State of West Virginia v. John Eugene Anderson ( 2014 )

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2014 Term
FILED
February 10, 2014
No. 12-0512 released at 3:00 p.m.
RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff Below, Respondent
v.
JOHN EUGENE ANDERSON,
Defendant Below, Petitioner
Appeal from the Circuit Court of Wood County
The Honorable Robert A. Waters
Case No. 10-F-93
AFFIRMED
Submitted: January 15, 2014
Filed: February 10, 2014
Joseph Munoz, Esq. Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
Parkersburg, West Virginia Attorney General
Attorney for Petitioner Benjamin F. Yancey III, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General
Charleston, West Virginia
Attorneys for Respondent
The Opinion of the Court was delivered PER CURIAM.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “In reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a circuit
court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of review. We review the rulings of
the circuit court concerning a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible
error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the circuit court’s underlying
factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de
novo review.” Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Vance, 207 W. Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000).
2. “‘In a criminal case, the inquiry made of a jury on its voir dire is
within the sound discretion of the trial court and not subject to review, except when the
discretion is clearly abused.’ Syl. pt. 2, State v. Beacraft, 126 W. Va. 895, 30 S.E.2d 541
(1944).” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Mayle, 178 W. Va. 26, 357 S.E.2d 219 (1987).
3. “When a trial court determines that prospective jurors have been
exposed to information which may be prejudicial, the trial court, upon its own motion or
motion of counsel, shall question or permit the questioning of the prospective jurors
individually, out of the presence of the other prospective jurors, to ascertain whether the
prospective jurors remain free of bias or prejudice.” Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Finley, 177 W.
Va. 554, 355 S.E.2d 47 (1987).
4. “The traditional appellate standard for determining prejudice for
discovery violations under Rule 16 of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure
i
involves a two-pronged analysis: (1) did the non-disclosure surprise the defendant on a
material fact, and (2) did it hamper the preparation and presentation of the defendant’s
case.” Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Rusen v. Hill, 193 W. Va. 133, 454 S.E.2d 427 (1994).
5. “Under the ‘in the possession of’ language of Rule 26.2[] of the
West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, a prosecutor is required to disclose
statements to which he has access even though he does not have the present physical
possession of the statements.” Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Watson, 173 W. Va. 553, 318 S.E.2d
603 (1984).
6. “A trial court’s evidentiary rulings, as well as its application of the
Rules of Evidence, are subject to review under an abuse of discretion standard.” Syl. Pt.
4, State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W. Va. 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998).
ii
Per Curiam:
John Eugene Anderson (hereinafter “petitioner”) appeals the Circuit Court
of Wood County’s March 12, 2012, order denying his motion for judgment of acquittal,
or alternatively, motion for a new trial arising out of his conviction of first degree
murder, for which he was sentenced to life in prison with mercy. Petitioner alleges that
the trial court erred by: 1) allowing a contaminated pool of jurors to be empaneled; 2)
permitting a witness to testify when neither his full criminal history nor a prior written
statement was produced by the State; and 3) refusing to allow the defense to introduce
evidence of the victim’s sex offender status. Upon careful review of the briefs, the
appendix record, the arguments of the parties, and the applicable legal authority, we find
that the circuit court committed no reversible error and therefore affirm petitioner’s
conviction.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In the early morning hours of March 24, 2010, the body of 69-year-old
Willard Wright (hereinafter “Mr. Wright”) was found in his apartment at 910 Ann Street,
Parkersburg, West Virginia. The State Medical Examiner determined that Mr. Wright’s
death was a homicide and that he died as a result of multiple sharp force injuries leading
1
to exsanguination; 1 in particular, Mr. Wright suffered from multiple stab wounds, the
most significant of which was a long neck wound which severed his jugular veins and
nearly decapitated him.
At trial, the State introduced evidence that on the afternoon of March 23,
2010, petitioner, his girlfriend, Tammy Wilfong (hereinafter “Ms. Wilfong”), and Ms.
Wilfong’s four-year-old daughter, visited Mr. Wright, who was nearly bedridden, at his
home and assisted him with household chores; Ms. Wilfong is Mr. Wright’s niece.
Apparently, during the course of the visit, Ms. Wilfong’s daughter advised her mother
that Mr. Wright, who was a registered sex offender, had licked her ear. The testimony
revealed that later that evening, petitioner borrowed a bicycle and cell phone from two
different acquaintances and went to the home of Dorothy Metz where he asked her to
accompany him to a home on Ann Street to pick up some money. When Ms. Metz asked
how he was going to get the money, he replied “Well, if you must know, I’m going up
here to kill this elderly man and take his money.”
The State called a litany of witnesses inculpating petitioner in the crime
including two acquaintances of Ms. Wilfong who picked petitioner up late that night near
the crime scene. Megyn Rollyson (hereinafter “Ms. Rollyson”) and Derek Zimmerman
(hereinafter “Mr. Zimmerman”) testified that upon picking up petitioner and the
1
Exsanguination is a medical term for fatal bleeding; Mr. Wright lost nearly the
entirety of his body’s blood volume as a result of his injuries.
2
borrowed bicycle near the scene, petitioner directed them to take him back to 910 Ann
Street to retrieve the borrowed cell phone, which he had left there. While there, Mr.
Zimmerman testified he was told to serve as a “look out” while petitioner retrieved the
cell phone, which he later told them had been “under a dead body.” When Ms. Rollyson
inquired if anyone was in the home at 910 Ann Street, petitioner replied, “No one that’s
alive.” Ms. Rollyson and Mr. Zimmerman further testified that after they left the scene,
they observed petitioner with the bloody cell phone, a bloody knife, and a black wallet
matching Mr. Wright’s wallet which was ultimately recovered in a storm drain near the
scene. Ms. Rollyson and Mr. Zimmerman further observed petitioner changing clothes
and trying to clean the bloody items when they returned to Ms. Wilfong’s apartment. Ms.
Wilfong testified that, upon returning to her apartment, petitioner told her that he had
killed her uncle and that her “baby would be safe now.”
In addition to the witnesses who testified to petitioner’s actions
immediately before and after the crime, the State called James Claypool (hereinafter “Mr.
Claypool”), who was housed with petitioner in the Washington (Ohio) County Jail after
petitioner was arrested. Mr. Claypool, who was being held on federal charges stemming
from his role as an “enforcer” in the Pagans motorcycle gang, testified that while he was
3
housed with petitioner, petitioner confessed to the crime2 and asked Mr. Claypool if he
could “take care of” some of the witnesses who would testify against him.
Trial began on January 3, 2012 and at the close of the six-day trial, the jury
returned a verdict of guilty of first degree murder; the same jury recommended mercy to
the court. Petitioner moved for a judgment of acquittal or new trial asserting the same
errors raised in this appeal. The trial court denied the motion and sentenced petitioner to
life in prison with mercy on March 12, 2012. This appeal followed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Generally,
[i]n reviewing challenges to findings and rulings made by a
circuit court, we apply a two-pronged deferential standard of
review. We review the rulings of the circuit court concerning
a new trial and its conclusion as to the existence of reversible
error under an abuse of discretion standard, and we review the
circuit court’s underlying factual findings under a clearly
erroneous standard. Questions of law are subject to a de novo
review.
Syl. Pt. 3, State v. Vance, 207 W. Va. 640, 535 S.E.2d 484 (2000). Additional standards
of review as pertain to the specific assignments of error are incorporated as appropriate in
the discussion below.
2
Mr. Claypool testified that petitioner told him that “this guy [Wright] put his
hands on my daughter. . . . Now they’re accusing me of killing him.” When Claypool
asked if he did it, petitioner replied, “F*ck, yeah, I did it. He had it coming.”
4
III. DISCUSSION
Petitioner asserts that the trial court erred by 1) allowing a jury to be
empaneled from a venire which had been contaminated by a prospective juror’s
prejudicial remarks; 2) permitting Mr. Claypool to testify when neither his full criminal
history nor a prior written statement was produced by the State; and 3) refusing to allow
the defense to introduce evidence of Mr. Wright’s sex offender status.
A. Contamination of the Venire
During voir dire, prospective juror Sarah Markell advised the trial court in
chambers that she overheard a juror, later identified as Jennie Ankrom (hereinafter “Ms.
Ankrom”), remark that petitioner “just looks guilty” while standing in the hallway with
“half a dozen” other prospective jurors whom she could not identify. Upon individual
questioning, Ms. Ankrom admitted that she remarked that petitioner “just looks guilty,
looks like my ex-husband.” However, Ms. Ankrom stated that she made the remark to
only one other prospective juror, later identified as Matthew Minton (hereinafter “Mr.
Minton”), when walking from the parking lot to the courtroom. During individual voir
dire, Mr. Minton confirmed that Ms. Ankrom made an inappropriate comment, which he
could not specifically recall and immediately disregarded. After individually questioning
these prospective jurors3 and based upon Ms. Markell’s indication that the comment was
3
Ms. Ankrom was excused as a result of her remarks; Ms. Markell and Mr.
Minton agreed that the remark was inappropriate and stated that it would not affect their
(continued . . .)
5
made in the presence of other jurors, the trial court inquired of the entire panel in open
court regarding whether they heard a “female juror ma[ke] a remark regarding the
Defendant.” Petitioner did not object to the trial court’s questioning the panel in open
court, nor did he request individual questioning of the remaining members of the venire
on this issue. No one other than Ms. Markell and Mr. Minton acknowledged hearing the
remark.4 At the close of voir dire, petitioner moved for a mistrial, which the trial court
denied.
ability to serve as impartial jurors. Mr. Minton, in fact, ultimately sat on the jury which
convicted petitioner.
4
The trial court inquired as follows:
During our period of time with you jurors, there came an
issue as to one of the jurors may not have followed the
instructions given by the Court not to discuss the case among
yourself. Apparently, one female juror made a remark
regarding the Defendant and apparently some of you heard it
and some of you did not hear it. Is there anyone who knows
what I’m referring to and heard a remark directed at the
Defendant by one of your fellow jurors? Okay. We’ve
already talked to you about that. Anyone else? We also
talked to one other juror, yes. So we had two jurors heard
that remark. Does anyone else know what we’re referring to
or heard the remark? We don’t want to say what the remark
was, but it was inappropriate. If a juror did make a comment,
would anybody be biased just because of an opinion of a
prospective juror? And that juror is no longer on the jury
panel, but that juror has been excused. If such a remark was
heard or is made, do you understand you’re to base a verdict
solely on the evidence represented and the law as given to
you by the court?
6
On appeal, petitioner claims that the trial court’s manner of questioning the
venire as a group regarding whether they heard Ms. Ankrom’s remark was erroneous and
essentially “chilled” the jurors from admitting to having heard the remark. Petitioner
argues that it is simply incredible that none of the jurors overheard the remark since Ms.
Markell said there were half a dozen jurors nearby; therefore, they were not forthright
during voir dire. Petitioner contends that the court should have conducted individual voir
dire of all of the remaining jurors as to whether they heard the remark. The State
contends that the trial court was entitled to rely on the sworn responses of the jurors
indicating they did not hear Ms. Ankrom’s remark, thereby obviating the need for further
individual voir dire. The State further argues that there was nothing about the trial
court’s comments concerning the matter that would make the jurors apprehensive about
advising the court they had heard the remarks.
With respect to the more specific standard of review as pertains to jury voir
dire, this Court has held that, “‘[i]n a criminal case, the inquiry made of a jury on its voir
dire is within the sound discretion of the trial court and not subject to review, except
when the discretion is clearly abused.’ Syl. pt. 2, State v. Beacraft, 126 W. Va. 895, 30
S.E.2d 541 (1944).” Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Mayle, 178 W. Va. 26, 357 S.E.2d 219 (1987).
With respect to prejudicial remarks made by a prospective juror during voir dire, we have
more specifically held:
[w]hen a trial court determines that prospective jurors have
been exposed to information which may be prejudicial, the
trial court, upon its own motion or motion of counsel, shall
7
question or permit the questioning of the prospective jurors
individually, out of the presence of the other prospective
jurors, to ascertain whether the prospective jurors remain free
of bias or prejudice.
Syl. Pt. 1, State v. Finley, 177 W. Va. 554, 355 S.E.2d 47 (1987).
We find that the trial court properly utilized the Finley procedure to address
the potential exposure of the venire to the inappropriate remarks. The trial court properly
struck the juror who made the remark and individually questioned jurors known to have
heard the remark. To ascertain which jurors were actually “exposed” to the remark, as
instructed by Finley, the trial court innocuously inquired as to whether the remainder of
the panel even heard the unidentified remark to determine if further individual voir dire
was needed. In short, there is simply no evidence that any additional jurors heard the
remark at all, much less were prejudiced by Ms. Ankrom’s mere expression of opinion
about petitioner’s guilt. As the State notes, it is possible that any prospective jurors who
may have heard the remark had been excused by the time the trial court inquired of the
panel. It is equally plausible that the jurors simply did not overhear the remark despite
being in Ms. Ankrom’s general vicinity. Moreover, the State further notes that one
specifically identifiable individual who heard the remark, Mr. Minton, was actually left
on the jury by petitioner. See also State v. Neider, 170 W. Va. 662, 295 S.E.2d 902
(1982) (finding no error where sworn veniremen who had read newspaper article about a
8
jail break indicated they could be unbiased). 5 We therefore find that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in its handling of the potential prejudice to the venire.
B. Criminal History and Prior Statement of James Claypool
Petitioner’s next two assignments of error concern witness James Claypool,
who testified to petitioner’s admission of guilt shortly after his arrest and petitioner’s
request that Mr. Claypool assist him in “taking care of” certain witnesses against him.
Petitioner contends that the trial court erred in not requiring the State to 1) provide a
complete criminal history of Mr. Claypool; and 2) obtain and produce a letter written by
Mr. Claypool to his attorney.
i. Criminal History of Claypool; W.V.R. Crim. P. 16(a)(1)(F)
5
Extra-jurisdictional caselaw on this precise issue indicates that most courts have
held that mere occurrence of prejudicial remarks during voir dire does not necessarily
require quashing of the entire panel. See U. S. v. Pantone, 609 F.2d 675 (3d Cir. 1979)
(finding no error where trial court refused mistrial after juror stated “it sounds like
everybody is guilty” during voir dire); U. S. v. Morrone, 502 F. Supp. 983 (E.D. Pa.
1980) (finding that corrective voir dire revealed no prejudice after venireman stated “it
looks like the Mafia is here”); State v. Ziel, 495 A.2d 1050 (Conn. 1985) (finding no error
where venire expressed no prejudice or bias after overhearing other veniremen discussing
news reports and express opinions during voir dire); Bauta v. State, 698 So. 2d 860 (Fl.
Ct. App. 1997) (no error where corrective voir dire revealed no prejudice to venire after
venireperson’s emotional outburst during voir dire); Beasley v. State, 74 So. 3d 357 (Miss.
Ct. App. 2010) (same); State v. Stewart, 296 S.W.3d 5 (Mo. Ct. App. 2009) (quashing
entire venire not warranted where venireperson remarked on prior knowledge of
defendant during voir dire); State v. Greathouse, 694 S.W.2d 903, 909 (Mo. Ct. App.
1985) (“Even if a venireman makes a broadly judgmental statement about the cause or a
derogatory remark about the defendant, a mistrial or discharge of the panel is not
automatically required.”).
9
Mr. Claypool testified that, at the time he was housed with petitioner, he
had entered into a plea agreement with the United States Attorney in 2009 to plead guilty
to a single felony charge of obstructing justice with bodily injury in exchange for
additional charges being dropped, but had not yet been sentenced. Before testimony
began, petitioner brought to the trial court’s attention the fact that he had not been
provided an up to date and accurate criminal history of Mr. Claypool. Petitioner asserted,
and the State agreed, that the history provided by the State showed only a misdemeanor
charge in 2006 and had not been updated to reflect the felony plea agreement into which
Mr. Claypool had entered in 2009. Nonetheless, the trial court found that Mr. Claypool
had testified to the felony plea at the preliminary hearing in 2010 and that he would be
available for further cross-examination on the issue during the in camera hearing pursuant
to West Virginia Rule of Evidence 404(b)6 which it would conduct prior to his testimony.
During the 404(b) hearing and during his testimony before the jury, Mr.
Claypool testified to his felony conviction and further testified that he made no
agreement with the State or federal authorities in exchange for his testimony in the case.
After the 404(b) hearing, the defense renewed its objection to Mr. Claypool’s testimony
arguing that it still did not have a “full” criminal history of Mr. Claypool. The court
6
The State contended that Mr. Claypool’s testimony was not, in fact, Rule 404(b)
evidence, but rather, was a continuation of the crime and evidence of consciousness of
guilt. Regardless, the trial court held an in camera hearing prior to allowing Mr.
Claypool to testify and found his testimony admissible.
10
overruled the defense’s objection, stating that the defense could only impeach Mr.
Claypool on felony convictions and the defense was well aware of the felony conviction.
Following Mr. Claypool’s testimony, the defense moved for a mistrial based on the
failure to provide the complete criminal history.
Petitioner argues that the State committed a discovery violation entitling
him to a new trial. Petitioner argues, essentially, that there was no way to know if Mr.
Claypool was being truthful about any post-2006 convictions or whether his testimony
that he had been promised no lenity was accurate. Petitioner also argues that Mr.
Claypool may have agreed to provide “substantial cooperation” for purposes of
sentencing and that without more complete information from the State, he could not
further investigate that issue. The State counters that it provided the defense with the
information it had and that the defense was on notice of, and had opportunity to
investigate, the additional felony conviction that did not appear on the report. On appeal,
the State argues that a simple PACER search would have provided petitioner with any
additional information regarding the conviction.7
This assignment of error arises out of the State’s duty of disclosure
pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure 16(a)(1)(F), as follows:
(a) Disclosure of Evidence by the State.—
(1) Information Subject to Disclosure.—
7
PACER is the federal court system’s case management software, available to
subscribing users to search the federal docket and its contents.
11
***
(F) State Witnesses.—Upon request of the
defendant, the state shall furnish to the defendant a
written list of names and addresses of all state
witnesses whom the attorney for the state intends to
call in the presentation of the case in chief, together
with any record of prior convictions of any such
witnesses which is within the knowledge of the state.
When a request for discovery of the names and
addresses of witnesses has been made by the
defendant, the state may be allowed to perpetuate the
testimony of such witnesses in accordance with the
provisions of Rule 15.
(emphasis added). To determine if a violation of this Rule entitles a defendant to a new
trial, this Court has held:
The traditional appellate standard for determining prejudice
for discovery violations under Rule 16 of the West Virginia
Rules of Criminal Procedure involves a two-pronged analysis:
(1) did the non-disclosure surprise the defendant on a material
fact, and (2) did it hamper the preparation and presentation of
the defendant’s case.
Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Rusen v. Hill, 193 W.Va. 133, 454 S.E.2d 427 (1994).
This Court has previously addressed this specific issue in State v. Adkins,
223 W.Va. 838, 679 S.E.2d 670 (2009). In Adkins, the State provided a criminal history
of a confidential informant which consisted of a pre-sentencing report and a CIB report;
neither of these documents contained a complete and accurate history. 223 W. Va. at
840, 679 S.E.2d at 672. After Adkins’ conviction, the defense requested another updated
criminal history which revealed a far more extensive criminal history, much of which
included crimes of dishonesty. Id. at 841, 679 S.E.2d at 673. The Court found that the
12
complete criminal history was, in fact, a surprise to the defense and the lack of this
information hampered the defendant’s ability to thoroughly cross-examine the State’s key
witness. Id. at 843, 679 S.E.2d at 675.
Unlike Adkins, however, in the instant case, there is no evidence of a
discovery violation in the first instance. Petitioner has failed to demonstrate that Mr.
Claypool had additional convictions of which he did not have knowledge and, more
importantly, of which the State did have knowledge. Rule 16(a)(1)(F) requires only that
the State produce a “record of prior convictions . . . within the knowledge of the state.” It
does not require the State to investigate convictions of which the defense has knowledge
to provide additional information such as whether the witness made any deal with the
federal government. The State represented that it had made no such promise of lenity and
did not withhold any record of conviction within its knowledge. Petitioner is essentially
asking this Court to speculate about non-existent additional convictions or information
relative to known convictions that he failed to investigate. We therefore find no
discovery violation which would entitle petitioner to a new trial.
ii. Prior Statement of Claypool; W.V.R. Crim. P. 26.2
Petitioner also contends that the trial court committed reversible error by
failing to require the State to produce a letter written by Mr. Claypool to his lawyer. Mr.
Claypool, after having the inculpatory conversations with petitioner, wrote his lawyer a
letter advising him of same. His lawyer then apparently notified authorities, culminating
13
in the authorities taking a recorded statement of Mr. Claypool; this recorded statement
was provided to petitioner’s counsel. At trial, however, petitioner contended that the
State was under an obligation, pursuant to West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure
26.2, to obtain and produce the letter Mr. Claypool wrote to his attorney. The State
claimed it did not possess, nor have access to, the letter; the trial court agreed.8 Petitioner
claims on appeal that this violation is tantamount to a violation of Brady v. Maryland,
373 U.S. 83 (1963) (requiring disclosure by the government of exculpatory or
impeachment evidence).9
West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2 provides, in part:
(a) Motion for production.— After a witness other than the
defendant has testified on direct examination, the court, on
motion of a party who did not call the witness, shall order the
attorney for the state or the defendant and the defendant's
attorney, as the case may be, to produce for the examination
and use of the moving party any statement of the witness that
is in their possession and that relates to the subject matter
concerning which the witness has testified.
(emphasis added). This Court has held that “[u]nder the ‘in the possession of’ language
of Rule 26.2[] of the West Virginia Rules of Criminal Procedure, a prosecutor is required
to disclose statements to which he has access even though he does not have the present
8
The State further made claims that such letter would be attorney-client
privileged; petitioner countered that any privilege had been effectively waived by the
recorded statement and subsequent testimony of Mr. Claypool.
9
The interplay between Rule 26.2 and Brady has been the discussion of much
federal jurisprudence, none of which appears relevant given the State’s lack of access to
the letter, discussed infra.
14
physical possession of the statements.” Syl. Pt. 5, State v. Watson, 173 W. Va. 553, 318
S.E.2d 603 (1984). The documents at issue in Watson were grand jury transcripts.
More akin to the issue as presented herein is State v. Kerns, 187 W. Va.
620, 420 S.E.2d 891 (1992). In Kerns, the defendant claimed that the State was obligated
to produce a statement taken by a private investigator for purposes of a civil action which
preceded the criminal case. 187 W. Va. at 626, 420 S.E.2d at 897. The investigator who
took the statement was eventually hired by the special prosecutor in the subsequent
criminal investigation. 187 W. Va. at 627, 420 S.E.2d at 898. Nonetheless, the Court
found that the State did not have access to, and therefore was not in possession of, the
statement; therefore, no Rule 26.2 violation occurred. Id.
We likewise find no violation of Rule 26.2 in the instant case. We find it
difficult to surmise how a letter presumably in possession of a witness’ attorney could be
deemed to be “in the possession of” the State. “Access to” has been given common­
sensical treatment and found typically where the statement is possessed by some sort of
instrumentality or agency of the government to which a prosecutor would naturally have
“access.”10 As such, we find that the trial court did not err in refusing to find a violation
of West Virginia Rule of Criminal Procedure 26.2.
10
See U.S. v. Trevino, 556 F.2d 1265, 1272 (5th Cir. 1977) (“Certainly the
prosecutor would not be allowed to avoid disclosure of evidence by the simple expedient
(continued . . .)
15
C. Evidence of Mr. Wright’s sex offender status
Finally, petitioner asserts that the trial court erred in refusing to allow him
to introduce evidence that Mr. Wright was a registered sex offender. At trial, the State
orally moved in limine to prevent any reference to Mr. Wright being a sex offender on
relevancy grounds. Petitioner objected, arguing that Mr. Wright’s sex offender status
may establish motive for a third party to have committed the murder. In particular, the
defense indicated that given the incident involving Ms. Wilfong’s daughter the day
before the murder, Ms. Wilfong herself would be a viable suspect and that such evidence
should be admissible. The trial court granted the State’s motion, ruling that such
evidence was neither relevant nor material. 11 In addition to potentially establishing
motive for a third person suspect, petitioner also briefly argued that Mr. Wright’s status
as a sex offender may serve as “provocation” and therefore lend itself to arguing lesser
included offenses. The trial court found that “provocation” was a self-defense principle
and was inapplicable to petitioner’s defense. On appeal, petitioner appears to have
settled on the latter argument, contending that the evidence was relevant to establishing
lesser-included offenses, although he does not identify how this evidence would warrant
a lesser-included offense under the facts and circumstances presented herein. Petitioner
of leaving relevant evidence to repose in the hands of another agency while utilizing his
access to it in preparing his case for trial[.]”).
11
The defense renewed their objection on the second day of trial, during the
testimony of Ms. Wilfong, and again during their motion for judgment of acquittal at the
close of the State’s case.
16
cites to Syllabus Point 4 of State v. Harden, 223 W. Va. 796, 679 S.E.2d 628 (2009)12 in
support of his contention that Mr. Wright’s sex offender status may have served to negate
intent or malice.
This Court has held that “[a] trial court’s evidentiary rulings, as well as its
application of the Rules of Evidence, are subject to review under an abuse of discretion
standard.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Rodoussakis, 204 W. Va. 58, 511 S.E.2d 469 (1998). We
find that the trial court properly excluded evidence of Mr. Wright’s sex offender status.
As observed by the trial court, at no time did petitioner advance a “self-defense” or “heat
of passion”-type defense. Certainly, the evidence adduced at trial indicated that Mr.
Wright was killed hours after the alleged encounter with Ms. Wilfong’s daughter.
Rather, in so many words, petitioner (a sex offender himself) appears to argue simply that
Mr. Wright’s sex offender status essentially “justified” his murder. As such, the trial
court correctly found the evidence inadmissible.
12
“Where it is determined that the defendant’s actions were not reasonably made
in self-defense, evidence that the decedent had abused or threatened the life of the
defendant is nonetheless relevant and may negate or tend to negate a necessary element
of the offense(s) charged, such as malice or intent.” Id.
17
IV. CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, the Circuit Court of Wood County’s March 12,
2012, order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
18