In Re K.E. & K.E. ( 2018 )


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  •           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
    January 2018 Term
    _______________                      FILED
    No. 17-0496                   February 20, 2018
    released at 3:00 p.m.
    _______________                  EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    OF WEST VIRGINIA
    In re K.E. & K.E.
    ____________________________________________________________
    Appeal from the Circuit Court of McDowell County
    The Honorable Booker T. Stephens, Judge
    Civil Action Nos. 16-JA-035, 036
    REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
    ____________________________________________________________
    Submitted: January 23, 2018
    Filed: February 20, 2018
    William O. Huffman, Esq.                  Patrick Morrisey, Esq.
    Law Office of William O. Huffman          Attorney General
    Princeton, West Virginia                  S. L. Evans, Esq.
    Counsel for the Petitioners               Assistant Attorney General
    C.G. and K.G. 	                           Charleston, West Virginia
    Counsel for the Respondent
    Department of Health and Human
    Resources
    Philip A. LaCaria, Esq.
    Law Office of Philip A. LaCaria
    Welch, West Virginia
    Guardian ad Litem to K.E. and K.E.
    JUSTICE WALKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
    SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
    1.     “Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are subject to
    de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse and neglect case, is tried upon the facts
    without a jury, the circuit court shall make a determination based upon the evidence and
    shall make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether such child is abused or
    neglected. These findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless clearly
    erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when, although there is evidence to support the
    finding, the reviewing court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a reviewing court may not
    overturn a finding simply because it would have decided the case differently, and it must
    affirm a finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible in light of the
    record viewed in its entirety.” Syllabus Point 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 
    196 W. Va. 223
    , 
    470 S.E.2d 177
     (1996).
    2.     “West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a) provides for grandparent preference
    in determining adoptive placement for a child where parental rights have been terminated
    and also incorporates a best interests analysis within that determination by including the
    requirement that the DHHR find that the grandparents would be suitable adoptive parents
    prior to granting custody to the grandparents. The statute contemplates that placement with
    grandparents is presumptively in the best interests of the child, and the preference for
    grandparent placement may be overcome only where the record reviewed in its entirety
    i
    establishes that such placement is not in the best interests of the child.” Syllabus Point 4,
    Napoleon S. v. Walker, 
    217 W. Va. 254
    , 
    617 S.E.2d 801
     (2005).
    3.     “By specifying in West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a)(3) that the home
    study must show that the grandparents ‘would be suitable adoptive parents,’ the Legislature
    has implicitly included the requirement for an analysis by the Department of Health and
    Human Resources and circuit courts of the best interests of the child, given all
    circumstances of the case.” Syllabus Point 5, Napoleon S. v. Walker, 
    217 W. Va. 254
    , 
    617 S.E.2d 801
     (2005).
    ii
    WALKER, Justice:
    Twins K.E. and K.E.1 were born dependent on drugs in April 2016. The
    West Virginia Department of Health and Human Resources (DHHR) immediately placed
    the Twins in foster care. Later, the Circuit Court of McDowell County terminated the
    parental rights of their biological parents, and both their foster parents and their paternal
    grandparents sought to provide the Twins with a permanent home. Relying on the
    “grandparent preference” contained in West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3) (2015), the
    circuit court selected the grandparents for permanent placement.
    At issue here is whether the circuit court correctly applied the grandparent
    preference in permanently placing the Twins. On the particular circumstances of the
    Twins’ case, and in light of our prior guidance regarding the application of that preference,
    we conclude that it did not. Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s order awarding
    permanent placement of the Twins to their paternal grandparents and remand this matter to
    the circuit court for entry of an order requiring DHHR to gradually transition K.E. and K.E.
    to the custody of C.G. and K.G., their foster parents.
    1
    We follow our traditional practice in cases involving sensitive facts and use initials
    to identify the parties rather than their full names. See In the Matter of Scottie D., 
    185 W.Va. 191
    , 192 n.1, 
    406 S.E.2d 214
    , 215 n.1 (1991).
    1
    I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND
    The Twins were born in April 2016 at Welch Community Hospital in
    McDowell County. Their mother, R.E., tested positive for cocaine, benzodiazepines, and
    Suboxone at their birth. Following delivery, the Twins tested positive for cocaine and
    showed signs of withdrawal. They were immediately transferred from Welch Community
    Hospital to Carilion Roanoke Memorial Hospital in Roanoke, Virginia (Roanoke
    Memorial), for treatment of their withdrawal symptoms. They remained at Roanoke
    Memorial for the first few weeks of their lives. R.E. did not accompany them from Welch,
    West Virginia, to Roanoke, Virginia, approximately 140 miles away.
    DHHR immediately took protective custody of the Twins. DHHR did not
    consider granting protective custody of the Twins to a member of R.E.’s family because
    she had previously told DHHR that they were not “appropriate.” Instead, DHHR placed
    the Twins with foster parents C.G. and K.G., who also cared for the Twins’ older, half-
    brother T.N.2 C.G. and K.G. reside in Mercer County, West Virginia, where they work
    and care for seven (7) other children. Yet, either C.G. or K.G. remained with the Twins at
    Roanoke Memorial through the Twins’ hospitalization.         No member of the Twins’
    biological family visited them at Roanoke Memorial or asked DHHR to do so.
    2
    C.G. and K.G. adopted T.N. in November 2016. R.E. is the biological mother of
    both T.N. and the Twins.
    2
    DHHR did not know the identity of the Twins’ biological father when they
    were born in April 2016. In May 2016, however, R.E.’s long-time boyfriend, E.N., told
    DHHR that he was “most likely” the Twins’ father. This could not be confirmed by DNA
    testing, though, until September 2016 due to E.N.’s lack of cooperation. According to
    DHHR reports, no biological relatives of the Twins—including E.N.’s parents—had
    expressed interest in giving the Twins a home as of November 2016. The Twins’ biological
    parents, E.N. and R.E., stopped attending proceedings in the Twins’ abuse and neglect case
    after May 2016, and they made no efforts to enter drug rehabilitation as directed by DHHR.
    Concluding that the biological parents’ actions “borderline[d] on abandonment,” the circuit
    court terminated their parental rights in December 2016. Meanwhile, the Twins remained
    in C.G. and K.G’s care. As of November 2016, C.G. and K.G had retained counsel and
    gained intervenor status in the Twins’ abuse and neglect case.
    In late December 2016 or early January 2017, E.N.’s mother, M.D. (the
    Twins’ paternal grandmother), contacted Child Protective Services Worker Amanda
    Starling (Starling) seeking permanent custody of the Twins. M.D. and Starling were
    already acquainted.     They had met because M.D. and her husband, D.D. (the
    Grandparents), served as guardians to another daughter of E.N.—the Twins’ half-sister.
    Starling followed up on M.D.’s call with a home visit. She then referred the case to
    DHHR’s adoption unit, where it was assigned to Lydia Lambert (Lambert), Region IV
    Adoption Specialist, in approximately January 2017.
    3
    The circuit court held a review hearing on March 23, 2017 to address the
    Twins’ permanent placement.3        During the hearing, the Twins’ guardian ad litem
    recommended that the Twins remain with the foster parents, C.G. and K.G. Lambert,
    speaking on behalf of DHHR, recommended that the Twins be permanently placed with
    the Grandparents because they were an approved foster home and they were guardians to
    the Twins’ half-sister. Lambert also stated that M.D. had told DHHR employee Marsha
    Phillips (Phillips) that she was interested in caring for the Twins if they were, in fact, her
    son’s children, as early as August 2016.
    The circuit court then questioned M.D., who confirmed that she had
    expressed interest in the Twins to Phillips in August 2016. She further represented that she
    had told the Twins’ foster mother that she wanted to care for the Twins if they proved to
    be her biological grandchildren. M.D. also stated that she called Starling “500 times” about
    the matter before late December 2016 or early January 2017. In response to questioning
    by the court, Starling flatly denied that M.D. contacted her before late December 2016 or
    early January 2017.
    3
    Counsel for DHHR, R.E., and E.N. appeared at the hearing, as did Starling and
    Lambert. C.G. and K.G. appeared by counsel and in person. Although M.D. was not a
    party to the Twins’ abuse and neglect proceeding, the circuit court invited M.D. to
    participate in the hearing after learning that she was waiting in the courtroom hallway. The
    circuit court also noted on the record during the March 2017 hearing that M.D. had
    submitted a letter. That letter was not included in the Appendix Record.
    4
    During the March 2017 hearing, it became apparent that the Twins’
    biological parents, R.E. and E.N., remained a part of the Grandparents’ lives. Starling
    testified that, in September 2016, she notified R.E. and E.N. of the Twins’ paternity by
    calling the only contact telephone number they had given her—the Grandparents’ home.
    Upon calling that telephone number, Starling spoke directly to R.E., who then shared the
    test results with E.N., who was also present in the home at the time. Starling also testified
    that E.N. entered the Grandparents’ home while she conducted the home visit in late 2016
    or early 2017. Finally, Starling testified that R.E. and E.N. live a few doors down from the
    Grandparents, in a house owned by the Grandparents. According to Starling, when parental
    rights are terminated due to drug use and the biological parent has not attempted
    rehabilitation, “there is no contact to be made between the terminated parents and the
    children.”
    Approximately one month later, on April 26, 2017, the circuit court ruled that
    the Twins should be permanently placed with their Grandparents. The circuit court
    explained,
    This goes against the recommendation of the guardian ad litem,
    but I feel that since these children are so young that—that they
    will not be affected. If they were much older, I think we—we
    would have a—would have a different outlook and a different
    result, but they’re one-year-old children or no more than two.
    They’re still babies. Also, I defer to blood relatives, I’ll just
    tell you, whenever that’s possible. Plus, the grandparents have
    a—is it a [sic.] half-sister? . . . That you already have of [the
    Twins]. So that will be the Court’s ruling. . . . —in the best
    interest of these children that they be returned to the
    grandparents.
    5
    The circuit court memorialized its bench ruling by Order entered on May 1,
    2017. C.G. and K.G. now appeal that order.
    II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
    We previously have explained the dual standard we apply when reviewing
    abuse and neglect cases such as this:
    Although conclusions of law reached by a circuit court are
    subject to de novo review, when an action, such as an abuse
    and neglect case, is tried upon the facts without a jury, the
    circuit court shall make a determination based upon the
    evidence and shall make findings of fact and conclusions of
    law as to whether such child is abused or neglected. These
    findings shall not be set aside by a reviewing court unless
    clearly erroneous. A finding is clearly erroneous when,
    although there is evidence to support the finding, the reviewing
    court on the entire evidence is left with the definite and firm
    conviction that a mistake has been committed. However, a
    reviewing court may not overturn a finding simply because it
    would have decided the case differently, and it must affirm a
    finding if the circuit court’s account of the evidence is plausible
    in light of the record viewed in its entirety.4
    With this standard at the fore, we consider the sole issue raised on appeal:
    whether the circuit court in this case correctly applied the grandparent preference found in
    West Virginia Code § 49-4-114(a)(3) in light of this Court’s prior guidance.
    4
    Syl. Pt. 1, In Interest of Tiffany Marie S., 
    196 W. Va. 223
    , 
    470 S.E.2d 177
     (1996).
    6
    III. ANALYSIS
    On appeal, C.G. and K.G. argue that a permanent placement with the
    Grandparents is not in the Twins’ best interest. They acknowledge the effect of the
    grandparent preference, but contend that the circuit court failed to account for pertinent
    record evidence that must be considered in conjunction with that preference, namely that
    (a) the Twins’ biological parents—whose parental rights have been terminated—have free
    access to the Grandparents’ home and live but two doors down the street in a home owned
    by the Grandparents; and (b) the Grandparents likely knew as early as May 2016 that the
    Twins were their grandchildren, yet took minimal steps to visit them or to obtain custody
    until December 2016. The Twins’ guardian ad litem filed a brief in which he echoes C.G.
    and K.G.’s arguments. Conversely, DHHR contends that the circuit court did not abuse its
    discretion by placing the Twins with their Grandparents because C.G. and K.G. failed to
    overcome the grandparent preference before the circuit court. We will examine the
    grandparent preference, then each of C.G. and K.G.’s arguments, in turn.
    The grandparent preference at issue in this case appears in West Virginia
    Code § 49-4-114(a)(3). That subsection states:
    For purposes of any placement of a child for adoption by the
    department, the department shall first consider the suitability
    and willingness of any known grandparent or grandparents to
    adopt the child. Once grandparents who are interested in
    adopting the child have been identified, the department shall
    conduct a home study evaluation, including home visits and
    individual interviews by a licensed social worker. If the
    department determines, based on the home study evaluation,
    that the grandparents would be suitable adoptive parents, it
    7
    shall assure that the grandparents are offered the placement of
    the child prior to the consideration of any other prospective
    adoptive parents.[5]
    As we have previously explained, “[t]he Legislature adopted the so-called
    ‘grandparent preference’ to govern the adoption of children whose parents’ parental rights
    have been terminated through abuse and neglect proceedings.”6
    The preference is just that—a preference. It is not absolute. As this Court
    has emphasized, the child’s best interest remains paramount:
    West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a) provides for grandparent
    preference in determining adoptive placement for a child
    where parental rights have been terminated and also
    incorporates a best interests analysis within that determination
    by including the requirement that the DHHR find that the
    grandparents would be suitable adoptive parents prior to
    granting custody to the grandparents. The statute contemplates
    that placement with grandparents is presumptively in the best
    interests of the child, and the preference for grandparent
    placement may be overcome only where the record reviewed
    in its entirety establishes that such placement is not in the best
    interests of the child.
    By specifying in West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a) that the home
    study must show that the grandparents “would be suitable
    adoptive parents,” the Legislature has implicitly included the
    5
    In 2015, the West Virginia Legislature recodified Chapter 49 of the West Virginia
    Code relating to Child Welfare. The grandparent preference, which was originally set forth
    in West Virginia Code § 49-3-1(a), is now codified at § 49-4-114(a)(3). The statutory text
    relevant to the grandparent preference was not changed.
    6
    In re Elizabeth F., 
    225 W. Va. 780
    , 786, 
    696 S.E.2d 296
    , 302 (2010).
    8
    requirement for an analysis by the Department of Health and
    Human Resources and circuit courts of the best interests of the
    child, given all circumstances of the case.[7]
    In short, “[t]he grandparent preference must be considered in conjunction
    with [this Court’s] long standing jurisprudence that ‘the primary goal in cases involving
    abuse and neglect . . . must be the health and welfare of the children.’”8
    In this case, while the circuit court couched its permanency decision in terms
    of the Twins’ best interests, it made plain during the March 2017 review hearing that its
    decision rested in large part on its avowed deference to “blood relatives.”9 The circuit
    court’s deference veers impermissibly close to the erroneous belief that “the grandparent
    preference [is an] absolute directive to place children with their grandparents in all
    circumstances.”10 That belief, by itself, is clear legal error given this Court’s earlier
    7
    Syl. Pts. 4 and 5, Napoleon S. v. Walker, 
    217 W. Va. 254
    , 
    617 S.E.2d 801
     (2005).
    8
    In re Hunter H., 
    227 W. Va. 699
    , 703, 
    715 S.E.2d 397
    , 401 (2011) (quoting Syl.
    Pt. 3, in part, In re Katie S., 
    198 W.Va. 79
    , 
    479 S.E.2d 589
     (1996)).
    9
    We have previously observed that West Virginia law does not grant a permanency
    preference to blood relatives, generally. See Kristopher O. v. Mazzone, 
    227 W. Va. 184
    ,
    193, 
    706 S.E.2d 381
    , 390 (2011). The grandparent preference is the sole exception to that
    rule, and, even then, the preference is tempered by consideration of the child’s best
    interests. 
    Id.
    10
    In re Elizabeth F., 225 W. Va. at 786, 
    696 S.E.2d at 302
    .
    9
    guidance that the preference must be considered in conjunction with the health and welfare
    of the child.11
    Setting aside the circuit court’s erroneous conception of the statutory
    grandparent preference, our review of the entire record in this case leaves the Court with
    the firm conviction that the circuit court mistakenly concluded that the Twins’ best interests
    are served by permanently placing them with their Grandparents. First, as recounted above,
    CPS Worker Starling testified that the Twins’ biological parents live in a house owned by
    the Grandparents, and which is located two doors down from the Grandparents’ own home.
    Starling’s testimony is unrebutted. Not only do the Twins’ biological parents live within
    eyeshot of the Grandparents, they also appear to use the Grandparents’ home as their own.
    They receive official telephone calls there. E.N., the Twins’ biological father, enters the
    Grandparents’ home unannounced. The Twins’ biological parents’ proximity and access
    to the Grandparents’ home renders their permanent placement there untenable.
    This Court has reversed a circuit court’s decision to place minor children
    with their grandparents in similar circumstances to ensure that the children’s best interests
    11
    In re Hunter H., 227 W. Va. at 703, 
    715 S.E.2d at 401
    .
    10
    are served.12 In In re Elizabeth F., this Court reversed the circuit court’s grant of custody
    of four minor children to their maternal grandmother, despite the grandparent preference.
    There, the record revealed that the grandmother had refused to shield the minor children
    from the “negative influences” of her adult children.13 Specifically, the grandmother
    permitted the children’s mother “to live in her home while [the mother] was using and
    abusing drugs”, and the children’s uncle to live in a trailer behind the grandmother’s house
    despite his numerous CPS referrals.14
    Similarly, in In re T.R., this Court refused to place a child with his maternal
    grandparents where the record showed that the grandparents resided in the same “family
    compound” as the child’s mother, whose parental rights to T.R. were previously
    terminated.15 This Court explained,
    Following our review of the record on appeal, we find no
    factual basis for petitioner’s claim that the DHHR failed to
    consider the grandparents as a potential relative placement. It
    is clear from the record on appeal that a DHHR case worker
    visited the grandparents’ home and that the DHHR knew that
    the grandparents and petitioner were a close family who lived
    12
    See In re Elizabeth F., 225 W. Va. at 785–87, 
    696 S.E.2d at
    301–03; see also In
    re T.R., App. No. 15-1235, 
    2016 WL 3165801
    , at *3 (W. Va. June 6, 2016) (memorandum
    decision).
    13
    
    Id.,
     225 W. Va. at 785, 
    696 S.E.2d at 301
    .
    14
    
    Id.
    15
    In re T.R., 
    2016 WL 3165801
     at *2.
    11
    in close proximity to one another. According to the DHHR,
    the grandparents were considered for placement in the
    beginning of the case and ultimately found to be unsuitable.[16]
    Despite hearing Child Protective Services Worker Starling’s testimony on
    this topic, the circuit court not only granted permanency to the Grandparents, but did so
    with no direction to the Grandparents as to the importance of shielding the Twins from
    R.E. and E.N. According to the unrebutted evidence before the circuit court, when parental
    rights are terminated due to drug use, and the biological parent has not attempted
    rehabilitation, as is the case here, “there is no contact to be made between the terminated
    parents and the children.” While DHHR represented at oral argument that it has verbally
    instructed the Grandparents not to permit R.E. and E.N. to access the Twins, it also
    admitted that there is nothing in writing to that effect. Even if there were, R.E. and E.N.’s
    undisputed physical proximity to the Grandparents’ home would make that instruction
    impossible to follow.
    Moreover, the circuit court gave little consideration to the bond developed
    by the Twins with C.G. and K.G., their foster parents, and T.N., their half-brother, during
    the Twins’ first seventeen months of life. C.G. and K.G. solely cared for the Twins from
    their birth in April 2016 to approximately April 26, 2017, the date the circuit court awarded
    permanent placement to the Grandparents. From that date until June 9, 2017, the Twins
    16
    Id. at *3.
    12
    were gradually transitioned to the Grandparents’ home. Thus, C.G. and K.G. were part of
    the Twins’ lives from April 2016 until June 2017.            Also, C.G. and K.G.—not the
    Grandparents—saw the Twins through their hospital stay.
    This Court has previously stressed the importance of the “continuity of
    relationships, surroundings and environmental influence” during a child’s first three years
    of life.17 These early years are truly formative because, “[i]n their simple everyday
    activities, infants and toddlers form the foundations of all later development.”18 Thus, the
    Twins’ best interests require that the bonds they formed with C.G. and K.G. in their first
    seventeen months of life not be short-changed.
    In contrast, the Grandparents had never met the Twins as of April 26, 2017,
    when the circuit court ordered that the Twins should be permanently placed with them.
    DHHR contends that the Grandparents delayed asserting their claim to the Twins until
    DNA testing confirmed that the Twins were, in fact, their son’s children.19 E.N., however,
    17
    See In Interest of Carlita B., 
    185 W. Va. 613
    , 623, 
    408 S.E.2d 365
    , 375 (1991)
    (citing J. Goldstein, A. Freud & J. Solnit, Beyond the Best Interests of the Child 32–33
    (1973)).
    18
    
    Id.
     (citing B. L. White, The First Three Years of Life, preface (1985)).
    19
    At oral argument, counsel for Respondent DHHR represented that M.D. was wary
    of offering to care for the Twins before paternity was established, conclusively, because
    her son, E.N., had previously claimed to be the father of another of R.E.’s children, when,
    in fact, he was not. While we do not doubt counsel’s veracity, we do not find support for
    this representation in this case’s Appendix Record.
    13
    reported to Starling in May 2016—when the Twins were approximately one month old—
    that he was “most likely” their father. Despite their son’s belief that he was the Twins’
    father, the Grandparents waited until at least August 2016 (when the Twins were
    approximately four months old) to make any DHHR employee aware of their interest in
    the Twins, and until March 2017 (when the Twins were approximately eleven months old)
    to attend a hearing in the Twins’ court case. For example, the Grandparents did not appear
    at the November or December 2016 hearings where the circuit court considered, and
    ultimately terminated, E.N. and R.E.’s parental rights, even though it was confirmed in
    September 2016 that E.N. was the Twins’ biological father.
    This “wait and see” approach contrasts starkly with the actions of C.G. and
    K.G., who accepted responsibility for the Twins at their births and obtained intervenor
    status in the Twins’ abuse and neglect proceeding in November 2016.               Had the
    Grandparents wanted to build a relationship with the Twins before April 26, 2017, they
    could have done the same and sought visitation. In Napoleon S., this Court explained that
    it would not fault the petitioning grandparents for failing to develop a relationship with
    their minor grandson because they had intervened in his abuse and neglect proceeding to
    secure visitation.20 Here, the Grandparents never took that first step, and so they are not
    entitled to the same credit.
    20
    Napoleon S., 217 W. Va. at 262, 
    617 S.E.2d at 809
    .
    14
    At first blush, this case presents a near perfect balance between the
    Grandparents (an approved foster home, guardianship of the Twins’ half-sister) and the
    foster parents, C.G. and K.G. (an approved foster home, adoption of the Twins’ half-
    brother). And, were that the only record evidence, then we likely could have found little
    fault with the circuit court’s application of the grandparent preference. However, viewed
    in its entirety, the record in this case establishes that the placement options presented to the
    circuit court were not evenly balanced. The undisputed and glaring facts about the presence
    of the biological parents in and around the home in which the Twins were to be placed, not
    to mention the steadfast opposition of the guardian ad litem, cannot be overlooked in the
    analysis of the best interest of the Twins, which must control. Because those interests are
    best served by permanent placement with C.G. and K.G., not their Grandparents, the Twins
    must be placed permanently with their foster parents.
    We are mindful that this is yet another disruption in the Twins’ young lives.
    However, we simply cannot overlook the physical proximity of the Twins’ biological
    parents to the Grandparents’ home—even after the circuit court placed the Twins there,
    and with no direction to DHHR on this point. As explained above, DHHR’s solution, an
    oral warning to the Grandparents to keep E.N. and R.E. away from the Twins, can hardly
    suffice when E.N. and R.E. live only two doors down the street from the Twins, in a house
    owned by the Grandparents. We also recognize that the foster care system faces an excess
    of children in need of care and a shortage of suitable placements, and we do not mean either
    DHHR or circuit courts to disregard grandparents as a preferred placement option. The
    15
    current systemic overload, however, cannot justify abandoning “the polar star by which
    decisions must be made which affect children”21—their best interests.
    Upon remand, the Circuit Court of McDowell County shall promptly
    convene parties and counsel and conduct a hearing on the most effective means of gradually
    transitioning the Twins from their Grandparents to C.G. and K.G.22 The transition of these
    children should be accomplished in a gradual manner that most effectively serves the best
    interests of the children.23
    21
    In re Hunter H., 231 W. Va. at 123–24, 744 S.E.2d at 233 (citing Michael K.T. v.
    Tina L.T., 
    182 W.Va. 399
    , 405, 
    387 S.E.2d 866
    , 872 (1989)).
    22
    See Syl. Pt. 8, in part, In re Jonathan G., 
    198 W. Va. 716
    , 
    482 S.E.2d 893
     (1996).
    23
    See Kristopher O., 227 W. Va. at 194, 
    706 S.E.2d at 391
     (“[I]t has been long
    understood that the law governing child custody directs that a child’s best interests are
    served by a gradual transition to a new home.”); Syl. Pt. 3, in part, James M. v. Maynard,
    
    185 W. Va. 648
    , 
    408 S.E.2d 400
     (1991) (“It is a traumatic experience for children to
    undergo sudden and dramatic changes . . . . Lower courts in cases such as these should
    provide, whenever possible, for a gradual transition period, especially where young
    children are involved. Further, such gradual transition periods should be developed in a
    manner intended to foster the emotional adjustment of the children to this change and to
    maintain as much stability as possible in their lives.”).
    16
    The circuit court may also consider setting a visitation schedule for the
    Grandparents and the Twins’ half-sister during this hearing, although those visits may not
    occur unsupervised at the Grandparents’ home.24
    IV. CONCLUSION
    The circuit court’s May 1, 2017 order placing custody of K.E. and K.E. with
    their Grandparents is hereby reversed and this case is remanded for entry of an order
    gradually transitioning K.E. and K.E. from their Grandparents to their foster parents, C.G.
    and K.G. The Clerk is directed to issue the mandate contemporaneously herewith.
    Reversed and Remanded with Directions.
    24
    We also caution that “the Grandparent Visitation Act automatically vacates a
    grandparent visitation order after a child is adopted by a non-relative.” Syl. Pt. 3, in part,
    In re Hunter H., 231 W. Va. at 118, 744 S.E.2d at 228.
    17