Randy C. v. Russell Maston, Superintendent ( 2019 )


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  •                              STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    Randy C.,                                                                         FILED
    Petitioner Below, Petitioner                                                 December 20, 2019
    EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
    SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
    vs) No. 18-0102 (Cabell County 14-C-732 and 17-C-643)                              OF WEST VIRGINIA
    Russell Maston, Superintendent,
    St. Marys Correctional Center,
    Respondent Below, Respondent
    MEMORANDUM DECISION
    Petitioner Randy C.,1 pro se, appeals the January 18, 2018, order of the Circuit Court of
    Cabell County dismissing his fifth petition for a writ of habeas corpus challenging his conviction
    for first-degree murder.2 Respondent Russell Maston, Superintendent, St. Marys Correctional
    Center,3 by counsel Julianne Wisman, filed a response in support of the circuit court’s order.
    1
    Because petitioner’s appeal from a denial of a previous habeas petition was treated as
    confidential, we also treat this appeal as confidential due to a need to refer to the prior appeal in
    [Randy] C. v. Mirandy (“Randy C. I”), No. 15-0646, 
    2016 WL 1547302
    (W. Va. Apr. 15, 2016)
    (memorandum decision).
    2
    In its January 18, 2018, order, the Circuit Court of Cabell County further dismissed
    petitioner’s second habeas petition challenging the West Virginia Parole Board’s 2014 denial of
    parole. Petitioner filed his first such petition in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County, which that
    court dismissed by order entered on June 16, 2015. This Court affirmed the June 16, 2015, order
    in Randy C. I. In the instant appeal, petitioner does not assign error to the dismissal of his habeas
    petition challenging the parole board’s 2014 decision. Also, given our affirmation of an earlier
    dismissal of a habeas petition alleging the same grounds for relief, we find issues regarding the
    2014 denial of parole were fully and finally adjudicated in Randy C. I. Therefore, hereinafter, we
    will refer to petitioner as appealing only the dismissal of his fifth petition for a writ of habeas
    corpus challenging his conviction for first-degree murder.
    3
    Since the filing of the appeal in this case, the superintendent at St. Marys Correctional
    Center has changed and the superintendent is now Russell Maston. The Court has made the
    necessary substitution of parties pursuant to Rule 41(c) of the West Virginia Rules of Appellate
    Procedure. Additionally, effective July 1, 2018, the positions formerly designated as “wardens”
    (Continued . . .)
    1
    Petitioner filed a reply.
    The Court has considered the parties’ briefs and the record on appeal. The facts and legal
    arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be significantly aided
    by oral argument. Upon consideration of the standard of review, the briefs, and the record
    presented, the Court finds no substantial question of law and no prejudicial error. For these
    reasons, a memorandum decision affirming the circuit court’s orders is appropriate under Rule
    21 of the Rules of Appellate Procedure.
    The record is sparse.4 However, in Randy C. I, this Court set forth the underlying facts:
    Petitioner arrived in West Virginia on August 25, 1996, after being
    paroled by Illinois on a conviction of armed robbery. On August 26, 1996,
    petitioner’s sister was murdered. On November 4, 1996, petitioner pled guilty to
    the first[-]degree murder of his sister. Consistent with the plea agreement, the
    [Circuit Court of Cabell County] sentenced petitioner to a life term of
    incarceration with the possibility of parole. The circuit court committed petitioner
    to the custody of the West Virginia Division of Corrections (“DOC”). On January
    29, 1997, the DOC compiled a report stating that there was evidence that in
    between strangling his sister and stabbing her to death, “[petitioner] removed his
    sister’s clothing and sexually assaulted her.”[5]
    
    2016 WL 1547302
    , at *1. (Footnote added).
    Petitioner has filed five petitions for a writ of habeas corpus in the circuit court
    challenging his first-degree murder conviction. In the first habeas proceeding, the circuit court
    appointed petitioner habeas counsel and held an omnibus hearing on May 24, 2006, at which
    petitioner’s trial counsel testified. By order entered on June 15, 2006, the circuit court denied
    petitioner’s first habeas petition, finding: (1) trial counsel provided credible testimony; (2) trial
    counsel testified that he discussed petitioner’s rights with petitioner and that he was satisfied
    are now designated “superintendents.” See W. Va. Code § 15A-5-3.
    4
    Petitioner requested the production of a June 4, 2015, hearing transcript from his fourth
    habeas proceeding. This Court granted the request by scheduling order entered on February 15,
    2018, and the transcript was filed on April 25, 2018. On February 27, 2018, petitioner filed a
    motion to supplement the record with an appendix. By order entered on June 19, 2018, we
    refused petitioner’s motion due to his failure to “certify that the documents . . . petitioner wishes
    to supplement the record with are part of the circuit court record” as required by Rule 7(c)(2)(a)
    of the Rules of Appellate Procedure. Accordingly, the appellate record consists only of the June
    4, 2015, hearing transcript from the prior habeas proceeding and the circuit court’s January 18,
    2018, order from the instant case.
    5
    We take judicial notice of the record in Randy C. I.
    2
    petitioner understood his rights; (3) trial counsel conducted a reasonable investigation in that he
    was present at petitioner’s preliminary hearing, talked to the investigating officer, was granted a
    full review of the evidence that the State intended to produce, and was given further information
    about what the State would prove at the time of the plea agreement; (4) the court did nothing to
    hurry petitioner into agreeing to the plea “as it was [petitioner]’s wish that the case be disposed
    of as soon as possible[,] and there is no evidence alleged or proven which would show the [c]ourt
    was prejudiced against [petitioner] because of his HIV status”; and (5) at the November 4, 1996,
    plea hearing, petitioner gave a factual history of how he came to West Virginia to kill his sister
    and “at no time, did he indicate that he was innocent, had a defense[,] or was dissatisfied with his
    [trial] counsel.” Petitioner appealed the circuit court’s June 15, 2006, order, which this Court
    refused on July 9, 2007.6
    Petitioner filed a second habeas petition in 2006, and the circuit court dismissed that
    petition by order entered on November 20, 2006. Petitioner did not appeal the November 20,
    2006, order. In 2010, petitioner filed a third habeas petition, and the circuit court dismissed that
    petition by order entered on January 28, 2010. Petitioner appealed the circuit court’s January 28,
    2010, order, which this Court refused on June 22, 2010.7
    In petitioner’s fourth habeas proceeding, the circuit court held a hearing on June 4, 2015.
    The circuit court heard petitioner’s testimony and confirmed that he had a previous and full
    opportunity to raise any habeas grounds he wished to:
    THE COURT: . . . The standard I have to apply today is what, if any, new
    grounds or new information [have] not been previously adjudicated by [the circuit
    court] in various earlier cases that [it] had considered. I guess [habeas counsel]
    filed a habeas [petition] at some point for you. Is that the one you had the hearing
    in? Did you come to this courthouse at some point and have a hearing similar to
    this?
    [Petitioner]: Yes, sir.
    THE COURT: And[,] that you then argue[d] that you had ineffective assistance
    from [trial counsel]?
    [Petitioner]: Yes, that’s true.
    THE COURT: And[,] did you argue that you involuntarily pled guilty?
    [Petitioner]: Yes
    6
    We take judicial notice of the record in Supreme Court No. 063143.
    7
    We take judicial notice of the record in Supreme Court No. 100444.
    3
    THE COURT: And[,] that you were not mentally competent to plead guilty at that
    time?
    [Petitioner]: Yes, sir.
    By order entered on July 16, 2015, the circuit court denied petitioner’s fourth habeas petition.
    Petitioner did not appeal the July 16, 2015 order.
    On November 17, 2017, petitioner filed his fifth habeas petition alleging ineffective
    assistance of trial counsel and an involuntary guilty plea. By order entered on January 18, 2018,
    the circuit court dismissed the habeas petition, finding:
    Petitioner has had numerous previous [h]abeas [c]orpus proceedings[,] including
    an omnibus hearing. Accordingly, [the doctrine of] res judicata applies to all
    matters raised . . . or which with reasonable diligence could have been known.
    Petitioner has not raised any of the narrow exceptions[,] which may allow for a
    [subsequent] [h]abeas [c]orpus proceeding[,] and this [p]etition may be properly
    dismissed without appointment of counsel or [an] omnibus hearing.
    (Emphasis omitted). Petitioner now appeals the circuit court’s January 18, 2018, order.
    In Syllabus Point 1 of Anstey v. Ballard, 
    237 W. Va. 411
    , 
    787 S.E.2d 864
    (2016), we held:
    “In reviewing challenges to the findings and conclusions of the circuit
    court in a habeas corpus action, we apply a three-prong standard of review. We
    review the final order and the ultimate disposition under an abuse of discretion
    standard; the underlying factual findings under a clearly erroneous standard; and
    questions of law are subject to a de novo review.” Syl. Pt. 1, Mathena v. Haines,
    
    219 W. Va. 417
    , 
    633 S.E.2d 771
    (2006).
    In Syllabus Point 4 of Losh v. McKenzie, 
    166 W. Va. 762
    , 
    277 S.E.2d 606
    (1981), we held:
    A prior omnibus habeas corpus hearing is res judicata as to all matters
    raised and as to all matters known or which with reasonable diligence could have
    been known; however, an applicant may still petition the court on the following
    grounds: ineffective assistance of counsel at the omnibus habeas corpus hearing;
    newly discovered evidence; or, a change in the law, favorable to the applicant,
    which may be applied retroactively.
    On appeal, petitioner raises for the first time newly discovered evidence and several other
    issues that the appellate record fails to show petitioner raised before the circuit court. Rule
    10(c)(7) of the Rules of Appellate Procedure provides, in pertinent part: “[Petitioner’s] argument
    must contain appropriate and specific citations to the record on appeal, including citations that
    pinpoint when and how the issues in the assignments of error were presented to the lower
    tribunal. The Court may disregard errors that are not adequately supported by specific references
    4
    to the record on appeal.” Therefore, we disregard those arguments that petitioner cannot show he
    presented to the circuit court. See State v. Honaker, 
    193 W. Va. 51
    , 56 n.4, 
    454 S.E.2d 96
    , 101
    n.4 (1994) (stating that issues based on a “missing record” will be ignored).
    Respondent argues that ineffective assistance of trial counsel and an involuntary guilty
    plea constitute issues that were fully and finally adjudicated in a prior habeas proceeding. We
    agree. Here, petitioner previously testified that he raised each of those issues at the May 24,
    2006, omnibus hearing in the first habeas proceeding. Therefore, based upon our review of the
    record, we concur with the circuit court’s finding that the doctrine of res judicata barred
    petitioner from raising those issues in a successive habeas petition. See Call v. McKenzie, 159 W.
    Va. 191, 194, 
    220 S.E.2d 665
    , 669 (1975) (finding that post-conviction litigation must end at
    some point because, “[w]hile a defendant is entitled to due process of law, he is not entitled to
    appeal upon appeal, attack upon attack, and habeas corpus upon habeas corpus”). Accordingly,
    we conclude that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing petitioner’s fifth
    habeas petition.
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the circuit court’s January 18, 2018, order
    dismissing petitioner’s fifth petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
    Affirmed.
    ISSUED: December 20, 2019
    CONCURRED IN BY:
    Chief Justice Elizabeth D. Walker
    Justice Margaret L. Workman
    Justice Tim Armstead
    Justice Evan H. Jenkins
    Justice John A. Hutchison
    5
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 18-0102

Filed Date: 12/20/2019

Precedential Status: Precedential

Modified Date: 12/20/2019