SER Robert E. Barrat, Esq. v. Nancy A. Dalby, Esq. , 236 W. Va. 316 ( 2015 )


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  •           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
    September 2015 Term
    FILED
    November 5, 2015
    released at 3:00 p.m.
    No. 15-0669                 RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA EX REL. ROBERT E. BARRAT, ESQ.,
    Petitioner,
    v.
    NANCY A. DALBY, ESQ., KIRK H. BOTTNER, ESQ., AND
    DAVID P. SKILLMAN, ESQ., MENTAL HYGIENE COMMISSIONERS,
    TWENTY-THIRD JUDICIAL CIRCUIT OF WEST VIRGINIA,
    Respondents.
    PETITION FOR WRIT OF PROHIBITION
    WRIT GRANTED
    Submitted: October 6, 2015
    Filed: November 5, 2015
    Robert E. Barrat, Esq.                              John M. Hedges, Esq.
    Pro Se                                              Teresa J. Lyons, Esq.
    Martinsburg, West Virginia                          Hedges & Lyons, PLLC
    Morgantown, West Virginia
    Counsel for Respondents
    JUSTICE LOUGHRY delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
    1. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question
    of law or involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.”
    Syl. Pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 
    194 W.Va. 138
    , 
    459 S.E.2d 415
     (1995).
    2. “‘A statute should be so read and applied as to make it accord with the
    spirit, purposes and objects of the general system of law of which it is intended to form a
    part; it being presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were familiar with all
    existing law, applicable to the subject matter, whether constitutional, statutory or common,
    and intended the statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the effectuation
    of the general purpose and design thereof, if its terms are consistent therewith.’ Syl. Pt. 5,
    State v. Snyder, 
    64 W.Va. 659
    , 
    63 S.E. 385
     (1908).” Syl. Pt. 5, Community Antenna Serv.,
    Inc. v. Charter Commc’ns VI, LLC, 
    227 W.Va. 595
    , 
    712 S.E.2d 504
     (2011).
    3. “Statutes which relate to the same persons or things, or to the same class of
    persons or things, or statutes which have a common purpose will be regarded in pari materia
    to assure recognition and implementation of the legislative intent. Accordingly, a court
    should not limit its consideration to any single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or
    word, but rather review the act or statute in its entirety to ascertain legislative intent
    i
    properly.” Syl. Pt. 5, Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving & Storage Co., 
    159 W.Va. 14
    ,
    
    217 S.E.2d 907
     (1975).
    4. The provisions of West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) (2013) require the
    circuit court to appoint legal counsel for the alleged protected person in proceedings
    instituted under the West Virginia Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, West Virginia
    Code §§ 44A-1-1 to -5-9 (2014).
    ii
    LOUGHRY, Justice
    The petitioner, Robert E. Barrat, an attorney practicing primarily in the Twenty-
    Third Judicial Circuit of West Virginia, invokes this Court’s original jurisdiction1 by seeking
    a writ of prohibition to prevent the respondents, Nancy A. Dalby, Esq., Kirk H. Bottner, Esq.,
    and David P. Skillman, Esq., the mental hygiene commissioners of the Twenty-Third Judicial
    Circuit, from appointing legal counsel for alleged protected persons in actions instituted
    under the West Virginia Guardianship and Conservatorship Act2 (“Guardianship and
    Conservatorship Act” or “Act”). In support of his request for relief, the petitioner asserts that
    West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) (2014) mandates that circuit courts, rather than mental
    hygiene commissioners, make such appointments. Upon our consideration of the parties’
    arguments, as well as our review of the statutory provisions in the Guardianship and
    Conservatorship Act, we conclude that the petitioner has demonstrated the requisite basis for
    the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
    I. Facts
    The facts of this case are essentially uncontested and succinct. The petitioner
    states that the respondent mental hygiene commissioners have appointed attorney James B.
    1
    See W.Va. Const. art. VIII, § 3 (“The supreme court of appeals shall have original
    jurisdiction of proceedings in habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition and certiorari.”).
    2
    West Virginia Code §§ 44A-1-1 to -5-9 (2014).
    1
    Rich, III, as legal counsel for the alleged protected person in most, if not all, of the
    proceedings instituted under the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act in the Twenty-Third
    Judicial Circuit over the last few years. The petitioner avers that he and approximately
    twenty other lawyers in the judicial circuit would be willing to accept such appointments.
    The respondent mental hygiene commissioners concede they have routinely appointed Mr.
    Rich as legal counsel for the alleged protected person based upon their past experience with
    his work in such proceedings. Our decision in this case is not impelled by which lawyers are
    being appointed for the alleged protected person in such proceedings, but whether the mental
    hygiene commissioners have the necessary authority to make such appointments under West
    Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a).
    II. Standard for Issuance of Writ of Prohibition
    Mental hygiene commissioners are attorneys who are appointed by the circuit
    court to act as judicial officers3 in certain mental health-related proceedings.4 The petitioner
    3
    See Canon 6, Code of Jud. Conduct (providing that “[a]nyone, whether or not a
    lawyer, who is an officer of a judicial system and who performs judicial functions, including
    but not limited to . . . Mental Hygiene Commissioners . . . is a judge within the meaning of
    the Code.”).
    4
    See W.Va. Code § 27-5-1(a) (2013) (“The chief judge in each judicial circuit of this
    state shall appoint a competent attorney and may, if necessary, appoint additional attorneys
    to serve as Mental Hygiene Commissioners to preside over involuntary hospitalization
    hearings. . . .”); see also W.Va. Code § 44A-2-9(a) (“The court may hear the petition for the
    appointment of a guardian or conservator or may designate the mental hygiene commissioner
    in the circuit to serve as the trier of fact at the hearing on the petition . . . .”).
    2
    seeks to prohibit the respondent mental hygiene commissioners from appointing legal
    counsel for the alleged protected person under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a). Because
    these commissioners act in a judicial capacity, we apply our well-established standard for
    relief in prohibition: “‘Prohibition will lie to prohibit a judge from exceeding his legitimate
    powers.’ Syl. Pt. 2, State ex rel. Winter v. MacQueen, 
    161 W.Va. 30
    , 
    239 S.E.2d 660
    (1977).” Syl. Pt. 1, State ex rel. J.C. v. Mazzone, 
    235 W.Va. 151
    , 
    772 S.E.2d 336
     (2015).
    In determining whether the mental hygiene commissioners are exceeding their legitimate
    powers by appointing legal counsel under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a), our review is
    plenary. “Where the issue on an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or
    involving an interpretation of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. Pt. 1,
    Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie A.L., 
    194 W.Va. 138
    , 
    459 S.E.2d 415
     (1995). With these precepts
    in mind, we proceed to determine whether a writ of prohibition should issue.
    III. Discussion
    West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) provides, in part, that “[t]he court shall
    appoint legal counsel for the alleged protected person to make recommendations to the court
    that are in the best interests of the alleged protected person.”5 Id. (emphasis added). The
    petitioner argues that this statutory provision clearly mandates that the circuit court–not the
    5
    The parties refer to counsel appointed under this statutory provision as “guardians
    ad litem” because counsel’s role in such matters is to “make recommendations . . . in the best
    interests of the alleged protected person.” W.Va. Code § 44A-2-7(a).
    3
    mental hygiene commissioner–is charged with the duty to appoint legal counsel. He further
    asserts that guardianship/conservatorship proceedings appear to be “eligible proceedings”
    under the Public Defender Services Act.6 The petitioner contends that the circuit court
    should establish a panel of local lawyers to receive appointments to act on behalf of the
    alleged protected persons in such proceedings and, once established,7 the court should
    distribute such appointments among all lawyers on the panel. Lastly, citing Canon 2 of the
    Code of Judicial Conduct,8 the petitioner argues that the respondents’ practice of appointing
    the same lawyer to perform all of this particular court-appointed work could have the
    appearance of impropriety.
    The respondent mental hygiene commissioners assert that the definition of
    “eligible proceedings” in the Public Defender Services Act9 does not include proceedings
    instituted under the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act. As they correctly observe, the
    Guardianship and Conservatorship Act has its own provision for the appointment of legal
    6
    See W.Va. Code §§ 29-21-1 to -21) (2013) (Public Defender Services Act); see also
    W.Va. Code § 29-21-2(2) (defining “eligible proceeding”).
    7
    See W.Va. Code § 29-21-9 (circuit courts to establish panel of local and regional
    private attorneys available to serve as counsel for “eligible clients” in eligible proceedings).
    8
    Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct states, in part: “A. A judge shall respect
    and comply with the law, shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all
    of the judge’s activities, and shall act at all times in a manner that promotes public
    confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary.”
    9
    See supra note 6.
    4
    counsel for the alleged protected person. See W.Va. Code § 44A-2-7(a). Maintaining that
    mental hygiene commissioners are authorized to act in the place of circuit courts under the
    Guardianship and Conservatorship Act, the respondents assert that their concurrent authority
    extends to the appointment of legal counsel for the alleged protected person. Arguing that
    the word “court” in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) can mean either the circuit court judge
    or the mental hygiene commissioner,10 they note that either the court or the mental hygiene
    commissioner may appoint legal counsel in proceedings involving the involuntary
    commitment of persons to state mental health facilities. See W.Va. Code § 27-5-4(h) (2013).
    Expounding upon the need for the appointing authority to have discretion in appointing legal
    counsel to assure that a protected person’s due process rights are being met, the respondents
    recite the twenty-one statutory responsibilities of appointed counsel in proceedings brought
    under the Act.11
    In determining whether mental hygiene commissioners have authority under
    West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) to appoint legal counsel for the alleged protected person,
    we observe that, since its enactment in 1994, we have referred to West Virginia Code §
    10
    The respondents state that this Court’s form order for the appointment of counsel
    under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) contains a signature line for either the circuit judge
    or the mental hygiene commissioner. This form order, as well as any other form orders we
    determine to be inconsistent with our decision today, will be modified, accordingly.
    11
    See W.Va. Code § 44A-2-7(c) (setting forth appointed counsel’s responsibilities to
    alleged protected person).
    5
    44A-2-7(a) in only two prior decisions. There is a passing reference to this statute in State
    ex rel. Shamblin v. Collier, 
    191 W.Va. 349
    , 355, 
    445 S.E.2d 736
    , 742 (1994), in the context
    of the newly enacted Guardianship and Conservatorship Act. Later, in In Re Dandy, 
    224 W.Va. 105
    , 
    680 S.E.2d 120
     (2009), we stated that West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a)
    “requires the circuit court to appoint counsel for an alleged protected person[.]” Dandy, 224
    W.Va. at 110, 
    680 S.E.2d at 125
    . Because the issue in Dandy did not involve whether a
    mental hygiene commissioner has authority to appoint legal counsel under this particular
    statute, we did not address the issue presently before us.
    In analyzing the appointing authority provided in West Virginia Code § 44A-2­
    7(a), we are guided by the precept that
    “‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a
    statute what it means and means in a statute what
    it says there.’” Martin v. Randolph County Board
    of Education, 
    195 W.Va. 297
    , 312, 
    465 S.E.2d 399
    , 414 (1995), quoting Connecticut Nat’l Bank
    v. Germain, 
    503 U.S. 249
    , 253-54, 
    112 S.Ct. 1146
    , 1149, 
    117 L.Ed.2d 391
    , 397 (1992).
    Appalachian Power Co. v. State Tax Dept., 
    195 W.Va. 573
    , 586,
    
    466 S.E.2d 424
    , 437 (1995); see also Stinson v. Com., 
    396 S.W.3d 900
    , 903 (Ky. 2013) (internal citations omitted) (“The
    plain meaning of the statutory language is presumed to be what
    the legislature intended.”); Haile v. State, 
    431 Md. 448
    , 
    66 A.3d 600
    , 611 (2013) (stating that in ascertaining actual intent of
    Legislature court will look to plain language under theory that
    “Legislature is presumed to have meant what it said and said
    what it meant.”); State v. Rama, 
    298 N.J. Super. 339
    , 
    689 A.2d 776
    , 777 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1997) (“[W]e are not to
    6
    presume that the Legislature intended something other than what
    it expressed by its plain language.”); Fox v. Fox, 
    61 Va. App. 185
    , 
    734 S.E.2d 662
    , 667 (2012) (“We look to the plain meaning
    of the statutory language, and presume that the legislature chose,
    with care, the words it used when it enacted the relevant
    statute.”).
    King v. West Virginia’s Choice, Inc., 
    234 W.Va. 440
    , 444, 
    766 S.E.2d 387
    , 391 (2014). The
    statutory language under consideration plainly provides that “[t]he court shall appoint legal
    counsel for the alleged protected person to make recommendations to the court that are in the
    best interests of the alleged protected person.” W.Va. Code § 44A-2-7(a). The court’s
    appointment of counsel mandated in subsection (a) is echoed in subsection (e) of this statute:
    A person appointed by the court as counsel for a
    nonindigent alleged protected person shall inform the court or
    the mental hygiene commissioner of his or her hourly rate at the
    onset of the case and seek approval of his or her fee for the case
    by submitting it to the court or the mental hygiene commissioner
    for approval . . . .
    W.Va. Code § 44A-2-7(e). This language clearly contemplates that once the court appoints
    counsel under subsection (a), if the alleged protected person is not indigent, counsel can
    approach either the court or the mental hygiene commissioner regarding his or her hourly
    rate/fee.12 See also W.Va. Code § 44A-1-13(c) (emphasis added) (“Attorneys appointed to
    represent individuals under this article shall be paid a reasonable rate of compensation from
    12
    West Virginia Code § 44A-2-14 sets forth another circumstance where following an
    initial act by the court, either the court or the mental hygiene commissioner may then act.
    Subsection (a) of this statute provides that “[t]he court may appoint a temporary guardian or
    temporary conservator, or both . . . upon a finding that an immediate need exists[.]” Id.
    Thereafter, subsection (b) provides that either “the court or mental hygiene commissioner for
    good cause shown” may extend the temporary guardianship or conservatorship. Id.
    7
    the [protected person’s] estate, as approved by the circuit court, or, in the event the court
    determines that the estate is devoid of funds for the payment of such fees, the attorney shall
    be paid at a rate prescribed by and from funds allocated by the supreme court of appeals.”).
    Similar to the statute under consideration, West Virginia Code § 44A-4-6(c) mandates that
    “the court shall appoint legal counsel for the protected person” when a petition for
    termination, revocation or modification of guardianship or conservatorship is filed.13 Id.
    (emphasis added).
    For purposes of our analysis, we must also consider the other provisions in the
    Guardianship and Conservatorship Act unrelated to the appointment and compensation of
    legal counsel. As this Court first articulated more than a century ago:
    “A statute should be so read and applied as to make it
    accord with the spirit, purposes and objects of the general
    system of law of which it is intended to form a part; it being
    presumed that the legislators who drafted and passed it were
    familiar with all existing law, applicable to the subject matter,
    whether constitutional, statutory or common, and intended the
    statute to harmonize completely with the same and aid in the
    effectuation of the general purpose and design thereof, if its
    terms are consistent therewith.” Syllabus Point 5, State v.
    Snyder, 
    64 W.Va. 659
    , 
    63 S.E. 385
     (1908).
    Syl. Pt. 5, Community Antenna Serv., Inc. v. Charter Commc’ns VI, LLC, 
    227 W.Va. 595
    ,
    
    712 S.E.2d 504
     (2011). Indeed,
    13
    But cf. W.Va. Code § 44A-3-5 (providing that either “the court or mental hygiene
    commissioner shall appoint a guardian ad litem” if conservator files petition to sell or
    mortgage protected person’s real estate).
    8
    [s]tatutes which relate to the same persons or things, or
    to the same class of persons or things, or statutes which have a
    common purpose will be regarded in pari materia to assure
    recognition and implementation of the legislative intent.
    Accordingly, a court should not limit its consideration to any
    single part, provision, section, sentence, phrase or word, but
    rather review the act or statute in its entirety to ascertain
    legislative intent properly.
    Syl. Pt. 5, Fruehauf Corp. v. Huntington Moving & Storage Co., 
    159 W.Va. 14
    , 
    217 S.E.2d 907
     (1975). A review of the Act’s other provisions clearly demonstrates that the Legislature
    has differentiated between those instances when the circuit court is to act, as opposed to those
    occasions when either the court or the mental hygiene commissioner is permitted to act.
    As with the statutory authority regarding the appointment of counsel, the circuit
    court is authorized to hear the petition for the appointment of a guardian or conservator. See
    W.Va. Code § 44A-2-9(a).          Although the court “may designate the mental hygiene
    commissioner in the circuit to serve as the trier of fact at the hearing on the petition[,]”14 the
    statute further provides that “the court” must be the trier of fact when the proceeding
    involves a missing person, and “[o]nly the court may enter an order appointing a guardian
    or conservator.” Id.; accord W.Va. Code § 44A-2-10. Other provisions of the Guardianship
    and Conservatorship Act set forth the circumstances where either the court or a mental
    hygiene commissioner may act. See W.Va. Code § 44A-1-14 (“The court or mental hygiene
    commissioner may . . . issue temporary protective orders . . . .”) (emphasis added); W.Va.
    14
    W.Va. Code § 44A-2-9(a).
    9
    Code § 44A-2-5 (providing either court or mental hygiene commissioner may authorize third-
    party upon good cause shown to inspect and copy otherwise confidential court file of
    guardianship/conservatorship proceeding); W.Va. Code § 44A-2-13a (“The mental hygiene
    commissioner or the court shall prepare an order . . . directing the appointees to complete the
    mandatory education and post any required bond . . . .”) (emphasis added); W.Va. Code §
    44A-2-15(c) (“The court or mental hygiene commissioner may conduct hearings on
    subsequent petitions filed pursuant to this chapter.”) (emphasis added). Similar instances
    appear throughout the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act.
    Although the respondents acknowledge the differentiations made between the
    court and the mental hygiene commissioner throughout the Act, they nonetheless argue that
    the word “court” in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) is merely a “shorthand reference” and
    that the appointment of legal counsel can be made by either the court or a mental hygiene
    commissioner. As discussed above, however, the Legislature has plainly specified the
    instances when either the court or the mental hygiene commissioner may act. Clearly, it
    could have acted consonantly in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) concerning the
    appointment of legal counsel for the alleged protected person. Because it did not, and
    because we are guided by the presumption that the Legislature “‘says in a statute what it
    10
    means and means in a statute what it says there[,]’”15 we are compelled to disagree with the
    respondents’ position on this issue.
    Additionally, we find no support for the respondents’ position from the
    provisions of West Virginia Code § 27-5-4(h) (2013).16 This statute provides that either the
    court or the mental hygiene commissioner may appoint legal counsel for a person who is the
    subject of an involuntary commitment proceeding. While one might be tempted to conclude
    that because the Legislature provided mental hygiene commissioners with the authority to
    appoint in involuntary commitment proceedings, it implicitly did the same in West Virginia
    Code § 44A-2-7(a). However, we “presume[] that the legislators who drafted and passed
    [West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a)] were familiar with all existing law,”17 including West
    Virginia Code § 27-5-4(h). Further, while “‘[s]tatutes which relate to the same persons or
    things, or to the same class of persons or things . . . will be regarded in pari materia to assure
    recognition and implementation of the legislative intent[,]’”18 we cannot ignore the plain
    language in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) providing that “[t]he court shall appoint legal
    15
    King, 234 W.Va. at 444, 766 S.E.2d at 391 (citations omitted).
    16
    See W.Va. Code § 27-5-4(h)(2) (“In the event the individual has not retained
    counsel, the court or mental hygiene commissioner . . . shall appoint a competent attorney .
    . . .”).
    17
    Community Antenna Serv., 227 W.Va. at 599, 
    712 S.E.2d at 508
    , syl. pt. 5, in part.
    18
    Fruehauf Corp., 159 W.Va. at 15, 
    217 S.E.2d at 908
    , syl. pt. 5, in part.
    11
    counsel[.]”      
    Id.
       Moreover, when the Legislature enacted the Guardianship and
    Conservatorship Act in 1994, it was presumptively aware that West Virginia Code § 27-5­
    4(h)19 allows for either the court or the mental hygiene commissioner to appoint counsel. The
    Legislature was also aware that the legislation creating the Guardianship and
    Conservatorship Act repealed West Virginia Code §27-11-1 (1992), which provided in
    subsection (b) that the “county commission . . . shall appoint a competent attorney . . . as
    guardian ad litem for the purposes of representing the interest of the [alleged incompetent]
    individual . . . .”20 Id. Armed with this awareness, the Legislature could have provided
    alternative authority in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) so as to allow either the court or
    the mental hygiene commissioner to appoint legal counsel. Critically, it did not.
    Notwithstanding the extensive grant of authority to mental hygiene
    commissioners under the Act, if the Legislature had intended mental hygiene commissioners
    to be on an equivalent basis with the circuit court for all purposes, there would be evidence
    of such intent. For example, we would expect to find a legislative definition or catch-all
    provision in the Act which provides that the word “court” shall also mean a mental hygiene
    commissioner absent an express contraindication. Because there is no such definition or
    provision, we are left with an Act that not only differentiates between when the court is to
    19
    At the time the Guardianship and Conservatorship Act was enacted, West Virginia
    Code § 27-5-4 had been in place for decades.
    20
    See 1994 W.Va. Acts 1360.
    12
    act, as opposed to when either the court or a mental hygiene commissioner may act, but one
    that also includes a specific statutory mandate that “the court” appoint legal counsel for the
    alleged protected person. W.Va. Code § 44A-2-7(a). Having omitted mental hygiene
    commissioners from this particular statutory mandate, “we are obliged not to add to statutes
    something the Legislature purposely omitted.” Banker v. Banker, 
    196 W.Va. 535
    , 547, 
    474 S.E.2d 465
    , 477 (1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
    Based on all of the above, we conclude that the Legislature said what it meant
    and meant what it said—that “[t]he court shall appoint legal counsel for the alleged protected
    person[.]” W.Va. Code § 44A-2-7(a); see also King, 234 W.Va. at 444, 766 S.E.2d at 391
    (citations omitted) (“‘courts must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it means
    and means in a statute what it says there.’”). Accordingly, we now hold that the provisions
    of West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a) (2014) require the circuit court to appoint legal counsel
    for the alleged protected person in proceedings instituted under the West Virginia
    Guardianship and Conservatorship Act. Because the Legislature has not extended this
    appointing authority to mental hygiene commissioners, we find that the respondents have
    “‘exceed[ed] [their] legitimate powers’”21 by appointing legal counsel for alleged protected
    persons under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a).22
    21
    Mazzone, 235 W.Va. at __, 772 S.E.2d at 337, syl. pt. 1, in part.
    22
    The petitioner also seeks a writ of mandamus directing our circuit courts to appoint
    (continued...)
    13
    IV. Conclusion
    Having determined that the petitioner is entitled to relief in prohibition, we
    grant the writ.
    Writ granted.
    22
    (...continued)
    legal counsel under West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a). Through our ruling today, we find
    relief in mandamus to be unnecessary. We also decline the petitioner’s request for a new
    court rule providing that all interested and qualified attorneys practicing within a circuit shall
    be considered for such appointments. Further, we reject the petitioner’s argument that circuit
    courts should be required to establish a panel of local lawyers under the Public Defender
    Services Act to receive appointments in guardianship/conservatorship proceedings. As the
    respondents correctly observe, not only has the Legislature separately provided for the
    appointment of legal counsel in such proceedings in West Virginia Code § 44A-2-7(a), those
    proceedings do not fall within the statutory definition of “eligible proceeding” under the
    Public Defender Services Act. See supra note 6. Lastly, we find the petitioner’s argument
    that the respondent mental hygiene commissioners’ appointment of the same attorney in
    guardianship/conservatorship proceedings could have the appearance of impropriety under
    our judicial canons to be mooted by our ruling herein.
    14