Clarence, Mary and Jacob Glaspell v. Taylor County Board of Education ( 2014 )


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  •                             STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    Clarence Glaspell, Mary Glaspell,                                                 FILED
    and Jacob Glaspell                                                           November 3, 2014
    Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners                                                RORY L. PERRY II, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    vs) No. 14-0175 (Taylor County 09-C-55)
    Taylor County Board of Education,
    Defendant Below, Respondent
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioners Clarence Glaspell, Mary Glaspell, and Jacob Glaspell, by counsel LaVerne
    Sweeney, appeal the Circuit Court of Taylor County’s December 16, 2013, order granting
    summary judgment to respondent. Respondent Taylor County Board of Education, by counsel
    Keith C. Gamble and Kenneth L. Hopper, respond in support of the circuit court’s order.
    Petitioners also filed a reply.
    This Court has considered the parties= briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s order is appropriate under Rule 21
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    I. Factual and Procedural Background
    On June 2, 2008, Jacob Glaspell (then a minor) was choked by Jesse Murphy while both
    were enrolled as students at Grafton High School (“GHS”).1 The incident occurred in the school
    on a ramp adjacent to the choral department, and several administrators were involved in
    responding to and investigating the incident, including David Knotts, the principal at GHS
    during the 2007-2008 school year; Lori Shumaker, an assistant principal; and Mary Tucker, an
    assistant principal. The school determined that Jacob Glaspell, Jesse Murphy, and other students
    were engaged in horseplay. After the incident, several students informed Mrs. Tucker that they
    were playing the “choking game”.2 According to school administrators, prior to this incident,
    1
    While respondent does not appear to dispute that Petitioner Jacob Glaspell was injured
    as a result of being choked, neither petitioners nor respondent set forth the type or extent of his
    injuries.
    2
    It is this Court’s understanding that the choking game involves restricting blood flow to
    the brain by squeezing or applying pressure to the neck and that once the pressure is released, the
    individual experiences a high.
    1
    they had no knowledge of the choking game. While some school administrators reviewed video
    of the incident, attempts to save the video failed when trying to load it onto disks and the video is
    no longer available to view.3
    Petitioners Mary and Clarence Glaspell filed the original civil action in the Magistrate
    Court of Taylor County on March 20, 2009. On August 14, 2009, the action was removed to the
    Circuit Court of Taylor County, where it was largely inactive until February 15, 2011, when an
    order was entered permitting petitioners to amend their pleadings to add Jacob Glaspell as a
    plaintiff and the Taylor County Board of Education (“the Board”) as a defendant. On April 7,
    2012, petitioners filed an amended complaint adding those parties. The amended complaint
    contained only one claim of negligence against the Board. Petitioners filed a second motion to
    amend their complaint wherein they requested to add Jesse Murphy as a defendant, and that
    motion was granted. The second amended complaint contained the same allegation of negligence
    against the Board as the first amended complaint. Petitioners then sought permission to file a
    third amended complaint to add additional claims of negligence against the Board. That motion
    was granted, but the third amended complaint was never served on the Board or its counsel.
    Following the close of discovery, the Board filed a motion for summary judgment. On
    November 7, 2013, the circuit court heard oral argument on the motion. Shortly thereafter, the
    circuit court executed an order indicating that it was prepared to grant summary judgment in
    favor of the Board. The court directed counsel for the parties to submit proposed findings of fact
    and conclusions of law, and the parties complied. The circuit court then executed the Board’s
    “Order Granting Defendant, Taylor County Board of Education’s motion for Summary
    Judgment” on December 16, 2013. Petitioners appeal from that order.
    II. Standard of Review
    Petitioners appeal the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment to respondent. Our
    standard of review for such order is de novo. Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 
    451 S.E.2d 755
    (1994) (“A circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo.”); Syl. Pt.
    2, Wickland v. Am. Travellers Life Ins. Co., 204 W.Va. 430, 
    513 S.E.2d 657
    (1998).
    III. Discussion
    On appeal to this Court, petitioners assert six assignments of error. First, petitioners argue
    that respondent was negligent as to the supervisory coverage ratio in the school cafeteria
    immediately prior to the subject injury. Petitioners contend that respondent had a duty to protect
    and serve the students and that part of the duty was to protect them from being harmed or
    distracted by students who lose interest in learning and focus on being disruptive. In addition,
    petitioners argue that respondent was required to safeguard the health and well-being of the
    children to protect them while participating in the lunch program from the time they leave the
    classroom for lunch until they return to the classroom at the conclusion of lunch. Petitioners
    argue that West Virginia Code § 18-5-18a, “Maximum teacher-pupil ratio,” is applicable in the
    3
    Petitioners admit that they were able to view the video of the incident on June 2, 2008.
    2
    cafeteria setting at the high school. However, that statute relates solely to the teacher-pupil ratio
    in the classroom for students in kindergarten through sixth grade. Petitioners fail to cite to any
    statutes or cases that set forth a teacher-pupil ratio for the cafeteria or other non-classroom
    settings. There were two to three teachers in the cafeteria during the lunch period. Further, the
    student who caused Petitioner Jacob Glaspell’s injuries did so outside of the cafeteria. Therefore,
    we find that the circuit court did not err in granting summary judgment on this ground.
    Petitioners’ second, third, fourth, and fifth assignments of error all relate to supervision of
    the students. In petitioners’ second assignment of error, they allege that respondent was negligent
    because its supervisory personnel failed to see up to ten students engaged in a choking game.
    This alleged error relates to petitioners’ fourth assignment of error that respondent was negligent
    because the choking games had been taking place for decades amongst youth and there had been
    nationally reported incidents of such games. Petitioners contend that respondent and
    respondents’ employees should have known of the students’ propensity to engage in choking
    game activities. They also assert that it was foreseeable that the students would continue
    participating in this game after leaving the cafeteria. Therefore, petitioners allege that
    respondent’s employees breached their supervisory duties. In response to respondent’s motion
    for summary judgment below, petitioners submitted an affidavit that included data concerning
    the choking game. Petitioners now cite to “publications” which include articles from Wikipedia
    and the Centers for Disease Control, arguing that the articles were easily available through a
    number of news sources prior to the subject incident.
    Respondent admits that its employees did not notice the students involved in a choking
    game in the cafeteria. However, there is no dispute that Jesse Murphy did not have a history of
    violence, and there were no known issues between Mr. Murphy and Petitioner Jacob Glaspell.
    Respondent also asserts that neither it nor its employees were aware of the existence of the
    choking game at the time of this incident. “Black’s Law Dictionary defines ‘actual knowledge’
    as ‘direct and clear knowledge, as distinguished from constructive knowledge,’ Black’s Law
    Dictionary at 888 (8th Ed.2004), and defines ‘actual notice’ as ‘[n]otice given directly to, or
    received personally by, a party.’ 
    Id. at 1090.”
    Mace v. Ford Motor Co., 221 W.Va. 198, 204, 
    653 S.E.2d 660
    , 666 (2007). Petitioners fail to cite to any evidence proving that respondent or its
    employees had actual knowledge or notice of the existence of this game in order to be on watch
    for the same. It is not feasible for school employees to be able to see what every student is doing
    in the cafeteria and hallways at every moment throughout a school day, particularly at the high
    school level. For these reasons, we find that the circuit court did not err in granting summary
    judgment to respondent on these grounds.
    Petitioners’ third assignment of error is that respondent was negligent because it was not
    monitoring the video feeds from the cafeteria during a lunch period while students were present.
    Petitioners argue that because the school had sixteen working video cameras positioned
    throughout the school at the time of the incident, an employee should have been positioned in the
    office constantly watching the video feed. In essence, petitioners contend that if a school
    employee had been monitoring the feed, the students’ activities leading up to and at the time of
    the incident would have been observed and stopped. In their related fifth assignment of error,
    petitioners contend that respondent was negligent because the hallways were inadequately
    supervised when students were present. They argue that when masses of students are to be in the
    3
    hallways, an ounce of prevention beats a pound of cure, again asserting that respondent was
    negligent in failing to have the supervision in place to prevent this incident.
    As set forth above, it is virtually impossible for school employees to be able to see what
    every student is doing at every moment throughout the school. As a practical matter, it is
    doubtful that a school employee would be able to simultaneously watch the video feeds from all
    sixteen cameras and prevent wrongdoing by students. Again, petitioners base their arguments on
    speculation that constant monitoring of the video feeds would have prevented this incident.
    Similarly, they assert that having a sufficient number of teachers in the hallways might have
    prevented this incident. Petitioners fail to present any evidence that the hallways were
    inadequately supervised, and they cite no law in support of this assignment of error. As set forth
    by the circuit court, without a breach of duty giving rise to the claim of negligence, respondent is
    entitled to immunity under the Governmental Tort Claims and Reform Act. W.Va. Code §§ 29­
    12A-1 to -18 (2013). Therefore, we find no error in the circuit court’s grant of summary
    judgment to respondent on this issue.
    Petitioner’s sixth and final assignment of error is that petitioners offered adequate
    evidence in response to a motion for summary judgment to establish that a genuine issue of fact
    existed as to whether respondent was negligent. In support of this argument, petitioners assert
    that they offered evidence to support each of their contentions of error set forth herein.
    Petitioners argue that any lack of evidence is due to the spoliation of evidence by the Board’s
    employees.4 Petitioners do not allege that respondent or its employees intentionally deleted the
    video footage, and it is undisputed that petitioners viewed the same. There do not appear to be
    factual disputes regarding the number of Board employees in any location in the school, and
    respondent admits that there were no employees constantly monitoring the video feed. Thus, it is
    unclear what the video would show that was not already in evidence for consideration by the
    circuit court. Pursuant to Rule 56 of the West Virginia Rules of Civil Procedure, summary
    judgment is proper where the record demonstrates “that there is no genuine issue as to any
    material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In this case,
    “the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with
    affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving
    party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” W.Va.R.Civ.P. 56(c). Therefore, we find that
    the circuit court did not err in finding that petitioners did not offer adequate evidence in response
    to respondent’s motion for summary judgment.
    For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the circuit court did not err in granting
    summary judgment in favor of respondent. Accordingly, we affirm.
    Affirmed.
    4
    While petitioners do not assert a specific assignment of error related to spoliation of
    evidence, they argue the same as part of their contention that respondent was not entitled to
    summary judgment. After some school employees and petitioners viewed video footage from the
    date of the incident, school personnel were attempting to copy the footage. However, they were
    unsuccessful and the footage was reportedly accidentally deleted.
    4
    ISSUED: November 3, 2014
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Robin Jean Davis
    Justice Brent D. Benjamin
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Menis E. Ketchum
    Justice Allen H. Loughry II
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 14-0175

Filed Date: 11/3/2014

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 11/3/2014