the Righini Court erred by
    refusing to apply that section. It is not clear whether the county assessor in Righini
    accepted or rejected the appraisals provided to it by the Commissioner, but it is clear that
    the assessor did not take its dispute to the PVC as is required by W. Va. Code § 11-1C-
    10(g). Instead, the county assessor challenged the appraisals pursuant to W. Va. Code §
    11-3-24. As we discussed above, it is our belief that the Legislature intended that a
    county assessor’s challenge to an appraisal provided to her by the Commissioner be
    presented to the PVC. Although Righini’s syllabus points do not explicitly state that
    24
    assessors may request that the Board change the Commissioner’s valuations, the result
    and the syllabus points of the case implicitly grant that authority in error.
    Because the two syllabus points of Righini implicitly allow assessors to
    change the appraisals provided to it by the Commissioner, we conclude that Righini must
    be overruled. In doing so, we acknowledge that the doctrine of stare decisis, which
    promotes the stability of the law, weighs against overruling cases. “An appellate court
    should not overrule a previous decision recently rendered without evidence of changing
    conditions or serious judicial error in interpretation sufficient to compel deviation from
    the basic policy of the doctrine of stare decisis, which is to promote certainty, stability,
    and uniformity in the law.” Syl. pt. 2, Dailey v. Bechtel Corp., 
    157 W. Va. 1023
    , 
    207 S.E.2d 169
    (1974). However, “when it clearly is apparent that an error has been made or
    that the application of an outmoded rule, due to changing conditions, results in injustice,
    deviation from that policy is warranted.” Woodrum v. Johnson, 
    210 W. Va. 762
    , 766 n.8,
    
    559 S.E.2d 908
    , 912 n.8 (2001) (internal quotations and citations omitted).
    We hold that pursuant to W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g) (2010), upon
    receiving the appraisal of natural resources property from the State Tax Commissioner, a
    county assessor may either accept or reject that appraisal. If the assessor rejects the
    appraisal, the assessor must show just cause for doing so to the Property Valuation
    Training and Procedures Commission, including a plan by which a different appraisal
    should be conducted. If the assessor accepts the appraisal, the assessor is then foreclosed
    25
    from later challenging the appraisal before either the Property Valuation Training and
    Procedures Commission under W. Va. Code § 11-1C-10(g) or the Board of Equalization
    and Review under W. Va. Code § 11-3-24 (2010). To the extent that In re 1994
    Assessments of Property of Righini, 
    197 W. Va. 166
    , 
    475 S.E.2d 166
    (1999), holds
    otherwise, it is expressly overruled.11
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, this Court affirms the May 10, 2012, Final
    Order of the Circuit Court of Taylor County as to each of the respondents herein.
    Case Number 12-0764 — Affirmed.
    Case Number 12-0765 — Affirmed.
    Case Number 12-0766 — Affirmed.
    Case Number 12-0767 — Affirmed.
    Case Number 12-0768 — Affirmed.
    11
    Eastern includes “cross-assignments of error” in its brief, alleging that the
    Assessor wrongfully hired a consultant, that Eastern did not have adequate time to
    prepare its defense before the Board, and that the Assessor’s consultant provided false
    testimony. Because each of these allegations does not allege error in the underlying
    order, they are not technically cross-assignments of error. Instead, they are a
    continuation of the arguments made in response to the petitioners’ brief. Because our
    ruling today is in favor of Eastern, and because that ruling makes irrelevant Eastern’s
    “cross-assignments of error”, we find that it is unnecessary to address them in any further
    detail.
    26