State of West Virginia v. Theresa M. Vanmeter ( 2019 )


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  •                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    State of West Virginia,                                                          FILED
    Plaintiff Below, Respondent                                                  November 8, 2019
    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    vs.) No. 18-0459 (Grant County 17-F-50)                                       SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    Theresa M. Vanmeter,
    Defendant Below, Petitioner
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Theresa M. Vanmeter, by counsel Jason T. Gain, appeals the Circuit Court of
    Grant County’s May 4, 2018, order sentencing her to a total indeterminate term of five to forty-
    five years of incarceration following her conviction of three counts of possession with intent to
    deliver a controlled substance, one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, and
    one count of criminal child neglect causing substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.
    The State of West Virginia, by counsel Caleb A. Ellis, filed a response. Petitioner filed a reply.
    On appeal, petitioner argues that her prior drug use and drug addiction was an impermissible
    factor upon which the circuit court based her sentence. Petitioner further argues that the Court
    should reconsider and overturn Syllabus Point 4 of State v. Goodnight, 
    169 W. Va. 366
    , 
    287 S.E.2d 504
     (1982), which states that “[s]entences imposed by the trial court, if within statutory
    limits and if not based on some [im]permissible factor, are not subject to appellate review.”
    This Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and
    legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly
    aided by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule
    21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    In November of 2017, petitioner was indicted on nine separate offenses: three counts of
    possession with intent to deliver a controlled substance, three counts of conspiracy to deliver a
    controlled substance, two counts of simple possession of a controlled substance, and one count
    of child neglect causing substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury.
    In March of 2018, petitioner pled guilty to three counts of possession with intent to
    deliver a controlled substance, one count of conspiracy to deliver a controlled substance, and
    one count of criminal child neglect causing substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury—
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    totaling five separate offenses. Per the plea agreement, the remaining charges were dismissed
    and the State would recommend that the sentences run consecutively. The plea agreement was
    later modified to allow petitioner the ability to argue for probation at sentencing. The circuit
    court ordered that a presentence investigation report be completed prior to sentencing; the report
    was completed on March 30, 2018.
    The circuit court held a sentencing hearing in April of 2018. Petitioner requested
    probation and cited her recent nine-month period of sobriety at a sober living facility. The State
    opposed alternative sentencing based on petitioner’s extensive drug use history as revealed in
    her presentence investigation report, her recent drug-induced seizure while pregnant, and that
    her five-year-old child was found to be living in a home filled with loaded guns and illegal
    drugs. The State argued that petitioner’s recent sobriety was only due to her arrests.
    At sentencing, the circuit court considered information provided in petitioner’s
    presentence investigation report and stated,
    I do appreciate the efforts Mrs. Van[m]eter’s made. Sometimes you get a little bit
    too late. And this—I mean, this information, I have to agree with [the prosecutor].
    I was a prosecutor for twenty years; I’ve been a [j]udge for nine. I’ve never seen a
    presentence report like that.
    Based partly on petitioner’s voluminous drug use history, the circuit court sentenced petitioner
    to the following terms of incarceration: two terms of one to fifteen years for her convictions of
    possession with intent to deliver heroin and Dilaudid, one term of one to five years for her
    conviction of possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, one term of one to five years
    for her conviction of conspiracy, and one term of one to five years for her conviction of child
    neglect which could result in substantial risk of death or serious bodily injury. Further, the
    circuit court ordered the sentences to run consecutively. The circuit court entered a sentencing
    order reflecting its decision on May 4, 2018, and it is from this order that petitioner now
    appeals.
    This Court reviews sentencing orders “under a deferential abuse of discretion standard,
    unless the order violates statutory or constitutional commands.” Syl. Pt. 1, in part, State v.
    Adams, 
    211 W. Va. 231
    , 
    565 S.E.2d 353
     (2002). We have also held that “[s]entences imposed by
    the trial court, if within statutory limits and if not based on some [im]permissible factor, are not
    subject to appellate review.” Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Goodnight, 
    169 W. Va. 366
    , 
    287 S.E.2d 504
    (1982). Furthermore, regarding the granting of probation as an alternative to incarceration, “the
    matter of probation is within the sound discretion of the trial court.” State v. Miller, 
    172 W. Va. 718
    , 720, 
    310 S.E.2d 479
    , 481 (1983).
    On appeal, petitioner concedes that her sentences are within the applicable statutory
    limits, but argues that this Court should find that drug addiction and prior drug use constitute
    impermissible factors not to be considered at sentencing. In support of this position, petitioner
    relies upon Robinson v. California, 
    370 U.S. 660
     (1962). In Robinson, the United States Supreme
    Court addressed a constitutional challenge to a California statute that made the status of narcotic
    addiction a criminal offense, “for which the offender may be prosecuted ‘at any time before he
    reforms.’” Id. at 666. Ultimately, the United States Supreme Court found that the statute in
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    question was unconstitutional because imprisoning those afflicted with drug addiction when it
    was possible that they had “never touched any narcotic drug within the State or been guilty of
    any irregular behavior there,” inflicted a “cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the
    Fourteenth Amendment.” Id. at 667.
    However, Robinson is not applicable because it does not speak to the factors a trial court
    may consider at sentencing. Robinson dealt with the constitutionality of a statute criminalizing
    addiction, but petitioner does not challenge the validity of the statutes under which her
    convictions were obtained and concedes that she violated them. Robinson simply fails to support
    petitioner’s assertion that an individual’s history of drug use may not be considered at
    sentencing.
    Furthermore, we have previously held that a sentencing court may consider a defendant’s
    prior criminal history and rehabilitative potential. See syl. pt. 2, State v. Buck, 
    173 W. Va. 243
    ,
    
    314 S.E.2d 406
     (1984) (holding that a sentencing court may consider codefendants’ respective
    involvement in the crime, prior records, rehabilitative potential, and lack of remorse). Here, the
    circuit court considered petitioner’s extensive prior drug use1 and her non-compliance with
    previous home incarceration regulations, and found a low likelihood of compliance with
    alternative sentencing. Buck permits consideration of a defendant’s prior criminal history, and
    petitioner’s prior drug use was considered as it related to her rehabilitative potential, which is
    also permissible under Buck. Thus, petitioner has failed to demonstrate error, and we find none.2
    1
    Petitioner also argues that the State’s estimated figures regarding her past drug use were
    improper to proffer to the circuit court. However, according to the record, the State’s estimated
    figures were based upon petitioner’s admissions within her presentence investigation report that
    she used illegal drugs daily for many years. Therefore, we do not find the State’s estimations
    improper.
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    Petitioner argues that the circuit court erred by not giving her the opportunity to “rebut
    the incorrect statements made by the prosecuting attorney, to argue that [petitioner’s] addiction
    was not a proper sentencing factor, nor did the court give [petitioner] the opportunity to make a
    statement herself in allocution.” However, petitioner completely fails to expound on this
    argument and thus fails to comply with Rule 10(c)(7) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
    Procedure, which requires that the brief contain an
    argument exhibiting clearly the points of fact and law presented, the standard of
    review applicable, and citing the authorities relied on, under headings that
    correspond with the assignments of error. The argument must contain appropriate
    and specific citations to the record on appeal, including citations that pinpoint
    when and how the issues in the assignments of error were presented to the lower
    tribunal. The Court may disregard errors that are not adequately supported by
    specific references to the record on appeal.
    Accordingly, we decline to address this issue.
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    Second, petitioner argues that this Court should reconsider and overturn its holding in
    Syllabus Point 4 of Goodnight. In support of this argument, petitioner asserts several public
    policy arguments that sentencing among the circuit courts is inconsistent and that the lack of
    uniformity in sentencing violates a defendant’s equal protection and due process rights.
    Petitioner’s counsel anecdotally argues that, in his experience, petitioner would likely have
    received probation for her convictions if she had been sentenced in another county. However,
    petitioner’s counsel’s assertions are purely speculative, and petitioner cites no authority that
    discretion in sentencing is unconstitutional. Therefore, we decline to overturn our long-standing
    and often cited holding in Syllabus Point 4 of Goodnight, and find petitioner is entitled to no
    relief in this regard.
    For the foregoing reasons, the circuit court’s May 4, 2018, sentencing order is hereby
    affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: November 8, 2019
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Tim Armstead
    Justice Evan H. Jenkins
    Justice John A. Hutchison
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