State of West Virginia v. A.D. ( 2019 )


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  •        IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
    September 2019 Term
    FILED
    November 22, 2019
    No. 18-0480                        released at 3:00 p.m.
    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
    Plaintiff Below, Respondent
    V.
    A.D.,
    Defendant Below, Petitioner
    ________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of Harrison County
    The Honorable James A. Matish, Judge
    Criminal Action No. 16-P-138-3
    REVERSED AND REMANDED
    _________________________________________________________
    Submitted: October 1, 2019
    Filed: November 22, 2019
    J. Michael Benninger                      Patrick Morrisey
    Benninger Law PLLC                        Attorney General
    Morgantown, West Virginia                 Elizabeth Davis Grant
    Attorney for Petitioner                   Assistant Attorney General
    Charleston, West Virginia
    Attorneys for Respondent
    JUSTICE JENKINS delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    i
    SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
    1.     “This Court reviews a circuit court’s order granting or denying
    expungement of criminal records for an abuse of discretion.” Syllabus point 1, In re A.N.T.,
    
    238 W. Va. 701
    , 
    798 S.E.2d 623
     (2017).
    2.     “A statutory provision which is clear and unambiguous and plainly
    expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted by the courts but will be given full
    force and effect.” Syllabus point 2, State v. Epperly, 
    135 W. Va. 877
    , 
    65 S.E.2d 488
    (1951).
    3.     “It is well established that the word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language
    in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part of the Legislature, should be afforded
    a mandatory connotation.” Syllabus point 1, Nelson v. West Virginia Public Employees
    Insurance Board, 
    171 W. Va. 445
    , 
    300 S.E.2d 86
     (1982).
    4.     “Penal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and in favor
    of the defendant.” Syllabus point 3, State ex rel. Carson v. Wood, 
    154 W. Va. 397
    , 
    175 S.E.2d 482
     (1970).
    5.     West Virginia Code § 60A-4-402(c) (2014) mandates that if a
    defendant who has been found guilty of a first offense for distributing less than fifteen
    grams of marihuana without any remuneration, and satisfies the conditions of West
    i
    Virginia Code § 60A-4-407 (2014), then the defendant is entitled to expungement of any
    record of his or her arrest directly connected to the offense as required by West Virginia
    Code § 60A-4-407(b).
    ii
    Jenkins, Justice:
    Petitioner A.D. 1 herein appeals from the April 15, 2018 order of the Circuit
    Court of Harrison County that denied her petition for expungement of her felony charge.
    A.D. contends that the circuit court erred when it denied her petition for expungement of a
    felony charge under West Virginia Code §§ 60A-4-407(a) and (b) (LexisNexis 2014) after
    she had pleaded guilty to a related misdemeanor charge subsequently filed under § 60A-4-
    401(c) (LexisNexis 2014); served a term of probation, and fully satisfied all requirements
    of West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b), and the case against her had been dismissed.
    Having considered the briefs submitted on appeal, the appendix record, the parties’ oral
    arguments, and the applicable legal authority, we find that the circuit court erred in denying
    A.D.’s petition for expungement of her felony charge. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit
    court’s final order and remand this case with instructions to expunge the records of A.D.’s
    felony charge pursuant to West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b).
    I.
    FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
    On December 22, 2013, A.D. was involved in a car accident in Harrison
    County, West Virginia. Passengers in A.D.’s vehicle gave statements to law enforcement
    that, while driving, she was smoking a marihuana cigarette with them. Following an
    1
    It is this Court’s customary practice in cases involving sensitive facts to
    refer to parties by their initials rather than by their given names. See In re Jeffrey R.L., 
    190 W. Va. 24
    , 26 n.1, 
    435 S.E.2d 162
    , 164 n.1 (1993).
    1
    investigation, Trooper First Class Joseph M. Bush (“Trooper Bush”), of the West Virginia
    State Police obtained an arrest warrant in magistrate court nine months later, on September
    2, 2014, and arrested A.D. for the felony offense of possession of marihuana2 with intent
    to deliver, pursuant to West Virginia Code § 60A-4-401(a)(ii).3 On September 16, 2014,
    A.D. appeared with her counsel, and she was given a personal recognizance bond. The
    same day, she waived her preliminary hearing, and the felony matter was placed in bound-
    over status in the circuit court.
    On October 9, 2015, nearly twenty-two months after the automobile accident,
    the Harrison County Prosecutor’s Office (“the State”) filed a criminal complaint, charging
    A.D. with the misdemeanor offense of unlawful possession of marihuana based upon the
    2
    Marihuana is a Schedule I controlled substance. See W. Va. Code § 60A-
    2-204(d) (LexisNexis 2014).
    3
    West Virginia Code § 60A-4-401(a)(ii) (LexisNexis 2014) states:
    (a) Except as authorized by this act, it is unlawful for any
    person to manufacture, deliver, or possess with intent to
    manufacture or deliver, a controlled substance.
    Any person who violates this subsection with respect to:
    ....
    (ii) Any other controlled substance classified in Schedule I, II,
    or III is guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, may be
    imprisoned in the state correctional facility for not less than
    one year nor more than five years, or fined not more than
    fifteen thousand dollars, or both[.]
    2
    same conduct underlying the felony arrest warrant filed by Trooper Bush on September 2,
    2014. A.D. pleaded guilty to the misdemeanor offense of possession of less than fifteen
    grams of marihuana without remuneration, as set out in West Virginia Code § 60A-4-
    401(c),4 and was sentenced to six months of unsupervised probation. Because she was a
    first-time offender for possession of marihuana, the matter was held open, pending the
    completion of her probation, at which time the matter would be dismissed pursuant to West
    Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(a).5
    4
    West Virginia Code § 60A-4-401(c) (LexisNexis 2014) states:
    It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally
    to possess a controlled substance unless the substance was
    obtained directly from, or pursuant to, a valid prescription or
    order of a practitioner while acting in the course of his
    professional practice, or except as otherwise authorized by this
    act. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty of a
    misdemeanor, and disposition may be made under section four
    hundred seven [§ 60A-4-407] of this article, subject to the
    limitations specified in said section, or upon conviction, such
    person may be confined in jail not less than ninety days nor
    more than six months, or fined not more than one thousand
    dollars, or both: Provided, That notwithstanding any other
    provision of this act to the contrary, any first offense for
    possession of Synthetic Cannabinoids as defined by
    subdivision (32) subsection, (d), section 101 [§ 60A-4-101],
    article 1 of this chapter; 3,4-methylenedioxypyrovalerone
    (MPVD) and 3,4-methylenedioxypyrovalerone and/or
    mephedrone as defined in subsection (f), section 101, article 1
    of this chapter; or less than 15 grams of marijuana, shall be
    disposed of under said section.
    5
    West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(a) (LexisNexis 2014) states, in relevant
    part:
    Whenever any person who has not previously been
    convicted of any offense under this chapter or under any statute
    3
    On October 13, 2015, the State and A.D. filed a joint motion in circuit court
    to dismiss with prejudice her felony case for possession of marihuana with intent to
    distribute. The judge entered an agreed order dismissing the felony case, with prejudice.
    Following the expiration of A.D.’s unsupervised probation, the misdemeanor offense was
    dismissed in magistrate court on April 19, 2016.
    With both matters having been dismissed, A.D. filed a petition for the
    expungement of her criminal record—both the felony charge and the misdemeanor
    offense—on August 16, 2016, and she subsequently filed an amended petition for
    expungement on October 27, 2016. The circuit court held a hearing on A.D.’s amended
    petition for expungement on November 3, 2016. A.D.’s counsel argued that her entire
    criminal record should be expunged under West Virginia Code § 60A-4-401(c) and West
    of the United States or of any state relating to narcotic drugs,
    marihuana, or stimulant, depressant, or hallucinogenic drugs,
    pleads guilty to or is found guilty of possession of a controlled
    substance under section 401(c) [§60A-4-401], the court,
    without entering a judgment of guilt and with the consent of
    the accused, may defer further proceedings and place him or
    her on probation upon terms and conditions. Upon violation of
    a term or condition, the court may enter an adjudication of guilt
    and proceed as otherwise provided. Upon fulfillment of the
    terms and conditions, the court shall discharge the person and
    dismiss the proceedings against him or her. Discharge and
    dismissal under this section shall be without adjudication of
    guilt and is not a conviction for purposes of this section or for
    purposes of disqualifications or disabilities imposed by law
    upon conviction of a crime, including the additional penalties
    imposed for second or subsequent convictions under section
    408 [§ 60A-4-408]. . . .
    4
    Virginia Code §§ 60A-4-407(a) and (b) because “the amount [of marihuana in A.D.’s
    possession] was so small that it clearly, factually qualified for a less than 15 grams under
    401(c).” At the hearing, the State did not object to the expungement of either the felony or
    the misdemeanor records. The State further averred:
    There was at no point in time that [the former
    prosecuting attorney], myself, or the office believed that the
    charge was appropriate or fair when it was charged as a
    delivery of a controlled substance when you have 20 year old
    children, for lack of a better word, or young adults passing
    around a marijuana cigarette.
    ....
    Your Honor, and I by no stretch of the imagination am trying
    to disparage Trooper Bush’s name, but the appropriate charge
    out of this would have potentially been a DUI or a DUI with
    injury. Both of these would be misdemeanor offenses. For
    whatever reason, [Trooper Bush] did not file his charges within
    a year of this accident. In fact, this felony charge was filed
    well after the year of this accident. The only thing he had left
    following a year was a felony charge.
    The appropriate charge probably could have been a
    DUI, which would’ve been a misdemeanor, but Trooper Bush
    did not meet his statute of limitations, and I’m not really sure
    if he felt that it was better to throw something at [A.D.] as
    opposed to nothing, but he came up with this felony charge.
    Never, in the history of my tenure as a prosecutor, have
    I seen a young adult charged with delivery of a controlled
    substance for smoking a joint with her friends. Yes, it’s illegal,
    but that is not the intent behind the distribution statute, Your
    Honor.
    . . . . Ultimately, it was decided that this was an
    inappropriate charge, that this young lady did not deserve to be
    saddled with a felony for her actions as far as distribution goes.
    ....
    5
    That is the State’s position. I do not have an objection
    to expungement of either type[.]
    Despite this testimony from the State, the circuit court concluded that it could not expunge
    the record of the felony charge, because, contrary to the representations made by the State,
    the misdemeanor plea was entered in exchange for the dismissal of the felony. See 
    W. Va. Code § 61-11-25
     (LexisNexis 2014) (prohibiting expungement where charges have been
    dismissed in exchange for a plea of guilty to another charge). The circuit court also
    summarily rejected A.D.’s expungement argument based on West Virginia Code § 60A-4-
    407(b).
    On April 15, 2018, the circuit court entered an order expunging the
    misdemeanor plea, but denying A.D.’s petition for expungement of the records relating to
    her felony arrest. The circuit court found that it had the authority to expunge the
    misdemeanor offense pursuant to West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b), but declined to
    expunge the felony record, finding that West Virginia Code § 61-11-25 does not allow for
    the expungement of offenses that are dismissed in exchange for a guilty plea to another
    offense. A.D. now appeals the April 15, 2018 order that denied her motion to expunge the
    records related to her felony arrest.
    6
    II.
    STANDARD OF REVIEW
    On appeal, “[t]his Court reviews a circuit court’s order granting or denying
    expungement of criminal records for an abuse of discretion.” Syl. pt. 1, In re A.N.T., 
    238 W. Va. 701
    , 
    798 S.E.2d 623
     (2017). To resolve the instant matter, “[w]here the issue on
    an appeal from the circuit court is clearly a question of law or involving an interpretation
    of a statute, we apply a de novo standard of review.” Syl. pt. 1, Chrystal R.M. v. Charlie
    A.L., 
    194 W. Va. 138
    , 
    459 S.E.2d 415
     (1995). With these standards in mind, we now
    address the issue presented.
    III.
    DISCUSSION
    The parties agree that A.D.’s felony arrest was based upon her circulation of
    a cigarette containing less than fifteen grams of marihuana and that she received no
    remuneration. A.D. contends that the circuit court abused its discretion and erred when it
    wrongly applied West Virginia Code § 61-11-25 and refused to expunge the record of her
    first-offense felony arrest for possession of marihuana with intent to deliver. She also
    argues that, the circuit court abused its discretion when it refused to expunge her felony
    record under West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b) after she pled guilty to misdemeanor
    possession under § 401(c), complied with the terms of her probation granted under
    § 407(a), and satisfied all of the requirements under § 407(b). The State argues that West
    7
    Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b) applies only to first offense possession, a misdemeanor;
    therefore, it cannot apply to A.D. insofar as she was arrested for distribution, a felony. We
    agree with A.D.’s interpretation of the relevant statutes.
    At issue in this case are two distinct expungement statutes, West Virginia
    Code § 61-11-25, which is the general expungement statute, and West Virginia Code
    § 60A-4-407(b), which applies to certain specific first-time offenders. We find West
    Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b) is the provision that should have been applied to A.D. by
    the circuit court.
    A.D. was originally charged under West Virginia Code § 60A-4-401(a)(ii),
    which is a provision of the Uniform Controlled Substances Act. This was A.D.’s first drug-
    related offense, and it involved less than fifteen grams of marihuana.6 The fact that A.D.’s
    charge involved a first-offense of distributing less than fifteen grams of marihuana, gives
    rise to another provision of the Act, West Virginia Code § 60A-4-402(c). West Virginia
    Code § 60A-4-402(c) expressly states that, “[n]otwithstanding any other provision of this
    chapter to the contrary, any first offense for distributing less than 15 grams of marihuana
    without any remuneration shall be disposed of under section 407 [§ 60A-4-407].”
    (Emphasis added). The foregoing language is plain and mandatory. See, e.g., Syl. pt. 2,
    6
    The parties do not dispute that the offense involved less than fifteen grams
    of marihuana. The parties also do not dispute that the original charge—under West
    Virginia Code § 60A-4-401(a)(ii)—was not the appropriate charge. See supra Part I, at 5-
    6.
    8
    State v. Epperly, 
    135 W. Va. 877
    , 
    65 S.E.2d 488
     (1951) (“A statutory provision which is
    clear and unambiguous and plainly expresses the legislative intent will not be interpreted
    by the courts but will be given full force and effect.”). See also Syl. pt. 1, Nelson v. W. Va.
    Pub. Emp.s Ins. Bd., 
    171 W. Va. 445
    , 
    300 S.E.2d 86
     (1982) (“It is well established that the
    word ‘shall,’ in the absence of language in the statute showing a contrary intent on the part
    of the Legislature, should be afforded a mandatory connotation.”). Therefore, because
    A.D.’s felony case concerned a “first offense for distributing less than 15 grams of
    marihuana without any remuneration,” West Virginia Code § 60A-4-402(c) requires that
    the matter be disposed of under West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407.
    The provision of West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407 applicable to the instant
    matter is found in subsection (b), which clearly and unambiguously mandates expungement
    upon the fulfillment of certain conditions:
    After a period of not less than six months which shall
    begin to run immediately upon the expiration of a term of
    probation imposed upon any person under this chapter, the
    person may apply to the court for an order to expunge from all
    official records all recordations of his or her arrest, trial, and
    conviction, pursuant to this section. If the court determines
    after a hearing that the person during the period of his or her
    probation and during the period of time prior to his or her
    application to the court under this section has not been guilty
    of any serious or repeated violation of the conditions of his or
    her probation, it shall order the expungement.
    W. Va. Code § 60A-4-407(b) (emphasis added). Under the language of § 60A-4-407(b),
    once a term of probation “imposed upon any person” under Chapter 60A has ended, that
    9
    person may then apply for expungement. (Emphasis added). After such an application has
    been made, the lower court must then hold a hearing in order to determine whether, “during
    the period of time prior to his or her application to the court under this section [the
    appellant] has [ ] been guilty of any serious or repeated violation of the conditions of his
    or her probation.” Id. If no such violation is found, the lower court “shall order the
    expungement.” Id. A.D. satisfied each of these requirements.
    We find further support for our application of the foregoing statutes in this
    Court’s decision in State v. Carper, 
    176 W. Va. 309
    , 
    342 S.E.2d 277
     (1986). In Carper,
    the defendant pleaded guilty to the delivery of less than fifteen grams of marihuana without
    remuneration. After pleading guilty, the defendant’s counsel argued that, under West
    Virginia Code § 60A-4-402(c), his client was entitled to mandatory probation pursuant to
    West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407. The circuit court disagreed, and found that under its
    interpretation of the law, West Virginia Code § 60A-4-402(c) did not apply to the
    defendant. As such, the defendant did not receive probation, and he was sentenced.
    On appeal, the defendant argued that §§ 60A-4-402(c) and 60A-4-407 of the
    West Virginia Code should be read together, and therefore, probation should be mandatory.
    This Court agreed with the defendant’s argument, and commented that “[t]his result is
    reached because W. Va. Code, 60A-4-402(c), states that a person whose first drug-related
    offense is distributing less than fifteen grams of marihuana without remuneration ‘shall be
    10
    disposed of under’ W. Va. Code, 60A-4-407.” State v. Carper, 
    176 W. Va. 309
     at 311,
    
    342 S.E.2d 277
     at 279. The Carper Court explained that,
    the actual language of W. Va. Code, 60A-4-402(c), is not
    confined to W. Va. Code, 60A-4-402[] offenses, as it is
    prefaced with the following language: “Notwithstanding any
    other provision of this chapter [Chapter 60A] to the contrary.”
    (Emphasis added). We cannot ignore this language. Under our
    customary rules of statutory construction, we have often held
    that the legislature is presumed to intend that every word used
    in a statute has a specific purpose. State ex rel. Johnson v.
    Robinson, 
    162 W. Va. 579
    , 
    251 S.E.2d 505
     (1979); Wooddell
    v. Dailey, 
    160 W. Va. 65
    , 
    230 S.E.2d 466
     (1976).
    Carper, 
    176 W. Va. 309
     at 312, 
    342 S.E.2d 277
     at 280.
    Furthermore, as Carper recognized, the Uniform Controlled Substances Act,
    in particular § 60A-4-407(b), identifies the consequences of drug-related charges among
    young adults and, thus, provides for remedial efforts, such as probation, when only a small
    amount of marihuana is involved:
    This Court takes notice of the pervasive abuse of controlled
    drugs among adolescents and young adults too inexperienced
    to be aware of the dangers of narcotics. The Uniform
    Controlled Substances Act, W. Va. Code, 60A-4-401(c) and
    60A-4-407 [1971] recognize[s] this problem by making first
    offense possession of under 15 grams of marihuana a
    misdemeanor with mandatory probation.
    Carper, 176 W. Va. at 311, 
    342 S.E.2d at 279
     (1986) (quoting State v. Dudick, 
    158 W. Va. 629
    , 
    213 S.E.2d 458
    , 467 (1975)). The Carper Court noted further, that
    Dudick’s comment on mandatory probation was
    reinforced when we spoke to the interaction between W. Va.
    Code, 60A-4-401, and W. Va. Code, 60A-4-407, in State v.
    11
    Barnett, 
    161 W. Va. 6
    , 
    240 S.E.2d 540
     (1977). In Barnett, the
    defendant had a previous drug-related offense and we said that
    in this situation a court “is under no mandatory duty to dispose
    of the case in accordance with the provisions of W. Va. Code,
    1931, 60A-4-407, as amended.” Syllabus Point 1, in part, State
    v. Barnett, 
    supra.
     The clear implication of Barnett is that if the
    defendant had not had a prior drug-related offense, probation
    would have been mandated under W. Va. Code, 60A-4-407.
    Carper, 176 W. Va. at 311, 
    342 S.E.2d at 279-80
    . Finally, the Carper Court explained that
    The implicit point made in Dudick is that where the
    legislature has mandated probation treatment in one section of
    the Uniform Controlled Substances Act, the section dealing
    with probation, W. Va. Code, 60A-4-407, [it] must be treated
    as mandatory. This is precisely the point in this case, with
    W. Va. Code, 60A-4-402(c), mandating treatment under the
    probation section, W. Va. Code, 60A-4-407.
    The underlying premise of Dudick was that the
    legislature intended that less than fifteen grams of marihuana
    might be possessed by young adults who were unaware of its
    dangers. The same may be said of an unremunerative delivery
    of less than fifteen grams of marihuana between friends.
    Carper, 
    176 W. Va. 309
     at 312, 
    342 S.E.2d 277
     at 281.
    The foregoing reasoning applies not only to probation under West Virginia
    Code § 60A-4-407(a), but applies with equal strength to the expungement provision found
    in West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b). This is particularly true in light of the fact that
    “[p]enal statutes must be strictly construed against the State and in favor of the defendant.”
    Syl. pt. 3, State ex rel. Carson v. Wood, 
    154 W. Va. 397
    , 
    175 S.E.2d 482
     (1970). Indeed,
    the case at hand perfectly illustrates the legislature’s intent and policy considerations in
    12
    allowing remedial measures under § 60A-4-407: a young woman was wrongly charged
    with a felony and she does not deserve to be burdened with a felony arrest record for the
    rest of her life.7 Accordingly, based upon the foregoing analysis, we hold that West
    Virginia Code § 60A-4-402(c) (2014) mandates that if a defendant who has been found
    guilty of a first offense for distributing less than fifteen grams of marihuana without any
    remuneration, and satisfies the conditions of West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407 (2014), then
    the defendant is entitled to expungement of any record of his or her arrest directly
    connected to the offense as required by West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b).
    Applying this holding to the instant case, we find that A.D. is entitled to
    mandatory expungement of her felony record under West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b).8
    A.D. is a first-time offender whose drug-related offense involved distributing less than
    fifteen grams of marihuana without remuneration. Therefore, pursuant to West Virginia
    Code § 60A-4-402(c), she was entitled to apply for expungement under West Virginia
    7
    West Virginia’s Uniform Controlled Substances Act is based upon a model
    act adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in 1970,
    and West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407 is based upon Section 407 of the model act. The
    reporter’s notes to the model act indicate that individuals who qualify for consideration
    under Section 407 “are either casual drug users or experimenters[.]” UNIFORM
    CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 407, Comment (1970) (in Handbook of the National
    Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws 251 (1970)). The reporter’s notes
    go on to state that Section 407 was drafted to “provide[] for confidentiality of the
    defendant’s record” and to “preclude any permanent criminal record from attaching to and
    following the individual in later life.” Id.
    8
    It should be noted that A.D. was not adjudged guilty.
    13
    Code § 60A-4-407(b) after successfully completing her probation, and satisfying the six
    month waiting period. She applied in accordance with the provisions set forth in the statute;
    therefore, upon confirming that A.D. had not been guilty of any serious or repeated
    violation of the condition of her probation, the circuit court had a mandatory duty to grant
    her petition for expungement in accordance with the provisions of West Virginia Code
    § 60A-4-407(b).9
    We caution, however, that our holding should not be interpreted as a gateway
    to the expungement of felony records that are not plainly and unambiguously first offenses.
    In other words, we limit our holding to the facts of the present case which involves an
    undisputed first-time offender under the clear meaning of § 60A-4-402(c). Thus, this
    holding should not be construed to allow for the expungement of records when an
    individual is—for example—charged with a first offense of possession of less than 15
    grams of marihuana under § 60A-4-407(b) and simultaneously a more serious distribution
    charge such as the distribution of heroin. See, e.g., Hutchinson v. Dietrich, 
    183 W. Va. 25
    ,
    27, 
    393 S.E.2d 663
    , 665 (1990) (“This Court believes that the Legislature, in enacting
    W. Va. Code, 60A-4-402(c), did not intend that individuals involved in the traffic of drugs
    9
    A.D. raises two statutory arguments to support her position that her felony
    record should have been expunged by the circuit court. In light of our decision that the
    circuit court erred in failing to expunge her felony record under the mandatory provision
    in West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b), we need not address A.D.’s alternative argument
    that her felony record could have also been expunged under this State’s general
    expungement statute, West Virginia Code § 61-11-25.
    14
    other than marijuana be accorded special, mandatory probation. As previously indicated,
    the Legislature has been specific in W. Va. Code, 60A-4-402(c), as to the individuals
    entitled to special treatment, and in Carper the Court suggested that the Carper rule was
    not to be extended to those engaged in other types of drug activity.”). Under the facts of
    this scenario, an individual cannot manipulate the statute to obtain mandatory expungement
    of the heroin charge.10
    IV.
    CONCLUSION
    For the reasons set forth above, the April 15, 2018 order of the Circuit Court
    of Harrison County denying A.D.’s petition for expungement of her felony arrest is
    reversed, and this case is remanded with instructions to the Circuit Court of Harrison
    County to expunge A.D.’s felony record under West Virginia Code § 60A-4-407(b).
    Reversed and Remanded.
    10
    An individual also cannot manipulate the statute to obtain additional
    dismissals at a later time. “There may be only one discharge and dismissal under this
    section with respect to any person.” W. Va. Code § 60A-4-407(a).
    15